MOTIVATION OF MANAGERSAND ENTREPRENEURS

In the sociology of management, there is an independent class of concepts that are called psychological theories of entrepreneurship. This does not mean that they do not say anything about the motivation and behavior of managers, on the contrary, they compare the behaviors of managers and entrepreneurs.

1 Instinctive theory of motivation by W. James

The first attempts to scientifically comprehend the motivation of entrepreneurial behavior date back to the end of the 19th century. William James (1842-1910), an outstanding American philosopher and psychologist, developed the doctrine of emotions, which became one of the sources of behaviorism. Together with his colleague Karl Lang, he developed a theory of emotions, which is called the James-Lang theory. According to the authors, an emotional response precedes an emotional experience. In other words, emotions stem from behavior, not cause it. “We are afraid because our heart is racing, our stomach is aching, etc. We are afraid because we are running. But we are not afraid, because we are running,” W. James explained human behavior with the help of the simplest unconditioned reflexes, which are also called instincts.

James singled out two most important instincts - ambition and the desire for rivalry, which determine 90% of success in business entrepreneurship. We know, wrote James, that if we do not complete this task, someone else will do it and receive credit or credit. Therefore, we are doing it. This is what ambition is based on.

Motivation for managers and entrepreneurs

In 1892, W. James came to the conclusion that the doctrine of emotions and the doctrine of motivation are completely different things. Indeed, emotions contain physiological components, and motivational responses are the result of interaction with something that is outside our body, say, with an object or another person. In the same way, in the words of James, there is a difference between the tendency to feel and the tendency to act. Emotions do not have the main thing that makes up the essence of the motive - orientation towards the goal. Emotions are a feeling of pleasure that comes at the moment when our needs and motives are satisfied, that is, motives aimed at achieving some goal.

So, motives induce, and the goal directs behavior. But emotions are the basis, that is, the desire of any living being to please itself. If you enjoy gardening, will you start gardening because you want to please yourself, or do you enjoy gardening? In other words, are all our motives and needs determined by our emotions, or are some of our motives caused by rational causes? A similar question, the resolution of which the understanding of entrepreneurial behavior depended on, remained unresolved for psychologists in the early stages of the development of the theory of motivation. True, in 1908, V. McDougal discovered another component of entrepreneurship - the instinct of constructiveness, and experimenters came up with many tests that measure the emotional basis of entrepreneurial activity.

Expectations and Values ​​Theory

Nevertheless, it was not possible to achieve full success in the framework of the theory of incentives. For a very long time, psychologists have been arguing about whether human behavior can be fully explained biologically (by subconscious impulses, emotions), or whether it also depends on cognitive, i.e., conscious, goal-rational reasons.

The argument could have dragged on had it not been for the emergence of an alternative emotional-instinctive approach. The new concept was based on values ​​and expectations (expectations), which have little in common with unconscious motives. The hierarchical theory of needs of A. Maslow was the first to make a hole in the old approach. In his nyatychlenka, the lower levels of needs reflected instinctive and uncreative behavior. and the higher, spiritual needs belonged to what nature has never invested in man. Entrepreneurship is focused specifically on the need for creativity and self-expression. A. Maslow adhered to a similar point of view in 1954.

Gradually it becomes clear that the previous understanding of motives is outdated. Psychologists have proposed to distinguish between two concepts: motive and motivation. The motive expressed stable personality traits rooted primarily in the emotional sphere (for example, aggression, love, hunger, fear). On the contrary, motivation should be understood as a situational characteristic - a tendency to act, formed here and now, but not biologically pre-installed in a person. If you are suddenly offered a promotion, then many separate motives immediately work - the desire for power, love for fame and high position, sports anger (or aggression) and much more, which together give the achievement motivation.

The new theory of motivation, developed as an alternative to the old theory of motivation, was called the theory of expectation and values, and K. Levin, E. Tolmgn, D. McClelland and J. Atkinson are considered its authors. Important ale ntami in it were goal-oriented behavior \ achievement motivation.

