Late September - early October 2013. Russia recalls one of the most dramatic episodes of its formation as a state - the dispersal of the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, also known as the shelling of the White House or the October Putsch.
These events, caused by the constitutional crisis faced by the young country, made Russia a presidential republic. Moscow again turned into a field for revolutionary experiments, which already happened in 1991, but this time everything ended much more tragically, although the current government managed not only to maintain, but also to consolidate its position.
RBC recalls the main characters of this drama that took place in the capital of Russia 20 years ago.
Boris Yeltsin- first president Russian Federation. He became a key figure in the October putsch. Together with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the Mayor of Moscow, he opposed Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, who were supported by most of the people's deputies.
On December 10, 1992, the day after the Congress of People's Deputies accused Yegor Gaidar of the failure of economic reforms and did not approve his candidacy for the post of Prime Minister, B. Yeltsin tried to disrupt the work of the Congress and actually provoked the constitutional crisis of 1992-1993.
It was B. Yeltsin on March 20, 1993. made a televised address to the people, in which he announced the suspension of the Constitution and the introduction of a "special procedure for governing the country", but a few days later it turned out that the president had signed a completely different decree. This saved B. Yeltsin from impeachment, since the present text of the decree did not contain gross violations of the Constitution.
April 25, 1993 the All-Russian referendum was held, remembered by the inhabitants of the country for the advertising slogan "Yes - yes - no - yes." As a result, it turned out that the majority of Russians support B. Yeltsin, approve of his socio-economic policy, do not want early presidential elections and do not want early elections of people's deputies.
September 21, 1993 B. Yeltsin's conflict with the legislature passed into the final stage. The President signed Decree No. 1400 "On a phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation", which stopped the work of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies, introduced a temporary system of government bodies and scheduled elections to the State Duma for December 11-12.
The Constitutional Court ruled that B. Yeltsin's actions were unconstitutional, on the basis of which the Supreme Council decided to terminate his presidential powers and transfer them to Vice President A. Rutskoi.
The confrontation between B. Yeltsin and people's deputies reached its peak on October 3-4, 1993. After the supporters of the Supreme Council seized the building of the Moscow City Hall on Novy Arbat and attempted to seize the television center in Ostankino, B. Yeltsin introduced a state of emergency in the capital. It was the first president of Russia who decided to storm the White House using tanks.
Photo: ITAR-TASS
After the capture of the White House, R. Khasbulatov, A. Rutskoy and a number of other leaders of the Supreme Council were detained and placed in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center, but in February 1994. they were amnestied (although their trial never took place) by the newly elected State Duma.
After his victory, B. Yeltsin began a large-scale reform of the Russian political system by signing a decree "On legal regulation in the period of gradual constitutional reform" and in fact endowing himself with the functions of a legislator. On December 12, a nationwide vote on the new Constitution of Russia was held, as well as elections to the State Duma and the Federation Council.
B. Yeltsin's subsequent activities are connected, first of all, with the Chechen conflict, the 1996 presidential elections. and the election campaign under the slogan "Vote or lose", the denomination of the ruble, the crisis of 1998, the concepts of "family" and "seven bankers" and the expression "dashing 90s" so beloved by the current government.
May 1999 The State Duma unsuccessfully tried to raise the issue of removing B. Yeltsin from office, but on December 31, 1999. the first president himself left the post, saying the famous "I'm tired, I'm leaving" and appointing him his successor. The ex-premier on the same day signed a decree guaranteeing B. Yeltsin protection from prosecution.
June 12, 2001 B. Yeltsin was awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, 1st class. According to Boris Nemtsov, while retired, B. Yeltsin was extremely annoyed by the fact that under V. Putin, freedom of speech began to curtail and the institution of elections was destroyed, although he did not speak about it publicly.
Boris Yeltsin died on April 23, 2007. at the age of 76, and on April 25 he was buried at the Novodevichy cemetery with military honors.
Alexander Rutskoy- the first and last vice-president of the Russian Federation. Initially, together with R. Khasbulatov, he supported the policy pursued by B. Yeltsin and even on March 11, 1991. signed a letter directed against a group of members of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, who constituted opposition to B. Yeltsin and offered him to leave the post of chairman of the Council.
June 12, 1991 he was elected vice president in tandem with Russian President B. Yeltsin. A. Rutskoy had a conflict with the head of state after he openly criticized Y. Gaidar's "shock therapy", calling his office "boys in pink pants." In addition, A. Rutskoi opposed the abolition of the USSR, criticized the Belovezhskaya agreement, comparing it with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918. Then he met with Mikhail Gorbachev and urged him to arrest B. Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich. As a result, the irritated B. Yeltsin signed a decree on the transfer of a number of structures that were subordinate to the vice president to the government.
During the constitutional crisis of 1993, on September 1, B. Yeltsin by his decree dismissed A. Rutskoy from all duties, however, the Supreme Council sent a petition to the Constitutional Court with a request to verify the compliance of this decree with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. According to the deputies, B. Yeltsin invaded the sphere of authority of the judiciary. Until the case was considered by the Constitutional Court, the decree was suspended.
After B. Yeltsin signed Decree No. 1400 on September 21, and the Constitutional Court ruled that the actions of the head of state were unconstitutional, the Supreme Council adopted a resolution on the termination of B. Yeltsin's presidential powers and their transfer to A. Rutskoi. He took up his duties on the night of September 22 and canceled the anti-constitutional decree of B. Yeltsin.
One of the first decrees of A. Rutskoy was the appointment of power ministers. Vladislav Achalov became Minister of Defense, Viktor Barannikov became Minister of Security, acting. Minister of the Interior - Andrey Dunaev. On October 3, A. Rutskoi called from the balcony of the White House to storm the Moscow City Hall and Ostankino. Subsequently, he admitted that the decision to send people to storm the television center was wrong: "Of course, it was a mistake. I did not want blood, but the nerves are in a lump." On the same day, B. Yeltsin signed a decree on the release of A. Rutskoy from the post of Vice-President of Russia.
On October 4, A. Rutskoi led the defense of the White House. Early in the morning, he drove around the House of Soviets in a Mercedes car with an inspection of the forces entrusted to him. When tanks opened fire on the White House, one of the shells hit A. Rutskoy's office. "The first shell hit the meeting room, the second - in the office of R. Khasbulatov, the third - in mine. Moreover, they hit with high-explosive shells, and not with blanks, as they say today. pierced the window and exploded in the right corner. Fortunately, my table was in the left. I jumped out of there crazy. I don’t know what saved me, "said the former vice president.
Photo: ITAR-TASS
In the evening of the same day, A. Rutskoy, R. Khasbulatov and Albert Makashov were arrested and taken to the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center. The former head of B. Yeltsin's security service, Alexander Korzhakov, said that he had the task of "cocking" A. Rutskoy and R. Khasbulatov, but it was impossible to do this, since they hid in a crowd of deputies. Together with other participants in the October coup, A. Rutskoi was amnestied in February 1993.
