49. Perestroika in the USSR: its causes and consequences (1985-1991). Economic reforms of perestroika.
In March 1985, after the death of Chernenko, at an extraordinary plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, MS Gorbachev was elected General Secretary.
The new Soviet leadership was aware of the need for reforms in order to improve the economy and overcome the crisis in the country, but it did not have a scientifically based program for such reforms developed in advance. The reforms began without comprehensive preparation. Gorbachev's reforms were called the "perestroika" of Soviet society. Perestroika in the USSR lasted from 1985 to 1991.
Reasons for restructuring:
Stagnation in the economy, the growth of scientific and technological backwardness from the West.
Low standard of living of the population: constant shortage of food and industrial goods, rising prices of the "black market".
The political crisis, expressed in the decomposition of the leadership, in its inability to ensure economic progress. The merging of the party-state apparatus with the businessmen of the shadow economy and crime.
Negative phenomena in the spiritual sphere of society. Due to strict censorship, there was a duality in all genres of creativity: official culture and unofficial (represented by "samizdat" and informal associations of creative intelligentsia).
Arms race. By 1985, the Americans announced that they were ready to launch nuclear weapons into space. We did not have the means to launch weapons into space. It was necessary to change foreign policy and disarm.
The purpose of the restructuring: improve the economy, overcome the crisis. MS Gorbachev and his team did not aim to turn to capitalism. They only wanted to improve socialism. So, the reforms began under the leadership of the ruling CPSU party.
April 1985 at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, an analysis was given of the state of Soviet society and a course to accelerate the socio-economic development of the country was proclaimed. The main attention was paid to scientific and technological progress (STP), the technical re-equipment of mechanical engineering and the activation of the "human factor". MS Gorbachev called for strengthening labor and technological discipline, increasing the responsibility of personnel, etc. To improve the quality of manufactured products, state acceptance was introduced - another body of administrative control. The quality of this, however, has not radically improved.
In May 1985, the anti-alcohol campaign began., which was supposed to provide not only "universal sobriety", but also an increase in labor productivity. The sale of alcoholic beverages has declined. Vineyards began to be cut down. Began speculation in alcohol, home brewing and mass poisoning of the population with wine surrogates. During the three years of this campaign, the country's economy lost 67 billion rubles from the sale of alcoholic beverages.
The fight against "unearned income" began. In fact, it came down to another offensive by local authorities on personal subsidiary farms and touched a layer of people who grew and sold their products in the markets. At the same time, the “shadow economy” continued to flourish.
In general, the national economy of the country continued to work according to the old scheme, actively using command methods, relying on the enthusiasm of workers. The old methods of work did not lead to "acceleration", but to a significant increase in accidents in various sectors of the national economy. The term "acceleration" disappeared from the official vocabulary a year later.
To rethink the existing order prompted disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in April 1986.
After the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the government decided that it was necessary to rebuild and start economic reforms. The program of economic reforms was developed for a whole year. Well-known economists: Abalkin, Aganbegyan, Zaslavskaya presented a good Pproject of reforms in the economy, approved in the summer of 1987. The reform project included the following:
Expanding the independence of enterprises on the principles of cost accounting and self-financing.
Gradual revival of the private sector in the economy (initially through the development of the cooperative movement).
Recognition of equality in the countryside of the five main forms of management (collective farms, state farms, agro-combines, rental cooperatives, farms).
Reducing the number of sectoral ministries and departments.
Rejection of the monopoly of foreign trade.
Deeper integration into the global market.
Now it was necessary for these economic reforms to develop and adopt laws.
Let's see what laws have been passed.
In 1987, the "State Enterprise Law" was adopted. This law was to come into force on January 1, 1989. It was envisaged that enterprises would be endowed with broad rights. However, the ministries did not give enterprises economic independence.
With great difficulty, the formation of the private sector in the economy began. In May 1988, laws were passed that opened up the possibility of private activity in more than 30 types of production of goods and services. By the spring of 1991, more than 7 million people were employed in the cooperative sector. And another 1 million people - self-employed. True, this led not only to the entry of new free entrepreneurs into the market, but also to the actual legalization of the “shadow economy”. Every year the private sector "laundered" up to 90 billion rubles. per year (in prices up to January 1, 1992). Cooperatives did not take root in our country, because cooperators were taxed at 65% of their profits.
