The state weapons program was first adopted in 2007. The document contains priority areas for the purchase of military equipment, ammunition, ammunition and equipment. The GPV also determines the amount of equipment to be repaired and modernized.
The State Armament Program is the core of the future State Defense Order (SDO), which is approved every year. The document clearly indicates the timing and volume of supplies to the troops. In recent years, the state defense order has been fulfilled at 96-99%. This year, the Ministry of Defense expects an indicator of at least 97%.
While maintaining the assigned tasks
Discussions on the State Liability Program for 2018–2025 have been ongoing since the end of 2016. The initial requests of the Ministry of Defense amounted to 30 trillion rubles. After the reduction in military spending announced by the government, the State Program was cut to 22 trillion, then to 17 trillion rubles.
In the near future, Russian President Vladimir Putin sees defense spending in the range of 2.7 - 2.8% of GDP (in 2016 this figure was 4.7%). At the same time, the previously set tasks for modernizing the Armed Forces and the military-industrial complex (DIC) must be completed.
The Ministry of Defense and industry have two strategic goals. The first is to increase the share of modern equipment in the troops to 70% by 2020 (in 2016 this figure was 58.3%). The second is to increase the share of civilian products in the defense industry to 50% by 2030 (16% in 2015).
The Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation predicts a 1.3-fold increase in the volume of civilian products by 2020. It is likely that the breakthrough will be achieved through the large-scale production of passenger aircraft of various classes.
The state is relying on the production of MS-21, Il-114-300, Il-112V, Tu-334, Tu-214 and Tu-204. By 2025, the number of aircraft produced should increase by 3.5 times, from 30 to 110 units.
The basis for the financial stability of the defense sector should not only be long-term contracts within the framework of the state defense order. At meetings devoted to defense industry issues, the head of state repeatedly called on industrialists to look for new markets.
Waiting for new weapons
Meanwhile, increasing the share of modern military equipment in the troops involves quite serious expenses. The Russian army is on the verge of a generational change in weapons: the service life of Soviet weapons, even their deeply modernized versions, is coming to an end.
From statements by officials it follows that the state will use budget funds to develop and purchase new weapons and equipment. Moreover, the replacement of outdated samples will not be equivalent in quantitative terms. The reason is that modern means of reconnaissance and destruction are much more effective than those invented in the last century.
- Yars missile system
- RIA News
At the moment, it can be said with 100% certainty that the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces), which perform the function of US nuclear deterrence, will remain the priority of the State Armed Forces.
In 2019-2020, the Voevoda silo complex with the R-36M Satan missile will be replaced by the fifth generation Sarmat complex. The RS-28 intercontinental ballistic missile of the same name will be equipped with a hypersonic warhead known as the Yu-71 product.
By 2022, the Topol-M mobile complex, which began entering the missile forces back in the 1980s, should be removed from the Strategic Missile Forces. Since 2011, the Ministry of Defense has purchased only the RS-24 Yars. In addition, by 2025, the Strategic Missile Forces may receive several Barguzin railway complexes with a lightweight version of the RS-24.
The ground forces and airborne forces are expecting replenishment in the form of a wide range of armored vehicles: BRDM-4M, BTR-MD “Rakushka”, vehicles on the “Armata” platform and about 100 units of the world’s only third-generation tank T-14.
- Vladimir Putin inspects a sample of modern equipment for the Russian army "Ratnik", OJSC "Concern "Kalashnikov" in Izhevsk.
- RIA News
In addition, the Civil Defense Program until 2025 will lead to a long-awaited revolution in communications and command and control. All infantrymen and paratroopers will wear the Ratnik uniform, which will increase the level of cooperation and mobility.
The Navy command expects two Priboi-class universal landing ships (UDC), dozens of corvettes, frigates, auxiliary vessels and submarines, including nuclear-powered ones, to appear in service.
From 2012 to 2016, Russian shipyards laid down five submarine cruisers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It is obvious that part of the expenses provided for in the State Program will go towards completing the construction of nuclear-powered ships, which will strengthen the naval component of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation.
The striking power of Russian ships and submarines will be increased through the purchase of Kalibr family cruise missiles and Zircon hypersonic anti-ship missiles. The coastal defense of the Russian Federation will be strengthened by the Bal and Bastion complexes.
Current plans for the modernization of the Aerospace Forces involve the addition of 50 strategic missile carriers Tu-160, Su-34, Su-35 fighters, modernized versions of the MiG-29, as well as the latest Su-57 (PAK FA) and MiG-35. With a high probability, aviation will receive new transport aircraft, multi-purpose and attack helicopters, as well as hundreds of drones, including attack ones.
- MiG-35
- RIA News
Perhaps the most modern element of the Russian army will be the air defense units that are part of the Aerospace Forces and the Ground Forces. The modernized Pantsir and Tor complexes and S-400 and S-500 anti-aircraft missile systems will be transferred to the air defense forces.