Later, he explained his behavior during the “Yeltsin coup” in this way: “I hope that by the end of his life he nevertheless understood what really happened then, in 1993. After all, I rebelled not against him, but against the team, against the people who then B. Yeltsin was surrounded. I want to believe that he knew this. Some time after those events, he nevertheless fired those who were around him at that time: E. Gaidar, G. Burbulis, M. Poltoranin ... Then A. Korzhakov."
After the release of A. Rutskoy, he no longer participated in the struggle for the highest government posts, but in 1996. was elected governor of the Kursk region and held this post for four years. He currently lives in Odintsovo and is the chairman of the board of directors of a cement plant located in the Voronezh region.
Ruslan Khasbulatov since October 29, 1991 - Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation. Even before the emergence of the constitutional crisis, he proposed to B. Yeltsin to dismiss the government of Y. Gaidar, but at that moment the majority of people's deputies did not support him. After the President on September 21, 1993. signed a decree on constitutional reform and dissolved the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies, R. Khasbulatov convened a meeting of the Presidium of the Armed Forces and stated the termination of B. Yeltsin's powers and their transfer to Vice President A. Rutskoi.
Later, the president's actions were qualified by R. Khasbulatov and his supporters-deputies as an attempt at a coup d'état. On September 23, the Congress of People's Deputies appointed March 1994. early presidential elections contrary to the results of the referendum.
During the coup, R. Khasbulatov, together with A. Rutskoi and other leaders of the Supreme Council, led the defense of the White House. On October 1, an attempt was made to negotiate peace between supporters of B. Yeltsin and the Supreme Council through the mediation of Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia. As a result, an agreement was signed on accounting and depositing all the weapons that were in the hands of the people who defended the House of Soviets. After the signing of "protocol No. 1", electricity was supplied to the building and journalists were allowed through, and the access control was relaxed, however, due to the intervention of R. Khasbulatov, the Congress of People's Deputies denounced this agreement, and the negotiations were terminated.
On October 3, R. Khasbulatov called on Russian soldiers to "take the Kremlin by storm with the usurper - the former criminal Yeltsin," stating that B. Yeltsin should be imprisoned in Matrosskaya Tishina. After the October events, he, along with A. Rutsky, was accused of organizing the seizure of the Moscow City Hall, but the State Duma commission later concluded that the seizure was carried out before their calls were made, and happened spontaneously. In addition, R. Khasbulatov denied accusations of organizing the storming of the television center. According to him, he called for "locating all the people as in August 1991, along the perimeter of the Supreme Council," but the "provocateurs" led them to take Ostankino.
When the shelling of the White House began on October 4, one of the shells hit the office of R. Khasbulatov, but the head of the Supreme Council was not injured. After B. Yeltsin's supporters took the House of Soviets, General Mikhail Barsukov brought the president a personal smoking pipe R. Khasbulatov, which B. Yeltsin smashed against the wall. A. Rutskoy speaks about the role of R. Khasbulatov in the October events as follows: “If there had been another person in the place of R. Khasbulatov, perhaps everything would have gone differently. he's puffing out his cheeks now."
Photo: ITAR-TASS
After the victory of B. Yeltsin's supporters, R. Khasbulatov was arrested and placed in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center. He was charged with organizing mass riots, but in February 1994. he was released under the amnesty of the State Duma. October 2010 R.Khasbulatov said that a group of Russian deputies is preparing an appeal to the International Court of Justice regarding the events of October 2010.
After his release, R. Khasbulatov became the head of the Department of World Economy of the Plekhanov Russian Academy. In the same year, he attempted to fulfill "Professor Khasbulatov's peacekeeping mission" by setting himself the task of organizing peace talks between Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev and the anti-Dudaev coalition, as well as the Russian authorities. However, this initiative proved to be a failure. After the fighting began in Chechnya, R. Khasbulatov returned to Moscow, where he continued to work at the institute. In 2003 he announced that he intended to take part in the presidential elections in Chechnya and was able to win in the first round, but he did not keep his promise.
Valery Zorkin- Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in 1991-1993. and since 2003 During the period of the constitutional crisis of 1992-1993, which preceded the dissolution of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, he actively participated in the negotiations of representatives of the branches of power. In particular, on his initiative in December 1992. Negotiations were held between President of Russia B. Yeltsin and Chairman of the Supreme Council R. Khasbulatov.
When March 20, 1993. B. Yeltsin delivered a televised address to the people, in which he announced the suspension of the Constitution and the introduction of a "special procedure for governing the country", the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized his actions as unconstitutional and found grounds for removal from office. September 21-22, 1993 The Constitutional Court, chaired by V. Zorkin, ruled that the president's actions were unconstitutional. This allowed the Supreme Council to adopt a resolution on the termination of the powers of President B. Yeltsin from the moment the famous decree No. 1400 was issued.
Photo: ITAR-TASS
After the shelling of the White House, on October 7, 1993, V. Zorkin, under the threat of criminal prosecution on charges of "legal support for the constitutional coup," resigned from the post of chairman of the Constitutional Court, retaining the powers of a judge. Only March 21, 2003. he was re-elected President of the Constitutional Court. Until now, he continues to fulfill his duties.
V. Zorkin reacted negatively to the demonstrations in defense of fair elections that took place in Moscow and other large cities of Russia after massive fraud in the elections to the State Duma in December 2011. The Chairman of the Constitutional Court is sure that "the rally passions were fueled from abroad", as in 1993, while the Russian Federation is more suited to people who will not "castigate vices", but "work patiently". At the same time, he compared the Russian opposition with Chatsky from Griboyedov's Woe from Wit.
Yegor Gaidar- one of the most controversial figures in Russian politics, the first Minister of Finance of Russia, the ideologist of large-scale reforms that allowed the country to make the transition to a market economy.
The refusal of the Congress of People's Deputies to approve Y. Gaidar as head of the Council of Ministers in December 1992. became one of the causes of the political crisis in the Russian Federation. Later, he described the current situation as follows: “Everything suggests that the constitutional resources have been exhausted. The people were asked at the referendum, they received an unequivocal answer, and now, contrary to their opinion, a coalition of communists, nationalists and just rogues demands to remove the president, whom they just recently convincingly supported Russia".
After the publication of Decree No. 1400 and the refusal of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies to dissolve, Y. Gaidar became one of the initiators of establishing a blockade of the White House, cutting off electricity and sewerage in it, as well as banning A. Rutskoy, R. Khasbulatov and their supporters from broadcasting on television. .
