After Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933 and the anti-Soviet and anti-communist excesses that began during the “National Revolution,” the USSR broke off all (until then very close) economic and military relations with Germany. However, already in 1939, Moscow and Berlin actually rushed into each other’s arms. Not immediately, of course, gradually, but nevertheless.
“Seeking a compromise with Russia was my secret idea: I defended it before the Fuhrer because, on the one hand, I wanted to facilitate the implementation of German foreign policy, and on the other, to ensure Russian neutrality for Germany in the event of a German-Polish conflict,” these words belong to Joachim von Ribbentrop. And it must be said that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Third Reich, for his part, did a lot to make this idea come true.
“It was my secret idea to seek a compromise with Russia”
It all started in March 1939. At the 18th Congress of the CPSU, Stalin gave a clear signal that he wanted to improve Soviet-German relations. Literally, he said that “Russia does not intend to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the capitalist powers.”
It was about the following. President Roosevelt's confidant, Ambassador Bullitt, expressed the following opinion in 1938: “The desire of the democratic states would be that there, in the East, it would come to a military conflict between the German Empire and Russia ... Only then would the democratic states attack Germany and force her to capitulate " That is, it becomes clear what motives guided European democracies at that moment, and the United States as well, albeit indirectly.
Joachim von Ribbentrop signs the non-aggression pact
Accordingly, after Stalin's speech, Ribbentrop, inspired by the message that was sent from Moscow, began to probe the waters. Negotiations on trade and industrial cooperation intensified in the Soviet capital. The way these negotiations would begin to develop would become a kind of signal: does Moscow really want rapprochement with Germany or is this nothing more than a figure of speech in Stalin’s speech? Negotiations indeed proceeded quite actively.
Ribbentrop and his proxies entered into negotiations with Astakhov, the plenipotentiary representative in Berlin, testing the waters at the political level, since Astakhov had the opportunity to convey information to the Moscow leadership about Germany’s intentions. The process, as already noted, began in the spring, and in a relatively short period of time, from March to August, became absolute.
During this period, Ribbentrop's communication with the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, intensified, who, in turn, was supposed to convey the intentions of the German government to the top leadership of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, active negotiations were underway in Berlin with high-ranking German diplomat Schnurre, who was responsible for trade and economic cooperation. He did not deal with major political issues, but nevertheless, in conversations with Charge d'Affaires of the USSR Astakhov and Deputy Trade Representative Babarin, he probed the political ground.
Ribbentrop also communicated with Astakhov. During one of the table conversations, he told him that if it comes to war with Poland, Germany will deal with it in a week. This was a bit of an exaggeration (it took longer), but the hint was completely straightforward. In another table conversation with Astakhov, Ribbentrop said that it was possible for two powers such as Germany and the Soviet Union to resolve all issues of mutual interests in the territory from the Baltic to the Black Sea to mutual satisfaction and that there were no obstacles to achieving these goals.
At this time, the military missions of England and France were present in Moscow, with whom there were long and persistent negotiations regarding the conclusion of military treaties similar to the one that was ultimately concluded between Molotov and Ribbentrop. The Soviet Union put forward a lot of claims regarding Poland, and England and France, as its (Poland's) allies, naturally took a negative position. That is, in 1939, not the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, but the Molotov-Chamberlain or Molotov-Deladieu Pact could have been concluded (conditionally), and the situation, of course, would have developed in a different way.
Nevertheless, negotiations continued and, what is most interesting, they continued until Joachim von Ribbentrop appeared in Moscow. But before that, he sent a secret telegram to Schulenburg, which said: “The Imperial government (meaning Germany) and the Soviet government, in accordance with existing experience, must take into account that the capitalist Western democracies are the irreconcilable enemies of both National Socialist Germany and the USSR.” . And one more thing: “Germany has no aggressive intentions against the USSR. The Imperial Government is of the opinion that in the space between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea there is no question that cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both countries. These include issues such as the Baltic Sea, the Baltics, Poland, issues of the South-East, etc. Moreover, political cooperation of both countries could only benefit both the German and Soviet economies, which complement each other in all directions.” .
“As a result of several years of ideological hostility, Germany and the USSR really do not trust each other. There is still a lot of accumulated garbage to be removed. But it can be stated that even during this time, the natural sympathy of the Germans for everything truly Russian never disappeared. The policies of both states can be built on this again.” This instruction from the Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador to the Soviet Union was given on August 14, 1939. And then, as they say, away we go...
Stalin, Molotov, Shaposhnikov and Ribbentrop during the signing of the non-aggression pact
Molotov, after listening carefully to Schulenburg, said that Ribbentrop's trip to Moscow required preparation. And no one then, in mid-August, could have imagined that this preparation would take only nine days. Already on August 16, Ribbentrop demanded that Schulenburg have a new meeting with Molotov. In addition, I asked to be informed that Germany is ready to conclude a non-aggression pact for a period of 25 years.
On August 17, a meeting between the Soviet People's Commissar and the German ambassador took place, at which it was agreed upon the need to simultaneously sign a special protocol that would determine the interests of the parties in a particular foreign policy issue, and would also become an integral part of the pact.
On August 20, after familiarizing himself with the draft Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Hitler sent a telegram to Stalin in which he said: “I sincerely welcome the signing of a new German-Soviet trade agreement as the first step in changing German-Soviet relations. The conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union means for me the long-term basis of German policy...
I have accepted the draft non-aggression treaty transmitted by your Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, but I consider it extremely necessary to clarify some issues related to this treaty as soon as possible... The tension between Germany and Poland is becoming intolerable... A crisis may arise any day...” On August 21, Stalin’s reply arrived in Berlin: “Thank you for your letter. I hope that the German-Soviet non-aggression pact will mark a decisive turn in the improvement of political relations between our countries. The Soviet government has instructed me to inform you that it agrees that Herr von Ribbentrop should arrive in Moscow on August 23.”
When Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow, he saw the Reich flag with the USSR flag
And on the agreed day, two planes with Ribbentrop and his entourage, with the German delegation, landed in Moscow. There is a version that on the way to the Soviet capital, these two planes were fired upon by air defense systems somewhere in the Velikiye Luki area and only by luck were they not shot down. Whether this is true or not is unknown; Ribbentrop himself does not write anything about this in his memoirs.
An interesting detail: the German Foreign Minister was flying on the Fuhrer’s personal plane, and when he arrived at the Moscow airport, he saw the Reich flag flying above him next to the flag of the Soviet Union. “Having walked around the honor guard of the Soviet Air Force, which made a good impression on us, we, accompanied by a Russian colonel, headed to the building of the former Austrian embassy, where I lived during my entire stay in Moscow,” he writes in his memoirs. Ribbentrop. And in the building opposite there were the British and French military missions, which were simultaneously negotiating the conclusion of military treaties with the Soviet Union. That is, all this friendly greeting took place before the eyes of the British and French. As Ribbentrop later recalled, “their eyes literally popped out of their sockets.” As for the negotiations themselves, they did not last long: in one day both the pact itself and the secret protocols to it were signed.
Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop shake hands after signing the pact
On August 22, on the eve of Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow, Hitler gave a two-hour speech to the leaders of the Wehrmacht. He spoke about the inevitability of war with Poland and placed all responsibility for its outbreak on the Poles. “The enemy cherished another hope,” the Fuhrer continued, “that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. But he miscalculated. “I am sure,” he emphasized, “that Stalin will never accept British proposals.” Only a blind pessimist can believe that Stalin is so stupid as not to discern British intentions. Russia is not interested in the existence of Poland... Litvinov's displacement was a decisive sign. In this step, I saw a change in Moscow's position towards the Western powers. I gradually changed my attitude towards Russia. We started political negotiations for a trade agreement, then the Russians proposed a non-aggression pact. Finally, they went even further and announced their willingness to sign it. Four days ago I established personal contact with Stalin and organized Ribbentrop's trip to Moscow to conclude this pact. We are not afraid of a blockade: the East will give us grain, coal, oil, metals, food... We have laid the foundation for the destruction of England's hegemony. And now the way is open for the soldiers.”
During a meeting with Ribbentrop, Stalin also spoke very curiously: “Although we have been pouring barrels of slurry on each other for many years, this is not a reason why we cannot get along with each other.” And they started to get along.
In Molotov’s office, in the same place where negotiations took place and documents were signed, dinner was served, during which Stalin made a very warm toast to the health of Comrade Hitler, in which he spoke of the Fuhrer as a person whom he always greatly respected. In general, the situation was favorable.
Joachim von Ribbentrop recalled one small episode that occurred towards the end of that evening. He asked Stalin if the Fuhrer's personal photographer, who was accompanying him, could take some photographs. Stalin agreed, and this was the first time he allowed a foreigner to take photographs in the Kremlin. When Stalin and the guests were photographed with glasses of Crimean champagne in their hands, the Soviet leader protested: he did not want such a photo to be published! At Ribbentrop's request, the photojournalist took the film out of the camera and handed it to Stalin, but he gave it back, noting that he believed in the honesty of his German guests and that the photograph would not be published.
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact became the “trigger” of the war
However, we got carried away with the details. What was the essence of the pact? First, spheres of interest were delimited in the countries lying between Germany and the Soviet Union. Finland, most of the Baltic states, and Bessarabia were declared to belong to the Soviet sphere. In the event of a German-Polish conflict, a “demarcation line” was agreed upon. That is, in fact, the issue of Poland was resolved.
And one more important fact: one of the conditions for signing the non-aggression pact was that Germany agreed with its ally Japan that it would not start a war against the Soviet Union in the east. That is, Moscow, of course, has protected itself in this sense.
Seventy-seven years ago, to the day, on August 23, 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was concluded between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Subsequently, different interpretations of this event and document arose. Many “patriots” accused the Soviet leadership of a crime against humanity on a par with Hitler’s Germany. Others recklessly equated fascism and communism... Let's try to figure out how everything really happened.
Reasons for signing the pact
Any event in world history has its own structure: prerequisites, reasons, occasion, course of events and results.
The reasons for signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were complex. The first was in the failure of great powers to comply with their obligations to other states. Thus, in 1935, the USSR, France and Czechoslovakia concluded a tripartite security agreement: if an aggressor country attacks one of these countries, two others were obliged to come to the rescue.
In 1938, England and France (France, bypassing the previous treaty) signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler's Germany in Munich, according to which Hitler pledged not to attack these countries, and they, in turn, would not prevent him from attacking the Soviet Union. In addition, England and France gave de facto consent to Germany to the division of Czechoslovakia.
That is, you seize the moment, right? France entered into an alliance with the USSR and Czechoslovakia with one hand, and with the other shook Hitler's hand, giving the green light to his actions. Here it is worth saying, for the sake of fairness, that this whole story should not be viewed as an attempt to unleash some kind of discord. This is history and you need to know it. The then French government agreed to the agreement, which then ultimately “abandoned” its own people by allowing the occupation of its country by the Nazis.
What happened seems all the more unthinkable because France was the most powerful power on the continent. Its army was larger than the German one and better equipped. At least until Hitler divided Czechoslovakia. The army of this small country was second only to the French. Having captured Czechoslovakia, Hitler gained access to factories that produced the most modern weapons in Europe: machine guns, tanks, cars, military equipment. It was after the capture of Czechoslovakia that the Nazi army became as our grandfathers and great-grandfathers remember it - almost invincible.
Thus, the first reason for signing the pact was the dishonesty of the great powers that gave Hitler the go-ahead for his actions.
The second reason : consisted of Poland’s reluctance to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory so that they would protect its territory from the Nazis. At the Moscow meeting in July 1939, where there were military representatives from England and France, Poland made it clear that it was not going to comply with previously concluded agreements and would itself confront the aggressor if necessary.
Thus, the Soviet Union found itself in an extremely difficult situation: Hitler’s possessions were getting closer to its own borders, and the great powers were silently conniving with the aggressor. At the same time, the Soviet leadership perfectly understood the danger of Nazi Germany: Hitler spoke directly about his plans more than once. In general, he is probably the most honest politician in history...