It was too late to start agricultural reforms. These reforms were half-hearted. The land was never transferred to private ownership. Rental farms did not take root, since all the rights to allocate land belonged to the collective farms, which were not interested in the appearance of a competitor. By the summer of 1991, only 2% of the land was cultivated on lease terms and 3% of the livestock was kept. As a result, the food issue has not been resolved in the country. The shortage of elementary foodstuffs led to the fact that even in Moscow their rationed distribution was introduced (which has not happened since 1947).
As a result, laws that meet the dictates of the times have not been adopted. Yes and commissioning adopted laws extended over a long period. On the whole, the economic reforms of perestroika were inconsistent and half-hearted. All reforms were actively resisted by the local bureaucracy.
Outdated enterprises continued to produce useless products. Moreover, a general decline in industrial production began.
There was no reform of credit, pricing policy, centralized supply system.
The country found itself in a deep financial crisis. Inflation growth reached 30% per month. Foreign debts exceeded 60 billion (according to some sources, 80 billion) US dollars; gigantic sums went to pay interest on these debts. The foreign exchange reserves of the former USSR and the gold reserves of the State Bank were depleted by that time.
There was a general shortage and a flourishing "black" market.
The standard of living of the population fell. In the summer of 1989, the first workers' strikes began.
As the economic reforms failed, Gorbachev began to focus on the transition to the market. In June 1990, a resolution “On the concept of transition to a regulated market economy” was issued, and then specific laws. They provided for the transfer of industrial enterprises to lease, the creation of joint-stock companies, the development of private entrepreneurship, etc. However, the implementation of most measures was postponed until 1991, and the transfer of enterprises to lease was stretched until 1995.
At this time, a group of economists: academician Shatalin, deputy. Chairman of the Council of Ministers Yavlinsky and others proposed their plan for the transition to the market in 500 days. During this period it was supposed to carry out the privatization of state enterprises of trade and industry, and significantly curtail the economic power of the Center; remove state control over prices, allow unemployment and inflation. But Gorbachev refused to support this program. The socio-economic situation in the country was continuously deteriorating.
In general, under the influence of perestroika, significant changes took place in all spheres of society. For 6 years of perestroika, the composition of the Politburo was updated by 85%, which was not even during the period of Stalin's "purges". Ultimately, perestroika got out of control of its organizers, and the leading role of the CPSU was lost. Mass political movements appeared and the "parade of sovereignties" of the republics began. Perestroika, in the form in which it was conceived, failed.
Politicians, scientists, publicists have several points of view on the results of perestroika:
Some believe that perestroika enabled Russia to begin to develop in line with world civilization.
Others see that as a result of perestroika, the ideas of the October Revolution were betrayed, there was a return to capitalism, and a huge country fell apart.
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Perestroika was a fatal event for many residents of the country, which radically changed their lives. Therefore, its prerequisites, main causes, events and results should be briefly described.
Prehistory of the era of perestroika
Spring 1985 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, at that time he was a little over 50 years old. The country was on the verge of a deep crisis - an arms race, a slowdown in production in all areas, corruption, people's disappointment in the ideas of communism, alcoholism among a large part of the population, power was in the hands of already elderly managers, and so on. General Secretary understood the need for change and therefore said that « It's time for everyone to change."Hence the name of this period of time.
Mainreasons changes can be called:
1
.Low level of efficiency from the management system in the country;
2
.Introduction of sanctions against the USSR;
3
.The military operation in Afghanistan, which has been going on for about 6 years;
4.
Falling oil prices.
The restructuring lasted 6 years and took place in 3 main stages:
Stage 1 (1985 -1988), when the anti-alcohol program came out, the fight against corruption began, the cadres in the upper management strata were rejuvenated, and glasnost was proclaimed - coverage of the negative. But with all this, there was no clear plan for transformation, moral values were undermined, and national interests were often neglected in favor of Western ones.
Stage 2 was the period from 1988 to 1989. At this time, censorship was finally softened - a step was taken towards the democratization of the population, the formation of prerequisites for the development of entrepreneurial activity began - cooperatives, private labor activity were allowed, freedom of creativity and the development of art began. also in 1989
In the same year, troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan and attempts were made to improve relations with the United States, that is, in fact, the USSR ceases to support the socialist regimes of other countries. The negative aspects include the low combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the decline in the authority of the ruling party, Chernobyl disaster, the spread of pornography, drug addiction, that is, the decline in the morals of young people and interethnic conflicts (clashes in Kazakhstan in 1986 and so on).