When the supporters of the putsch organized an assault on the Moscow mayor's office and the television center, Ye. Gaidar decided to turn to the Muscovites for support. On the evening of October 3, he went on television, declaring that "at this hour it is not enough to rely only on the forces of the police and the security services," and calling on "all Russians who value democracy and freedom" to gather at the Moscow City Council building.
After this appeal, thousands of Boris Yeltsin's supporters came to the building of the Moscow City Council, which was under the control of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation. Barricades were built on Tverskaya and adjacent streets. Volunteers formed self-defense detachments, which were used, in particular, to protect a number of objects, including the Ekho Moskvy radio station. At the same time Y. Gaidar received a guarantee from the chairman of the State Committee for Emergency Situations that, if necessary, the demonstrators supporting the president would be given weapons. Later, E. Gaidar noted that only after these measures, at about 02:00 Moscow time on October 4, the military began to carry out the orders of B. Yeltsin, and the troops moved to Moscow to storm the White House.
Photo: ITAR-TASS
After the victory of President B. Yeltsin in the confrontation with the Supreme Council, E. Gaidar, who was the chairman of the electoral bloc "Russia's Choice", which united supporters of the continuation of market reforms, headed the list of candidates for the elections to the State Duma. Election posters with his portrait were accompanied by the slogan: "Everyone says ... He does it." However, in the elections, the bloc received only 15% of the vote, losing to the Liberal Democratic Party.
As the first deputy head of government and acting. Minister of Economy of the Russian Federation E. Gaidar continued his course of reducing inflation, as well as tightening the budget and monetary policy. However, in the new composition of the government, according to him, the possibilities to pursue such a policy were "very limited." In January 1994 V. Chernomyrdin announced economic decisions related to another increase in budget expenditures and the risk of inflation. E. Gaidar was not even informed about this. January 13, 1994 he wrote a letter to B. Yeltsin, noting that he could not be both in the government and in opposition to him, and resigned seven days later.
In 1996-1999 E. Gaidar was a member of the board of directors of OJSC, from 1994 to 2001. He was the chairman of the Democratic Choice of Russia party. To participate in the 1999 parliamentary elections. the democratic bloc "Union of Right Forces" was formed, which included the party of E. Gaidar. Later, SPS was transformed into a party, and E. Gaidar became its co-chairman, along with Irina Khakamada.
He insisted that the Union of Right Forces support him in the 2000 presidential elections. In the State Duma (1999-2003) he was a member of the budget and taxes committee. According to him, the most successful reforms in which he was involved were the tax reform, the reform of budgetary federalism, and the creation of the Stabilization Fund. Ye. Gaidar openly spoke out against the "YUKOS affair". In his opinion, "a stronger move aimed at stopping economic growth in Russia has not happened for a long time."
November 24, 2006 During an international conference in Dublin, at which E. Gaidar presented his book "The Death of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia", he was hospitalized in one of the city hospitals with symptoms of severe poisoning. expressed the opinion that this was connected with the murder of A. Politkovskaya and A. Litvinenko: "The deadly construction of Politkovskaya - Litvinenko - Gaidar, which did not miraculously end, would be extremely attractive to supporters of unconstitutional power-based options for changing power in Russia." Ye. Gaidar himself spoke in a similar way: "One of the overt or covert opponents of the Russian authorities is behind what happened."
In recent years, Ye. Gaidar has written extensively about the need to build a functioning democracy in Russia. “How do you think, what do you feel when it seems to you that you have already pulled your country out of the quagmire, and then you see how it is being pulled back there again?”, - he noted in an interview.
Ex-Finance Minister of the Russian Federation, President - Chairman of the Board of VTB24 Bank Mikhail Zadornov noted that "people did not know how serious Y. Gaidar's influence was on economic decision-making in Russia - even in recent years, when he did not hold any posts."
E. Gaidar died on December 16, 2009. at the age of 53. In Moscow in the building high school Economics (SU-HSE), a monument to the former Minister of Finance was unveiled on Pokrovsky Boulevard.
... and others
Pillars of the Yeltsin camp in 1993. were Chairman of the Council of Ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, his deputy Konstantin Kobets, Interior Minister Viktor Yerin, Mayor of Moscow, head of the presidential security service Alexander Korzhakov, head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Filatov, and General Valery Evnevich, whose troops were directly led shelling of the White House and dispersed the Supreme Council.
Photo: ITAR-TASS
Photo: ITAR-TASS
Photo: RBC
Photo: RIA Novosti Valery Evnevich
The key figures in the camp of the putschists, in addition to A. Rutskoy and R. Khasbulatov, were generals Vladislav Achalov, Albert Makashov and Viktor Barannikov, the leader of Labor Russia Viktor Anpilov, the founder and leader of the nationalist movement Russian National Unity Alexander Barkashov, the first deputy chairman of the Supreme of the Council Yuri Voronin, member of the Supreme Council and co-chairman of the "National Salvation Front" Ilya Konstantinov, his colleague Sergei Baburin, deputy chairman of the nationalist party "Russian People's Union" Viktor Alksnis, chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation Ramazan Abdulatipov, V. Achalov's assistant Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Terekhov and others .
Albert MakashovPhoto: ITAR-TASS
According to the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, as a result of mass riots in Moscow from September 21 to October 4, 1993. more than 6 thousand people were detained. On the evening of October 4, after the victory of B. Yeltsin's coalition, the Russian vice-president A. Rutskoy, the leader of the "Union of Officers" Albert Makashov and the chairman of the Supreme Council R. Khasbulatov were arrested. Later, several more well-known participants in the confrontation were detained.
A criminal case was initiated against them and other participants in the events. The investigation team included more than two hundred people, several episodes were investigated, including the assault on the television center in Ostankino, but it turned out to be extremely difficult to get a real picture of what was happening. The main defendants in the case were R. Khasbulatov, A. Rutskoy, V. Achalov, V. Barannikov, as well as A. Makashov and several of his subordinates. On the day of B. Yeltsin's victory, all of them were taken to the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center. They spent several months there, until the prison amnesty, which was announced in February 1994. The defendants were released, the proceedings were terminated.
According to the conclusion of the commission of the State Duma of Russia to investigate the events of September-October 1993, the fact that the participants in the October putsch escaped criminal prosecution made it impossible for those who suffered during the riots to receive any compensation for damage to health or property.
After the announcement of an amnesty, in March 1994. Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Filatov, wishing to punish B. Yeltsin's opponents, made, in fact, a black list of deputies who did not leave the Supreme Council until October 3, 1993. It included 151 people. No social benefits for these persons were no longer valid. Such a measure, however, did not work for long - in April of the same year, the black list was canceled by presidential decree. Almost all the main characters of the political arena in the fall of 1993. found their place in politics or business.