Infantry is a priority
The most important issue that worries the military and experts is the distribution of funds provided for by the State Program of Promotion. Deputy Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) Konstantin Makienko suggests that the Navy will receive the least amount of money (expected 2.6 trillion rubles, 15% of the funding of the State Program).
In his opinion, the tense situation in Ukraine and Central Asia, as well as the operation in Syria, dictate the need to invest more funds in the Ground Forces and Airborne Forces, where the share of modern equipment today does not exceed 50%.
- Military personnel of the 31st Separate Guards Air Assault Order of Kutuzov, 2nd Class Brigade of the Russian Airborne Forces
- RIA News
Military expert, senior researcher at the Higher School of Economics Vasily Kashin supports the idea of directing the vector towards large-scale modernization of weapons of infantry and airborne units. In his opinion, the current situation in the world creates too high risks of local conflicts.
“Russian armored vehicles are almost all Soviet-designed. And many of its samples have conceptual flaws that cannot be eliminated within the framework of the designs that were laid down in Soviet times, based on the specific tasks facing the Soviet army,” Kashin explained in an interview with RT.
At the same time, the expert noted that the previous GPV made it possible to arm the missile brigades of the Ground Forces with Iskander operational-tactical systems, various types of drones, and new communication and command and control systems.
“In the first years of the GPV, more modernized versions of weapons will be purchased. The new generation of equipment will begin to enter the troops in a few years. It has to be finalized to the stage where it can be put into mass production,” Kashin clarified.
The Ministry of Defense has begun work on the state armament program (GAP) for the period 2018–2025. This was stated by Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov on the Rossiya 24 TV channel. According to him, “the nearest military-industrial commission will consider the main forecast indicators until 2020, which will determine the resource capabilities of the state to support the state arms program for 2018–2025.”
Thus, it has been officially announced that the timing of the development of a promising state weapons program and its implementation has been shifted to a later date: previously it was about 2016–2020. Plans changed due to the deterioration of the international situation, the growth of the terrorist threat and, accordingly, a different level of complexity of the tasks to be solved.
Reasons for adjusting the state program
Of course, we are talking about a sharp aggravation of the situation around Russia due to the events in Ukraine, the transfer of Crimea by decision of its population to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, as well as the continued implementation of Western plans to create a European missile defense system and build up NATO “muscles” in Europe.
The second, but no less important reason is the increasing threat from international terrorism and Russia’s decision to provide military assistance to Syria on its territory in the fight against ISIS. The decisive and effective actions of our military caused a muted, but very noticeable irritation of the United States and other countries participating in the international anti-ISIS coalition. The actions of the latter, which in fact only contributed to its expansion, look very pale against the background of the successes of the Russian group. Turkey's absolutely inadequate actions became a concentrated expression of this dissatisfaction. These include all sorts of obstacles for our ships, the entry of Turkish troops into Iraqi territory without his invitation, etc.
Such relationships and Western sanctions have led to a deterioration in Russia’s political and economic ties with leading Western countries. The logical result is a noticeable deterioration in the overall economic situation in the world, including in our country.
the main task
In the current, very difficult situation, the main task of the developers of the new, already fifth GPV-2025 is to combine in one project the financial capabilities of the state, the desires of customers and the capabilities of the domestic defense-industrial complex to implement them in a timely manner. In fact, the new state weapons program can be compared to a battle front, the result of victory in which will be to ensure reliable security for Russia. In this regard, to solve this triune, multifactorial and very complex task, it will be legitimate to use one of the main military principles - concentration of efforts on the main direction. In this case, there are several such directions.
The basic factor in developing GPV-2025 is the state’s ability to finance the program. It is currently known that the estimated amount of funding for the long-term state arms program for the period 2018–2025 is estimated at 30 trillion rubles. Taking into account inflation expectations, this approximately corresponds to the level of financing of the current program, the cost of which was about 20 trillion rubles.
Marine Corps of the Russian Navy. Photo: Alexey Pavlishak/TASS
Most likely, the amount of 30 trillion is not final and can be reduced or increased. But today the main directions in which the amount will be distributed must be determined.
Main directions
When developing a new state weapons program, the first and main direction should be maintaining the strategic deterrent forces at the proper level and in constant combat readiness. This is the combat potential of intimidation, which is designed to deter potential aggressors from the desire to begin military operations against the Russian Federation. Its main components are reconnaissance and strike assets. The former must promptly recognize the threat of attack and notify the country's leadership so that appropriate decisions can be made, while the latter must inflict unacceptable damage on the aggressor and force him to abandon his plans.
The second important area is the area of information warfare, the importance of which is growing by leaps and bounds. Today, the information war is already underway, and without the availability of adequate means, one can be defeated already in peacetime, before the use of armed means begins.