The Need for a Revision of the Theory of Instincts The theory of basic needs, which we discussed in previous chapters, urgently requires a revision of the theory of instincts. This is necessary at least in order to be able to differentiate instincts into more basic and less basic, more healthy and less healthy, more natural and less natural. Moreover, our theory of basic needs, like other similar theories (353, 160), inevitably raises a number of problems and questions that require immediate consideration and clarification. Among them, for example, the need to abandon the principle of cultural relativity, the solution of the issue of the constitutional conditionality of values, the need to limit the jurisdiction of associative-instrumental learning, etc. There are other considerations, theoretical, clinical and experimental, which push us to reevaluate individual provisions of the theory of instincts, and perhaps even to completely revise it. These same considerations make me skeptical of the opinion, which is especially widespread in Lately among psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists. I am talking here about the undeservedly high assessment of such personality traits as plasticity, flexibility and adaptability, about the exaggerated attention to the ability to learn. It seems to me that a person is much more autonomous, much more self-governing than modern psychology assumes for him, and this my opinion is based on the following theoretical and experimental considerations: 1. Cannon's concept of homeostasis (78), Freud's death instinct (138), etc.; 2. Experiments to study appetite, food preferences and gastronomic tastes (492, 491); 3. Levy's experiments on the study of instincts (264-269), as well as his study of maternal overprotection (263) and affective hunger; 4. The harmful consequences of early weaning of the child and persistent inculcation of toilet habits discovered by psychoanalysts; 5. Observations that have led many educators, educators and child psychologists to recognize the need to give the child more freedom of choice; 6. Concept underlying Rogers therapy; 7. Numerous neurological and biological data given by supporters of the theories of vitalism (112) and emergent evolution (46), modern embryologists (435) and such holists as Goldstein (160), are data on cases of spontaneous recovery of the organism after an injury. These and a number of other studies, which I will cite below, reinforce my opinion that the body has a much greater margin of safety, a much greater capacity for self-defense, self-development and self-management than we thought so far. In addition, the results of recent studies once again convince us of the theoretical necessity of postulating some positive tendency towards growth or self-actualization inherent in the body itself, a trend that is fundamentally different from the balancing, conservation processes of homeostasis and from reactions to external influences. Many thinkers and philosophers, including those as diverse as Aristotle and Bergson, in one form or another, have already attempted to postulate this tendency, the tendency towards growth or self-actualization, with more or less frankness. Psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, and psychologists spoke about it. It was discussed by Goldstein and Buhler, Jung and Horney, Fromm, Rogers and many other scientists. However, the most weighty argument in favor of the need to address the theory of instincts is probably the experience of psychotherapy and especially the experience of psychoanalysis. The facts that confront the psychoanalyst are inexorable, though not always obvious; the psychoanalyst is always faced with the task of differentiating the desires (needs, impulses) of the patient, the problem of classifying them as more basic or less basic. He constantly encounters one obvious fact: the frustration of some needs leads to pathology, while the frustration of others does not cause pathological consequences. Or: the satisfaction of some needs increases the health of the individual, while the satisfaction of others does not cause such an effect. The psychoanalyst knows that there are needs that are terribly stubborn and self-willed. Remove it will not be possible to cope with persuasion, coaxing, punishments, restrictions; they do not allow alternatives, each of them can be satisfied only by a single "satisfier" that internally corresponds to it. These needs are extremely demanding, they force the individual, consciously and unconsciously, to seek opportunities to satisfy them. Each of these needs appears to a person as a stubborn, insurmountable fact that cannot be logically explained; a fact that must be taken for granted, as a starting point. It is very significant that almost all existing currents of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, clinical psychology, social and child therapy, despite fundamental differences on many issues, are forced to formulate one or another concept of instinct-like needs. The experience of psychotherapy forces us to turn to the specific characteristics of a person, to his constitution and heredity, forces us to abandon consideration of his external, superficial, instrumental habits and skills. Whenever the therapist is faced with this dilemma, he prefers to analyze the instinctive rather than the conditioned responses of the individual, and it is this choice that is the basic platform of psychotherapy. This urgent need for choice is regrettable because, and we shall return to the discussion of this question, there are other, intermediate and more important alternatives that give us greater freedom of choice - in a word, the dilemma mentioned here is not the only possible dilemma. And yet today it is already obvious that the theory of instincts, especially in the forms in which it is presented by McDougall and Freud, needs to be revised in accordance with the new requirements put forward by the dynamic approach. The theory of instincts, no doubt, contains a number of important provisions that have not yet been properly evaluated, but at the same time, the obvious fallacy of its basic provisions overshadows the merits of others. The theory of instincts sees a self-moving system in a person; it is based on the fact that human behavior is determined not only by external, environmental factors, but also by a person’s own nature; it argues that human nature has a ready-made system of ultimate goals and values, and that in the presence of favorable environmental influences, a person seeks to avoid illness, and therefore wants exactly what he really needs (which is good for him). The theory of instincts is based on the fact that all people constitute a single biological species, and argues that human behavior is due to certain motives and goals inherent in the species as a whole; She draws our attention to the fact that extreme conditions When the body is completely left to itself, to its internal reserves, it shows miracles of biological efficiency and wisdom, and these facts are still waiting for their researchers. Errors in the theory of instincts I consider it necessary to emphasize at once that many errors in the theory of instincts, even the most outrageous and deserving of a sharp rebuff, are by no means inevitable or inherent in this theory as such, that these errors were shared not only by the followers of the theory of instincts, but also by its critics. 1. The most egregious in the theory of instincts are semantic and logical errors. Instinctivists are rightfully accused of inventing ad hoc instincts, resorting to the concept of instinct whenever they cannot explain a particular behavior or determine its origins. But we, knowing about this error, being warned about it, of course, will be able to avoid hypostatization, that is, mixing a fact with a term, we will not build shaky syllogisms. We are much more sophisticated in semantics than the instinctivists. 2. Today we have new data provided to us by ethnology, sociology and genetics, and they will allow us to avoid not only ethno- and class-centrism, but also the simplistic social Darwinism that the early instinctivists sinned and led them into a dead end. Now we can understand that the rejection that the ethnological naivety of the instinctivists met in scientific circles was too radical, too hot. As a result, we got the other extreme - the theory of cultural relativism. This theory, widely held and highly influential in the past two decades, is now under heavy criticism (148). Undoubtedly, the time has come to redirect our efforts to the search for cross-cultural, general species characteristics, as the instinctivists did, and I think that we will be able to avoid both ethnocentrism and hypertrophied cultural relativism. So, for example, it seems to me obvious that instrumental behavior (means) is determined by cultural factors to a much greater extent than basic needs (goals). 3. Most of the anti-instinctivists of the 1920s and 1930s, such as Bernard, Watson, Kuo and others, criticizing the theory of instincts, spoke mainly about the fact that instincts cannot be described in terms of individual reactions caused by specific stimuli. In essence, they accused the instinctivists of being behavioristic, and on the whole they were right—instincts really do not fit into the simplistic scheme of behaviorism. However, today such criticism can no longer be considered satisfactory, because today both dynamic and humanistic psychology proceed from the fact that no more or less significant, integral characteristic of a person, no integral form of activity can be defined only in terms of "stimulus-response". If we assert that any phenomenon must be analyzed in its totality, then this does not mean that we call for ignoring the properties of its components. We are not opposed to considering reflexes, for example, in the context of classical animal instincts. But at the same time, we understand that a reflex is an exclusively motor act, while instinct, in addition to a motor act, includes a biologically determined impulse, expressive behavior, functional behavior, an object-goal and affect. 