The first deputy head of the Armed Forces, Yuri Voronin, who was a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, was elected to the State Duma several times. He worked as an auditor of the Accounts Chamber, but was removed from his position upon reaching the age of 65 - the maximum age for being in the civil service. Now Yu.Voronin is the head of the "Rossiyskoe Otechestvo" (Russian Fatherland) organization for maintaining communication between Russians and compatriots who have remained abroad. He is a member of the Academy of Technological Sciences of Russia.
Sergei Baburin, who previously headed the SC Committee on Economic Reform, until last year was the rector of the Russian State University of Trade and Economics (RGTEU). In 2012 he was dismissed by the Minister of Education Dmitry Livanov, according to one version, because the students strongly opposed the merger of their university with the Plekhanov Russian Academy of Economics, according to another, because of poor results and high corruption of the university. After the events of autumn 1993. S.Baburin was repeatedly elected to the State Duma. Currently heading political party"Russian All-People's Union".
People's deputy and chairman of the executive committee of the "National Salvation Front" of the Armed Forces Ilya Konstantinov after 1993. took up social work in 2008. joined the "Fair Russia", but soon left it due to ideological differences with the policy of the party. Later he joined the party "Russian People's Union" S. Baburin. In 2012 I.Konstantinov participated in the "Russian March" in Moscow.
Another bright representative of the political arena in October 1993. - Colonel General Albert Makashov. Then he was the head of defense of the White House. After his release from Lefortovo, he was repeatedly elected to the State Duma, developed legislation in the field of military reform. Among parliamentarians, he became known for his anti-Semitic statements. In 2005 joined the signatories of the resonant "Letter 5000".
After being released from Lefortovo, Viktor Barannikov died of a stroke. Vladislav Achalov ran for the State Duma and for a long time headed the Union of Russian Paratroopers. In 2011 the general is dead.
Appointed in the days of the October events of 1993. Stanislav Terekhov, the leader of the "Union of Officers", ran for the State Duma twice as assistant to the Minister of Defense of Russia, but was not elected. He took over as co-chairman of the far-right National Power Party of Russia (NDPR). In 2012 participated in the Russian March.
Alexander BarkashovPhoto: ITAR-TASS
The leader of the "Russian National Unity" Alexander Barkashov, who in 1993. spoke in support of the Supreme Council, after the shelling of the White House, he ran for the State Duma, but his organization was banned. In 2005 information appeared in the media that A. Barkashov took monastic vows in the "True Orthodox Church". His religious followers organized their own movement, which they named after the politician - "Alexander Barkashov".
Stanislav TerekhovPhoto: ITAR-TASS, RIA Novosti
Active participant in the October 1993 riots. Viktor Anpilov, as a result of the dispersal of the Supreme Council, was also arrested, but not on October 4, but a few days later at his dacha. He was also awaited by imprisonment in the Lefortovo detention center, where he stayed until his release under an amnesty in February. next year. V. Anpilov ran for the State Duma, however, unsuccessfully. In 1999 joined the unregistered National Bolshevik party of Eduard Limonov "Other Russia". In 2006 took part in one of the "March of Dissent". Currently, he heads the executive committee of the Other Russia movement.
Viktor Alksnis, who was deputy chairman of the nationalist party "All-Russian People's Union", was a deputy of the State Duma of the III and IV convocations. Currently, he is the mayor of the village of Tuchkovo, Moscow Region.
Ramazan Abdulatipov, who in September-October 1993. represented the Supreme Council in negotiations between the president and parliament, by now he has achieved the greatest success among those who were part of the coup camp - he is the head of Dagestan.
As stated in the conclusion of the State Duma commission to investigate the events of September-October 1993, the severity of the consequences of what happened and to this day all domestic legal means in relation to persons whose actions led to the indicated consequences do not allow us to refer to the events of September 21 - October 5, 1993. as to an inverted page of Russian history.
"The final and fair resolution of issues related to the consequences of the events of September 21 - October 5, 1993, is possible only if the persons whose actions, related to abuse of power, became the initial cause of these events, are held accountable under the law," the document notes. .
Today marks 20 years since the storming of the Ostankino television center on October 3, 1993 and the subsequent shelling of the White House.
The key participants in those events from the side of opponents of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, speaking about them today, place different accents. Alexander Rutskoy regrets the victims and believes that this should not happen again; Ruslan Khasbulatov is sure that he should have acted tougher and "take power into his own hands."
Former Chairman of the Supreme Council R. Khasbulatov and former Vice-President of the Russian Federation A. Rutskoi visited the pre-premiere screening on the eve of the memorable date documentary film NTV columnist Vladimir Chernyshev " White House, black smoke" dedicated to the tragic events of October 1993.
A. Rutskoi, in an interview with journalists, expressed regret over the death of civilians at that time, but denied accusations that members of the Supreme Council were involved in this.
"We are accused of having created all the conditions for civil war, and we, on the contrary, did everything possible and impossible to prevent it," A. Rutskoi said.
He added that the investigation, which continued for a year after the October events, found out that "not a single person was killed from the weapons seized from the members of the Supreme Council." A. Rutskoi placed responsibility for the murders of citizens on his opponents.
“As for the events at the Ostankino television center. If you watch archival videos and take freeze-frames, you can see where they are shooting from. From the building, people are being fired at on the square in front of Ostankino, and from infantry fighting vehicles, from KPVT heavy machine guns they are hitting people. "Who was in the building? Interior troops, police. Who gave them the command to shoot at people?" - said A. Rutskoi.
He remembered the snipers, whose participation in those events was officially established during the investigation, but who led them was never found out.
“As for the snipers, the Supreme Council did not have sniper rifles. Journalist Mark Deutsch published an interview with the FSB general in the Stolitsa magazine on the question of whose snipers were after all. This general tells Deutsch: Korzhakov met 25 sportsmen in Vnukovo physique, they left for Fryazino - there was a brigade of special forces of internal troops, there they received sniper rifles. And whose then were the snipers?" - said A. Rutskoi.
He explained his threats to "lift aviation into the air" as an "emotional outburst" and said that he had no serious intentions to involve aviation in this conflict. "When you're indoors and there's artillery around the building, how do you feel?" - noted A. Rutskoi.
He lamented that for many years these events have been surrounded by "blatant lies", but expressed confidence that "history and time will put everything in its place."
"The public will know what really happened in 1993. For what reasons should they know the truth? So that this never happens again," A. Rutskoi said.
R. Khasbulatov, in turn, said that B. Yeltsin's opponents should have acted tougher. "Now I would have turned them all into a ram's horn. And I would have brought them to justice. I would not have relied on either the acting president or his worthless ministers. We should have acted tougher, very tough, given the actions that the other side was taking," he said.
According to him, "on the other side were bankrupt rebels who failed to lead the country."
"The country was on the verge of an uprising. They failed, and plunged people into poverty, but they wanted to put it on the parliamentarians. In fact, there was no power, and it just had to be taken," R. Khasbulatov said.
