Leonid Kvasnikov and the atomic bomb. An excerpt characterizing Kvasnikov, Leonid Romanovich

Kvasnikov, Leonid Romanovich
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Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov (June 2, 1905 - October 15, 1993) - head of the scientific and technical intelligence department, one of the initiators of the start of foreign intelligence work on nuclear issues, Hero of Russia (1996).

Biography

Born in the Tula province (Uzlovaya station), he worked in construction from the age of 17. In 1926 he graduated from the vocational school of the People's Commissariat of Railways and worked first as an assistant driver and then as a locomotive driver.

In 1934 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of Chemical Engineering. After graduation, he worked as an engineer at a chemical plant in the city of Dzerzhinsk.

In 1938 he was mobilized to serve in state security agencies. A year later he becomes head of the scientific and technical intelligence department.

He was one of the initiators of the start of foreign intelligence work on nuclear issues.

In 1943 he was sent to New York as deputy resident for scientific and technical intelligence. During his work in New York, the most important materials on the use of atomic energy for military purposes were obtained, as well as information and samples of equipment on aviation, chemistry, and medicine.

After the war, he returned to Moscow and was appointed deputy head of the scientific and technical intelligence department, and in 1947 he headed this department, which he headed until his resignation in 1966.

Awards

On June 15, 1996, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, L. R. Kvasnikov was (posthumously) awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for the successful completion of special tasks to ensure state security in conditions involving a risk to life, and for the heroism and courage displayed.
For the successful organization of scientific and technical intelligence work, he was awarded the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Patriotic War 2nd degree, three Orders of the Red Star and medals of the USSR.
He was also an Honorary Foreign Intelligence Officer.

24.08.2012
Leonid Kvasnikov and the atomic bomb

Photo by Vyacheslav Safronov
svetsky.com›istoriia/leonid-kvasnikov

In the early 20s of the last century, scientists around the world made many discoveries in the field of studying radioactive elements. On the eve of World War II, some European scientists came to the conclusion that the fission reaction of uranium nuclei could be used to produce weapons of unprecedented destructive power. Experiments in this area were actively conducted, in particular, in Nazi Germany. Hungarian nuclear scientist Leo Szilard, who fled to the United States to escape Nazi persecution, convinced Albert Einstein, who lived there, to send a letter to American President Franklin Roosevelt. In his letter, the great physicist warned about the danger of deadly weapons appearing in Germany.

By order of the President, all references to work in the field of nuclear energy disappeared from the pages of the American scientific press. This circumstance was brought to the attention of a young employee of Soviet scientific and technical intelligence, Leonid Kvasnikov.

The life path of Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov began in such a way that he could become a teacher, scientist, and major engineer in industry. But he was destined for something else - to play an exceptional role in the history of the formation and development of the scientific and technical direction of the foreign intelligence activities of the Soviet Union, to lead the intelligence officers who obtained top-secret materials for our country under the American atomic program. And the words of Igor Kurchatov that “Soviet intelligence provided invaluable assistance in the creation of Soviet nuclear weapons” can be attributed directly to Leonid Romanovich.

AT THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

In 1939–1940, Kvasnikov was a member of the Soviet-German Checkpoint Commission. He repeatedly went on business trips through this commission to Germany and the German occupation zone of former Poland to carry out reconnaissance missions. In February 1941, he was appointed head of the scientific and technical intelligence department.

Due to the nature of his activity, Leonid Romanovich did not break ties with science and closely followed the emergence of new scientific achievements. He also did not ignore the discovery in 1939 of the chain reaction of fission of uranium-235 atoms, leading to the creation of an atomic explosive and weapons using it. During the same period, he drew attention to the fact that the names of prominent scientists and any mention of their work in the field of nuclear physics and atomic energy completely disappeared from the pages of American scientific journals. Other alarming points also emerged. In particular, the foreign intelligence of the USSR state security agencies learned that work was underway in Germany to create a “superbomb” using the energy of atomic fission.

Somewhat later, the Center learned that on October 11, 1939, German nuclear physicist Albert Einstein, who emigrated to the United States, sent a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt in which he pointed out the possibility of Hitler developing new superbombs based on atomic energy, which would have enormous destructive power.
Roosevelt immediately instructed his adjutant Watson to contact interested American departments and scientific institutions to study the scientist’s letter, which at first seemed fantastic to him. The conclusion of the experts was streamlined: the creation of such weapons is possible in principle, but at a later time.

Roosevelt decides to create a Uranium Advisory Committee to deal with this problem. The American president informed British Prime Minister Winston Churchill about his decision. By mutual agreement, Churchill and Roosevelt instructed their intelligence services to study the possibility of “disrupting the efforts of Nazi scientists through secret war methods and at the same time ensuring that England and the United States have priority in the development of the atomic bomb.” Both leaders decided to coordinate efforts to create new weapons and exchange information and scientists in this field.

It should be noted that the problem of splitting the atomic nucleus and obtaining a new source of energy was also of interest to Soviet scientists who conducted relevant research. Thus, in 1934, Soviet scientist Nikolai Semenov created a general quantitative theory of chain reactions, for which he was later awarded the Nobel Prize. His ideas in relation to the fission of uranium-235 atoms were used in 1940 by Leningrad physicists Yakov Zeldovich and Yuli Khariton. At the same time, few people believed in the likelihood of creating an atomic bomb in the USSR in those years. In addition, back in 1936, at a session of the USSR Academy of Sciences, employees of the Physico-Technical Institute in Leningrad were sharply criticized for the fact that their research in the field of nuclear physics allegedly “has no practical prospects.”

Of course, the young head of Soviet scientific and technical intelligence knew about this. Nevertheless, shortly before the treacherous attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, Leonid Kvasnikov initiated the sending of a letter of orientation to a number of foreign intelligence residencies, including London, New York, Berlin, Stockholm and Tokyo, providing for penetration into leading centers of nuclear research and obtaining information about the work of major nuclear physicists. At the same time, the document contained instructions to begin obtaining information about possible work in the West to create atomic weapons.

This problem was new, unknown to Soviet intelligence officers working abroad. However, the very first results confirmed: Kvasnikov gave a very accurate orientation. Already in September 1941, the London station of the NKVD reported that the idea of creating a “uranium bomb” was taking on real shape in England. Documentary information was received from one of its agents that the British government was seriously considering the issue of creating a bomb of great destructive power.

This information was contained in the report of the Uranium Committee dated September 16, 1941, intended for British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The document spoke about the beginning of work on the creation of an atomic bomb in the UK and the USA, about its proposed design and about the transfer of the center of gravity of research and production to the USA in connection with the military situation in Europe.

According to information from the London station, the Uranium Committee received the code name “Tube-Elloys Directorate”. The scientific work of British physicists in the field of atomic energy was led by a special group of scientists led by the famous physicist George Thomson.