4. Even from the point of view of formal logic, I cannot explain why we must constantly choose between absolute instinct, instinct complete in all its components, and non-instinct. Why don't we talk about residual instincts, about instinct-like aspects of attraction, impulse, behavior, about the degree of instinct-likeness, about partial instincts? Too many writers have thoughtlessly used the term "instinct", using it to describe needs, goals, abilities, behavior, perceptions, expressive acts, values, emotions as such, and complex complexes of these phenomena. As a result, this concept has practically lost its meaning; practically any of the human reactions known to us, as Marmor (289) and Bernard (47) rightly point out, one or another author can classify as instinctive. Our main hypothesis is that of all the psychological components of human behavior, only motives or basic needs can be considered innate or biologically determined (if not entirely, then at least to a certain extent). The very same behavior, abilities, cognitive and affective needs, in our opinion, do not have a biological conditionality, these phenomena are either a product of learning or a way of expressing basic needs. (Of course, many of the human abilities, such as color vision, are largely determined or mediated by heredity, but we are not talking about them now). In other words, there is a certain hereditary component in the basic need, which we will understand as a kind of conative need, unrelated to internal, goal-setting behavior, or as a blind, goalless urge, like Freud's impulses of the Id. (We will show below that the sources of satisfaction of these needs also have a biologically determined, innate character.) Purposeful (or functional) behavior arises as a result of learning. Supporters of the theory of instincts and their opponents think in terms of "all or nothing", they talk only about instincts and non-instincts, instead of thinking about this or that degree of instinctiveness of this or that psychological phenomenon, and this is their main mistake. And indeed, is it reasonable to assume that the entire complex set of human reactions is entirely determined by heredity alone or not at all determined by it? None of the structures underlying any holistic reactions, even the simplest structure underlying any holistic reaction, can be determined only genetically. Even colored peas, experiments on which allowed Mendel to formulate the famous laws of the distribution of hereditary factors, need oxygen, water and top dressing. For that matter, the very genes do not exist in an airless space, but surrounded by other genes. On the other hand, it is quite obvious that no human characteristic can be absolutely free from the influence of heredity, because man is a child of nature. Heredity is the prerequisite for all human behavior, every act of a person and every his ability, that is, whatever a person does, he can do it only because he is a man, because he belongs to the species Homo, because he is the son of his parents. Such a scientifically untenable dichotomy has led to a number of unpleasant consequences. One of them was the trend according to which any activity, if it contained at least some component of learning, was considered non-instinctive, and vice versa, any activity in which at least some component of instinctive heredity was manifested. But as we already know, in most, if not in all, human characteristics, both determinants are easily found, and hence the dispute itself between supporters of the theory of instincts and supporters of the theory of learning, the longer it goes on, the more it begins to resemble a dispute between a party of pointed and blunt ends. Instinctivism and anti-instinctivism are two sides of the same coin, two extremes, two opposite ends of a dichotomy. I am sure that we, knowing this dichotomy, will be able to avoid it. 5. The scientific paradigm of the instinctive theorists was animal instincts, and this caused so many errors, including their inability to discern unique, purely human instincts. However, the biggest misconception naturally arising from the study of animal instincts was, perhaps, the axiom about the special power, about the immutability, uncontrollability and uncontrollability of instincts. But this axiom, which is true only of worms, frogs and lemmings, is clearly unsuitable for explaining human behavior. Even recognizing that basic needs have a certain hereditary basis, we can make a lot of mistakes if we determine the measure of instinctiveness by eye, if we consider as instinctive only those behavioral acts, only those characteristics and needs that do not have a clear connection with factors external environment or are distinguished by a special power that clearly exceeds the strength of external determinants. Why should we not admit that there are needs that, despite their instinctoid nature, are easily repressed, that can be suppressed, repressed, modified, masked by habits, cultural norms, guilt, and so on. (as it seems to be with the need for love)? In short, why should we not admit the possibility of the existence of weak instincts? It is this mistake, this very identification of instinct with something powerful and unchanging, that most likely became the reason for the sharp attacks of culturalists on the theory of instincts. We understand that no ethnologist will be able even for a moment to digress from the idea of ​​the unique originality of each people, and therefore will angrily reject our assumption and join the opinion of our opponents. But if we all treated both the cultural and biological heritage of man with due respect (as the author of this book does), if we regarded culture simply as a more powerful force than instinctoid needs (as the author of this book does), then we would have long seen nothing paradoxical about the claim that our weak, fragile instinctoid needs need to be protected from stronger and more powerful cultural influences. the same cultural influences, because they constantly remind of themselves, require satisfaction, and because their frustration leads to harmful pathological consequences. That is why I argue that they need protection and patronage. To make it quite clear, I will put forward another paradoxical statement. I think that revealing psychotherapy, depth therapy and insight therapy, which combine almost all known methods of therapy except hypnosis and behavioral therapy, have one thing in common, they expose, restore and strengthen our weakened, lost instinctoid needs and tendencies, our crushed, relegated animal self, our subjective biology. In the most obvious form, in the most concrete way, such a goal is set only by the organizers of the so-called personal growth seminars. These seminars - both psychotherapeutic and educational - require from the participants an extremely large expenditure of personal energy, complete dedication, incredible efforts, patience, courage, they are very painful, they can last a lifetime and still not achieve the goal. Is it necessary to teach a dog, cat or bird how to be a dog, cat or bird? The answer is obvious. Their animal impulses declare themselves loudly, clearly and are unmistakably recognized, while human impulses are extremely weak, indistinct, confused, we do not hear what they whisper to us, and therefore we must learn to listen and hear them. It is not surprising that the spontaneity, natural behavior inherent in the representatives of the animal world , we often notice for self-actualized people and less often for neurotics and not very healthy people. I am ready to declare that the disease itself is nothing but the loss of the animal nature. A clear identification with its biology, "animality" paradoxically bring a person closer to greater spirituality, to greater health, to greater prudence, to greater (organic) rationality. 6. The focus on the study of animal instincts led to another, perhaps even more terrible mistake. For some incomprehensible, mysterious reasons for me, which perhaps only historians could explain, the idea has become established in Western civilization that the animal nature is a bad principle, that our primitive impulses are selfish, selfish, hostile, evil impulses.22 Theologians call it is original sin or the voice of the devil. The Freudians call it the impulses of the Id, philosophers, economists, educators come up with their own names. Darwin was so convinced of the bad nature of instincts that he considered struggle, competition, to be the main factor in the evolution of the animal world, and completely did not notice the manifestations of cooperation, cooperation, which, however, Kropotkin was easily able to discern. It is this view of things that makes us identify the animal origin of man with predatory, vicious animals such as wolves, tigers, wild boars, vultures, snakes. It would seem, why don't we think of more sympathetic animals, for example, deer, elephants, dogs, chimpanzees? It is obvious that the aforementioned tendency is most directly connected with the fact that the animal nature is understood as bad, greedy, predatory. If it was really necessary to find a similarity to man in the animal world, then why not choose for this an animal that really looks like a man, for example, an anthropoid ape? I contend that the monkey as such is, on the whole, a much sweeter and more pleasant animal than the wolf, hyena, or worm, and that he also possesses many of the qualities that we traditionally classify as virtues. From the point of view of comparative psychology, we are, rightly, more like a monkey than like some kind of reptile, and therefore I will by no means agree that the animal nature of man is evil, predatory, bad (306). 7. To the question of the immutability or non-modifiability of hereditary traits, the following should be said. Even if we assume that there are such human traits that are determined only by heredity, only by genes, then they are also subject to change and, perhaps, even more easily than any others. A disease such as cancer is largely due to hereditary factors, and yet scientists do not leave attempts to look for ways to prevent and treat this terrible disease. The same can be said about intelligence, or IQ. There is no doubt that to a certain extent intelligence is determined by heredity, but no one will dispute the fact that it can be developed through educational and psychotherapeutic procedures. 8. We must admit the possibility of greater variability in the realm of instincts than instinctive theorists admit. Obviously, the need for knowledge and understanding is not found in all people. In intelligent people, it appears as an urgent need, while in the weak-minded it is presented only in a rudimentary form or is completely absent. The same is the case with the maternal instinct. Levy's research (263) has revealed a very large variability in the expression of the maternal instinct, so great that it can be said that some women have no maternal instinct at all. Specific talents or abilities that seem to be genetically determined, such as musical, mathematical, artistic abilities (411), are found in very few people. Unlike animal instincts, instinctoid impulses can disappear, atrophy. So, for example, a psychopath does not have a need to fall in love, a need to love and be loved. The loss of this need, as we now know, is permanent, irreplaceable; psychopathy is not treatable, at least with the help of the psychotherapeutic techniques that we currently have. Other examples can be cited. A study of the effects of unemployment in one of the Austrian villages (119), like a number of other similar studies, showed that prolonged unemployment has not only a demoralizing, but even a destructive effect on a person, as it depresses some of his needs. Once oppressed, these needs can fade away forever, they will not awaken again even if external conditions improve. Data similar to these were obtained from observations of former prisoners of Nazi concentration camps. One can also recall the observations of Bateson and Mead (34), who studied the culture of the Cuban Balinesians. An adult Balinese cannot be called "loving" in our Western sense of the word, and he, apparently, does not feel the need for love at all. Balinese infants and children react to lack of love with stormy, inconsolable crying (the researchers' movie camera captured this crying), so we can assume that the absence of "love impulses" in the adult Balinese is an acquired trait. 