The third direction is the improvement, development and creation of reserves of high-precision weapons (HPT). Today, it is the WTO, along with reconnaissance means, that is the key to achieving success in defense and offense. Everyone understands that in the event of the use of nuclear weapons there will be no winners. Therefore, high-precision weapons will become the main argument in the confrontation between countries, which was confirmed by the experience of military operations in Yugoslavia. At the same time, one must understand that, along with the availability of conventional samples, it is important to have sufficient reserves of “smart” weapons, and their production requires considerable financial costs and manufacturing time. Therefore, the creation of the required stock of WTO in wartime conditions may not be ensured.
The development of new and improvement of existing types of weapons is another important area for focusing the main efforts. This is a lengthy and quite costly process, but you cannot do without it. The use of new weapons has always seriously influenced combat operations, even to the point of changing their forms and methods. Thus, work on the creation in the USA served as the basis for the development of the concept of a “global strike”. In accordance with it, the use of such means can ensure victory over the enemy without the use of nuclear weapons.
Another main direction of GPV-2025 is the improvement and equipping of types and branches of the military with new types of conventional weapons. After the collapse of the USSR, the process of re-equipping the army with new equipment stopped. Many types of obsolete equipment have reached the end of their service life and must be replaced. Today we can say that the troops are rearming, although not as quickly as we would like given the international situation.
It is known that within the framework of the GPV-2020 it was planned to equip the army with new types of weapons in the ratio of 30% and 70% of the total as of 2015 and 2020, respectively. It is too early to assess the extent to which the task has been accomplished, but the obvious intensification in this direction and the increase in the number of new weapons in the troops are quite noticeable.
It is known that the main reason for performing any task is determined by the desire of the performers and security. Today, the desire on the part of the leadership of the Russian Federation to increase the combat capability of the Armed Forces and the defense capability of the country is obvious. Regarding support, it should be noted that here the military-political leadership of the state must show firmness in decisions and consistency in achieving goals with the support of the population. “In the whole world we have only two faithful allies - our army and navy. “Everyone else will take up arms against us at the first opportunity,” said Emperor Alexander III the Peacemaker. And today the situation in the world is no simpler than in his time. This is due to Russia’s independent policy, whose actions do not fit into the framework defined for us by the United States and its NATO allies.
The existing shortcomings in the functioning of the Russian defense industry should not become a hindrance in ensuring the required combat capability of our Armed Forces. For all their intensity, the tasks assigned to him must be real and achievable. Otherwise, the prospects for solving these very problems are quite vague and will be limited by references to “objective” reasons and lack of finance.
And one last thing. In modern conditions, in order to implement the state armaments program for 2018–2025, the option of “belt tightening” should not be ruled out. There have been such examples in the history of Russia, and, one must assume, our people will agree to this without grumbling and with understanding.
At the beginning of July, the military is expected to submit the plan for the state armament program for 2018-2025 (GPV-2025) for consideration to the board of the Military-Industrial Commission for its further submission for approval to the President of the Russian Federation. But already today information has leaked to the press that funding for the army and navy rearmament program will be reduced by 5 trillion rubles: from the requested RF Ministry of Defense 22 trillion. up to 17 trillion allocated to him. rubles This is how sequestration turns out.
Everyone remembers how sharply (without mincing words addressed to Mr. A. Siluanov) S.K. reacted. Shoigu, when he learned about the Ministry of Finance’s proposal to reduce the expenditures of the Russian Defense Ministry to upgrade arms and military equipment to 12 trillion. rubles Following this, we were all simply “fascinated” by the statement of Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation D. Rogozin about the refusal to modernize previous models of military equipment in favor of the construction of new, promising vehicles. For some reason, behind this “crafty” phrase, a lack of funds for all areas of rearmament was immediately felt, because quite recently the same Dmitry Olegovich convincingly argued that modernization is no worse than the construction of new models and cited the example of the modernization of Project 1144 TARKR.
And there are serious reasons for this. In recent years, the situation with financing all aspects of the life of our society has been constantly deteriorating, and the crisis has had an impact. Syria and Ukraine, the deployment of the Arctic group, and the growth of instability in the Central Asian region required increasing expenses. Against this background, the voices of our home-grown liberals sounded jesuitically about “defense sufficiency” and a reasonable approach to spending the state budget. To spite them, jingoistic patriots and left-wing radicals began to talk about the fact that the third world war is on the threshold, and our rulers were not at all concerned about this situation... Moreover, the guarantor of the Constitution himself suggested that the defense industry magnates think about conversion projects for their industries and enterprises. Others began to sing mantras about the “fifth column” and its treacherous policies. Both “on the left” and “on the right”, the guardians of the good of the state and the Russian people beat themselves in the chest with their heels and claim that it is their position that is the most correct and far-sighted... And who in such a situation should the common man believe, “where should the poor peasant go”!? (With)
So what's really going on? Why are officials who, by virtue of their official position, should, on the contrary, be concerned with every fiber of their soul about the growth of the military power of the state and its armed forces, forced to sequester funding for the rearmament program of the RF Armed Forces?