The data obtained by Soviet intelligence in London was sent for examination to the 4th Special Department of Operational Equipment of the NKVD, which had its own research center and corresponding production base. Despite the difficult military situation, they were extremely promptly reviewed and assessed by employees of the 4th Special Department. Already on October 10, 1941, his boss Kravchenko reported to Beria: “The materials are of absolute interest as evidence of the great work being done in England in the field of using uranium atomic energy for military purposes.”

In turn, the New York residency of the NKVD, in response to Kvasnikov’s request, sent a telegram to Moscow on November 24, 1941, which stated that, according to information it had, there were American scientists in London who were working on an explosive substance they had invented with enormous destructive power. strength.
The cable noted that they were studying the possibilities of regulating the strength of this explosive. Checking the received message through the capabilities of the London residency showed that American professors Urey, Bragg and Fowler were indeed in London to familiarize themselves with the progress of work in England on the creation of an atomic bomb and determine the prospects for concluding an agreement with English scientists on joint work in the field of atomic research in the future.

At the end of 1941, information came from London that the United States and Great Britain had decided to coordinate their efforts in atomic energy work.
Later, information was received that on June 20, 1942, during negotiations in Washington, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to build nuclear facilities in the United States, since England was subjected to constant air raids by German aircraft. In the operational correspondence of Soviet intelligence, the project to create atomic weapons in the USA and England received the code name “Enormoz”. The Americans called the work on the atomic bomb the “Manhattan Project”.

Based on information received from the London residency of the NKVD regarding the Enormoz project and the conclusion of the 4th special department of operational equipment of the NKVD dated October 10, 1941, the scientific and technical intelligence unit headed by Kvasnikov prepared in March 1942, signed by People's Commissar Beria, a special message for Stalin “On intensive research work being carried out in England, the USA, Germany and France to create an atomic bomb.” The document stated, in particular:

“In order to obtain a new source of energy in a number of capitalist countries, in connection with the ongoing work on fission of the atomic nucleus, a study began on the use of atomic energy from uranium for military purposes.

Based on the importance and relevance of the problem of the practical use of atomic energy of uranium-235 for military purposes in the Soviet Union, it would be advisable:

1. To study the issue of creating a scientific advisory body under the State Defense Committee of the USSR from authoritative persons to coordinate, study and direct the work of all scientists and research organizations of the USSR dealing with the issue of uranium atomic energy.

2. To ensure secret familiarization with the materials of the NKVD of the USSR on uranium to prominent specialists in order to assess and appropriately use these materials.

Note. The issues of fission of the atomic nucleus in the USSR were dealt with by: Academician Kapitsa - at the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician Skobeltsyn - at the Leningrad Physical Institute, Professor Slutskin - at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology and others.”

However, Beria, who received this document, did not sign it and did not report it to Stalin. Only on October 6, 1942, under No. 1720/B, the document was sent to the State Defense Committee. This happened after, at a meeting held with the chairman of the GKO on September 28 with the participation of Soviet scientists Ioffe, Semenov and Kapitsa, Stalin said that the Soviet Union also needed to work on the creation of atomic weapons. At the same meeting, the GKO resolution No. 2352 “On the organization of work on uranium” was adopted, signed by Stalin. It obliged the USSR Academy of Sciences, represented by Ioffe, to resume work on atomic energy research and submit to the State Defense Committee before April 1, 1943 a report on the possibility of creating atomic weapons or uranium fuel.

In the same year, the proposal of scientific and technical intelligence to create a special body to coordinate our scientific forces in this area was supported. As a result, by decision of the Soviet government, the so-called Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created, which was entrusted with dealing with issues of atomic energy, and primarily with the creation of atomic weapons. The laboratory was headed by Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov, with whom foreign intelligence subsequently collaborated closely for many years. All information received by intelligence on this issue was sent to him personally without delay.

BUSINESS TRIP TO THE USA

At the end of 1942, the intelligence leadership decided to send Leonid Kvasnikov on a business trip to the United States. He was tasked with organizing the acquisition of information about atomic weapons. At the same time, Kvasnikov was supposed to head the scientific and technical intelligence residency in New York. In mid-January 1943, he left for a new place of work.

In November 1943, the chief resident of foreign intelligence in New York, Vasily Zarubin, received a telegram from the Center, which reported that a group of leading English scientists had left for the United States to work on Enormoz. The message said that among them was the famous physicist, German political emigrant, member of the German Communist Party Klaus Fuchs. He had previously done research in the field of fast neutrons at the University of Birmingham and was recruited by the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Red Army General Staff, and then transferred to the NKVD foreign intelligence service. By that time, the State Defense Committee had made a decision according to which military intelligence was to concentrate all its efforts on obtaining information regarding the military-political plans of Nazi Germany and not to divert its forces and resources to scientific and technical issues, which became the exclusive prerogative of scientific and technical intelligence of state bodies. security. Kvasnikov’s residency had to establish contact with Fuchs and maintain it during his stay in the United States.

Fuchs arrived in the United States in December 1943. By this time, installation of equipment had already begun in Los Alamos and recruitment was in full swing. By decision of the Center, a liaison agent from the New York station was assigned to maintain contact with Fuchs. In early February 1944, he established contact with Fuchs and began to receive from him secret information about the progress of construction of the plant in Oak Ridge, as well as secret materials from a delegation of British scientists.

Thanks to the efforts of Kvasnikov and his colleagues, scientific and technical intelligence information from state security agencies began to play an important role in the practical activities of Laboratory No. 2, headed by Kurchatov. He, in particular, noted that the information obtained by intelligence “forces us to reconsider our views on many issues and establish three new directions in work for Soviet physics.”

Kurchatov emphasized that the information received by intelligence “creates the technical capabilities of solving this entire problem in a much shorter time.”
The main task of Enormoz intelligence at that time was to inform Soviet scientists about the real results of work ongoing in the United States to create atomic weapons. And this task was successfully solved largely thanks to Kvasnikov and the staff of his station, who actively worked with the sources they had in touch and, first of all, with Klaus Fuchs.

From the spring of 1944 to January 1945, Klaus Fuchs worked directly at the secret American nuclear research center in Los Alamos, where 45 thousand civilians and several thousand military personnel worked. Twelve Nobel Prize laureates in physics from the USA and European countries were involved in the creation of the first atomic bomb at this center. But even against their background, Klaus Fuchs stood out for his knowledge; he was entrusted with solving the most important physical and mathematical problems.

In early June 1945, another meeting took place with Klaus Fuchs. Detailed documentary information on the structure of the atomic bomb was received from the agent. He informed Soviet intelligence that the first American atomic bomb would be tested in July 1945. This information was extremely important, and the station immediately reported it to the Center, which sent it as a special message to Stalin. And when a nuclear explosion was carried out near Alamagordo (New Mexico) on July 16, this event did not take the Soviet government by surprise.

On August 6 and 9, 1945, American aircraft dropped two atomic bombs, “Little Boy” and “Fat Man,” on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moscow realized that this warning was addressed primarily to the Soviet Union, and from this they concluded that it was necessary to speed up work on creating its own atomic weapons.