Under these conditions, Soviet diplomacy ruined both England and France, and Germany itself. It signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact on August 23.
The meaning of the pact
Firstly, the USSR resolved the pressing problem peacefully, and not militarily, as future allies in the anti-Hitler coalition hoped. They thought that the USSR would stop Germany by starting military operations. But that did not happen.
Secondly, the Soviet Union created a favorable advantage for itself: it moved the border at a minimum to the Curzon line, and at a maximum, after September 17, 1939, another 200 km to the west. In the context of an imminent war, this was of utmost importance.
Thirdly, the USSR “pushed” this war away from its borders for two years. In conditions when each state then behaved exclusively in its own interests, the Soviet leadership acted not only correctly, but in the only possible way competently.
Fourthly, the Soviet Union delayed the war at the expense of Germany, its future enemy. Because the. Germany supplied the USSR with machine tools and all necessary equipment almost until March 1941.
Fifthly, although Poland could no longer be saved from the impending catastrophe, the Baltic countries escaped Nazi occupation for two years.
All accusations against the USSR are simply groundless. As a rule, people who say this (that communism is the same as that the USSR committed a crime with this pact, etc.) for some reason do not talk about France and England. In fact, by the end of August 1939, the Soviet Union was the only country in Europe that had not entered into an agreement with Hitler or had not caved in to him. And this is the merit of the Soviet leadership directly.
Many also say that Stalin and Hitler almost kissed and supposedly loved each other very much... In my opinion, those who say this are completely unhealthy, extrapolating their problems in their personal lives to history. Of course, there was no love between the Soviet leadership and Hitler. There was a pragmatic goal: to delay the inevitable war and the border to the West at any cost. For this purpose, the USSR strictly observed its part of the agreements. Even when the Nazis went beyond the border stipulated in the pact after September 17, 1939, in a number of places the Soviet army was forced to put the “partners” in their place by force.
Of course, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact did not reduce the number of losses of our people in the fight against Nazism, about which. But the pact may have played a key role in preserving the Soviet and our people. Because if in 1941 the border passed through the territory of the Union, it is unknown how everything would have ended.
Text of the pact
NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE USSR.
USSR Government and Government Germany , guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between the USSR and Germany and based on the main provisions of the neutrality treaty concluded between the USSR and Germany in April 1926, we came to the following agreement:
1. Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.
2. In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of military action by a third power, the other Contracting Party will not support this power in any form.
3. The Governments of both Contracting Parties will remain in future contact with each other for consultation in order to inform each other about matters affecting their common interests.
4. Neither of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly directed against the other party.
5. In the event of disputes or conflicts between the Contracting Parties on issues of one kind or another, both parties will resolve these disputes and conflicts exclusively peacefully through a friendly exchange of views or, if necessary, by creating commissions to resolve the conflict.
6. This agreement is concluded for a period of ten years with the understanding that, unless one of the Contracting Parties denounces it one year before its expiration, the term of the agreement will be considered automatically extended for a further five years.
7. This treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification must take place in Berlin. The agreement comes into force immediately after its signing.
SECRET ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
On the occasion of the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned representatives of both Parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of delimiting their spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to agreement as follows:
1. In the event of territorial and political transformations in the areas belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania will be the line dividing the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Lithuania's interest in the Vilna region is recognized by both Parties.
2. In the event of territorial and political changes in areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR will be delimited approximately along the line of the Narev, Vistula and San rivers.
The question of whether it is desirable in the interests of both Parties to maintain the independence of the Polish state and the boundaries of such a state will only be finally decided by the course of future political events.
In any case, both Governments will resolve this issue by friendly agreement.
3. Regarding South-Eastern Europe, the Soviet side indicated its interest in Bessarabia. The German side clearly stated its complete political disinterest in these territories.
4. This protocol is considered by both Parties as strictly secret.
The Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939 marked a sharp turn in Soviet foreign policy from support for “collective security” to cooperation with Germany. The division of “spheres of interest”, which the leaders of the USSR and Germany agreed upon, made it easier for Hitler to seize Poland and ensured the territorial expansion of the USSR in 1939-1940.
After the conclusion of the Munich Treaty between Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France on September 30, 1938, the policy of “collective security” failed, and the USSR found itself isolated. This created the preconditions for a revision of the course pursued by the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. Such a revision also corresponded to the interests of the German leadership, which was preparing for a military clash with Poland. After the capture of the Czech Republic by Germany on March 15, 1939, Poland received security guarantees from Great Britain and France, and on June 14, Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on an alliance against Germany began in Moscow. However, they moved slowly and almost reached a dead end. Germany also urgently needed raw materials, which, in the context of the conflict with Great Britain and France, could be bought in the USSR. Under these conditions, Soviet-German contacts began, aimed at improving bilateral relations.
On December 16, 1938, the head of the Eastern European reference department of the political and economic department of the German Foreign Ministry, K. Schnure, informed Soviet representatives that Germany was ready to provide a loan in exchange for expanding Soviet exports of raw materials. This proposal became the starting point for Soviet-German rapprochement - so far unstable and not guaranteed by anything.
The German credit initiative evoked a positive response from the Soviet side. It was agreed that on January 30 a delegation led by Schnurre would go to Moscow.
At the New Year's reception of the heads of diplomatic missions on January 12, 1939, Hitler suddenly approached the Soviet Ambassador A. Merekalov, “asked about living in Berlin, about the family, about the trip to Moscow, emphasized that he knew about my visit to Schulenburg in Moscow, wished success and said goodbye." This has never happened before. But Hitler considered such a demonstration to be the maximum publicity of his intentions, which he could undertake without reciprocal expressions of sympathy from the Soviet side. But they weren’t there. Therefore, when reports about Schnurre’s trip leaked to the world press, Ribbentrop banned the visit and the negotiations broke down.