At stage 3 (June 1989 - September 1991) all processes in the country have ceased to be manageable. The CPSU party loses its power and a struggle among the factions begins. During this period of time, a huge number of opposition movements are born and develop. A parade of sovereignties is taking place - countries began to secede from the Soviet Union. Also was abolished 1977 constitution years and the financial situation of the population has deteriorated markedly. The outflow of scientists, prominent figures abroad began.
In this way, The main goals of the restructuring were:
1
.Democratization of the USSR, the introduction of publicity;
2
.Normalization of relations with other countries;
3
.Rejuvenation of personnel in the management system;
4
.Increasing the efficiency of the economy through the introduction of some market elements.
It is difficult to say what has been achieved from this. The USSR broke up into a number of independent and sovereign states, the ruling party was liquidated, there was a catastrophic drop in the standard of living of the population and radical economic and political reforms were carried out to stabilize the state of the country in the future. A positive result can only be called an attempt to democratize society and introduce market instruments, which in the future, after the collapse of the USSR, began to be applied everywhere.
In March 1985, M.S. became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Gorbachev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - N.I. Ryzhkov. The transformation of Soviet society began, which was to be carried out within the framework of the socialist system.
April 1985 at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was proclaimed a course towards accelerating the socio-economic development of the country (the policy of "acceleration"). Its levers were to be 1) the technological re-equipment of production and 2) an increase in labor productivity. It was supposed to increase productivity at the expense of labor enthusiasm (socialist competitions were revived), the eradication of alcoholism ( anti-alcohol campaign - May 1985) and combating unearned income.
The “acceleration” led to a certain revival of the economy, but by 1987, a general reduction in production began in agriculture, and then in industry. The situation was complicated by the huge capital investments needed to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant (April 1986) and the ongoing war in Afghanistan.
The country's leadership was forced to make more radical changes. From the summer of 1987 perestroika proper began. The program of economic reforms was developed by L. Abalkin, T. Zaslavskaya, P. Bunich. The NEP became a model for perestroika.
The main content of the restructuring:
In the economic sphere:
1. There is a transfer of state enterprises to self-support and self-sufficiency.
2. Since the defense enterprises were not able to operate in the new conditions, a conversion - the transfer of production to a peaceful track (demilitarization of the economy).
3. In the countryside, the equality of five forms of management was recognized: state farms, collective farms, agro-combines, rental collectives and farms.
4.To control product quality has been state acceptance was introduced.
5. The directive state plan was replaced by a state order.
In the political sphere:
1.Intra-party democracy is expanding. Internal party opposition emerges associated primarily with the failures of economic reforms. At the October (1987) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee B.N. Yeltsin.
2.At the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU, a decision was made to ban uncontested elections.
3. The state apparatus is being substantially restructured. In accordance with the decisions of the XIX Conference (June 1988), a the new supreme body of legislative power - the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the corresponding Republican conventions. The permanent Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the republics were formed from among the people's deputies. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M.S. became the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Gorbachev (March 1989), Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR - B.N. Yeltsin (May 1990).
In March 1990, the post of president was introduced in the USSR. M.S. became the first president of the USSR. Gorbachev.
4. Since 1986, a policy of "glasnost" and "pluralism" has been pursued”, i.e. in the USSR, a kind of freedom of speech is artificially created, which implies the possibility of free discussion of a range of issues strictly defined by the party.
5. The country is starting to take shape multi-party system.
In the spiritual realm:
1. The state weakens ideological control over the spiritual sphere of society. Free previously banned literary works , known to readers only by "samizdat" - "The Gulag Archipelago" by A. Solzhenitsyn, "Children of the Arbat" by B. Rybakov, etc.
2. Within the framework of “glasnost” and “pluralism”, “ round tables on some questions of the history of the USSR. Criticism of Stalin's "personality cult" begins, the attitude towards civil war etc.