It seems to me that today’s program of equipping the army and navy with promising models of weapons and military equipment is faced with a new, changed situation, which those who, as usual, are preparing for “past wars” cannot understand. This is why demands arise for the mass production of “new”, and in fact slightly improved, samples of traditional weapons and military equipment. Which, undoubtedly, are also needed. But they cannot radically influence the balance of power in the confrontation with the world hegemon and his henchmen from NATO. We need a radically new solution that knocks the trump cards of numerical superiority out of the hands of NATO generals over our armed forces...
And now the president of the country speaks and talks about the appearance, the action of which is based on “new physical principles.” These are laser, hypersonic and beam weapons. This is a very expensive weapon. Therefore, a legitimate question arises: “Where will we get the funds for this fundamentally new weapon?” The shortest way is to redistribute existing funds, and if this is not enough, then reduce the purchase of traditional weapons. I must admit, this has already happened in our state, when the unforgettable N.S. For the sake of establishing a new type of armed forces (Strategic Missile Forces), Khrushchev put ships and planes under the knife. The famous reduction of 1200 thousand people in the USSR Armed Forces. Apparently, following the example of 1961, the same “re-grading” has taken place today: the construction of large NKs has been abandoned (as they say, until better times), the purchase of PAK TA T-50 and the innovative T-14 tank on the Armata platform is being transferred to the right and reduced. . Fortunately, the decision to continue work on “Sarmat”, “Barguzin”, “Rubezh” remains unchanged, the construction of “Boreev-A”, “Yaseni-M”, “Voronezhi”, “Neba-U” and other types of weapons and military equipment will continue , providing strategic parity with our incredible overseas partners.
But the future, as noted by V.V. Putin, for weapons based on new physical principles, such as hypersound, for example. And here, according to the statement of Deputy Minister of Defense Yu. Borisov, we are 10 years ahead of our partners because of the puddle.
Thus, in November 2016, a new hypersonic weapon was tested - “product 4202” or “Yu-71”. An ICBM equipped with it launched from the Dombarovsky position area in the Orenburg region. At an altitude of about 100 km, a device separated from the rocket and, at a speed of up to Mach 15, hit a target at the Kamchatka Kura training ground. Before entering the dense layers of the atmosphere, the device performed a maneuver in altitude and heading, after which it performed a “slide” and dived almost vertically onto the target. The anti-aircraft maneuver and hypersonic speed of such a warhead, in addition to the missile defense system, guarantees it a breakthrough of all existing and future US missile defense systems.
According to the general opinion, the Navy suffered the most from the sequestration of funding for GPV-2025, which, of the requested 4.7, will receive only 2.6 trillion. rub. And this despite the fact that the construction of “Boreev” and “Ash” will continue. But what will the fleet get for the infrastructure and general purpose forces that it needs so much? This is where you remember the words of D. Rogozin about replenishing the fleet with “muscular frigates and corvettes”, and not with ships of the 1st rank...
But even in this extremely difficult situation, the fleet plans to increase its combat capabilities by equipping its ships with fundamentally new, hypersonic weapons.
Thus, on April 21, 2017, the Russian Minister of Defense announced the successful completion of the first combat mission by a nuclear submarine of a new project.
Presumably, this nuclear submarine cruiser K-560 "Severodvinsk" (Project 885) made the first launch of the Zircon-S GZPKR from a sea carrier in the period April 10-15, 2017 from the White Sea. The missile successfully hit the designated target. And just recently there was a message that our new product 3M-22, better known as the Zircon-S hypersonic anti-ship missile, reached a speed of Mach 8 during testing. True, the developers themselves confirmed only Mach 6.
The first Zircon-S GZPKR complexes are planned to be installed on the Peter the Great TARKR during the modernization of the ship, planned for 2018-2020. In total, the cruiser will be equipped with 10 3S-14 vertical launchers, each of which can accommodate 3 Zircon missiles. Thus, the ship will carry up to 30 Zircons on board. This will significantly expand the ship’s combat capabilities, increase its combat stability, and will also significantly expand the range of missions performed. At one time, the former commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral V. Chirkov, said that by 2020 a “group of strategic non-nuclear deterrence forces” equipped with high-precision long-range weapons should be created within the Russian Navy. The basis of this group will be the Project 885M Yasen nuclear-powered submarine cruisers, modernized Project 949M nuclear-powered submarine cruisers, and Project 1144 heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers (http://www.interfax.ru/russia/549055).