9. I have already said that as we climb the phylogenetic ladder, we find that instincts and the ability to adapt, the ability to respond flexibly to changes in the environment, begin to appear as mutually exclusive phenomena. The more pronounced the ability to adapt, the less distinct are the instincts. It was this pattern that became the cause of a very serious and even tragic (from the point of view of historical consequences) delusion - a delusion, the roots of which go back to antiquity, and the essence is reduced to the opposition of the impulsive principle to the rational one. Few people think that both of these principles, both of these tendencies are instinctive in nature, that they are not antagonistic, but synergistic with each other, that they direct the development of the organism in the same direction. I am convinced that our need for knowledge and understanding can be as conative as our need for love and belonging. The traditional instinct-mind dichotomy is based on a misdefinition of instinct and a misdefinition of mind—definitions that define one as opposed to the other. But if we redefine these concepts in accordance with what we know today, then we will find that not only are they not opposed to each other, but they are not so different from one another. A healthy mind and a healthy impulse are directed towards the same goal; in a healthy person, they in no way contradict each other (but in a sick person they can be opposite, in opposition to each other). The scientific evidence at our disposal indicates that it is essential for a child's mental health to feel protected, accepted, loved, and respected. But this is exactly what the child desires (instinctively). It is in this sense, sensibly and scientifically provable, that we claim that instinctoid needs and rationality, reason, are synergistic and not antagonistic to each other. Their seeming antagonism is nothing more than an artifact, and the reason for this lies in the fact that, as a rule, sick people are the subject of our study. If our hypothesis is confirmed, then we can finally solve the age-old problem of mankind, and questions like: "What should a person be guided by - instinct or reason?" or: "Who is the head of the family - the husband or the wife?" will disappear by themselves, lose their relevance due to the obvious ludicrousness. 10. Pastor (372) convincingly demonstrated to us, especially by his deep analysis of the theories of McDougall and Thorndike (I would add here the theory of Jung and, perhaps, the theory of Freud), that the theory of instincts gave rise to many conservative and even anti-democratic in essence social, economic and political consequences due to the identification of heredity with fate, with ruthless, inexorable fate. But this identification is wrong. A weak instinct can only show up, express itself, and be satisfied if the conditions predetermined by culture favor it; bad conditions suppress, destroy the instinct. For example, in our society it is not yet possible to satisfy weak hereditary needs, from which we can conclude that these conditions require significant improvement. However, the relationship discovered by Pastor (372) can by no means be considered either natural or inevitable; on the basis of this correlation, we can only state once again that in order to evaluate social phenomena, one must pay attention not to one, but to at least two continuums of phenomena. democracy-authoritarianism", and we can trace this trend even in the example of science. For example, today we can talk about the existence of such approaches to the study of society and man as exogenously authoritarian-socialist, or exogenously social-democratic, or exogenously-democratic-capitalist, etc. In any case, if we consider that the antagonism between a person and society, between personal and public interest is natural, inevitable and insurmountable, then this will be a departure from solving the problem, an unjustified attempt to ignore its very existence. The only reasonable justification for this point of view can be considered the fact that in a sick society and in a sick organism this antagonism really takes place. But even in this case, it is not inevitable, as Ruth Benedict (40, 291, 312) has brilliantly shown. And in a good society, at least in the societies that Benedict described, this antagonism is impossible. Under normal, healthy social conditions, personal and social interests in no way contradict one another, on the contrary, they coincide with each other, are synergistic with each other. The reason for the persistence of this misconception about the dichotomy of the personal and the public lies only in the fact that the subject of our study so far has been mainly sick people and people living in poor social conditions. Naturally, in such people, in people living in such conditions, we inevitably find a contradiction between personal and public interests, and our trouble is that we interpret it as natural, as biologically programmed. 11. One of the shortcomings of the theory of instincts, like most other theories of motivation, was its inability to detect the dynamic relationship and hierarchical system that unites human instincts, or instinctive impulses. As long as we consider impulses as independent formations independent of each other, we will not be able to approach the solution of many pressing problems, we will constantly revolve in a vicious circle of pseudo-problems. In particular, such an approach does not allow us to treat the motivational life of a person as a holistic, unitary phenomenon, dooms us to compiling all sorts of lists and enumerations of motives. Our approach, however, equips the researcher with the principle of value choice, the only reliable principle that allows us to consider one need as higher than another or as more important or even more basic in relation to another. The atomistic approach to motivational life, on the contrary, inevitably provokes us to reasoning about the death instinct, the striving for Nirvana, for eternal rest, for homeostasis, for balance, for the only thing a need is capable of in itself, if considered in isolation from other needs, is it is to demand one's own satisfaction, that is, one's own annihilation. But for us it is quite obvious that, having satisfied the need, a person does not find peace and, moreover, happiness, because the place of the satisfied need is immediately occupied by another need, which for the time being was not felt, weak and forgotten. Now she can finally state her claims at the top of her voice. There is no end to human desires. It is pointless to dream of absolute, complete satisfaction. 12. It is not far from the thesis about the baseness of instinct to the assumption that the mentally ill, neurotics, criminals, weak-minded and desperate people live the richest instinctive life. This assumption naturally follows from the doctrine, according to which consciousness, reason, conscience and morality are external, external, ostentatious phenomena, not characteristic of human nature, imposed on a person in the process of “cultivation”, necessary as a deterrent factor of his deep nature, necessary in the same sense as shackles are necessary for an inveterate criminal. In the end, in full accordance with this false concept, the role of civilization and all its institutions - schools, churches, courts and law enforcement agencies, designed to limit the base, unbridled nature of instincts, is formulated. This mistake is so serious, so tragic, that we can put it on the same level with such delusions as belief in God's chosen sovereignty, as blind conviction in the exclusive rightness of this or that religion, as the denial of evolution and the holy belief that the earth is a pancake lying on the ground. on three whales. All past and present wars, all manifestations of racial antagonism and religious intolerance, which the press reports to us, are based on one or another doctrine, religious or philosophical, instilling in a person disbelief in himself and in other people, degrading the nature of man and his capabilities. Curiously, this erroneous view of human nature is held not only by instinctivists, but also by their opponents. All the optimists who hope for a better future for man - environmental-mentalists, humanists, unitarians, liberals, radicals - all deny with horror the theory of instincts, mistakenly believing that it is it that dooms humanity to irrationality, wars, antagonism and the law of the jungle. Instinctivists, persisting in their delusion, are unwilling to abandon the principle of fatal inevitability. Most of them have long lost any optimism, although there are those who actively profess a pessimistic view of the future of mankind. An analogy can be drawn here with alcoholism. Some people slide into this abyss rapidly, others slowly and gradually, but the result is the same. It is not surprising that Freud is often put on a par with Hitler, for their positions are in many ways similar, and there is nothing strange in the fact that such wonderful people as Thorndike and McDougall, guided by the logic of low instinctiveness, came to the anti-democratic conclusions of the Hamiltonian persuasion. But in fact, it is enough just to stop considering instinctoid needs as obviously base or bad, it is enough to agree at least that they are neutral or even good, and immediately hundreds of pseudo-problems, over the solution of which we have been unsuccessfully racking our brains for many years, will disappear by themselves. If we accept this concept, then our attitude to learning will also change radically, it is even possible that we will abandon the very concept of "learning", which obscenely brings together the processes of education and training. Each step that brings us closer to agreement with our heredity, with our instinctive needs, will mean the recognition of the need to satisfy these needs, will reduce the likelihood of frustration. A moderately deprived child, that is, not yet fully cultivated, has not yet parted with his healthy animal nature, tirelessly strives for admiration, security, autonomy and love, and does this, of course, in his own way, in a childish way. How do we meet his efforts? A wise adult, as a rule, reacts to children's antics with the words: "Yes, he is drawing!" or: "He just wants to attract attention to himself!", and these words, this diagnosis automatically mean a denial of attention and participation, a command not to give the child what he is looking for, not to notice him, not to admire him, not to applaud him. However, if we learn to reckon with these children's calls for love, admiration and adoration, if we learn to treat these pleas as legal requirements, as manifestations of a natural human right, if we respond to them with the same participation with which we treat his complaints to hunger, thirst, pain or cold, then we will stop dooming him to frustration, we will become for him a source of satisfaction of these needs. Such an educational regime will entail one single, but very important consequence - the relationship between parent and child will become more natural, they will have more affection and love. Do not think that I am advocating total, absolute permissiveness. The pressure of inculturation, that is, education, discipline, the formation of social skills, preparation for a future adult life, awareness of the needs and desires of other people, to some extent, of course, is necessary, but the process of education will cease Annoy us and the child only when he is surrounded by an atmosphere of affection, love and respect for each other. And, of course, there can be no question of any indulgence in neurotic needs, bad habits, drug addiction, fixations, need for the familiar, or any other non-instinctoid needs. And finally, we must not forget that short-term frustrations, life experiences, even tragedies and misfortunes can have beneficial and healing consequences.