On April 17, the Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry (Ribbentrop's first deputy) E. Weizsäcker was visited by the Soviet Ambassador A. Merekalov. The reason for the visit was quite good: after the capture of Czechoslovakia, there remained an unresolved issue about Soviet military orders that were placed at the Czech Skoda factories. However, the discussion went beyond the scope of this process; it was about the “political climate” in relations between the two states.
On May 5, the adviser of the Soviet embassy, G. Astakhov, came to K. Schnurre (again about the Skoda - the Germans declared their readiness to fulfill the Soviet order), and the conversation turned to changes in the Soviet People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Schnurre reported: “Astakhov touched upon the removal of Litvinov and tried, without asking direct questions, to find out whether this event would lead to a change in our position towards the Soviet Union.”
After replacing M. Litvinov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs with V. Molotov, “Hitler, for the first time in the six years of his rule, expressed a desire to listen to his experts on Russia.” From their report, Hitler learned that the USSR was now adhering not to the policy of world revolution, but to a more pragmatic state course. After watching a documentary about Soviet military parades, the Fuhrer exclaimed: “I had absolutely no idea that Stalin was such a handsome and strong personality.” German diplomats were given the command to continue exploring the possibilities of rapprochement with the USSR.
Conversations between Schnurre and Astakhov became more frequent. On May 26, the German Ambassador to the USSR F. von Schulenburg received instructions to intensify contacts with Molotov. But the matter had not yet moved forward - the Soviet leadership still had hopes of negotiations with Great Britain and France. However, both political negotiations with Great Britain and France in June-July and military consultations in August were difficult. On July 18, Molotov gave the command to resume consultations with the Germans on concluding an economic agreement. On July 22, the resumption of Soviet-German economic negotiations was announced. At this stage, favor towards German proposals could be used to put pressure on intractable Anglo-French partners.
At the end of July, Schnurre received instructions to meet with Soviet representatives and resume consultations on improving Soviet-German relations. He invited Astakhov to lunch (due to Merekalov’s departure, he became the USSR Charge d’Affaires in Germany) and Deputy Soviet Trade Representative E. Babarin (the representative was also on vacation at that time). In the informal atmosphere of the restaurant, Schnurre outlined the stages of a possible rapprochement between the two countries: the resumption of economic cooperation through the conclusion of credit and trade agreements, then the “normalization and improvement of political relations,” then the conclusion of an agreement between the two countries or a return to the neutrality treaty of 1926. Schnurre formulated the principle which his superiors will then repeat: “in the entire region from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea and the Far East, in my opinion, there are no insoluble foreign policy problems between our countries.”
Molotov telegraphed Astakhov: “Between the USSR and Germany, of course, with improved economic relations, political relations can also improve. In this sense, Schnurre, generally speaking, is right... If now the Germans are sincerely changing the milestones and really want to improve political relations with the USSR, then they are obliged to tell us how they specifically imagine this improvement... The matter here depends entirely on the Germans. We would, of course, welcome any improvement in political relations between the two countries.”
German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop received Astakhov and presented him with an alternative: “If Moscow takes a negative position, we will know what is happening and how to act. If the opposite happens, then from the Baltic to the Black Sea there will be no problems that we together cannot resolve among ourselves.”
On August 11, Stalin, having discussed the current situation at the Politburo, gave the go-ahead to strengthen contacts with Germany. On August 14, Astakhov informed Schnurre that Molotov agreed to discuss improving relations and even the fate of Poland. On August 15, Ambassador Schulenburg received instructions from Ribbentrop to invite the Soviet side to accept a visit from a major German leader in the near future. But Molotov replied that there was no need to rush into Ribbentrop’s visit, “so that everything would not be limited to just conversations held in Moscow, but concrete decisions would be made.” Time was on the USSR's side, as Hitler planned an attack on Poland on August 26th.
To speed things up, Ribbentrop sent Schulenburg to Molotov with a draft pact, simple to the point of primitiveness: “The German state and the USSR undertake under no circumstances to resort to war and to refrain from any violence against each other.” The second point provided for the immediate entry into force of the pact and its long life - 25 years. The USSR and Germany were not supposed to fight until 1964. In a special protocol, Ribbentrop proposed to carry out “coordination of spheres of interests in the Baltic, problems of the Baltic states,” etc. At the first meeting with the German ambassador on August 19, Molotov replied that if economic agreements were signed today, then Ribbentrop could arrive in a week - on August 26 or 27. It was too late for the Germans - just these days they planned to attack Poland. In addition, Molotov was surprised by the amateurishly drawn up draft of the pact. He suggested that the Germans take as a basis one of the already concluded pacts and draw up a draft as expected, with several articles adopted in diplomatic terms. To Schulenburg’s proposal to move up the dates of Ribbetrop’s visit, “Molotov objected that even the first stage - the completion of economic negotiations - had not yet been completed.”
But on August 19, a fundamental decision was made to receive Ribbentrop in Moscow in the near future. At the second meeting with Molotov that day, Schulenburg received a draft non-aggression pact, drawn up according to all the rules of diplomatic science.
On the night of August 20, a trade and credit agreement was signed. The USSR received 200 million marks, with which it could buy German equipment and pay off debts with supplies of raw materials and food.
On 20 August, Hitler, risking his prestige, sent a personal message to Stalin to encourage his new partner to accept Ribbentrop on 22 or 23 August. In his letter, Hitler accepted the Soviet draft pact.
On 21 August, Stalin thanked Hitler for the letter, expressed hope that the pact would be "a turning point in the improvement of political relations between our countries" and agreed to Ribbentrop's arrival on 23 August.
When Hitler learned that Ribbentrop could go to Moscow on August 23, he exclaimed: “This is one hundred percent victory! And although I never do this, now I will drink a bottle of champagne!”
On August 23, arriving in Moscow, Ribbentrop received a cool reception, but at a very high level. Stalin personally participated in the negotiations. The Soviet side rejected the preamble proposed by the Germans about friendship between the two peoples, but agreed to the wording about a “friendly” exchange of views to resolve Soviet-German differences.