The head of foreign intelligence, Pavel Fitin, wrote in a report addressed to the People's Commissar of State Security Vsevolod Merkulov: “The practical use of the atomic bomb by the Americans... opens a new era in science and technology and will undoubtedly entail the rapid development of the entire Enormoz problem...

All this puts Enormoz in a leading position in our intelligence work and requires immediate measures to strengthen technical intelligence.”

In September 1945, Klaus Fuchs went to another meeting. In addition to the technical data on testing the atomic bomb, he handed over to the Center a copy of the memorandum of the Los Alamos Scientists Association to the American administration. Speaking with alarm about atomic weapons as a “super-destructive means of warfare,” scientists insisted on the need to create an international organization to control the use of atomic energy and proposed to familiarize other countries with the secrets of its production. They emphasized that in a few years other countries would be able to produce atomic weapons, and competition in this field would produce the most disastrous results. However, Truman, who replaced Roosevelt as US President in April 1945, was not going to share atomic secrets with anyone. In addition, he did not really trust the words of scientists that other countries would be able to create atomic weapons in a few years: the Soviet Union lay in ruins, and no one overseas even imagined that in four years the US monopoly in this area would end.

In addition to working on the Enormoz project, Kvasnikov in New York was also involved in organizing the receipt of scientific and military-technical information. From the NTR residency, the Center received a large volume of secret documentary information and samples of equipment on aviation, radar, chemistry, and medicine, which were of significant interest to the domestic industry working at the front.

AGAIN IN MOSCOW

At the end of 1945, Kvasnikov’s business trip to the USA ended. In November, he sailed home on the American steamer Nathan Towson. Returning to Moscow in December 1945, Kvasnikov continued to work in the central intelligence apparatus.

From 1948 to 1963, Leonid Romanovich was the head of the scientific and technical intelligence department, which was later transformed into a department. In this position, his brilliant organizational skills were widely demonstrated. Under the leadership of Kvasnikov, scientific and technical intelligence achieved serious success in solving the problems it faced. When implementing intelligence information, he maintained close contacts with our most prominent nuclear scientists, including Kurchatov, as well as with ministers and heads of industrial enterprises.

After testing the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, a large group of its creators were awarded state awards. The list of awardees included six intelligence officers who worked abroad in the area of scientific and technical intelligence. Kvasnikov received the Order of Lenin.

When Kvasnikov worked as the head of the scientific and technological revolution, in the first years he had to spend a lot of effort and energy to fight off the incompetent instructions of Lavrentiy Beria. The People's Commissar, for example, demanded that he provide complete lists of agents through the NTR, indicating names and addresses, which is strictly prohibited by intelligence laws. Leonid Romanovich sabotaged the implementation of this ridiculous instruction in every possible way, as if he did not understand what was going on. In response, the vindictive Beria ordered the NTR apparatus to be reduced by half, and then this half was reduced by another 50 percent.

The workers dismissed by Beria, however, received their salaries according to a separate list, and not in the cash register. As a result, by the time Beria was removed from power, Kvasnikov managed to retain 70 percent of scientific and technical intelligence officers. He was aware that dispersing the scientific and technological revolution cadres, which consisted of highly qualified specialists, was not a difficult task, but restoring its intelligence potential would require many years and significant funds.

From 1963 to 1966, Kvasnikov worked as a senior consultant to the head of the KGB PGU (foreign intelligence) for scientific and technical intelligence. In December 1966 he retired.

In addition to the Order of Lenin, honorary state security officer Colonel Kvasnikov was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of the Patriotic War of the 1st and 2nd degrees, two Orders of the Red Star, many medals, as well as the badge “For Service in Intelligence.”

For the successful completion of special tasks to ensure state security in conditions involving a risk to life, displaying heroism and courage, by decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 15, 1996, Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia.

Nvo.ng.ru›Special services›…/14_kvasnikov.html

LEONID ROMANOVICH KVASNIKOV lived a bright, relatively long life (88 years).

The purpose of this article is to find out the reason for his death using the FULL NAME code.

Watch "Logicology - about the fate of man" in advance.

Let's look at the FULL NAME code tables. \If there is a shift in numbers and letters on your screen, adjust the image scale\.

11 14 15 33 47 57 68 83 86 98 104 119 133 143 148 165 180 193 194 208 223 226 236 260
K V A S N I K O V L E O N I D R O M A N O V ICH
260 249 246 245 227 213 203 192 177 174 162 156 141 127 117 112 95 80 67 66 52 37 34 24

12 18 33 47 57 62 79 94 107 108 122 137 140 150 174 185 188 189 207 221 231 242 257 260
L E O N I D R O M A N O VI C H K V A S N I K O V
260 248 242 227 213 203 198 181 166 153 152 138 123 120 110 86 75 72 71 53 39 29 18 3

KVASNIKOV LEONID ROMANOVICH = 260 = DEATH FROM A HEART ATTACK.

260 = 62-CARE + 198-LIFE FROM HEART ATTACK.

260 = 166-DEPARTURE FROM... + 94-INFARCTION.

166 - 94 = 72 = MYOCARDIUM.

Code DATE OF DEPARTURE: 10/15/1993. This = 15 + 10 + 19 + 93 = 137 = LIFE IS ENDED.

Let's look at the columns:

137 = LIFE IS PERFECT\
_____________________________
138 = LIFE IS BEAUTIFUL\

185 = LIFE TERMINATED
________________________________________
86 = LIFE P\ terminated\ = DIES

86 = LIFE P\ terminated\
____________________________
177 = ...LIFE IS ENDED

177 - 86 = 91 = DYING.

260 = 137 + 123-CATastrophe.

279 = INFARCTION-93 x 3.

Code of the full DATE OF DEATH = 279-FIFTEENTH OF OCTOBER + 112-\ 19 + 93 \- (code of the YEAR OF DEATH) = 391.

391 = 279-FIFTEENTH OF OCTOBER + 112-DEAD.

279 - 112 = 167 = CARDIAC STOP.

391 - 260-(FULL NAME code) = 131 = FATAL\outcome\.

Code for the number of full YEARS OF LIFE = 164-EIGHTY + 84-EIGHT = 248.

248 = END OF LIFE FROM HEART ATTACK.

Let's look at the column in the second table:

18 = IN...
______________________________
248 = EIGHTY EIGHT

248 - 18 = 230 = 167-HEART STOP + 63-INFAR\CT\.

260 = 167-HEART STOP + 93-INFARCTION.

Dedicated to the memory of the intelligence officers involved in the creation of the domestic nuclear missile shield.

From the author

In the mid-90s, the constellation of Heroes of the Fatherland was replenished with six names. This was an echo from the secret front of the Great Patriotic War and from the Cold War.

In 1995 and 1996, by Decree of the Russian President, the title of Hero of Russia was awarded to intelligence officers Leonid Kvasnikov, Vladimir Barkovsky, Alexander Feklisov, Anatoly Yatskov and internationalist special agents Maurice and Leonid Cohen.