It is assumed that the 3M-22 GZPKR will be deployed on the new Kalina-class RPKSN/SSBN and modernized TU-160M2 missile carriers. It is also possible to place them on mobile coastal missile systems. All this should increase the ability of the naval forces to solve the tasks assigned to them.
But missile systems like Zircon place increased demands on the quality of target designation. And at long distances (the expected range of the 3M-22 is from 400-500 and up to 1000 km) and in conditions of time shortage, only space target designation means can solve this problem. After all, a rocket flying at hypersonic speed must receive information in real time, without distortion or interference. And this is only possible when using space communication lines, which was implemented in the 3M-22 product.
It is not for nothing that V.V.’s meeting was devoted to the development of space systems. Putin with members of the Security Council and representatives of Roscosmos, which took place on May 22 this year in Sochi.
The measures taken should, to a certain extent, neutralize the advantage of the surface forces of the navies of NATO countries over the forces of the Russian Navy. But, unfortunately, only in the near sea zone. But in the far zone, only our fourth generation nuclear submarines can effectively resist US and NATO ships. And we don’t have that many of them.
I specifically did not touch upon the issues of equipping other types and branches of the military with new types of weapons and military equipment, believing that this would be done better than me by members of the forum who gave the best years of their lives to serving in their ranks.
In conclusion, I would like to note that the leadership of the country and the armed forces is doing everything to ensure that the dreams of Washington hawks about an unrequited “instant global strike” on the centers of military-political control of Russia and its armed forces are dashed by our asymmetric response to lovers of forced democratization of sovereign countries and their peoples.
Dmitry Gorenburg,Center for Naval Analysis; Harvard University
At the end of 2017, President Vladimir Putin approved the State Armament Program for 2018-2027. What types of weapons will be supplied to the Russian army over the next eight years? And what is the likelihood that the Russian government will be able to fulfill its objectives? According to government plans, Russia appears to be preparing to secure its leadership in some areas (anti-ship missiles, electronic warfare, air defense), close the gap in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles and precision weapons, and come to terms with the gap in several areas, including particularly on surface ships and automated control systems.
Scope of the program
The Russian State Armament Program (SAP) for 2018-2027, which was approved at the end of the year, determined Russia's priorities in the field of rearmament for the next ten years. The previous program, which will run until 2020, was the plan under which the Russian military modernized its weapons starting in 2011. The total budget for this program was 19.3 trillion rubles. GPV-2027 was initially considered as an option to save GPV-2020, whose expensive and long-term programs were transferred to the next ten-year plan. Total cost of the successor program will be 19 trillion rubles. This suggests that spending on military procurement will actually remain the same. The amount in rubles remains the same, while almost all purchases will be made from domestic suppliers, which will protect transaction volumes from the impact of ruble exchange rate fluctuations.
The scope of the program became the subject of lengthy bargaining between the ministries of defense and finance. Back in 2014, the military requested funding of between 30-55 trillion. rub. for ten years, while the Ministry of Finance set the bar at 14 trillion. rub. As the country's financial situation began to deteriorate in 2015, the adoption of the SAP was delayed until 2017, and both sides reduced the proposed volumes. In 2016, the Ministry of Defense requested 22-24 trillion. rub. for eight years, while the Ministry of Finance agreed to allocate no more than 12 trillion. As a result of lengthy and at times tough negotiations, a sum of 17 trillion was agreed upon last winter. rub. To date, this figure has increased to 19 trillion. rub., and the duration of the program is up to standard ten years. As a result, several of the most ambitious and expensive projects have been postponed, including the creation of new aircraft carriers, destroyers, strategic bombers and interceptor fighters.
Friction over the financing of military expenditures, however, did not end there. Although the total amount was agreed upon, there was internal conflict within the Ministry of Defense over the distribution of procurement funding among the various departments that prepared documents to justify the importance of their activities. As noted in the approved naval doctrine, such documents often have little connection with any real assessment of military needs or the potential of the defense industry to produce the requested weapons and their carriers. It is clear that the Navy is losing the battle over budget allocation. The highest priority in procurement funding is given to the ground forces and nuclear weapons modernization, while the navy, which had the largest level of funding under the GPV 2020, will be at the bottom of the funding hierarchy.
Nuclear forces
Priorities for the development of Russian nuclear forces until 2027 have been determined. After 2021, the naval component of the nuclear triad will consist of six Delta-IV class strategic nuclear submarines (SAS) and eight Borei class SSSUs, equally divided between the Northern and Pacific fleets. This will make it possible to have 12 submarines at permanent disposal, while two will undergo major repairs and modernization. The aviation component is subject to renewal, modernized versions of TU-95 missile-carrying bombers ( Bear H) and eleven TU-160 ( Blackjack) will receive new engines and electronic equipment, as well as updated weapons. Designed to replace the X-55 missile, the new long-range cruise missile X-101, modified with nuclear warheads, has a range of up to 4,500 km. In addition, the Russian military announced the resumption of the process of creating a new TU-160S bomber, the serial production of which is expected to be restored no earlier than 2021. This represents a more cost-effective and technically feasible alternative to bringing an entirely new strategic bomber design, known as the PAK DA, into production within a reasonable time frame.