Attached to the agreement was a secret protocol providing for the division of “spheres of influence” in Eastern Europe. Ribbentrop suggested that the USSR control the fate of Finland and Bessarabia. It was decided to divide the Baltic states into spheres of interest: Estonia, geographically closest to Leningrad - the Soviet Union, Lithuania - Germany. A controversy has erupted over Latvia. Ribbentrop tried to get Libau and Vindava into the German sphere of influence, but the Soviet Union needed these ports, and Stalin knew that the agreement was more valuable to Hitler than the two ports and all of Latvia in addition. Hitler did not become stubborn and gave up Latvia, informing Ribbentrop of his decision in Moscow. In relation to the Polish state, Ribbentrop proposed dividing spheres of interest along the border of ethnic Poland, the “Curzon Line,” placing Western Belarus and Ukraine under the control of the USSR. But Stalin considered it possible to draw a dividing line along the Vistula, thus claiming to participate in deciding the fate of the Polish people. In general, the sphere of interests of the USSR was close to the borders of the Russian Empire.
After the signing of the documents, a weight was lifted from the shoulders of the negotiating participants - failure of the meeting would mean a strategic failure for both sides. The conversation went much more friendly.
The Soviet-German non-aggression pact, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was signed on the night of August 24, 1939 (the official date of its signing is considered to be the start of negotiations on August 23).
This agreement marked the beginning of a period of Soviet-German rapprochement and made it easier for Hitler to defeat Poland, which Germany attacked on September 1, 1939. Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, marking the beginning of World War II. The USSR took advantage of this military conflict by occupying the western parts of Ukraine and Belarus, which were previously part of the Polish state. On September 28, a new Soviet-German treaty “On Friendship and Borders” was concluded, which formalized the division of the territory of the destroyed Polish state between the USSR and Germany. Having agreed to transfer all ethnic Polish territories to Germany, the USSR also received Lithuania into its sphere of influence, and began to establish its military-political control over the Baltic states.
NON-AGGRESSION TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION
USSR government and
German government
Guided by the desire to strengthen the cause of peace between the USSR and Germany and based on the main provisions of the neutrality treaty concluded between the USSR and Germany in April 1926, we came to the following agreement:
Article I
Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack against each other, both separately and jointly with other powers.
Article II.
In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of military action by a third power, the other Contracting Party will not support this power in any form.
Article III.
The Governments of both Contracting Parties will remain in future contact with each other for consultation in order to inform each other about matters affecting their common interests.
Article IV.
Neither of the Contracting Parties will participate in any grouping of powers that is directly or indirectly directed against the other party.
Article V
In the event of disputes or conflicts between the Contracting Parties on issues of one kind or another, both parties will resolve these disputes or conflicts exclusively peacefully through a friendly exchange of views or, if necessary, by creating commissions to resolve the conflict.
Article VI.
This agreement is concluded for a period of ten years with the understanding that, unless one of the Contracting Parties denounces it one year before its expiration, the term of the agreement will be considered automatically extended for a further five years.
Article VII.
This treaty is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification must take place in Berlin. The agreement comes into force immediately after its signing.
Secret additional protocol
to the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union
When signing the non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the undersigned representatives of both parties discussed in strictly confidential manner the issue of delimiting areas of mutual interests in Eastern Europe. This discussion led to the following result:
1. In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern border of Lithuania is simultaneously the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR. At the same time, the interests of Lithuania in relation to the Vilna region are recognized by both parties.
2. In the event of a territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Polish state, the border of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR will approximately run along the line of the Nareva, Vistula and Sana rivers.
The question whether the preservation of an independent Polish state is desirable in mutual interests and what the boundaries of this state will be can only be finally clarified during further political developments.
In any case, both governments will resolve this issue by way of friendly mutual agreement.
3. Regarding the southeast of Europe, the Soviet side emphasizes the USSR’s interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas.
4. This protocol will be kept strictly confidential by both parties.
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Eastern Europe between Hitler and Stalin. 1939-1941 M., 1999.
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Shubin A.V. The world is on the edge of the abyss. From global crisis to world war. 1929-1941. M., 2004.
What were the reasons for the Soviet-German rapprochement in 1939?
Why did the German leadership insist on signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in the second half of August 1939?
How did Soviet-German relations in 1939 depend on the progress of Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations?
What changes were made to the draft documents during the negotiations on August 23-24, 1939?
The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, which guaranteed the neutrality of each side in the military conflict with Poland and the Western powers, was signed between the German Reich and the USSR on August 24, 1939 in Moscow. It was assumed that the agreement would be valid for 10 years. Today this agreement is best known as the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact”, after the names of the people who participated in its signing. The German side was represented by German Foreign Minister Jochim von Ribbentrop. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, became the plenipotentiary on the Soviet side. The agreement was signed in the presence of J. Stalin and the German Ambassador to the USSR von Schulenburg.
Following the September Wehrmacht invasion of western Poland, and the subsequent occupation of the Polish eastern territories by the Soviet Union, the non-aggression pact was supplemented by the German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Border of September 28, 1939. Three secret protocols attached to the new agreements adjusted the zones of influence of the USSR and Germany, and also regulated the exchange of citizens remaining in the redistributed territories of the Polish Republic.
Recognition of the conclusion of a secret protocol
The release of additional secret agreements occurred in 1945, after the end of World War II, in which Germany was defeated. However, hints about the existence of secret protocols appeared much earlier - intelligence services in the Baltic countries expressed concern about their possible existence just a few days after the signing of the officially promulgated part of the pact.
Until the beginning of the Perestroika era, the public policy of the Soviet Union was to completely deny the existence of any secret protocols. The USSR recognized only the officially promulgated part of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. By order of M. Gorbachev, a commission was created to investigate the existence of secret agreements between the Reich and the USSR. In December 1989, the commission concluded that a secret protocol did exist and announced its findings to the Council of People's Deputies of the USSR.
The declaration adopted by the Council acknowledged the existence of secret protocols, while simultaneously condemning their signing. On September 1, 1989, Germany declared the protocols invalid from the moment they were signed. The Soviet Union did the same on December 24, 1989, after examining a microfilmed copy provided by the German side.