The life path of the legendary four scouts is amazing, and the intelligence journey is unique. They penetrated the wall of secrecy erected by American intelligence agencies around the atomic bomb facilities in the United States. Their feat lies in the main thing - preventing the threat of a nuclear attack on Soviet Russia in order to eliminate Russian statehood, attempts of which the West has not stopped for a thousand years.

In the 80s, the first book about the “atomic” affairs of Soviet state security during the war years appeared from the pen of atomic intelligence officer Alexander Feklisov. But the description of the work of his three colleagues - ideologist and strategist of atomic intelligence Leonid Kvasnikov, historiographer of scientific and technical intelligence Vladimir Barkovsky and educator of young intelligence officers Anatoly Yatskov in the form of separate manuscripts was begun only in the new century.

And when the manuscript about the operational, social and life path of Vladimir Barkovsky was published (2015), the author was faced with a fact: many interesting information about Leonid Kvasnikov, the largest intelligence officer-scientist, and his colleague Anatoly Yatskov, an intelligence officer with brilliant operational experience, as well as about others colleagues in the scientific and technical direction of intelligence, remained on the pages and in the records of archival material - “Barkovsky’s legacy.”

The author could not (and did not dare) keep silent about these two heroes also because they were his mentors in operational matters in the 60s, and in the 70s-80s Anatoly Yatskov, head of the scientific and technological revolution department, and Vladimir Barkovsky, professor Institute of Intelligence, became the author’s colleagues at work in the “personnel forge” for many years.

Why did the author take on such a great responsibility and such an honorable mission to prepare a triad of manuscripts about intelligence officers of the scientific and technical direction in the work of domestic state security? And what about such unique personalities, with their amazing destinies?

In addition to the great desire to work on their vivid biographies, several more reasons appeared. One of them is that the author was a colleague of Kvasnikov (he hired him at NTR in the late 50s), and Barkovsky and Yatskov (with breaks in the 70s-90s).

Another reason has already been mentioned - “Barkovsky’s legacy.” The archive stimulated interest in these remarkable personalities, because it contained not only open publications, but also notes in the margins, some unpublished pages and notes-reasonings...

And there was a third, and apparently not the least, reason: a great desire and grateful desire to “talk” about remarkable individuals and senior colleagues who played a significant role in the operational fate and life of the author.

So it happened that the appearance of the “Barkovsky legacy” in the author’s field of view prompted him to work on the biographies of three outstanding personalities of civil and professional intensity.

The amazing destinies and unique professional successes of Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov, Vladimir Borisovich Barkovsky and Anatoly Antonovich Yatskov quickly captivated the author for hours and days, months and even more than one year...

The author, for fear of seeming immodest, would still like to admit one more reason for the unbridled craving for pen and paper when it comes to the fate of these brilliant professionals with unique operational experience. This could only happen when the author was filled with all his soul with reverence for the patriotic feat of Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov and Anatoly Antonovich Yatskov.

Their deeds for the sake of the Fatherland will be perceived by more than one generation of people as the light of the star of the feat they accomplished!

Preface
Scout Seer

One hundred and ten years have passed since the birth and twenty-five years are approaching since the death of a unique personality in the affairs of scientific and technical intelligence and the entire state security system - Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov.

His life path from his youth was connected with technology: railway vocational school, locomotive driver, technical university student, innovator engineer, graduate student... These are the milestones of his first third of life; then a quarter of a century in intelligence, its extremely specific direction - scientific and technical.

Having arrived within the walls of the NTR, Leonid Romanovich began to lead a team of intelligence officers of four people on the eve of the war, dozens during the war years, in the Center and abroad, and many dozens during the Cold War.

Leonid Romanovich was and is still being talked about as a talented organizer of the work of this multifaceted area of state security intelligence. In intelligence matters, he was rightfully characterized by such characteristic features as a “visionary” and an “ideologist-strategist.” And his “brainchild” - NTR - is regarded by experts in our country and abroad as the most effective in the “global intelligence community” in penetrating “beyond the wall of secrecy” of the West.

The following is rightly considered to be the most accurate in assessing his personality as an intelligence officer-scientist: “A man with an engineering background, deep knowledge of physics and rare insight.”

Leonid Romanovich had a professional intuition, who helped him through knowledge situation foresee situation and preempt its complications with specific actions. This was the case with the “military atom”, with “ideological backwardness in cybernetics”, with participation in the creation of a nuclear missile shield and in work in the interests of space programs...

Leonid Romanovich's spiritual attitude was a deep awareness of the role of the individual in life, based on a moral position - duty to the Fatherland.

Leonid Romanovich possessed very important business and personal qualities at the time of his transition from engineer to graduate student and then to intelligence officer-scientist: intuition and excellent analytical skills. He was able to direct them to the implementation of his own principle - the priority of scientific knowledge in practical activities. And then his motto became: expediency is the force that turns possibility into reality. That's all? But from this concept, elevated to a principle, NTR grew - “the house that Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov built”! And this is the long-term integration of its large-scale structure in times of rapidly changing state security agencies: in the NKGB-NKVD-MFA system and, finally, during the “quiet” fifteen years as part of the KGB, however, during the “Cold War” with its economic aspect.

* * *

The following lines are all about him as a Citizen, Scientist, Officer and Professional, and in three guises: in intelligence affairs in general, in his own affairs of scientific and technological revolution and in its manifestations with atomic issues:

? “war in peace” and “it cannot be dealt with by disarmament”; “The Union has captured key elements of the defense of the free world”;

? “during the war years, with the help of scientific and technological revolution, the potential of our armed forces was laid”, “scientific and technological revolution... in the needs of ensuring national security”, “they created such a base and such a personnel basis for solving problems of an amazing nature...”;

? “...there is a possibility of creating atomic weapons”, “it was about ending the American monopoly on the atomic bomb”, “the production time for the first atomic bomb was significantly reduced”, “if we were late... we would have tested this charge on ourselves”, “without atomic bomb, we would be a minor power..."

* * *

The fate of Leonid Romanovich, an intelligence officer and scientist, is very unusual: he received early military ranks and twice the rank of “colonel” (in state security and regular, military, after the formation of the KGB); he was awarded orders twice in one year; he was included in two lists - both for encouragement and for transfer to ... bunks, depending on the success or failure in testing the first domestic atomic bomb.

After “success”, he was awarded the Order of Lenin among five of his colleagues in “atomic affairs.” In total, he had seven orders during his twenty-five years of leading the NTR. However, after an undeserved and premature resignation, to the detriment of the business, Leonid Romanovich’s colleagues “pushed” for him a personal pension.

His portrait is placed on a modest stand “NTR and Atomic Intelligence” in the foreign intelligence history room at its headquarters in Yasenevo. And there his name is included in the book “Honorary State Security Officers.”

In the hero’s homeland, in the local history museum, a wide exhibition is presented about the life and reconnaissance feat of the legendary fellow countryman. At the school where the future Hero of Russia studied, a memorial plaque was installed: “The school is named after the Hero of the Russian Federation, the legendary employee of the Foreign Intelligence Service Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov 06/2/1905 – 10/15/1993.”