We can talk with the least confidence about the prospects for the development of the land component of the Russian nuclear triad. Currently, three projects are being implemented: the Russian mobile ground complex with the Rubezh intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the railway complex with the Barguzin ICBM, and the silo-based complex with the Sarmat ICBM. Project Rubezh is close to completion, with testing completed in 2015 and deployment expected in 2017. The RS-26 Rubezh is a further development of the RS-24 Yars complex, the missiles of which are equipped with independently targetable warheads designed to overcome missile defenses. Barguzin is expected to be ready for flight testing in 2019, although there was a period of several months in 2016 when it looked like the program would be put on hold due to budget cuts. The Barguzin's range and accuracy are expected to surpass the former Soviet rail-based system, which was decommissioned in 2005. The RS-28 Sarmat is a new generation silo-based ICBM. The system was initially expected to be ready for deployment in 2018, but unspecified problems with its development led to launch tests being pushed back from the originally planned date in 2015 to a date no earlier than June 2017. As a result, Sarmat is unlikely to be deployed earlier than 2020, assuming that the difficulties can be overcome and the planned test schedule can be met.
Ground troops
After being largely underfunded under GPV 2020, the Army is expected to receive the largest share of GPV 2027 funds. According to some sources, more than a quarter of the total program budget will be allocated to equipping ground and airborne forces. This is partly due to Russia's experience in Ukraine, which is making the view that ground forces may be needed in future conflicts increasingly popular. For the most part, the redistribution of funds is explained, however, by the readiness for mass production of new models of armored vehicles and tanks. The T-90 and T-14 Armata tanks, the Kurganets-25 infantry fighting vehicle and the Boomerang armored personnel carrier are expected to enter service within the next eight years, although the number of units of some types of equipment, such as the Armata, may be limited due to high production costs.
The production of ground-based artillery and missiles was a positive development for the ground forces against the general background. The deployment of Iskander medium-range missiles is on schedule, with all installations expected to be in place by 2019. New multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) Uragan and Tornado-S have been deployed since 2017; It is expected that their procurement will continue during the GPV-2027. Deliveries of the Coalition self-propelled artillery mount (SAU), which should eventually completely replace the Msta self-propelled gun of the Soviet period, began in 2016. New short-range air defense systems will also be purchased.
The situation with tactical automated control systems for ground forces is more problematic. They were initially expected to be deployed in 40 brigades by 2020; but so far they are being field tested in only one division. The military reportedly has mixed reviews of the systems, which may lead them to conclude that the systems need improvement before widespread deployment. In this case, the development of networked military control capabilities may be delayed until after 2027. In the meantime, the ground forces will continue to receive intelligence, control and communications (CRUS) and electronic warfare systems, which have proven themselves well in Syria.
Naval forces
The Russian naval forces (Navy Forces) were left out of the GPV-2027. In the State Program of Promotion 2020, 4.7 trillion were allocated for them. rubles, which the Navy could not fully master due to a combination of problems in the Russian shipbuilding industry, as well as the influence of Western and Ukrainian sanctions. As a result, in GPV-2027, funding for the Navy is expected to be reduced to 2.6 trillion. rub. Despite the existence of grandiose plans discussed in documents such as the recently approved Naval Doctrine, Russia plans to focus on the construction of submarines and small ships in naval shipbuilding. In the area of surface ship construction, the focus will be on new patrol ships of several different types, featuring larger displacement and better armament, as well as the start of the long-delayed mass production of Admiral Gorshkov class frigates. Until the problems with this type of ship are resolved, the Navy will continue to build Admiral Grigorovich class frigates with less advanced characteristics.
The only new class of surface ships expected , will be built during the GPV-2027, is the class of Super-Gorshkov frigates (displacing 8,000 tons), which is increasingly seen as a cheaper and more practical alternative to the class of nuclear-powered missile cruisers of the Leader class with a displacement of 14 thousand tons. Key Takeaway What this means is that the Russian Navy is seeking to increase the size of its smaller ships in order to increase their combat effectiveness and endurance, while delaying indefinitely the purchase of supplies of larger ships such as destroyers, landing craft and aircraft carriers.
As for submarines, GPV-2027 will undoubtedly provide funding for the completion of the construction of six (and possibly seven) Yasen-M nuclear submarines with cruise missiles, as well as for the modernization of four to six boats of two classes - “ Oscar" and "Shark", developed during the Soviet period. Construction of fifth-generation nuclear submarines (conditionally classified as the Husky class) will begin in mid-2020. For diesel submarines, the main emphasis will be on the development of air-independent power systems for future Kalina-class submarines. In the meantime, Lada-class submarines will also be built, as well as advanced Kilo-class submarines.