REFERENCE: The Soviet copy of the original document was declassified and published in 1992-93.
Prerequisites for starting negotiations
The close military-diplomatic ties that existed between the two countries until the mid-1930s were mostly broken by the time of the negotiations. Subsequent discussion of a potential political deal between Germany and the Soviet Union was discussed as part of economic negotiations between the two countries.
From April to July, Soviet and German officials repeatedly announced the possibility of starting political negotiations, although in fact no real consultations took place at that time. Observing the growing power of Nazi Germany, Europe froze in anticipation, and 1939 became the year of “trade” - sensing the approach of a major war, and Western countries and the USSR were testing the possibility of concluding political alliances on which they could later rely.
In May, Stalin removed Maxim Litvinov from his post as Foreign Minister, replacing him with Vyacheslav Molotov. Litvinov, who had Jewish roots, was inclined towards an alliance with the Western powers (Great Britain and France).
August negotiations
Having completed the final details of the economic agreement, Germany and the Soviet Union began discussing a political alliance in early August. British and French negotiators planned trilateral military talks in Moscow that same month, the main goal of which would be to develop a unified response of the three powers to German expansion.
Tripartite military negotiations between Britain, France and the Soviet Union began in the middle of the last summer month of 1939. The transit of Soviet troops through Polish territory in the event of a German attack became a stumbling block that firmly stalled the achievement of any compromise. Polish officials categorically refused to give permission for Soviet troops to move on their soil: the Polish Foreign Minister expressed fears that once the Red Army entered Polish territory, it would immediately occupy the country.
On August 21, the Soviet Union suspended trilateral military negotiations with Britain and France because the final German-Soviet commercial agreement had been signed two days earlier. On the same day, Stalin received assurances that Germany would approve secret protocols to the proposed non-aggression pact, which would place part of Poland east of the Vistula, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland under the protectorate of the USSR.
Secret protocol
Since Western countries did not want to comply with Soviet demands, it was decided to sign a secret Nazi-Soviet treaty. The day after the suspension of tripartite negotiations, Ribbentrop received an audience with Stalin. On August 24, a 10-year non-aggression pact was signed.
According to the protocol, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland were divided into German and Soviet spheres of influence. In the north, Finland, Estonia and Latvia became Soviet protectorates. Poland was divided in the event of its “political regrouping”: the areas east of the sources of Pisa, Narew, Vistula and Sana went to the Soviet Union, and Germany received the western territories. Lithuania, adjacent to East Prussia, fell within the German sphere of influence, although the second secret protocol agreed in September 1939 gave most of it to the USSR. According to it, Lithuania received its historical capital of Vilnius, which was under Polish control.
The next clause of the agreement provided for German non-interference in the actions of the Soviet Union in relation to Bessarabia, which at that time was an integral part of Romania.
REFERENCE: As a result, Bessarabia, northern Bukovina and Hertsa were integrated into the Soviet Union.
On August 24, the official Soviet press mouthpieces Pravda and Izvestia published the text of the unclassified part of the Pact on the front page, along with the infamous photograph of a smiling Stalin and Molotov signing the treaty.
The news caused consternation and surprise from government leaders and media outlets around the world. Most knew only about the British-French-Soviet negotiations, which lasted for several months. The concluded pact shocked the allies of Nazi Germany, in particular Japan, as well as the Comintern, foreign communist parties and Jewish communities around the world.
Soviet and German propaganda had to work hard to explain such a sharp change in political course: during the decade preceding the signing of the non-aggression pact, the Soviet Union fought against the Nazis using both political and military methods. After the signing of the pact, Molotov tried to reassure the Germans with his good intentions, making comments to journalists like: “fascism is a matter of taste.”
REFERENCE: The Soviet newspaper Izvestia dated August 21, 1939 published an article “On Soviet-German relations,” which analyzed the issue of improving political ties between Germany and the USSR after the signing of the Soviet-German trade and credit agreement.
German newspapers and radio began a massive manipulation of public opinion, trying to drown out the public outcry caused by the agreements reached with the USSR. At the same time, Hitler still considered an attack on the Soviet Union inevitable.
The day after the signing of the pact, the French and British negotiating delegations urgently requested a meeting with the Soviet negotiator K. Voroshilov, who referred to the changed political situation. On the same day, Hitler told the British ambassador in Berlin that Britain should agree to his demands regarding Poland, since the signed treaty with the Soviets had significantly changed the strategic situation from that of the First World War. Now Germany had no need to scatter its forces, fighting against such a serious enemy as the USSR.
On August 25, Great Britain went all-in by concluding a military treaty with the Polish Republic. Due to this circumstance, Hitler postponed the invasion of Poland planned for August 26 until September 1. In accordance with this military treaty, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3.
Consequences of the pact for other countries
On September 1, the Wehrmacht army invaded Poland from the west. Mass killings of Polish and Jewish civilians, as well as prisoners of war, began immediately. In the first month of the German occupation, executions took place in more than 30 towns and villages.
On September 17, the Soviet army invaded Poland, violating the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact of 1932, and occupied territory assigned by secret protocol to the Soviet Union. Polish troops were already fighting in the west with German units superior in all respects, desperately trying to avoid the capture of Warsaw, and therefore could not provide serious resistance to the Red Army.
REFERENCE: On September 21, the Soviet Union and Germany signed a formal agreement coordinating military movements in Poland, including clearing out saboteurs. A joint German-Soviet parade was held in Brest-Litovsk.
The German-Soviet meeting in September touched upon the future structure of the "Polish region". Soviet authorities immediately began a campaign of Sovietization of the newly acquired areas, organizing staged elections that resulted in the legitimation of the Soviet annexation of eastern Poland.
Making changes to the secret protocol
11 days after the Soviet invasion, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was modified into the German-Soviet Friendship and Border Treaty. The joint declaration of the Soviet Union and the German Reich, published on September 28, 1939, declared a final settlement of the problems arising from the collapse of the Polish state and the creation of a reliable basis for lasting peace in the region.