Leonid Romanovich is revered among his like-minded people and followers in the Titan Club of the Association of Veterans of Foreign Intelligence, this wonderful public organization with its many-sided assistance to veterans in their daily lives. However, only in 2016 there was talk about the well-deserved transfer of the ashes of the Hero of Russia Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov to the Alley of Heroes of the Troekurovsky cemetery. In the meantime, the Hero’s urn “huddles” in the same cell with the urns of his two relatives...

...It was precisely such individuals that Napoleon spoke about: "Brilliant people – these are meteorites destined to burn to illuminate their age!”

Leonid Romanovich not only brightly “illuminated” his participation in the affairs of scientific and technical intelligence, but also left us, all the people of Soviet and present-day Russia, a cloudless sky, albeit with nuclear missile cover for many decades and, God willing, for centuries...

* * *

This manuscript is not so much a biography of Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov, but also a “biography” of NTR under his leadership and the fate of his bright like-minded people, warmly called “Kvasnikov’s guardsmen.”

This includes the complex relationship between the leadership of intelligence and state security with the government and the scientific world at the beginning of the “era of atom and cybernetics”, in the post-war period and in “capitalized” Russia. And of course, “moments of truth”, when the actions and correctness of the intelligence service led by Leonid Romanovich in the interests of the Fatherland were recognized and assessed according to their merits.

Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov... A bright personality, a bright life for the sake of the Fatherland, a bright memory in the souls of his colleagues and fellow citizens about his senior comrade - SCOUT-SCAINER!

The Tula Land is rich in significant personalities for the Fatherland since the time of the Battle of Kulikovo and the formation of princely Rus', tsarist, imperial and Soviet Russia.

On the Central Russian Upland, a galaxy of talented people of culture and labor, military leaders were born, grew up and showed themselves... And here, near the famous “forge of the defense of the might of the Fatherland,” at the very beginning of the century Leonid Kvasnikov was born.

Leonid Romanovich was born on June 2, 1905 in the family of a railway worker, who at that time lived at the small Uzlovaya station near Tula. Leonid began his working career at the age of seventeen as a worker on the construction of a bridge. After graduating from the railway technical school in the city of Tula in 1926, he worked as an assistant driver, then as a locomotive driver. Kvasnikov himself recalled: “I was four and a half years old when I saw a steam locomotive – moving forward... I chose the mechanical faculty of the Moscow Institute of Chemical Engineering.”

In 1934, Leonid Romanovich graduated from the institute with honors. He worked for a year at a chemical plant in the city of Dzerzhinsk, then entered graduate school at the Moscow Institute of Chemistry and Mathematics. In 1938, as a graduate student, he took part in the work of a special commission of the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry to examine factories producing ammunition. He made a proposal to automate several operations when loading artillery shells, which was put into production. I prepared my PhD thesis on ammunition. But…

In September 1938, Kvasnikov was sent to work in the state security agencies. He began his journey in intelligence as an operational commissioner of the scientific and technical intelligence (NTR) department. He repeatedly went on business trips to Germany and Poland to carry out reconnaissance missions. In the period from 1939 to 1942, he worked for some time as a deputy, and then as head of the scientific and technological revolution department.

He did not interrupt science and closely followed the emergence of new scientific achievements. He did not ignore the discovery in 1939 of the chain reaction of fission of uranium-235 atoms, leading to the creation of an atomic explosive and weapons using it. Then he drew attention to the fact that the names of prominent scientists who had previously regularly published their articles on the problem of nuclear physics had disappeared from the pages of American scientific journals.

Other alarming points also emerged. As Leonid Romanovich recalled about this time: “I am always interested in... a new direction in the field of science...” Later, according to Kvasnikov, they said that for him “ it was like an insight prompted by intuition...”

At the end of 1940, Leonid Romanovich initiated a directive to residencies in the USA, England and Germany: to begin obtaining information about possible work in these countries on the creation of atomic weapons. The first results confirmed that Kvasnikov gave a very accurate orientation. Already in September 1941 in London, Donald Maclean handed over to the London station the report of the Uranium Committee addressed to Winston Churchill. This document spoke about the beginning of work on the creation of an atomic bomb in Britain and the USA, about its design and about transferring the center of gravity of research and production to America. Therefore, the intelligence leadership decided to send Kvasnikov on a business trip to the United States. He was tasked with organizing the acquisition of information about atomic weapons, as well as heading the station for all scientific and technological progress in New York. In January 1943, Leonid Romanovich left for a new place of work.

In New York, he was involved in organizing the receipt of scientific and military-technical information. He showed high professionalism and a deep understanding of the problems that the employees subordinate to him worked on. He took direct part in intelligence work. From the residency, the Center received a large volume of secret documentary information and samples of equipment on aviation, radar, chemistry, and medicine, which were of significant interest to the domestic industry working for the front. Work in the scientific and technical direction of state security intelligence ran as a “red thread” throughout Leonid Kvasnikov’s life. But here he was the one who gave birth to atomic intelligence and brought it to triumph, being the first to begin the hunt for atomic secrets.

Under the leadership of Kvasnikov, the most important materials on atomic energy and its use for military purposes were obtained. The New York station informed the Center in advance about the upcoming first American test of an atomic bomb. And when on June 16, 1945, the mushroom of an atomic explosion rose over the desert of New Mexico, the basic data concerning the structure of the atomic bomb and the materials used in its construction were already at the disposal of Soviet scientists.

After the successful completion of his business trip in December 1945, Leonid Romanovich returned to Moscow and continued working in the central office. From 1948 to 1963, he was the permanent head of the intelligence department - NTR. In this position, his brilliant organizational skills were widely demonstrated. Under the leadership of Leonid Romanovich, NTR has achieved serious success in solving the problems facing it. When implementing intelligence information, he maintained close contact with our prominent nuclear scientists, including I.V. Kurchatov, as well as with ministers and heads of industrial enterprises.

The selection of Leonid Kvasnikov as the head of scientific and technical intelligence fully justified itself. This intelligence officer-scientist worked excellently both in the “field” abroad and in the Center. Not every intelligence officer could cooperate with a person like Kurchatov. In Kvasnikov they saw exactly the person who could communicate with Igor Vasilyevich, in fact, on equal terms. Regularly transmitting intelligence information to him, he worked more closely than other intelligence officers with the head of the Soviet atomic project. And this time spent among scientists, according to him, “was the happiest thing in my life.” As those close to Leonid Romanovich recalled: “they were comrades and friends in such an important matter …»

At fifty-seven years old, still full of strength, Leonid Romanovich in 1963 was excommunicated from direct control of his “brainchild” - NTR. Until 1966, he worked as a senior consultant to the head of the KGB PGU for scientific and technical intelligence. In December 1966 he retired.