I would like to put things in order in this one of the most important and most confusing scientific topics, and, of course, find out their role in nature and in human society, as part of nature; as well as accurately determine their position in the overall architecture of consciousness.
In contrast to physics, where first paradoxes are experimentally discovered, and then a new theory is demanded, in the topic of consciousness, the analytical approach can immediately reveal a significant paradox about the usual judgments. And this is because there is a lot of baseless chatter in the subject of consciousness, which is quickly accepted as scientific truth, and then gives rise to baseless judgments that become habitual. In this regard, in the topic of instincts, as part of consciousness, we will have many surprises that are called paradoxes in science, but not objective, as in physics, but anthropogenic. And one of these paradoxes is the ambiguity of the innateness of instincts. It may also seem paradoxical to consider human instincts, moreover, with an emphasis on special importance in this aspect, which many are not used to.
An analytical approach requires an underlying model and a rigorous theory. As a fundamental scientific toolkit, we will take the integration model of consciousness and theories that are part of it, starting with the theory of the level organization of consciousness.
Yes, you heard right: the theories included in the model, in the model of consciousness. Consciousness is a supercomplex object, therefore it occupies a special place in theoretical terms, and its model objectively requires many theories included in this model, which distinguishes this subject. In this sense, the phrase "theory of consciousness" is completely absurd, because the explanation of consciousness requires many theories, not just one. And the theory of instincts is one of such incoming theories, but not general and fundamental, but private.