The parties expressed their conviction that the conclusion of the treaty would contribute to ending the state of war existing between Germany on the one hand, and England and France on the other, which corresponds to the true interests of all peoples. Both governments pledged to make joint efforts to achieve this goal as quickly as possible.
On October 3, the German Ambassador to Moscow, von Schulenburg, informed von Ribbentrop that the Soviet government wanted to obtain the city of Vilnius and its surroundings. On October 8, 1939, as a result of an exchange of letters between Molotov and the German Ambassador, a new agreement was reached.
REFERENCE: The Red Army occupied Vilna (Vilnius) on September 19, 1939, in order to transfer the city to Lithuania in October of the same year. The transfer was regulated by the “Agreement between the Soviet Union and Lithuania on the transfer of the city of Vilna and the Vilnius region to the Republic of Lithuania and mutual assistance” dated October 10, 1939.
The Baltic countries had no choice but to sign the so-called Defense and Mutual Assistance Pact, which allowed the Soviet Union to station its troops on their territory.
Secret changes to the protocol on border settlement and immigration issues
An agreement on resolving a number of current issues was signed by Germany and the Soviet Union on January 10, 1941. According to the secret protocols of the new agreement, Germany renounced its claims to Lithuanian territory, ceding it to the Soviet Union in exchange for 7.5 million dollars (31.5 million Reichsmarks). As a result of the new agreements, the border between Germany and the Soviet Union was established from the Igorka River to the Baltic Sea.
The agreement also extended the commercial agreement until August 1, 1942, established trade rules in the Baltic countries and Bessarabia, and calculated compensation for German property interests in the Baltic states, now within the sphere of influence of the USSR.
It also included provisions on the migration to Germany within 2.5 months of ethnic Germans and German citizens from the Soviet Baltic territories and the migration to the Soviet Union of Baltic and “White Russian” citizens from German territories.
Termination of the pact
The non-aggression pact ended at 03:15 on June 22, 1941, with the start of a massive Wehrmacht attack on Soviet positions in eastern Poland.
It is worth noting that von Ribbentrop himself was against Germany’s invasion of the USSR, about which he even drew up a special memorandum and sent it personally to Hitler. He had no doubt that German troops were capable of reaching Moscow, but expressed concern that Germany was unlikely to be able to reap the benefits of its victories due to the well-known Russian ability to resist passively.
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August 23, 2009 marks the 70th anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Historians and politicians are still arguing about whether this document directly contributed to the start of the war or simply made it easier for Hitler to make a decision about it.
The non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany, better known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was concluded in Moscow on August 23, 1939. This document, according to some historians, greatly contributed to the start of the Second World War, while according to others, it made it possible to delay its start. In addition, the pact largely determined the fate of Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, as well as Western Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans: as a result of the pact, these peoples, many of whom united under one state for the first time in their history, almost completely merged into the Soviet Union. Despite the adjustments made to the destinies of these peoples by the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact still determines many geopolitical realities in modern Europe.
According to the non-aggression pact, the Soviet Union and Germany pledged to “refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.” Moreover, both sides promised not to support coalitions of other countries whose actions may be against the parties to the agreement. Thus, the idea of “collective security” in Europe was buried. It became impossible to restrain the actions of the aggressor (and Nazi Germany was preparing to become it) through the joint efforts of peace-loving countries.
The pact was signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Vyacheslav Molotov, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Joachim von Ribbentrop. Attached to the agreement was a secret additional protocol that defined the delimitation of Soviet and German spheres of influence in Eastern Europe in the event of “territorial reorganization.” The treaty was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR a week after its signing, and the existence of a “secret additional protocol”, which was never ratified, was hidden from the deputies. And the very next day after the ratification of the treaty, September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland.
In full accordance with the secret protocol, the original of which was found in the archives of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee only in the mid-1990s, German troops in 1939 did not enter the eastern regions of Poland, populated mainly by Belarusians and Ukrainians, as well as the territory of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia . Soviet troops subsequently entered all these territories. On September 17, 1939, Soviet troops entered the territory of the eastern regions of Poland. In 1939-1940, relying on left-wing political forces in these countries, the Stalinist leadership established control over Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and as a result of a military conflict with Finland, also classified by a secret protocol in the sphere of interests of the USSR, it tore away part of Karelia and territories adjacent to Leningrad (now the city of St. Petersburg).
As British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote in his memoirs (1940-1945), the fact that such an agreement between Berlin and Moscow was possible meant the failure of British and French diplomacy: it was not possible to direct Nazi aggression against the USSR, nor to make the Soviet Union its ally before the outbreak of World War II. However, the USSR cannot be called a clear winner from the pact, although the country received an additional two years of peacetime and significant additional territories near its western borders.
As a result of the pact, Germany avoided a war on two fronts in 1939-1944, successively defeating Poland, France and small European countries and receiving an army with two years of combat experience to attack the USSR in 1941. Thus, the main benefit from the pact, according to many historians, can be considered Nazi Germany. ("Soviet historiography", publishing house of the Russian State University for the Humanities, 1992).
Political assessment of the pact
The main text of the non-aggression pact, although it meant a sharp turn in the ideology of the USSR, which had previously sharply condemned fascism, did not go beyond the framework of the practice of international relations accepted before World War II. A similar pact was concluded with Nazi Germany, for example, Poland in 1934, and other countries also concluded or tried to conclude such agreements. However, the secret protocol attached to the pact certainly ran counter to international law.
On August 28, 1939, an explanation was signed to the “secret additional protocol”, which delimited the spheres of influence “in the event of territorial and political reorganization of the regions that are part of the Polish State.” The zone of influence of the USSR included the territory of Poland east of the line of the Pissa, Narev, Bug, Vistula, and San rivers. This line roughly corresponded to the so-called "Curzon Line", which was supposed to establish the eastern border of Poland after the First World War. In addition to Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Soviet negotiators also expressed interest in Bessarabia, lost in 1919, and received a satisfactory response from the German side, which declared its “complete political disinterest” in these areas. Subsequently, this territory became part of the Moldavian SSR within the USSR. (For more details, see the book “1939: Lessons from History”, Institute of General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1990, p. 452.)