For achieving high intelligence results, Colonel Kvasnikov was awarded the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner of Labor, the Order of the Patriotic War, two Orders of the Red Star, and many medals. He was awarded the title “Honored Worker of the NKVD”, “Honorary State Security Officer” and “Honorary Employee of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service”.

Leonid Romanovich died on October 15, 1993. He was buried in Moscow at the Vagankovskoye cemetery, in the columbarium.

In 1996, Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov was awarded the highest award of the Fatherland - the “Golden Star” of the Hero of Russia, posthumously.

“...To provide secret information on uranium to a narrow circle of prominent scientists and specialists to evaluate intelligence information and use it accordingly...”

Leonid Kvasnikov, head of the NTR intelligence department

NKVD, March 1942

Chapter 1
When the fatherland is in danger

So, the targeting of Soviet state security intelligence on atomic issues occurred at the end of 1940 on the initiative of Leonid Kvasnikov, an employee involved in issues of science and technology. From him, the industrialized countries of Europe and overseas received instructions to the residencies - so far in general terms.

Kvasnikov’s initiative took place in the residency among several tasks of “first importance” - about Hitler’s plans, Churchill’s intentions and ... information about the latest secret technology. It was at this time that documentary information was received, which the London station regarded, without a doubt, as that “Britain is firmly on the path to the atomic bomb...”

The brainchild of a scout-scientist

The information came into the hands of Leonid Kvasnikov virtually simultaneously from two sources (both from the “Cambridge Five”) in the Foreign Ministry and from an employee in the Committee associated with military issues. NTR historiographer Vladimir Barkovsky recalled this serious event in the work of London intelligence officers: “...on the English side, we were helped, without knowing it, by Lord Hankey, an employee of the government committee on the use of science for military purposes...”

Intelligence officer Barkovsky noted that even without special training in the field of nuclear physics, it was possible to understand that the information deserves the closest attention for two reasons - it was about weapons and, moreover, about new weapons: “...it was a report...on the possibility of creating an atomic bomb... In fact, the very fact that the documents were received from Lord Hankey’s office spoke of their authenticity and importance. The possibility of a trap here was excluded..."

This confidence was based on the credo of Soviet intelligence (and serious intelligence services around the world!) regarding the information obtained: it must be documentary in form, reliable in content and secret in significance.

All this related to information received from the Committee, which ended up in the hands of the Five agent John Cairncross, the Lord's assistant. And the information said that the scientific work of British physicists in the field of atomic energy was led by a special group of scientists led by the authoritative physicist George Thomson.

Two pieces of evidence in support of the seriousness of the problem - the "Lord's committee" and the "famous physicist" - excluded even a hint of accident in the release of such (and alarming) information. Accident? No way! Without a doubt, our scientific and technical intelligence of the early forties, with its staff of four people, was lucky with the insight of Leonid Kvasnikov. And he, an inquisitive intelligence officer-scientist, probably knew the saying of the Greek Cicero: “If a person thinks that there are accidents in the historical movement of society, then he is a complete idiot.”

AND Much later, the role of Leonid Kvasnikov, a specialist in large-scale scientific and technological progress, was repeatedly noted as having the ability to build a principle - the priority of scientific knowledge in practical activities. Be it aviation or missile technology, radio electronics or atom, or other problems of science and technology in the defense interests of the Country of Soviets.

* * *

Naturally, the question arises about the emergence of “nuclear physics” in intelligence: “As for foreign intelligence, there was only one person who was well versed in this issue, Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov, a graduate of the Moscow Chemical Institute (for some reason, in those years the problem of nuclear physics was most fully taught in chemical institutes).” And therefore, it is no coincidence that one of the characteristics of Leonid Kvasnikov’s personality in the question on the “topic” is that “he was insight itself.”

The great intelligence officer worked in Dzerzhinsk

The thirties of the last century were for Dzerzhinsk a time of great construction of the city, rapid industrial development, including at the Chernorechensky Chemical Plant (CHP). The new workshops required good specialists. And one of them was the young engineer Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov. In 1934, after graduating from the institute, he was sent to ChKhZ.

Leonid Kvasnikov began his career much earlier. In 1922, as a 17-year-old boy, he became a laborer on the construction of a railway bridge in Penza. After graduating from technical school in 1926, he worked for two years as an assistant locomotive driver, then as a technical draftsman, and in 1929 he became a locomotive driver on the Moscow-Kursk Railway. In 1930, Leonid entered the mechanical faculty of the Moscow Institute of Chemical Engineering (MICM). Having received a diploma with honors, he is assigned to our city, to ChKhZ.

At that time it was one of the largest chemical enterprises in the country, and working here was very prestigious. Kvasnikov, as a creative person, immediately became involved in an active technical search for improving the quality of products and improving equipment for sustainable maintenance of the technical process. A year later he entered graduate school at the Moscow Institute of Chemical Mathematics and Mathematics. Inspecting ammunition factories with a special commission, Kvasnikov makes a number of valuable proposals for automating technological operations, which were successfully introduced into production.

Probably L.R. Kvasnikov would have become a good scientist if in 1938 he had not been invited to the Party Central Committee and then sent to the foreign intelligence school. Soon after graduation, Kvasnikov was appointed deputy head of the scientific and technical intelligence department of the NKVD, and in 1941 he already headed this department. By that time, our intelligence became aware of work in Germany to create an atomic bomb. England and the USA concentrated their scientific efforts in the same direction. The head of Soviet scientific and technical intelligence became aware of this and he is concentrating the attention of our intelligence officers on obtaining information on the creation of atomic weapons.

Then Kvasnikov became aware of the Manhattan Project, according to which Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to build nuclear facilities in the United States. Based on these data, the scientific and technological revolution department, headed by Kvasnikov, prepared a special message for Stalin. Soon, Stalin signed GKO Resolution No. 2352 “On the organization of work on uranium,” and then Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created, which was entrusted with the creation of atomic weapons. It was headed by I.V. Kurchatov, with whom foreign intelligence has worked closely for many years. However, it was not possible to obtain any materials from the American Nuclear Research Center at that time.

At the end of 1942, the intelligence leadership decided to send L.R. Kvasnikova in the USA. He is tasked with organizing the acquisition of information about atomic weapons.

Here is what Kvasnikov wrote about that period: “In America I again found myself almost alone. There was essentially no operational staff. But I noted two smart young people... They were then the main workers who met with people through whom I received materials from physicists who worked directly at Los Alamos. Yatskov got in touch with Harry Gold, through whom we received materials from Klaus Fuchs.” He was a famous German physicist who worked in the United States for the foreign intelligence service of the NKVD.

Kvasnikov further lists that in addition to data on reactors, the release of uranium 235, and bomb design diagrams, he also transferred packages of uranium ore, fuel rods, and much more. “But from the center I received only the most general guidance; I asked the first questions on the materials received, and not our scientists from Moscow. Our informants had to feel that they were dealing, if not with an equal, then at least with a fairly competent specialist. This forced us to delve into the problem thoroughly.”