He noted that he still considers "the most adequate for Russia political system parliamentary democracy". In his opinion, at the moment there is no opposition as such.
“There have been attempts since 2011 to do something, but you see what kind of reprisal is taking place. And, by the way, Yeltsin led 100,000-strong demonstrations, he didn’t ask anyone, he walked around the stadiums, along the streets of Moscow, no one threw him into a jail. And now they are grabbing people for allegedly beating up policemen, this is ridiculous and ugly,” R. Khasbulatov said.
Both A. Rutskoi and R. Khasbulatov do not see themselves in the Russian politics of today. A. Rutskoi admitted that he had several attempts to return to the political field, but they all ended in nothing. R. Khasbulatov even exclaims: "But how will I return to politics? I was expelled, what are you talking about? I was thrown out of big politics!"
The political crisis of 1993 between the two branches of Russian power - the executive represented by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the legislative represented by the parliament - the Supreme Council (SC) of the RSFSR, headed by Ruslan Khasbulatov, on October 3-4 in Moscow turned into an armed clash and ended with a tank shelling of the parliament - House of Soviets (White House). According to various sources, about 200 people became victims of these events, and at least 1,000 were injured. The confrontation was motivated by differences in the ideas of the parties to the conflict about reforming the constitutional system, about the new Constitution, as well as about the ways of Russia's socio-economic development.
The brightest memories of Russians in the autumn of 1993
Russians, twenty years later, still find it difficult to give a definite assessment of the events of the autumn of 1993, the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) reports based on the results of its study.
Every third (36%) of 1,500 Russians admitted that he took the events of October 3-4, 1993, to heart. What is happening did not cause any emotions in a fifth of respondents (21%), and 31% of the participants in the September survey, which was conducted in 100 settlements of 43 constituent entities of the Russian Federation, reported that they were still very small, or had not yet been born at the time of the crisis.
Describing their most vivid memories of those days at the request of sociologists, 9% of respondents each pointed to the tanks on the streets of the capital and the storming of the White House, 7% most remembered the moments of armed clashes, the feeling of the approach of war. For 6%, the October events are associated with a feeling of fear and panic. 4% of respondents recall the political background, or rather, the confrontation between the President of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Council.
Every fifth (19%) Russian said that during the events of 1993 he did not support any of the parties to the conflict. A sixth share (16%) of the respondents, according to their confession, adhered to the position of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, a little less (14%) sympathized with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. 13% of respondents could not remember their point of view, 7% were unable to give a definite answer to the question about their preferences.
In retrospect, more than half (57%) were unable to determine which side was the truth in those events. One fifth (20%) of the respondents assume that the position of the Supreme Council was correct, in particular, because B. Yeltsin subsequently pursued an anti-people policy (“everything was destroyed, but nothing was created”), the Supreme Council tried to preserve the Soviet Union (according to 4%), defended the interests of the people (2%). Only 9% now support the position of the then president, since the country needed changes (2%), and B. Yeltsin advocated democratic reforms, life began to improve under him (1% each). At the same time, 15% believe that there were no right-wingers among the participants in the conflict.
According to the relative majority (43%) of Russians, if the Supreme Council, rather than the president's supporters, had won, Russia would have developed differently. At the same time, 42% could not imagine a hypothetical situation. Every sixth (15%) noted that the country would have gone the same way anyway.
On September 21, 1993, at exactly 20:00 on the central television channel, the news broadcast opened with an emergency speech by B. N. Yeltsin.
In his address to the people, he announced that he had signed Decree No. 1400 "On a phased constitutional reform in the Russian Federation."
Based on this decree,
"The Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation have been dissolved, and elections to a new legislative institution, the State Duma, have been scheduled at the same time"
Did Boris N. Yeltsin have the right to such things?
The answer to this question is given by the Constitution in force at that time. She directly:
Moreover, as specifically stated in the Constitution, in such a case, the powers of the President « stop immediately».
This means that on the evening of September 21, 1993, the 1993 coup d'état began in Russia.
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Two years ago, in 1991, few people imagined that the allies, who together killed socialism and the USSR, would quarrel with each other in the end.
This is R. I. Khasbulatov, according to some, initially "served Boris Nikolayevich" so that he was ready to "get out of his shirt" And Yeltsin directly called him his successor.
The White House was the center, the soul of the resistance of the all-pro-Western anti-socialist forces, all those who wanted to end the USSR
In just a couple of years, Yeltsin will shoot the White House
Yes, Khasbulatov and Rutskoi did a lot for Yeltsin and for the murder of the USSR. Here are just a few of their accomplishments:
- Khasbulatov and Rutskoi supported the separation of the RSFSR and other regions from the USSR, ignored the Politburo and the CPSU.
- Khasbulatov and Rutskoi in the spring of 1991 thwarted an attempt by people's deputies to remove B. N. Yeltsin from the post of speaker
- Khasbulatov and Rutskoi in the summer of 1991 supported Yeltsin in the presidential elections
- Khasbulatov and Rutskoi in August 1991 supported Yeltsin in his confrontation with the State Emergency Committee
- Khasbulatov and Rutskoi supported the ban on the CPSU
- Khasbulatov and Rutskoi supported Yeltsin's liberal "shock therapy"
- Khasbulatov and the Supreme Council approved the ratification of the Belovezhskaya Accords, which liquidated the USSR
Already half of the acts committed by them "Khasbulatov and Rutskoi" are drawn to high treason and even directly to treason to their homeland. In any other country, this is punishable by a court, a life sentence or even the death penalty.
In the United States, the revision of borders and the separation of branches of power is already the gravest crime; it would never occur to anyone to destroy their statehood there. But Russia in 1991 and 1993 is a special case.
Yeltsin, Khasbulatov and Rutskoi killed the USSR together, but soon their paths will part
The stumbling block will be power and property. It will be too small, there are three of them, the third will be superfluous
Here is an approximate table that indicates the actions of future opponents
In fact, the main cause of the conflict was the question of power. Who will govern the RSFSR - the president or the parliament?
But there was another reason - property, its privatization. The Supreme Council had its own plans for its privatization.
Summing up, there are 2 reasons that served as a catalyst for the conflict:
- The question of power
- The issue of privatization of property
It would seem that there is no reason to doubt the reality of the conflict, that it was not a performance, as it is now commonly believed, about the August putsch of 1991. However, a reasonable doubt arises again.
These are the lists of the dead during the bloody conflict of 1993.
There are different people on the lists, but when you read them, doubts arise
None of the lists contains a single politician, an enemy of B. N. Yeltsin, there is not a single deputy of the Supreme Council or someone from their inner circle on the lists
As in August 1991, ordinary citizens died, with the only difference being that there were more of them, more victims
Yeltsin seemed to be fighting the Supreme Soviet, but not a single deputy of the Supreme Soviet was injured, killed or even wounded.