PLACE AND FORMATION OF INSTINCTS IN THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

According to the integration model of consciousness, instincts certainly belong to its first range, i.e. to reflex-intuitive, consisting of the following levels:

1. signal
2. definitely reflex
3. reactive
4. conditioned reflex
5. efficient
6. combination
7. impressionable
8. intuitive
9. representational

This range covers images from neural signals to representations. The other two ranges are not shown here due to irrelevance in this topic. We only note that the second range extends from ideas to personalities, and the third from personalities to ethnos.
In the above range, as in all three, odd numbers correspond to figurative levels, and even numbers correspond to connecting levels. Instincts in their primary manifestation belong to the level of reactions that are formed on the basis of combining signals with the help of an unconditioned reflex, i.e. unconditioned reflex connections. Simply put, instincts are a figurative product of the unconditioned reflex. Why?
Any type of image or any image level of consciousness can manifest itself in three different phases: in the phase of thinking, in the phase of behavior and in the phase of perception, as described in the integration model of consciousness. In the phase of behavior, the unconditioned reflex product manifests itself as a reaction, in the phase of perception - as an urge, and in the phase of thinking - as an instinct, but not the whole instinct, but its primary stage. At this primary stage, any instinct manifests itself primitively, and it is difficult to distinguish from what we call a reflex, except perhaps for some prolongation, which is generally characteristic of the phase of thinking at any of the figurative levels. Much greater extension in time and participation in complex life circumstances instinct acquires at the second and third stages of its formation, i.e. with the participation of a conditioned reflex and a combination, but only in all three phases: thinking, behavior and perception.
So, with regard to the conditioned reflex, i.e., its product: both actions, and desires, and drives are subject to the presence of instinct. And regarding the associative reflex, i.e. its product: and actions, and experiences, and impressions, the presence of instinct is also quite obvious.
From this it can be seen that instincts influence our desires, experiences, impressions, drives ... which corresponds to an intuitive empirical truth and is unlikely to cause doubts in anyone.
After the conditioned reflex stage, the instincts are completed at the associative stage. This is how instincts make us experience our third stage of formation and choose a series of actions based on this. By the way, we are impressed by what is more in line with our instincts.
In order to understand more clearly the principle of the action of instincts, we need to answer three questions:

1. What is the ambiguity of innateness?
2. Why are the same instincts RELATIVELY the same in different individuals of the same species?
3. How do instincts affect our most complex life manifestations?

WHAT IS THE AMBIGUITY OF NATURAL INSTINCT?

First, if we keep in mind the primary stage of the formation of an instinct, then this is analogous to the triggering of an unconditioned reflex, as we are too accustomed to say. In fact, a certain set of unconditional reflex connections connect a certain set of neural signals into a single reaction. Due to the integral essence of the reaction, they occur with us every time with some variety and originality, if we take a closer look at this problem. Every time we sneeze differently, although according to the same pattern, we pull our hand from the hot one in different ways, orgasm results in different ways. All this cannot be overlooked, and this points to the clearly composite nature of the unconditioned reflex, or rather the formation of its reaction. Other evidence can be read in the integration model of consciousness. Instinct, on the other hand, as an image similar to a reaction, but not in the phase of behavior, but in the phase of thinking, has a similar composite character.
There is already a factor different from innate. And, if we take into account that there are also stages that depend on conditioned and combinational reflexes, then the innateness of instincts appears even more ambiguous. The most paradoxical thing is that we can neither deny their innateness completely, nor fully recognize it. There is certainly an innately dependent component here, but there is also a variable-situational component, there is an educated one, as well as a hereditary one. Those. there is a pledge and similarity of instincts in animals of the same species (including humans), but there is also an originality in each of them.

WHY ARE THE INSTINCTS RELATIVELY THE SAME?

In all animals, including humans, instincts can be considered relatively the same within the same species. Here the reader will have two questions: first, why does a person have ?; and secondly, why are they the same, if the author spoke about originality within one species, and even for the same person (animal) in different situations, he can manifest himself somewhat differently?
It must be said that this work on instincts was started for the sake of human instincts, since this topic is extremely relevant due to its complexity.
Well, in different ways, it's like, for example, you will not meet two identical trees. Let's just say that instincts within a species are relatively the same, since everything is relative.
Of course, there is a predestination, since there is an innate component, and it creates biochemical and physiological prerequisites for the sameness, but there is another mysterious component that is usually little taken into account, this is the aspect of developmental parallelisms provided by the presence of identical internal foundations and the same conditions of formation. And, I must say, the phenomenon of parallelisms can even be very clear, often leading even at times to the false idea of ​​complete predetermination, although in fact predetermination is only apparent.
Those. in parallel, in different people, independently of each other, instincts can develop, as it were, in the same channel. Then they will be similar at first glance, and distinguishable only at a glance with artistic attention. Again, as in the example with trees: we note the similarity of these trees according to species characteristics, but the artist will distinguish them by the composition of branches and other things.
And, as we see in life, instincts do develop somewhat differently in people of different classes, different civilizations, different eras, different nationalities and just different psychotypes. Those. on the one hand, we will observe small differences, and on the other, global similarities. And the main meaning here lies simply in the conditions of the formation environment in which the individual (individual) grows, develops and is brought up. And the entire voluminous social totality of individuals will develop in parallel conditions. In each of these environments, their own instinctive parallelisms will be formed, but there will also be universal human parallelisms. And this is one of the reasons why instincts (especially human ones) have not been clearly described and characterized. And this is precisely the contribution of conditioned and combinational reflexes to the individual development of instincts. Since representatives of the same social environment will have the same conditioned and combinational reflexes (rather similar in many respects), then the instincts in their complex phase of development will be formed almost the same.
If we take an example from a completely different field, from biology, then tissue similarities, as well as similarities of organs, sometimes very confused evolutionists of the past in relation to some animal species, when the relationship of origin only seemed, but in some cases turned out to be false, because animals with similar organs could even belong to different evolutionary branches. So the eye of an octopus and the eye of a mammal have many similarities. So, while scientifically studying systemicity in the broad sense of the word, these parallelisms cannot be discounted. And with regard to the development of instincts in people, the same thing happens, i.e. on a similar basis, under similar conditions, similar instincts develop, although they might not be very similar if these people find themselves in different conditions of development. But, it must be said that when a professional selects a puppy for his professional needs, he looks precisely at the originality of instinctive accents in the same litter, although, of course, the general set of instincts is certainly the same.