A more important focus for the Russian Navy in the coming years than the creation of new ships and submarines will be the development of new weapons systems and the improvement of existing ones. The introduction of Kalibr missiles gave the Russian fleet the ability to hit enemy ships and ground targets with cruise missiles at long range; As a result, even small ships moored near Russian ports can become a serious threat to the enemy, including NATO member countries. The Russian military appreciated the advantages these missiles provided and installed them on a large number of ships and submarines. Over the next eight years, Russia will continue to install these missiles on most new surface ships and submarines, upgrade some of its existing fleet units to carry these missiles, and improve the accuracy and reliability of the missiles themselves. The military is also working to develop a new hypersonic missile that could pose an even greater threat to Russia's adversaries in the medium to long term.
Air Force
Over the past seven years, the Russian Air Force has begun to receive significant numbers of modern aircraft and has continued to fund the development of new models, such as the newly christened fifth-generation fighter Sukhoi SU-57 (formerly known as the T-50 or PAK F). The SU-57 is not scheduled to go into mass production until the upgraded engines are ready, which is unlikely to happen before 2027. Over the next eight years, Russia will continue to purchase small quantities of these aircraft for testing. In addition, it will continue to acquire SU-35S fighters (a new contract for 50 aircraft was signed at the end of 2016), as well as SU-30SM fighters and SU-34 fighter-bombers (probably in the amount of 12-18 aircraft of each of the two types in year). The Air Force may be supplied, although probably in small quantities, with Mikoyan MiG-35 fighters. In general, since the Russian Air Force is now equipped with modern fighters, their purchases will be reduced to leave room for the supply of other types of aircraft. The same goes for military helicopters, since over the past seven years the Russian military has already received what it needs. Development of the new high-speed helicopter will begin no earlier than 2027.
One of the main objects of attention will be the provision of transport aircraft and tankers, which have been the weak point of the Russian Air Force for a long period. It is expected that serial production of the long-suffering Ilyushin Il-76 MD90A will begin in 2019, and that after that the military will receive 10-12 aircraft of this type per year. A light transport aircraft is currently being developed, a prototype of which is planned to be presented in 2024. The A-100 aircraft with a long-range radar detection and control system (AWACS) based on the Il-76MD-90A was supposed to be delivered in 2016, but the deadline was repeatedly postponed. However, deliveries of this aircraft will be included in GPV-2027. Finally, Russia is experiencing a boom in the production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). By 2020, combat UAVs will be produced, as well as a new generation of reconnaissance UAVs.
In order to strengthen air defense, Russia will continue to deploy long-range S-400 missiles and short-range Pantsir-S missiles. It seems increasingly unlikely, however, that the new generation S-500 air defense system will be ready for mass production soon, although official plans still indicate that a prototype will be created by 2020. In the original plans, the start of serial production of the S-500 was scheduled for 2015. Development of a new generation of short-range air defense systems has just begun, and it is unlikely to be ready for production until 2030.
Impact on combat readiness and regional security
GPV 2020 is often characterized as the first successful weapons program in Russia's post-Soviet history. It was designed to help the Russian military overcome a backlog caused by a long supply disruption due to the economic crisis of the 1990s. Over the past seven years, the military has made great strides in the modernization of weapons and equipment. By and large, the new models are based on updated late Soviet developments. Currently, the Russian defense industry faces a much more difficult task of starting mass production of new models. This is more successful in some areas, such as the production of nuclear submarines, missile systems and UAVs. Less progress has been made with regard to warships and air defense systems. No conclusions have been drawn about the situation with tanks and armored vehicles.
Now that the most serious gaps have been largely filled, GPV-2027 is focused on moving the Russian army to a more regular supply schedule. Funding will remain relatively stable, although it may be adjusted depending on the economic situation. The previous program showed that the state budget and the defense industry can more or less maintain the current level of funding. The biggest challenge will be successfully bringing new designs to mass production.
As for the impact of modernization on military capabilities, Russia is already strong enough to defend itself against any adversary in a conventional war and defeat any neighboring state except China. It also has more than sufficient nuclear deterrent capabilities. Therefore, new purchases under the program will be aimed at ensuring that the country keeps pace with its competitors (NATO member countries and China). In some areas, such as air defense, anti-ship missiles and electronic warfare, Russia will continue to outperform its opponents. In other areas, such as UAVs, precision weapons, tanks and armored vehicles, it looks set to close the gap. Finally, in several areas, including surface ships, military transport aircraft, and automated control systems, it will continue to lag significantly behind the United States and may begin to lag behind China.
GPV-2025 - state weapons program for 2018-2025. It is this document that determines how much and what kind of equipment should be produced and supplied to our armed forces. Naturally, starting from this program, the direction for the further development of the Russian armed forces is being created.