Since the provisions of the secret protocol, developed by the Stalinist leadership together with Hitler’s entourage, were clearly illegal, both Stalin and Hitler chose to hide this document both from the international community and from their own peoples and authorities, with the exception of an extremely narrow circle of people. The existence of this protocol in the Soviet Union was hidden until 1989, when a special Commission for the political and legal assessment of the pact, formed by the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, presented evidence of the existence of this document to the Congress. Having received this evidence, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, in a resolution dated December 24, 1989, condemned the secret protocol, emphasizing that this protocol, along with other Soviet-German agreements, “lost force at the time of the German attack on the USSR, that is, June 22, 1941.”
Recognizing the immorality of the secret agreement between Stalin and Hitler, the pact and its protocols cannot be considered outside the context of the military-political situation then prevailing in Europe. According to Stalin’s plans, the Soviet-German pact was supposed to be a response to the policy of “appeasement” of Hitler that had been pursued for several years by Great Britain and France, which pursued the goal of quarreling two totalitarian regimes and turning Hitler’s aggression primarily against the USSR.
By 1939, Germany had reclaimed and militarized the Rhineland, completely rearmed its army in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, annexed Austria, and established control over Czechoslovakia. Following Hitler, Hungary and Poland put forward claims to Czechoslovakian territories, which also received pieces of the territory of this country.
In many ways, the policies of the Western powers led to such a sad result - on September 29, 1938, the heads of government of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy signed an agreement in Munich on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, which went down in Russian history as the “Munich Agreement.”
On March 22, 1939, Wehrmacht troops occupied the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda (German name - Memel), and soon Hitler approved the plan for the occupation of Poland. Therefore, the statements often heard today that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the “trigger” of World War II do not correspond to reality. Sooner or later, Hitler, even without a pact with the USSR, would have started a war against Poland, and most European countries at one stage or another in the period 1933-1941 tried to come to an agreement with Nazi Germany, thereby only encouraging Hitler to make new conquests. Until August 23, 1939, negotiations with Hitler and with each other were conducted by all the great European powers - Great Britain, France, and the USSR. (For details about the negotiations in Moscow in the summer of 1939, see “1939: Lessons from History,” pp. 298-308.)
By mid-August, multilateral negotiations entered a decisive phase. Each side pursued its own goals. By August 19, Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations had reached a dead end. The Soviet government agreed to the visit of German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Moscow on August 26-27. Hitler, in a personal message to Stalin, asked to agree to Ribbentrop’s arrival in Moscow on August 22, or at the latest on August 23. Moscow agreed, and 14 hours after Ribbentrop's arrival, a non-aggression pact was signed between Germany and the Soviet Union.
Moral assessment of the pact
Immediately after its signing, the pact attracted criticism from many participants in the international communist movement and from representatives of other leftist forces. Even without knowing about the existence of secret protocols, these people saw in the pact a conspiracy, unthinkable for adherents of leftist ideology, with the darkest imperialist reaction - Nazism. Many scholars even consider the pact to be the beginning of the crisis of the international communist movement, as it deepened Stalin's distrust of foreign communist parties and contributed to Stalin's dissolution of the Communist International in 1943.
After the war, realizing that the pact tarnished his reputation as the main anti-fascist on the planet, Stalin made every effort to justify the pact in Soviet and world historiography. The task was complicated by the fact that the Americans, who occupied the western part of Germany, fell into the hands of German documents that made it possible to make an assumption about the existence of secret protocols to the pact. Therefore, in 1948, with the participation of Stalin (as many researchers believe, he personally) a “historical information” was prepared called “Falsifiers of History.” The provisions of this certificate formed the basis of the official Soviet interpretation of the events of 1939-1941, which remained unchanged until the end of the eighties.
The essence of the “reference” was that the pact was a “brilliant” move by the Soviet leadership, which made it possible to exploit the “inter-imperialist contradictions” between Western bourgeois democracies and Nazi Germany. Without the conclusion of the pact, the USSR would allegedly certainly have become a victim of the “crusade” of capitalist countries against the first socialist state. The provisions of the “historical reference” in the Soviet Union could not be disputed even after Stalin’s death; it was simply that in school and university textbooks under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, his name was more often replaced with words like “country leadership” or “Soviet diplomacy.” (Source - "Soviet Historiography", publishing house of the Russian State University for the Humanities, 1992.) This continued until Gorbachev's reforms in the late eighties, until participants in the first Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR demanded to find out the circumstances of the conclusion of the pact, which largely contributed to the accession of a number of its territories to the Soviet Union .
On December 24, 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, at that time the highest authority in the Soviet Union, adopted a resolution “On the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty of 1939,” officially condemning secret protocols as “an act of personal power,” in any way did not reflect “the will of the Soviet people, who are not responsible for this conspiracy.” It was emphasized that “negotiations with Germany on secret protocols were conducted by Stalin and Molotov in secret from the Soviet people, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the entire party, the Supreme Council and the Government of the USSR.”
The consequences of this “conspiracy” are felt to this day, poisoning relations between Russia and the peoples affected by the Stalin-Hitler protocol. In the Baltic states, these events are hailed as a prelude to the “annexation” of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Based on this, far-reaching conclusions are drawn regarding relations with today's Russia and the status of ethnic Russians in these countries, who are presented as “occupiers” or “colonists.” In Poland, memories of the secret protocols to the pact become a justification for equating Nazi Germany and Stalin's USSR in moral terms, the resulting denigration of the memory of Soviet soldiers, or even for regretting the lack of a coalition between Poland and Nazi Germany for a joint attack on the USSR. The moral unacceptability of such an interpretation of the events of those years, according to Russian historians, stems from the fact that none of the approximately 600 thousand Soviet soldiers who died liberating Poland from the Nazis knew anything about the secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
The material was prepared based on information from open sources