So why was such a bloody massacre necessary?
Take a look at the following table
|
August coup 1991 |
The conflict between the RSFSR Armed Forces and the Kremlin in 1993 |
|
The plans and the "putschists" were known in advance, 1-2 weeks in advance |
Yeltsin's plans were known in advance, 2-3 weeks in advance |
|
"Putschists" did nothing to neutralize Yeltsin in advance |
Yeltsin did nothing to neutralize the Supreme Soviet in advance |
|
long time"putschists" were inactive |
For a long time, both sides were inactive |
|
During the putsch, only simple people |
Only ordinary people died during the conflict |
|
"Putschists" abandoned the use of force |
Yeltsin agreed to the use of force by shooting the White House |
The scenarios of the events of 1991 and 1993 are very similar, with the only difference that in the first case the White House won, and in the second the Kremlin.
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Many people were surprised that, having dissolved the parliament, B. N. Yeltsin did not take the House of Soviets under protection and thereby allowed him to raise the banner of struggle against the Kremlin. Boris Nikolayevich explains his actions by the fact that people's deputies knew in advance about the upcoming dispersal of parliament and could prepare for the defense of the White House
Indeed, rumors about the upcoming coup began to circulate in the capital on the afternoon of September 21st.
According to V.I. Anpilov, he was warned about this even earlier - on the 20th.
According to Yu. M. Voronin, on the same day, Deputy Minister of Defense General K. I. Kobets came to him.
He reported that
"an hour ago" the meeting of the collegium of the Ministry of Defense ended, at which the question of the role of the army in the upcoming dispersal of parliament was discussed.
Having received such information, Yu. M. Voronin immediately brought it to R. I. Khasbulatov.
Meanwhile, there is reliable information that A. V. Rutskoy and R. I. Khasbulatov learned about the existence of the draft decree No. 1400 “ a week before its release”, that is, around September 14th.
It would seem that they should have immediately taken appropriate measures. So far, no information on this score has been found, except for I. Ivanov's statement that shortly before September 21, Ruslan Imranovich had a secret meeting with B. N. Yeltsin.
As for Monday the 20th, according to R. I. Khasbulatov, after Yu. M. Voronin contacted him, he tried to contact P. S. Grachev, without finding him at his workplace, called the Kremlin.
It turned out that Grachev was there. Neither the president nor the minister of defense wanted to talk to the speaker.
Then Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov invited the Chief of the General Staff M. N. Kolesnikov to his place. He confirmed the information received from K. I. Kobets, but declined to put it in writing.
The next morning, R. I. Khasbulatov ordered to inform the heads of the subjects of the Federation about the “alarming situation” in the capital, then met with generals V. A. Achalov, Yu. N. Kalinin and B. V. Tarasov and posed the question to them: what wait from the rebels? At 10.00 Khasbulatov invited Yu. M. Voronin to contact V. S. Chernomyrdin, and he himself tried to phone the president and prime minister.
He was not connected to any of them.
Sounding the alarm, R. I. Khasbulatov called a special meeting for 17.30 with the invitation of the Chief of the General Staff.
It was attended by A. V. Rutskoy, V. D. Zorkin (head of the constitutional court) and V. G. Stepankov. An invitation was sent to the government. Nobody came from there.
But why was it impossible late at night from the 21st to the 22nd to blockade the White House, change its security, turn off communications, record the president's address to the people, and only after that, on the morning of the 22nd, promulgate Decree No. 1400?
Why couldn't all this have been done on the 21st, just before Boris Yeltsin's speech on television?
Moreover, the president and his entourage developed plans to capture the Armed Forces.
So, here is the chronology of events that took place before the climax of the conflict:
a) 14.10. 93 The Supreme Council (SC) becomes aware of the draft decree No. 1400
b) 21.10.93 Yeltsin and Khasbulatov have a meeting, the content of which is unknown
c) The government ignores the sun
d) 21.10.93 Yeltsin announces constitutional reform on TV
So, Yeltsin had every opportunity to unleash a bloodless conflict. He only needed to prevent the organized resistance of the Armed Forces.
But he did not, allowing the opposition to organize itself.
It turns out that Boris Nikolayevich allowed the opposition to organize itself. But why?
First, by doing so, he provoked her to retaliatory actions, which could then be qualified as unleashing a civil war.
Secondly, he put the heads of local councils, most of them dissatisfied with the presidential policy, with a choice that allowed them to strike at the local Soviet authorities.
Thirdly, in this way it was possible to influence foreign financial and credit institutions, which at that particular time continued to decide the fate of Russia's external debt.
At 19.55 R. I. Khasbulatov was brought a “sealed envelope” from the “President of the Russian Federation”.
The speaker himself recalled:
« In it, I was informed that from September 21 "the activities of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies will be terminated, that the President signed a Decree on a gradual constitutional reform." There was no decree ».
While Ruslan Imranovich was thinking about what to do, Boris Nikolayevich appeared on the screens and announced the decree.
What did Khasbulatov do? He saw that he was being ousted from power. He further recalled:
« After listening to this, Yu. Voronin, V. Agafonov, V. Syrovatko, A. Milyukov, members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, deputies, our employees, as well as the heads of regions, enterprises, leaders of socio-political movements, parties who were here trade unions...
I proposed to immediately convene the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. His meeting began at 20.15.
The meeting of the Presidium ended with the adoption of a resolution "On the immediate termination of the powers of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin". It noted the anti-constitutional nature of Decree No. 1400 and went on to say:
"one. On the basis of Article 121 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, consider the powers of the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin terminated from the moment of signing the said Decree.
2. The said Decree, in accordance with the second part of Article 121 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, is not subject to execution.
3. In accordance with Article 121 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, to recognize that the Vice-President of the Russian Federation A. V. Rutskoi began to exercise the powers of the President of the Russian Federation from the moment the Decree was signed.
4. To convene on September 22, 1993, an extraordinary meeting of the VII emergency session of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation with the agenda "On the political situation that has developed in the Russian Federation as a result of the coup."
At the same time, it was decided to create the Headquarters of the Resistance of the Supreme Council. Khasbulatov recalls:
“It included members of the Presidium, deputies, leaders of parties and social movements, responsible employees of the Supreme Council, chairmen of a number of regional Councils, located in the building of the Supreme Council. Y. Voronin headed the Headquarters.
The meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council lasted “only 30-40 minutes”, that is, until about 20.50
At 21.00 R. I. Khasbulatov spoke at a meeting of people's deputies in the hall of the Council of Nationalities. He stated that the parliament would defend the Constitution, called the organization of the defense of the House of Soviets as the first task, suggested that the councils of all levels immediately convene sessions and assess what had happened, called on political organizations and trade unions to stand up for the parliament.