3. Cultural ties with the West are expanding.
By 1990, the idea of perestroika had practically exhausted itself.. Failed to stop the decline in production. Attempts to develop a private initiative - the movement of farmers and cooperators - turned into the heyday of the "black market" and the deepening of the deficit. "Glasnost" and "pluralism" - the main slogans of perestroika - to the fall of the authority of the CPSU, the development of nationalist movements. Nevertheless, since the spring of 1990 the Gorbachev administration has been moving on to the next stage of political and economic reforms. G . Yavlinsky and S. Shatalin prepared the program "5oo days", providing for relatively radical economic transformation with a view to a gradual transition to the market. This program was rejected by Gorbachev under the influence of the conservative wing of the CPSU.
In June 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a resolution on a gradual transition to a regulated market economy. Provision was made for gradual demonopolization, decentralization and denationalization of property, the establishment of joint-stock companies and banks, and the development of private entrepreneurship. However, these measures could no longer save the socialist system and the USSR.
Since the mid-1980s, the disintegration of the state has actually been planned. Powerful nationalist movements emerge. In 1986, there were pogroms of the Russian population in Kazakhstan. Interethnic conflicts arose in Fergana (1989), in the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan (1990). Since 1988, an armed Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict began in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1988-1989 Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Moldova get out of control of the center. In 1990 they officially declare their independence.
June 12, 1990 The First Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR adopts the Declaration on State Sovereignty Russian Federation .
The President of the USSR enters into direct negotiations with the leadership of the republics on the conclusion of a new Union Treaty. To give legitimacy to this process in March 1991, an all-Union referendum was held on the issue of preserving the USSR. The majority of the population spoke in favor of preserving the USSR, but on new terms. In April 1991, Gorbachev began negotiations with the leadership of 9 republics in Novo-Ogaryovo ("Novoogarevsky process").
By August 1991, they managed to prepare a compromise draft of the Union Treaty, according to which the republics received much greater independence. The signing of the agreement was scheduled for August 22.
It was the planned signing of the Union Treaty that provoked speech by the State Committee for the State of Emergency (August 19–August 21, 1991), which tried to preserve the USSR in its old form. The State Committee for the State of Emergency in the Country (GKChP) included the vice-president of the USSR G.I. Yanaev, Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov, Minister of Internal Affairs B.K. Pugo, KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov.
The GKChP issued an arrest order B.N. Yeltsin, elected on June 12, 1991 President of the RSFSR. Martial law was introduced. However, the majority of the population and military personnel refused to support the GKChP. This sealed his defeat. On August 22, the members were arrested, but the signing of the treaty never took place.
As a result of the August coup, M.S.'s authority was finally undermined. Gorbachev. The real power in the country passed to the leaders of the republics. At the end of August, the activities of the CPSU were suspended.
On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (B.N. Yeltsin, L.M. Kravchuk, S.S. Shushkevich) announced the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - the “Belovezhskaya Accords”. On December 21, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined the CIS.
MS Gorbachev to the presidency in March 1985. And already on April 23 of the same year, he announced a course towards perestroika. It is worth saying that the political course originally proclaimed by the president was called "acceleration and perestroika", while the emphasis was on the word "acceleration". Subsequently, it disappeared, and the term "perestroika" came to the fore.
The essence of the new political course truly amazed sane politicians, because Gorbachev put the accelerated development and industrial production on an unprecedented scale at the forefront. From 1986 to 2000, it was planned to produce as many goods as produced in the previous 70 years.
However, such a grandiose plan was not destined to come true. The term "acceleration" lost popularity by the end of 1987, and perestroika lasted only until 1991, and ended with the collapse of the Union.
The first stage of the new era
Perestroika began with a radical change in party leaders. It must be said that the personnel nomenclature of the times of the rule of the country by Chernenko and Andropov has grown so old that the average age of the party leader was more than 70 years. Naturally, it was unacceptable. And Gorbachev seriously took up the "rejuvenation" of the party apparatus.
Another important sign of the first period of perestroika was the policy of glasnost. For the first time in many years, reality in the Soviet Union was shown not only in a life-affirming light, but also reflected negative aspects. There was some freedom of speech, of course, still timid and not in full force, but then it was perceived as a breath of air on a stuffy afternoon.
In foreign policy Gorbachev sought to strengthen and improve Soviet-American relations. This was expressed in a unilateral ban on nuclear tests.