Kvasnikov said that “everyone who worked in Beria’s department at that time had the terrible word “disinformation” hanging over them, which was fraught with a quick recall to Moscow and immediate ending up in Beria’s basements. Therefore, it was necessary to be so oriented in the problem as not to miss to Moscow those data that caused even the slightest doubt.”

Thanks to the efforts of Kvasnikov and his colleagues, scientific and technical intelligence information began to play an important role in the practical activities of Laboratory No. 2. Kurchatov emphasized that the information received by intelligence “creates the technical capabilities of solving the entire problem of the atomic bomb in a much shorter time.” The main thing that interested scientists was the real results of the US work on creating atomic weapons. And this task was successfully solved largely thanks to L.R. Kvasnikov and the staff of his residency.

The secret American nuclear research center at Los Alamos employed 45 thousand civilians and several thousand military personnel. The creation of the first atomic bomb was carried out here by 12 Nobel Prize laureates in physics from the USA and European countries. From there, Klaus Fuchs conveyed extremely valuable information not only of a theoretical, but also of a scientific and technical nature. So, in January 1945, he announced a uranium bomb and the start of work in the United States to create a plutonium bomb.

Assessing the information received, Kurchatov wrote to the government leadership in 1943: “Obtaining this material is of enormous, invaluable importance for our state and science. Now we have important guidelines for subsequent scientific research; they enable us to bypass many very labor-intensive phases of developing the uranium problem and learn about new scientific and technological ways to solve it.”

In June 1945, detailed documentary information on the design of the atomic bomb was received from the United States from our intelligence officers. And on June 4, 1945, Kvasnikov reported to the Center: “... information has been received that in the United States for the month of July this year. The first experimental explosion of an atomic bomb has been scheduled."

And when a nuclear explosion was carried out in the state of New Mexico on July 16, this event did not take the Soviet government by surprise. It concluded from this that it was necessary to accelerate work on creating its own atomic weapons. And the day of the first test of the Soviet atomic bomb was brought closer in many ways by the activities of Kvasnikov and his informants, which probably prevented the use of weapons by the Americans during the Korean War of 1950-1953, and also thwarted US plans to use atomic weapons against the USSR.

In addition to the atomic bomb, L.R. In New York, Kvasnikov was also involved in organizing the receipt of scientific and military-technical information and took a direct part in intelligence work. From the NTR residency, the Center received a large volume of secret information and samples of equipment on aviation, radar, chemistry, and medicine, which were of significant interest to the domestic industry working at the front.

Returning to Moscow in December 1945, Kvasnikov continued to work in the central intelligence apparatus. From 1948 to 1963, Leonid Romanovich was the permanent head of scientific and technical intelligence. When implementing intelligence information, he maintained close contacts with our most prominent nuclear scientists, including I.V. Kurchatov, as well as with ministers and heads of industrial enterprises.

After the tests of the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, the list of those awarded included six intelligence officers who worked abroad in the line of scientific and technical intelligence. Kvasnikov was awarded the Order of Lenin.

From 1963 to 1966 L.R. Kvasnikov worked as a senior consultant to the head of the KGB PGU (foreign intelligence) for scientific and technical intelligence. In December 1966 he retired.

For achieving high intelligence results, honorary state security officer Colonel Kvasnikov was awarded the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st and 2nd degree, two Orders of the Red Star, many medals, as well as the badge “For Service in Intelligence” .

Leonid Romanovich died on October 15, 1993. He was buried at the Vagankovskoye cemetery in Moscow.

For the successful completion of special tasks to ensure state security in conditions involving risk to life, for the heroism and courage shown in this case, by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of June 15, 1966 L.R. Kvasnikov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia.

Affiliation

USSR USSR
Russia Russia

Type of army Years of service Rank Battles/wars Awards and prizes

Leonid Romanovich Kvasnikov (2 June (19050602 ) , Nodal , Tula province , Russian empire - October 15 , Moscow , Russia) - head of the scientific and technical intelligence department, one of the initiators of the start of foreign intelligence work on nuclear issues. Hero of the Russian Federation (), Colonel (1949).

Biography

“The quality and volume of information we received from sources in Great Britain, Canada and the United States was extremely important for the organization and development of the Soviet atomic program. Detailed reports on the design and operation of the first nuclear reactors and gas centrifuges, on the specifics of making uranium and plutonium bombs, played a vital role in the development and acceleration of the work of our nuclear scientists, because they simply did not know a number of issues.
This, first of all, concerns the design of the system of focusing explosive lenses, the size of the critical mass of uranium and plutonium, the principle of implosion formulated by Klaus Fuchs, the design of the detonation system, the time and sequence of operations when assembling the bomb itself and the method of activating its initiator... Atomic bomb in the USSR was created in 4 years. If it weren’t for the scouts, this period would have been twice as long...
... Today, however, it is reliably known that the first Soviet atomic bomb ( RDS-1) was copied down to the smallest detail from the American plutonium dumped on Nagasaki" ...
Upon returning to Moscow, he was in the reserve appointment of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR (from December 1945 to February 1946). Then, until his dismissal, he served in scientific and technical intelligence, supervising creation of the Soviet atomic bomb. Consistently held positions: deputy head of the 11th department of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB-MGB of the USSR (from June 27, 1946 - department “1-E” of the PGU MGB of the USSR) (from February 1946 to July 1947); head of the 4th department of the 5th Directorate of the CI at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (from July 1947 to September 1950); head of the 2nd department of the CI at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (September 1950 to December 1951); And. O. Head of the 4th Department of the PGU MGB USSR (January to April 1952); head of the 4th department of the PGU MGB USSR (from April 1952 to March 1953); head of the 11th department of the VSU Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (from March to May 1953); Deputy Head of the 6th Department of the VSU Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (from May 1953 to March 1954); head of the 10th department of the KGB PGU under the USSR Council of Ministers (from July 1954 to August 1963); senior consultant of the Group of Consultants under the head of the KGB PGU under the USSR Council of Ministers (from August 1963 to December 1966).
After retiring, he worked at the All-Russian Research Institute of Interindustry Information
Three years after his death, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.

Awards

Ranks

Senior Lieutenant GB(April 28, 1941);

Major GB(February 11, 1943);

Lieutenant Colonel GB (4 October 1944);

Lieutenant Colonel (July 1945);

Colonel (1949).

Memory

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. Website " Heroes of the Country ».