Subsequently, during that period, having met with the leader of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FNPR) Igor Evgenievich Klochkov, the speaker agreed with him on the support of the parliament by trade unions,
and then, having discussed with the head of the Department of Security of the House of Soviets Alexander Bovt some issues of protecting the "White House", he retired and between 22.40 and 23.00 tried to determine the parliament's response to the step taken by B. N. Yeltsin.
Thus, a document called "Organization of the work of the Leadership of the Resistance (general plan)".
It provided for an emergency convocation of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies, an assessment of the actions of B. N. Yeltsin by the Constitutional Court, the formation of the Provisional Government, the involvement of law enforcement agencies and local authorities on the side of the parliament, reaching an agreement with public organizations and using them to put pressure on the rebels.
It is very strange that the speaker drew up such a document only on the evening of the 21st, although he had long known about the existence of draft decree No. 1400.
Even more amazing is that in twenty minutes he wrote a document that took up almost six pages of typographical text.
The speaker of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR Ruslan Khasbulatov, long before the adoption of decree No. 1400, knew about it, about Yeltsin's intentions to disperse the Supreme Council
But he did nothing to prevent this, to somehow prevent it, although the constitutional powers of Parliament allowed him to do this.
It so happened that that evening an hour and a half, from 22.30 to 24.00, the journalist A. Lugovskaya spent in the reception room of A. V. Rutskoi.
During this time, V. S. Lipitsky, A. G. Tuleev, V. G. Urazhtsev, Yu. M. Voronin, V. G. Stepankov and S. N. Baburin visited his office, the longest, almost 40 minutes, was V. G. Stepankov. What they discussed, we do not know.
In the meantime, the speaker and vice president were making the first decisions and issuing related orders, the Kremlin began to move from words to deeds.
Shortly after BN Yeltsin's speech at the House of Soviets, long-distance communications ceased to operate, not only the telephone, but also the telegraph.
During R. I. Khasbulatov's speech in the hall of the Council of Nationalities, it was reported that the White House was disconnected from government communications. According to other sources, government communications were turned off a little later - at 23.00.
The next day, "about 10 o'clock" V. S. Chernomyrdin ordered to turn off the city telephone in the House of Soviets. This order was carried out in several stages. So, on the afternoon of the 22nd, the telephone on the White House watch continued to work.
The speaker's phone worked until the next morning, and " three telephones in the offices of "3" employees" and after that…
If on the 22nd it was impossible to call from the disconnected phones from the White House, then until the 23rd they received calls from the city.
In addition, as R. I. Khasbulatov writes
« objects of the Parliament were seized - the Parliamentary Center on Tsvetnoy Boulevard, a garage, a building on Novy Arbat, where a number of ... organizations worked - the Supreme Economic Council, the Control and Budget Committee, the State Property Fund, the Central Election Commission, part of the apparatus of the Supreme Council.
Almost immediately, the accounts of the Supreme Council were blocked.
Parliament was left without means of communication, without transport, without money.
On the very first evening, police outfits appeared at the White House, the Constitutional Court, the Moscow City Council, the mayor's office. True, they were only observing the order.
When the meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Council was coming to an end, writes R. I. Khasbulatov, “A noise was heard. Everyone turned their heads, someone approached the windows. I got up and walked over too. People were gathering at the White House.”
The arrivals were people from the National Salvation Front (leader A. Kryuchkov), military group(leader A. Markov) and from the Union of Officers (leader S. Terekhov).
According to some reports, on the evening of the 21st there were “several thousand people” at the White House, according to others, one and a half, two or even three thousand.
The White House defense headquarters was immediately created, some defenders received pistols and machine guns (few, about 10-20 pieces). This resistance had broad prospects. However, most of the people at the barricades were unarmed.
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What were the first stepsopposing sides?
While the people were gathering under the windows of the White House and the first preparations were being made for its defense, the session of the Constitutional Court began at 21:40.
« When the meeting of the Supreme Council was already coming to an end, the floor was given to Valery Zorkin.
He read out the decision of the Constitutional Court, which qualified Presidential Decree No. 1400 as unconstitutional.
After that, the Supreme Council adopted a resolution on the termination of the powers of B. N. Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation from 20.00 and on the transfer of his powers to A. V. Rutskoi.
A. V. Rutskoi describes these events in a similar way. This is how it really should have happened.
In fact, events developed quite differently.
When the Supreme Council heard the speaker's brief information about the coup, a resolution was immediately adopted to remove B. N. Yeltsin from power. This happened already at 00.19. 142 voted in favor, 3 against, 3 abstained.
Khasbulatov adds:
« After the vote to remove Yeltsin from the presidency, a whole group of influential members of the Presidium - chairmen of committees and commissions, who did a lot to aggravate and complicate the situation in the Supreme Soviet, resigned their powers of chairmen.
These are: S. Stepashin, Chairman of the Defense and Security Committee; E. Ambartsumov, Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs; A. Pochinok, Chairman of the Budget Commission; S. Kovalev, Chairman of the Human Rights Committee. Finally, Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council N. Ryabov resigned.
Then, by 137 votes, the Supreme Council decided to assign presidential duties to A. V. Rutskoi. Already at 00.25 he was sworn in, after which he announced two decrees: on his assumption of the presidency and on the abolition of decree No. 1400.
Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court recognized that Decree No. 1400 was unconstitutional only at 00.45. And Valery Dmitrievich Zorkin went up to the podium of the Supreme Council at 2:12.
This was important. If we take the point of view of the law, we must admit that the Supreme Soviet showed unnecessary haste. Although, on the basis of the Constitution, from the moment of promulgation of Decree No. 1400, B. N. Yeltsin automatically lost his presidential powers, a decision of the Constitutional Court was required for the legal registration of this fact.
Why did the Supreme Council issue its decision without waiting for its verdict? What did those two hours give him?
Nothing. On the other hand, the “hurriedness” shown allowed the Kremlin to talk about the illegality of the decision adopted by the Supreme Council to remove B. N. Yeltsin from power.
The situation was exactly the same with A. V. Rutskoi. Since, by signing Decree No. 1400, B. N. Yeltsin automatically lost presidential power, from that moment his powers automatically passed to the vice president.
But for the legal registration of this fact and the swearing in of the acting president, the decision of the Constitutional Court was also required.
The premature swearing in of A.V. Rutskoy did not give him anything. But it allowed the Kremlin to characterize him as an impostor.
Let's note these facts:
- The Supreme Court stripped Yeltsin of his presidential status, bypassing the Constitutional Court (CC), which made this decision dubious from the point of view of legality
- The Supreme Court, bypassing the Constitutional Court, expressed doubts about the legitimacy of President A. Rutskoi
Both of these actions played into the hands of Yeltsin. Was it intentional or not?