Results of the beginning of perestroika
It is worth saying that the first stage of perestroika brought some changes to the life of the Soviet person and society as a whole. It was possible to rejuvenate the composition of the party leadership, which only benefited the country and its inhabitants. Glasnost led to the removal of tension in society, and thanks to nuclear disarmament, the situation in the world was defused.
However, then mistake after mistake, the discrepancy between words and deeds on the part of the government led to the fact that the results achieved came to naught.
Conversation with Doctor of Economics Hegumen Philip (Simonov)
April 23, 1985 General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M.S. Gorbachev announced plans for broad reforms aimed at the comprehensive renewal of society, the cornerstone of which was called "acceleration of the country's socio-economic development."
And exactly 30 years ago, on October 15, 1985, the next Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU considered and approved the draft of the main directions of economic and social development USSR for 1986-1990 and for the period up to 2000. Thus was given an official start to the new economic course, known as "perestroika".
The consequences of numerous "reforms" and "transformations", begun in those years and continued in subsequent years, affect to this day. About what kind of economy they “rebuilt”, what they wanted to come to and why it turned out “as always”, what transformations our country really needed, what the “experience” of those years can teach and what each of us Orthodox should do, we talk with the abbot Philip (Simonov), Doctor of Economics, Professor, Honored Economist of the Russian Federation, Head of the Department of Church History of the Faculty of History of Moscow State University. M.V. Lomonosov.
Father Philip, they talk about two types of economic systems: command-administrative and market. What is their fundamental difference? What are the pros and cons?
First, let's say a few words about a certain commonality that unites these two concepts. This commonality consists in the fundamental economic illiteracy of those who introduced these terms for political reasons, then picked up and used them in the framework of the political struggle, and those who conveyed these concepts - perfect historical and political economic rubbish - to our time.
Any sane person, even without a higher economic education, not to mention academic degrees and titles, talking about something, usually finds out its main characteristics. That is, trying to answer the question "what is it?", finds out, which it is what are its characteristics that make it exactly that, and not something else.
Therefore, speaking of the "market economy", one immediately wants to ask: which is it a market economy?
After all, the market existed and mediated exchange both in slave-owning antiquity, and in the stadially incomprehensible East, and in feudal Europe, and in early capitalism, and at its later stages.
Public figures who abandoned political economy as a science due to its “dark Soviet past” and threw the term “market economy” into society as the main idea of a bright future, themselves acted very politically and economically: they used this meaningless term to fight for power, but no one was told what kind of "market economy" they were talking about.
Everyone thought that it was socially oriented, with the preservation of the achievements that society already had ( free education and healthcare, full employment, 8-hour working day with a 41-hour working week, etc.), and with the acquisition of those preferences that the market gives (private business initiative, increased management efficiency, improved quality based on competition, etc.) .).
But this is exactly what, as it turned out, no one guaranteed. Because what happened was what happened: complete violation of the rights of workers, rampant "gangster capitalism" in the spirit of the era of primitive capital accumulation based on the unproven dogma "the market will solve everything", the emergence of a system of almost feudal "feeding" and other delights that fit perfectly into a "market economy" - provided that no one gave an exact definition of this phenomenon. What has grown has grown.
Now about the "command system". Don't you feel the economic inferiority of the term itself? It's not the language of economics, it's pure politics! By the way, no one has given a scientific definition of this term either - because it is simply impossible from the point of view of theory.
economic science speaks not of a “market” and “command” economy, but of systems of directive and indicative planning
In science, however, there was a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of systems of directive (as in the USSR) and indicative planning - the latter was the basis for the sectoral development of the countries of post-war Europe. On the basis of indicative planning, Gaullist France, for example, created its own competitive aerospace industry. Is this not an indicator of the effectiveness of the method? By the way, the intersectoral balance model, on which the Soviet planning and forecasting model was based, was developed by the American economist of Russian origin, Nobel laureate Vasily Leontiev. It’s now that we realized it, we adopted the unreadable law “On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation”, only the system of this strategic forecasting over 25 years has been so destroyed that there is not only no one to calculate this intersectoral balance, but there is no one to teach how to calculate it.
At the same time, the main problem was the limits of application of one or another model, which, in essence, determines the effectiveness of both. In short: is it possible to plan production to the maximum range, or are there still some boundaries beyond which the inefficient use of the resources of the economy begins?