WHAT DOES INSTINCTS AFFECT OUR MOST DIFFICULT LIFE MANIFESTATIONS?

But complete genetic predetermination cannot take place in relation to instincts, because unconditionally it is easy to imagine only biochemical predetermination, since it is determined genetically quite clearly, but it is impossible to genetically specify a reaction to the shape of the body, the nature of the voice and its intonation, as well as to others. life manifestations of the same order of complexity. And, if we take sexual instincts as an example due to their simpler consideration, it becomes obvious that mental reactions to the forms of the female body are not only a product of an unconditioned reflex, but also a conditional and combinational one, because the reaction to pheromones is gradually conjugated and with body shapes, and with the character of the voice and with the type of behavior, as well as with many other manifestations, when we see, for example, that an object of the opposite sex flirts with us, as they say, and we instinctively react to it (object). This can only be given indirectly with the participation of more complex reflexes and with the participation of the law of parallelisms. Those. in this subsequent development of instinct in our psyche, and in the psyche of other animals, too, in addition to the unconditioned, two more reflexes participate: conditional and combinational. The fact that it comes to associative is evidenced by the fact that there is an obvious attachment to complex forms and to dynamic processes, which are inaccessible to the conditioned reflex, not to mention the unconditioned, to which only direct natural smells and direct tactility are available. And this dependence of the instincts on higher reflexes raises the instincts to the level of so-called spirituality, if these instincts are encouraged.
And it must be said that these reinforcing incentives at the stages of conditioned and combinational reflexes act differently. The conditioned reflex always acts primitively, and the light of the light bulb just before the feeding itself directly “accustoms” to the reaction to extraneous influence according to the Pavlovian food-light bulb-saliva scheme. So a conditioned reflex in a person can fix an instinct regarding the shape of the body. But, as for ritual behavior, coquettishness, and similar complex phenomena, this is already a clear influence of the associative reflex. In some isolated tribes, probably, even today one can find a very artificial change in the shape of the body and positive reactions to them among fellow tribesmen, unlike us, people of another civilization. And their rituals of mating behavior, as already a manifestation of the combination reflex, can also be different.
But instincts, as we have already said, can also influence the so-called spiritual aspects of a person, if we do not take humanists into account and look from a natural point of view, for example, at the functions of conscience, which are inherited and in no way amenable to education in some individuals. And others, you see, there is almost no need to educate, i.e. they do not need to read the list of commandments, because they will not do these bad things anyway.
The beast also shows qualities close to the so-called human spirituality, when it does not touch other people's cubs, and sometimes saves them from starvation; when he feels gratitude, for example, to a person and contacts with him. It's about instincts. social group, complex instincts, instincts that regulate social behavior in packs and in society (where there is no big difference). The culture of behavior in a pack of wolves and in a human society do not differ as much as humanists believe, and this is because even culture in the notorious human society is also determined by instincts, as by some simple directive messages. Of course, culture and conscience are by no means reduced to instincts alone, but are largely predetermined by them, initiated, without which they would not work, as happens in some human individuals with the corresponding genetic defects.

The third theoretical premise modern science about human communication can be considered the theory of instincts social behavior, which arose from the idea of ​​evolutionism by Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and
G. Spencer (1820-1903).

At the center of this trend is the theory of W. McDougall (1871–1938), an English psychologist who has been working in the United States since 1920. The main theses of his theory are as follows.

1. The psychology of personality plays a decisive role in the formation of social psychology.

2. main reason social behavior of individuals are innate instincts. Instincts are understood as an innate psycho-physiological predisposition to the perception of external objects of a certain class, causing emotions and a willingness to respond in one way or another. In other words, the action of instinct involves the emergence of an emotional reaction, motive or act. At the same time, each instinct corresponds to a very specific emotion. The researcher paid special attention to the herd instinct, which gives rise to a sense of belonging and thus underlies many social instincts.

This concept has undergone some evolution: by 1932 McDougall abandoned the term "instinct", replacing it with the concept of "predisposition". The number of the latter was increased from 11 to 18, but the essence of the doctrine has not changed. Unconscious needs for food, sleep, sex, parental care, self-affirmation, comfort, etc. were still considered the main driving force of human behavior, the foundation of social life. Gradually, however, the American intellectual climate was changing: scientists became disillusioned with the rather primitive idea of ​​the immutability of human nature, and the scales tipped in favor of the other extreme - the leading role of the environment.

Behaviorism

The new doctrine, called behaviorism, dates back to 1913 and is based on the experimental study of animals. E. Thorndike (1874–1949) and J. Watson (1878–1958), who were strongly influenced by the works of the famous Russian physiologist I.P. Pavlova.

Behaviorism - the science of behavior - proposes a rejection of the direct study of consciousness, and instead - the study of human behavior according to the "stimulus - reaction" scheme, that is, external factors come to the fore. If their influence coincides with inborn reflexes of a physiological nature, the “law of effect” comes into force: this behavioral reaction is fixed. Consequently, by manipulating external stimuli, any necessary forms of social behavior can be brought to automatism. At the same time, not only the innate inclinations of the individual are ignored, but also the unique life experience, attitudes and beliefs. In other words, the focus of researchers is the relationship between stimulus and response, but not their content. However, behaviorism has had a significant impact on sociology, anthropology and, most importantly, management.