An excerpt characterizing Kvasnikov, Leonid Romanovich
“Il faut absolument que vous veniez me voir, [It is necessary that you come to see me," she told him in such a tone, as if for some reasons that he could not know, this was absolutely necessary.
– Mariedi entre les 8 et 9 heures. Vous me ferez grand plaisir. [Tuesday, between 8 and 9 o'clock. You will do me great pleasure.] - Boris promised to fulfill her wish and wanted to enter into a conversation with her when Anna Pavlovna called him away under the pretext of her aunt, who wanted to hear him.
“You know her husband, don’t you?” - said Anna Pavlovna, closing her eyes and pointing at Helen with a sad gesture. - Oh, this is such an unfortunate and lovely woman! Don't talk about him in front of her, please don't talk about him. It's too hard for her!
When Boris and Anna Pavlovna returned to the general circle, Prince Ippolit took over the conversation.
He moved forward in his chair and said: Le Roi de Prusse! [The Prussian king!] and having said this, he laughed. Everyone turned to him: Le Roi de Prusse? - asked Ippolit, laughed again and again calmly and seriously sat down in the depths of his chair. Anna Pavlovna waited for him a little, but since Hippolyte decidedly did not seem to want to talk anymore, she began a speech about how the godless Bonaparte stole the sword of Frederick the Great in Potsdam.
“C"est l"epee de Frederic le Grand, que je... [This is the sword of Frederick the Great, which I...] - she began, but Hippolytus interrupted her with the words:
“Le Roi de Prusse...” and again, as soon as he was addressed, he apologized and fell silent. Anna Pavlovna winced. MorteMariet, a friend of Hippolyte, turned decisively to him:
– Voyons a qui en avez vous avec votre Roi de Prusse? [So what about the Prussian king?]
Hippolytus laughed, as if he was ashamed of his laughter.
- Non, ce n "est rien, je voulais dire seulement... [No, nothing, I just wanted to say...] (He intended to repeat the joke that he heard in Vienna, and which he had been planning to put all evening.) Je voulais dire seulement, que nous avons tort de faire la guerre pour le roi de Prusse. [I just wanted to say that we are fighting in vain pour le roi de Prusse. (Untranslatable play on words meaning: “over trifles.”)]
Boris smiled cautiously, so that his smile could be classified as mockery or approval of the joke, depending on how it was received. Everyone laughed.
“Il est tres mauvais, votre jeu de mot, tres spirituel, mais injuste,” said Anna Pavlovna, shaking her wrinkled finger. – Nous ne faisons pas la guerre pour le Roi de Prusse, mais pour les bons principes. Ah, le mechant, ce prince Hippolytel [Your play on words is not good, very clever, but unfair; we are not fighting pour le roi de Prusse (i.e. over trifles), but for good beginnings. Oh, how evil he is, this Prince Hippolyte!],” she said.
The conversation continued throughout the evening, focusing mainly on political news. At the end of the evening, he became especially animated when it came to the awards bestowed by the sovereign.
“After all, last year NN received a snuff box with a portrait,” said l “homme a l” esprit profond, [a man of deep intelligence,] “why can’t SS receive the same award?”
“Je vous demande pardon, une tabatiere avec le portrait de l"Empereur est une recompense, mais point une distinction,” said the diplomat, un cadeau plutot. [Sorry, a snuff box with a portrait of the Emperor is a reward, not a distinction; rather a gift.]
– Il y eu plutot des antecedents, je vous citerai Schwarzenberg. [There were examples - Schwarzenberg.]
“C"est impossible, [This is impossible," the other objected.
- Pari. Le grand cordon, c"est different... [The tape is a different matter...]
When everyone got up to leave, Helen, who had said very little all evening, again turned to Boris with a request and a gentle, significant order that he should be with her on Tuesday.
“I really need this,” she said with a smile, looking back at Anna Pavlovna, and Anna Pavlovna, with the sad smile that accompanied her words when speaking about her high patroness, confirmed Helen’s desire. It seemed that that evening, from some words spoken by Boris about the Prussian army, Helen suddenly discovered the need to see him. She seemed to promise him that when he arrived on Tuesday, she would explain this need to him.
Arriving on Tuesday evening at Helen's magnificent salon, Boris did not receive a clear explanation of why he needed to come. There were other guests, the countess spoke little to him, and only saying goodbye, when he kissed her hand, she, with a strange lack of a smile, unexpectedly, in a whisper, said to him: Venez demain diner... le soir. Il faut que vous veniez… Venez. [Come for dinner tomorrow... in the evening. I need you to come... Come.]
On this visit to St. Petersburg, Boris became a close person in the house of Countess Bezukhova.
The war was flaring up, and its theater was approaching the Russian borders. Curses against the enemy of the human race, Bonaparte, were heard everywhere; Warriors and recruits gathered in the villages, and contradictory news came from the theater of war, false as always and therefore interpreted differently.
The life of old Prince Bolkonsky, Prince Andrei and Princess Marya has changed in many ways since 1805.
In 1806, the old prince was appointed one of the eight commanders-in-chief of the militia, then appointed throughout Russia. The old prince, despite his senile weakness, which became especially noticeable during the period of time when he considered his son killed, did not consider himself entitled to refuse the position to which he had been appointed by the sovereign himself, and this newly discovered activity excited and strengthened him. He was constantly traveling around the three provinces entrusted to him; He was pedantic in his duties, strict to the point of cruelty with his subordinates, and he himself went down to the smallest details of the matter. Princess Marya had already stopped taking mathematical lessons from her father, and only in the mornings, accompanied by her nurse, with little Prince Nikolai (as his grandfather called him), entered her father’s study when he was at home. Baby Prince Nikolai lived with his wet nurse and nanny Savishna in the half of the late princess, and Princess Marya spent most of the day in the nursery, replacing, as best she could, a mother to her little nephew. M lle Bourienne, too, seemed to be passionately in love with the boy, and Princess Marya, often depriving herself, yielded to her friend the pleasure of nursing the little angel (as she called her nephew) and playing with him.
At the altar of the Lysogorsk church there was a chapel over the grave of the little princess, and in the chapel a marble monument brought from Italy was erected, depicting an angel spreading his wings and preparing to ascend to heaven. The angel's upper lip was slightly raised, as if he was about to smile, and one day Prince Andrei and Princess Marya, leaving the chapel, admitted to each other that it was strange, the face of this angel reminded them of the face of a deceased woman. But what was even stranger, and what Prince Andrei did not tell his sister, was that in the expression that the artist accidentally gave to the face of the angel, Prince Andrei read the same words of meek reproach that he then read on the face of his dead wife: “Oh, why did you do this to me?..."
Soon after the return of Prince Andrei, the old prince separated his son and gave him Bogucharovo, a large estate located 40 miles from Bald Mountains. Partly because of the difficult memories associated with the Bald Mountains, partly because Prince Andrei did not always feel able to bear his father’s character, and partly because he needed solitude, Prince Andrei took advantage of Bogucharov, built there and spent most of his time there. time.
Prince Andrei, after the Austerlitz campaign, firmly decided never to serve in military service again; and when the war began, and everyone had to serve, he, in order to get rid of active service, accepted a position under his father in collecting the militia. The old prince and his son seemed to change roles after the 1805 campaign. The old prince, excited by the activity, expected all the best from the real campaign; Prince Andrei, on the contrary, not participating in the war and secretly regretting it in his soul, saw only one bad thing.
On February 26, 1807, the old prince left for the district. Prince Andrei, as for the most part during his father’s absences, remained in Bald Mountains. Little Nikolushka had been unwell for the 4th day. The coachmen who drove the old prince returned from the city and brought papers and letters to Prince Andrei.