Western world was limited to indicative planning, within the framework of which it was planned not to produce (in natural units), but the resources necessary for the development of this production - those sectors that are recognized as priorities for the economy at the moment. At the same time, a combination of public and private financing was envisaged: the state made initial investments in priority sectors for itself, setting a certain development vector, and private capital, having this benchmark, joined the investment process, increasing its efficiency.
The domestic economy, even in the conditions of that strange “market”, the transition to which began under Gorbachev, could not abandon the dogmas of directive planning “from above” (at the same time, enterprises did not participate in the process of preparing the plan, but received ready-made planning targets from the center), despite even to the fact that it began to very clearly demonstrate its shortcomings against the background of the growth in the well-being of the population and the corresponding increase in demand: a “deficit economy” arose, under the sign of which all the Gorbachev years passed. Let us leave aside the question of how much this deficit was the result of objective factors and how much it was man-made, consciously organized. It's not about that. The question is that the government of that time failed to ensure the effective implementation of that speculative intersectoral balance that the State Planning Committee worked on in its last years; failed to combine their own ideas about the standard of living of the population of the country with the ideas of this same population; failed to separate the economy from the ideology (as China did, for example).
The idea that “all of us, comrades, apparently need to rebuild” was first expressed by Gorbachev in May 1985. But even earlier, in 1983, in the leading party magazine Kommunist, the then Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU Yu.V. Andropov set the task of accelerated "progress of the productive forces", which was subsequently exploited by Gorbachev under the amorphous slogan of "acceleration".
In essence, it came down to three streams of situational reform measures that were little linked to each other: « publicity» (which came down to chewing on the negative points in the media Soviet history and everyday life, without developing as a result of any significant concept of the further development of society) - « cooperation» (to which one must add the epic of creating joint ventures with foreign capital, which ended, in general, ingloriously and did not make a significant contribution to economic growth; apologists for "perestroika" say that it was through cooperation and joint ventures that "elements were introduced into the socialist economy" market," - but these elements existed before them, but what cooperation really introduced into the economy was elements of the wild market, "gray" schemes, raiding, consumer deception - everything that lush color flourished later, in the 1990s) - « new thinking» (emphasis - M.S. Gorbachev) in foreign policy (in fact, it meant the rejection of the ideological imperative in diplomacy and a certain "thaw" in relations with the West).
The reforms imposed by the IMF were designed for the economies of developing countries. They were not applicable to the developed economy of Russia
Ultimately, for the Soviet Union, all this resulted in an uncontrolled increase in borrowing on the world loan capital market, where at that time they were very willing to give "credits under Gorbachev", entering into an external debt crisis and receiving an IMF stabilization program (such a program since the 80s The twentieth century was carried out in all countries that fell into the "debt spiral"), the condition for financing under which were those "reforms" that destroyed the country's economy. And not only due to some malicious intent (although 1991 in the West was quite reasonably perceived as a brilliant victory in the Cold War, with which, however, they could not figure out what to do for a long time), but also because, according to the usual Western laziness, this program, the foundations of which were developed for developing countries, was not designed for a developed economy, and neither those who set the tasks nor those who thoughtlessly carried them out did not understand this.
The simplest example: "agrarian reform", according to the stabilization program, implies the elimination of large inefficient land ownership (such as pre-revolutionary landowners), the formation of small peasant (farm) farms on the basis of actually confiscated land and then their cooperation with the prospect of creating an agro-industrial complex capable of meeting the country's needs for food. This model is valid, for example, for the Upper Volta.
But in former USSR did not have large landownership of the landowner type. But were cooperation and agro-industrial complex. Nobody noticed this.
As a result, large landed cooperative property was disbanded, and in its place was formed exactly what can be compared with inefficient landlord latifundial land ownership, which does not give a marketable product. Former arable fields and forage areas - those that are not built up with cottages - have been overgrown with undergrowth for 25 years, farmers have failed, and now we have to restore Agriculture and cooperation - this word, by the way, was banned throughout the 1990s, even articles on this topic were not published. And now our Ministry of Agriculture is planning to start a reform similar to the Upper Volta, in order to mix the consequences of the stupidity that, under the dictation of the IMF, was committed in the 1990s: to return unused farmland to the state land fund and find effective method ensure the restoration of their productive potential.
The people have always called it: "A bad head does not give rest to the legs."