The program will be approved in June-July this year. Quite understandably, the details are kept secret. But if we analyze the speeches and interviews of people involved in this program (Dmitry Rogozin, Yuri Borisov and others), then we can already draw preliminary conclusions.
The main task of the Russian military-industrial complex, as repeatedly stated at the highest level (Putin, Shoigu), was to bring the level of equipment of the armed forces with modern equipment to 70% by 2020.
Here the interests of several departments collide. This includes the army, military-industrial complex enterprises, and the Ministry of Finance. In 2015, when work began on the creation of the State Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense requested 55 trillion rubles for the program. Later, in 2016, the amount was adjusted to 30 trillion. The Ministry of Finance was ready to allocate no more than 12 trillion for the program.
Of course, sanctions, crises, etc. played a role, and I think that in the end the parties will come to an agreement on a figure of 15-18 trillion rubles.
In terms of time, the program was supposed to operate from 2016 to 2025. But, since our economic situation really leaves much to be desired, it is worth remembering that the already funded part of the State Program for 2011-2020 has not yet been fully implemented. And 20 trillion rubles were allocated for this part.
Rogozin says that all unspent and unused funds will be transferred to the next program. Apparently, the whole problem is in the calculations.
But today we can conclude that there will be less money. Even taking into account what they will not have time to master within the previous program. And little by little information is leaking out about who will finance the SAP program.
I'll start with the sad (for some) news about what will NOT happen.
The reduction will affect the fleet the most
There will be no nuclear supercarriers of the Storm project. They were not just shelved, but for an “indefinite period.” Which in our realities can be equated to the fact that even if aircraft carriers go into final development, it will definitely not be in the next 10-15 years.
The same applies to the Leader project destroyers. Unlike the aircraft carrier, all work on them was postponed until after 2025.
Yes, it is obvious that our finances are not very good, so perhaps promising, but expensive ships are postponed “for later”.
At the same time, it cannot be said that the fleet was “offended.” In GPV-2025, the fleet will receive more funds for repairs, modernization and completion than any other types of troops.
"Borey" will maintain the same pace of construction. This is our weapon of defense and retaliation, everything is in order with submarine missile carriers.
Nuclear icebreakers of Project 22220 will be completed within the framework of the State Armed Forces. "Arctic", "Siberia" and "Ural". What do nuclear icebreakers have to do with the navy? It's easy to read. In general, the program for the construction of ships and vessels for the Arctic will not be cut by a single ruble. Many people say so, referring to the assignment given by the president.
In the Arctic grouping, within the framework of GPV-2025, work will also continue with the icebreaker “Ilya Muromets” and universal patrol ships of the Arctic zone of Project 23550.
Repairs and upgrades
It is clear that in times of crisis and other problems, the main burden of work will fall on the “old people”. As part of the GPV, the Peter the Great, Admiral Kuznetsov, and Moskva will be modernized.
It would be nice, by the way, to finish the repairs of the Admiral Nakhimov.
In general, the fleet will not be affected. Yes, work on promising aircraft carriers and destroyers has been postponed. But today our fleet has more significant tasks than aircraft carriers. The Syrian Express showed that we have a shortage of less expensive, but more significant ships and vessels.
VKS
There are abbreviations here too.
Although the reduction in funding will not hit VKS much. The emphasis will be on supplying combat aircraft, Su-35, Mi-8AMTSh helicopters, and S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems to aviation units that have been well tested during the Syrian war.
The S-400, which is supplied to the troops in the amount of 4-5 regimental sets per year, will most likely be preferred to the promising S-500. Until more stable times.
The same thing will apparently happen to PAK DA. Another promising, but very expensive project. Of course, PAK YES will be implemented, but not in GPV-2025.
Moreover, we are developing a project to modernize the Tu-160 to the Tu-160M2 modification. Most likely, the Tu-160M2 will go into production until 2025 and will serve. Two strategic bomber projects at the same time are something not all rich countries can afford.
But the first production T-50 fighters within the framework of GPV-2025 should already be in units and at airfields.
In addition, much attention is paid to transport aviation. It is within the framework of GPV-2025 that light transport aircraft Il-112 and medium transport aircraft Il-214 should begin to enter service with the troops. The role of heavy transport aircraft is still assigned to the Il-76 of all modifications.
Ground troops
The figure of 70% for new technology by 2020 is serious. And the pace must be appropriate. Yes, the share of the same new tanks by 2020 will be 70%. But not at the expense of the Armat, but at the expense of the T-72B3.
“Armata” is not being shelved, but we are no longer talking about hundreds of new tanks, but about more modest numbers. 20-30 tanks per year is most likely exactly the number that can be expected in the context of budget cuts.
Nevertheless, this number of tanks will provide both the initial stage of training of crews and specialists, and the testing of new equipment among the troops.