In neobehaviorism (B. Skinner, N. Miller, D. Dollard, D. Homans, and others), the traditional “stimulus-response” scheme is complicated by the introduction of intermediate variables. From the point of view of the problem of business communication the greatest interest represents the theory of social exchange by D. Homans, according to which the frequency and quality of rewards (for example, gratitude) are directly proportional to the desire to help a source of positive incentive.

Freudianism

A special place in the history of social psychology is occupied by Z. Freud (1856–1939), an Austrian physician and psychologist. Freud lived in Vienna almost all his life, combining teaching with medical practice. A scientific internship in Paris in 1885 with the famous psychiatrist J. Charcot and a trip to America in 1909 to give lectures had a significant impact on the development of his teaching.

Western Europe at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. It was characterized by social stability, lack of conflict, an excessively optimistic attitude towards civilization, boundless faith in the human mind and the possibilities of science, and the bourgeois hypocrisy of the Victorian era in the field of morality and moral relations. Under these conditions, the young and ambitious Freud, brought up on the ideas of natural science and hostile to "metaphysics", began the study of mental illness. At that time, physiological deviations were considered the cause of mental deviations. From Charcot, Freud got acquainted with the hypnotic practice of treating hysteria and began to study the deep layers of the human psyche.
He concluded that nervous diseases are caused by unconscious mental traumas, and connected these traumas with the sexual instinct, sexual experiences. Scientific Vienna did not accept Freud's discoveries, but a revolution in science nevertheless took place.

Consider those provisions that are directly related to the patterns of business communication and to one degree or another have withstood the test of time.

model of the mental structure of personality, according to Freud, consists of three levels: “It”, “I”, “Super-I” (in Latin “Id”, “Ego”, “Super-Ego”).

Under " It ” refers to the deepest layer of the human psyche, inaccessible to consciousness, initially an irrational source of sexual energy, called libido. “It” obeys the principle of pleasure, constantly strives to realize itself and sometimes breaks into consciousness in the figurative form of dreams, in the form of slips of the tongue and slips of the tongue. Being a source of constant mental stress, “It” is socially dangerous, since the uncontrolled realization by each individual of his instincts can lead to the death of human communication. In practice, this does not happen, because a “dam” in the form of our “I” stands in the way of the forbidden sexual energy.

“I AM ”obeys the principle of reality, is formed on the basis of individual experience and is designed to promote the self-preservation of the individual, its adaptation to the environment on the basis of restraint and suppression of instincts.

“I”, in turn, controlled “ Super-I ”, which is understood as social prohibitions and values, moral and religious norms learned by the individual. The “Super-I” is formed as a result of the identification of the child with the father, acts as a source of feelings of guilt, reproaches of conscience, dissatisfaction with oneself. From here follows the paradoxical conclusion that there are no mentally normal people, everyone is neurotic, since everyone has an internal conflict, a stressful situation.

In this regard, Freud's proposed mechanisms for relieving stress, in particular repression and sublimation, are of practical interest. Their essence can be illustrated as follows. Imagine a hermetically sealed steam boiler in which the pressure is steadily increasing. An explosion is inevitable. How to prevent it? Either strengthen the walls of the boiler as much as possible, or open the safety valve and release steam. The first is repression, when unwanted feelings and desires are forced out into the unconscious, but even after the displacement they continue to motivate the emotional state and behavior, remain a source of experience. The second is sublimation: sexual energy is catalyzed, that is, it is transformed into external activity that does not contradict socially significant values, for example, artistic creativity.

Similar information.

The theory of instincts of social behavior.

Originated in the USA. The first serious central work is considered to be the book of the English psychologist McDougall, who worked in the USA, ʼʼIntroduction to Social Psychologyʼʼ (1920). For a number of years this book has been used as a textbook in American universities. According to his theory, personality psychology plays a decisive role in the formation of social psychology.

The main reason for the social behavior of individuals is innate instincts, ᴛ.ᴇ. an innate predisposition to the perceptibility of the environment and a willingness to respond in one way or another. He believed that each instinct corresponds to a certain emotion. He attached particular importance to the social instinct, which gives rise to a sense of belonging to a group.

This theory was leading in the USA. The concept of instinct was eventually replaced by the concept of predisposition, but the main driving forces of human behavior, the basis of social life, were still considered the need for food, sleep, sex, parental care, self-affirmation, etc. Freud's work, especially the structure of the personality and the driving forces of development, was of great importance for the development of this theory, and the mechanisms for relieving stress also turned out to be important. The theory of psychological defense he created was further developed in social psychology Currently, there are 8 methods of psychological protection:

1) Denial is manifested in the unconscious rejection of information that is negative for self-esteem. A person, as it were, listens, but does not hear, does not perceive what threatens his well-being ...

2) Repression - an active way to prevent internal conflict, involves not only turning off negative information from consciousness, but also special actions to preserve the positive self-image, ᴛ.ᴇ. a person can not only forget facts that are not acceptable to him, but also put forward false, but acceptable explanations for his actions. 3) Projection - an unconscious attribution to another person of one's own desires and aspirations of personal qualities, most often of a negative nature.

4) Substitution - the removal of internal stress by transferring, redirecting the action aimed at an inaccessible object, into an accessible situation.

5) Identification - the establishment of an emotional connection with another object of identification with him. Often allows you to overcome feelings of inferiority.

6) Isolation - protection from traumatic facts by breaking emotional ties with other people. Loss of the ability to empathize. And the most effective are:

7) Rationalization manifests itself in the form of a decrease in the value of the unattainable. 8) Sublimation - ϶ᴛᴏ translation of unfulfilled desires (sexual) into a socially acceptable channel.

9) Regress - ϶ᴛᴏ return to past (childish) forms of behavior. Freud's ideas about human aggressiveness and methods of psychological defense found a new development in the works of the American psychologist Eric Fromm (1900-1980) (2Escape from Freedomʼʼ).

The theory of instincts of social behavior. - concept and types. Classification and features of the category "Theory of instincts of social behavior." 2017, 2018.