On the whole, for the USSR, “perestroika” meant in fact a complete rejection of the political, economic and ideological model that the CPSU adhered to in the post-war period, in Lenin’s language (which was sharp on labels): opportunism and revisionism. With quite predictable consequences: "cooperation" (or rather, those capitals that arose on its basis and, of course, showed their political ambitions) removed Gorbachev from the domestic political arena, and "glasnost" finally buried him as a politician, along with the USSR destroyed by his hands.
What were the results of "perestroika"? Were the set goals achieved? Is it fair to say that this led to the collapse of the USSR?
“Perestroika” could not lead to any real results: it was a voluntaristic policy that situationally suited its creator
Actually, I already answered this question. "" could not lead to any real results: it was a voluntaristic policy that situationally suited its creator, who tried to sit on all chairs at once: both improve socialism and directive planning to preserve, and introduce the capitalist market into this economic system, and did not while implementing the ideas of self-financing, to be both the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the President - and all in one bottle. Actually, there were no scientifically based goals - there were some impulsive good wishes “between Lafite and Cliquot”, to which the Academy of Sciences frantically tried to give a scientific appearance.
And when there is no real - not situational, but scientifically substantiated - development goal, from which the tools to achieve it follow, there can be no positive result by definition.
What changes did the Soviet Union really need? And what does the experience of the last decade of the existence of the Soviet Union teach us in terms of the organization of economic life?
I must say that the "Kremlin elders" of the last Soviet period did one big stupidity: they considered the whole people stupid.
Let me explain. I started traveling abroad on official business in the late 1980s. Yes, everything was good and beautiful there. In general, decently than we have under Gorbachev. But there, in prosperous Vienna, for the first time I saw homeless people with carriages, in which all their meager belongings were placed. People who, in no less prosperous London, spent the winter sleeping under bridges in cardboard boxes, for whom Vladyka Anthony (Bloom) urged them to collect at least something at Christmas that would make them feel the joy of the birth of Christ. People who rummaged through garbage cans in search of food.
If the "elders" did not consider the Soviet people headless idiots, they would allow them to freely travel abroad - not on tour packages accompanied by the KGB, but freely, simply by taking a visa. We are not idiots, we, besides jeans and street cafes, would see something else that would make us understand: tourism should not be confused with emigration. We knew full well that we were never in danger of becoming homeless or unemployed. We understood that we do not have to pay for education, and our education is such that our reports at international conferences were listened to with attention. We understood that we did not need to pay at the clinic or hospital, that we had already paid for it in the form of income tax.
And now we understand that you have to pay for everything - but where to get it? Right now, in a crisis, according to polls, people no longer have enough money for food, the share of expenses for these purposes in total expenses is growing, someone is already getting into savings, and the quality of food is deteriorating. And it is impossible to compete for wages, because, unlike in Europe, we do not have normal trade unions that would respond to the needs of the working people, and would not satisfy their own needs.
In a healthy society, the state assumes the function of socially oriented distribution of funds
Here we are talking about church charity, we are working to help the poor and the homeless - but this help in itself is an indicator of the unhealthy of society, because in a healthy society there should not be socially unprotected strata, and the task of ensuring social protection (including ensuring full employment of the population) the state assumes the function of socially oriented distribution of funds received from the population as taxes. And if the Church, which does not have tax source income, is forced to take on the function of social protection, performing it at the expense of voluntary donations (that is, in fact, re-taxation of the population: after all, taxes have already been paid to the state, and we have the right to expect that the state will fulfill its social functions, as soon as it exists in this connection), this means that the state does not fulfill its constitutional functions, and society does not control it.
As for the experience of the “decline and fall of the USSR”. Then there was a lot of talk about the Chinese model - but, unfortunately, no one really bothered to either study this model in detail or justify the possibility of using its elements in the conditions of the Soviet economy: some looked with lust at the West, others - forward "back to Lenin ”, the economy, meanwhile, was suffocating from an inefficient management model, and where, under the guise of a “socialist market”, the management model changed (initially at the micro level, then, with the folding of organized groups, already at a higher level), the processes of initial accumulation of capital began with cruelty late medieval and early modern times.
No real model was proposed based on its own economic complex, taking into account its features: the Central Committee of the CPSU, which actually ruled the country, rewrote old dogmas "from congress to congress", and the scientific world tried - through meditation - to discover "new content" in them. Some “unknown forces” also interfered: I remember well how in one of the working groups on Staraya Square they prepared a draft decree on foreign economic activity, got excited and argued, finally did it by night and went home - and the next morning they read in the newspaper “ True” text, where all our thoughts were spelled out “exactly the opposite”… By whom? And why?
There can be only one conclusion: you need to know exactly what you are doing and what exactly should come of it.
Thus, there can be only one conclusion from this negative experience: you need to know exactly what you are doing and what exactly should come of it, and not today or tomorrow (“and after us even a flood”; “yes, we drink pits, morning we will die" - 1 Corinthians 15:32), but for years to come. If we talk about the economy, there should be a development model consciously chosen as a goal with known characteristics determined scientifically, and not “from the wind of one’s head” (after all, too often we are guided not by economic reality, but by our own ideas about this reality); directions, methods and tools for achieving the set goal should be determined, ensuring, among other things, the stability of the national economy to internal and external stresses that no one has canceled, no matter how much we would like to; finally, there must be the right people who would not tell pleasant tales made up of their own ideas about reality, but would work effectively for this goal, and not against it.
Otherwise, we will constantly encounter unpleasant surprises for ourselves: it suddenly turns out that we do not have self-sufficiency in food, then we suddenly realize that some industry has collapsed, and as a result, rockets are falling, then it turns out that the level of education has dropped to zero (by the way, according to polls, almost half of the respondents, in connection with the abolition of school astronomy, are now sure that the sun revolves around the earth), otherwise an insight will suddenly happen, from which it will become clear that the world community was just flirting with us like a cat with a mouse: they showed PR candy wrappers (like the notorious myth about the "G-8", which in practice never ceased to be the "G-7"), but in fact they pursued the old policy of ousting a competitor from the market. And the number of such discoveries can multiply to infinity.
What economy should be in Russia? What should we strive for? What potential for the development of the economy, if I may say so, is inherent in Orthodoxy, its ethics?
Effective, that is, ensuring the growth of the produced national income and its distribution and redistribution to achieve development goals - and not individual sectors, industries or industries, but the entire economic complex of the country.
Based on scientific and technological progress, without which we will be doomed to trail behind world development.
Socially oriented, as it should be, the economy of the “welfare state”, which is spelled out in our Constitution, that is, satisfying the basic legitimate needs of the population - not some part of it, but all citizens, since we are so fond of talking about “civil society”.
Diversified, that is, tuned to meet a wide range of national needs and various areas national security.
Integrated into the world economy not as a raw material appendage, but as an equal partner in the emerging global division of labor.
Life will show what place Orthodoxy can take in this system. The economy is a non-confessional phenomenon. Religious ethics (and this is the only and most important thing that faith can offer to participants in the economic process) begins to work when organizational processes begin to operate: in the organization of the production process and everything connected with it (rest time, disability, pensions, etc. .), as well as in the organization of distribution, exchange and consumption of the produced product (in a generalized sense). How fair will these organizational processes be, how aimed at the indicated by the apostle uniformity(see 2 Cor. 8, 14), how prepared a person will be for this justice in the process of education and upbringing - all this is not only not indifferent to religious ethics and its bearers, but is also an open field for influence.
And then everything will depend on how much we ourselves, the bearers of religious ethics, are not indifferent to all these problems, how much we ourselves are rooted in Christ's teaching, how much it is not external and temporary for us (that is, existing only when we enter from the world into church walls in order, as they say now, to “satisfy one’s religious needs”), but internally, experienced and assimilated, which has become not even a part of life, but life itself, insofar as we ourselves are “not strangers and aliens, but fellow citizens saints and their own to God” (Eph. 2:19).
Those who are God's own cannot be absolutely alien to economic reality.
See how this “own” sounds in Greek: οἰκεῖοι (ikii). Those who inhabit God's οἶκος (ikos), who - their God, οἰκεῖοι, domestici, His household, those cannot be absolutely alien to economic reality. They are like members Houses, by virtue of their rights and obligations, by all means participate, in their measure, in its creation and organization - economy.
And what other participation does the Master of the house expect from us, if not evidence, do not preach the Gospel of His beloved Son - "not the letter, but the spirit, because the letter kills, but the spirit gives life" (2 Cor. 3: 6), - "even to the ends of the earth" (Acts 1: 8).
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