The Constitutional Court (CC) was initially on the side of the Supreme Council and condemned Yeltsin's decree No. 1400
But the Supreme Council, depriving Yeltsin of the status of president, for some reason bypassed the Constitutional Court, which gave Yeltsin's supporters grounds to declare that the decision taken by the Supreme Court was not legitimacy
If the Supreme Council would have accepted the deprivation of Yeltsin's presidential status after the decision of the Constitutional Court, Yeltsin would have stopped being president of the RSFSR
Another issue is closely related to the question of A. V. Rutskoy's presidential powers. The fact is that according to the Constitution, the President is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
This means that simultaneously with the issuance of a decree on his assumption of the post of President, A. V. Rutskoi had to issue a decree on his assumption of the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
Maybe A. V. Rutskoi forgot about this and no one reminded him of the need for such a step?
No. This question arose on the evening of the 21st, when a whole group of generals came to the White House.
According to the testimony of Colonel General Leonid Grigoryevich Ivashov, he not only initiated this proposal, but also prepared a draft of the corresponding decree.
However, if A. V. Rutskoi signed Decree No. 1 on assuming the office of President at 0.25, then the decree on assuming the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which has No. 8 and dated September 22, apparently, was signed only in the evening of that day, when the number " Rossiyskaya Gazeta, which came out on the morning of the 23rd, has already been made up.
As a result, on the afternoon of the 22nd, a contradictory situation arose. On the one hand, B. N. Yeltsin lost his presidential powers, but was not legally deprived of the powers of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
On the other hand, A. V. Rutskoi became president, but did not assume the powers of the Supreme Commander.
In order to deprive Yeltsin of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, it was necessary to announce this on the Rossiyskaya Gazeta page.
The editorial office of the publication was controlled by the Supreme Council, but the decree depriving Yealtsin of the powers of the commander-in-chief was not published.
The Supreme Council deprived Yeltsin of the status of president, retained for him the right of supreme commander
This could not but affect the relationship between the White House and the army, which faced the question: who to obey?
As we remember, when planning his first actions, R. I. Khasbulatov outlined the formation of the Provisional Government. A draft decree No. 3 on the resignation of V. S. Chernomyrdin was even prepared.
But this idea of the speaker did not receive support. Before the meeting of the Supreme Council, R. I. Khasbulatov and A. V. Rutskoi agreed to create a Military Council, and not to touch the government for the time being.
The meetings of the factions that took place came to a similar conclusion, suggesting that they limit themselves only to the resignation of VF Yerin, who was responsible for dispersing the May Day demonstration. Deputy N.A. Pavlov informed A.V. Rutskoy about this. Pavlov himself recalled it this way:
"BUT. V. Rutskoi, replied that he absolutely agreed with this ... And what was our amazement when, after about 2-3 hours, in the morning, Rutskoi went up to the podium of the congress and read out decrees on the release of Grachev and Golushko and on their appointment to their positions Achalov and Barannikov.
Later, instead of V. F. Erin, A. F. Dunaev became the Minister of Internal Affairs.
According to some reports, when the Supreme Soviet took a break, A. V. Rutskoi called N. M. Golushko and P. S. Grachev and invited them to the House of Soviets. Both refused to do so, demonstrating that they did not recognize him as president.
Explaining the position of P. S. Grachev, A. V. Rutskoy said a few days later:
“… Grachev has an incentive to defend Yeltsin. As soon as Yeltsin is removed from power, the question immediately arises of how and by whom the property of the army was sold. But corruption is even a trifle.
Grachev will need to answer for the secret supply of weapons to Azerbaijan and Armenia, Abkhazia and Georgia, to Moldova and Transnistria and answer why he armed ... the warring parties.
If on the night of the 21st to the 22nd phone conversation A. V. Rutskoy with the Minister of War and the Minister of Security took place and they really refused to come to the White House, the decree on their resignation was quite logical.
Apparently, after that, A. V. Rutskoi chose V. A. Achalov and, fearing that he might refuse the ministerial portfolio, signed a decree on his appointment without even talking to him.
This is how V. Achalov recalled it:
“I learned about my appointment to the post of Minister of Defense when I was on the thirteenth floor of the House of Soviets. No one consulted me about this."
How the appointment of V.P. Barannikov and A.F. Dunaev took place remains unknown. In a conversation with me, Andrei Fedorovich for some reason evaded answering this question, noting only that he had been invited to the White House by Yu. M. Voronin.
Having received a new appointment, V. A. Achalov remained in his office on the 13th floor. He appointed General A. M. Makashov as his deputy. The duties of the chief of staff were assigned to Colonel V. V. Kulyasov.
V.P. Barannikov settled on the sixth floor. His “team” included 6-8 people: 2-3 people were outside the walls of the White House and only occasionally appeared here; 3-4 people were active officers of the Ministry of Security, therefore, although they were under V.P. Barannikov, they did not advertise it.
As a result, some, even quite knowledgeable people, believed that Viktor Pavlovich had only one assistant, Nikolai Vladimirovich Andrianov.
A. F. Dunaev is located on the 4th floor, in the left wing of the building. According to A. M. Sabor, A. F. Dunaev had only one assistant - Grigory Stepanovich Nikulin, several technical personnel and about 20 security people.
A. F. Dunaev fully confirmed this information, specifying only that Oleg Georgievich Gorbatyuk performed the duties of leading his guards
In addition, the team of A. F. Dunaev included the former lieutenant colonel of the investigative committee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Alexander Alekseevich Rodionov.
After the meeting of the Supreme Council ended, A. V. Rutskoy and R. I. Khasbulatov met with the appointed ministers and invited them to go to their workplaces.
S. Baburin recalled:
“We, the deputies, were ready to go with them to the ministries so that they could actually perform their official functions. I told them about it many times."
VI Anpilov was even more resolute. He proposed to build a column of supporters of the parliament, put people's deputies at the head of the column, as well as A. V. Rutskoy and R. I. Khasbulatov, and accompany the appointed ministers "to the buildings in which they should work."
According to S. A. Filatov, on the night of the 21st to the 22nd, all the commanders of the armed forces, fleets and military districts called from the White House, and all of them answered the question posed by him that they would be faithful to the Constitution.
But when it was required to move from words to deeds, it turned out that the army and parliament understand this loyalty differently.
Why this happened is the subject of a special study.
According to V. A. Achalov, having received a new appointment, he immediately contacted the headquarters of the Airborne Forces (VDV). Since the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Yevgeny Nikolaevich Podkolzin, was ill, the conversation took place with his first deputy, Oswald Mikulovich Pikauskas.
He declared that he supported the Supreme Council and was ready to place the headquarters of the Airborne Forces at the disposal of V. A. Achalov.
This means that already on the morning of September 22, the parliament could receive the support of the paratroopers. There is evidence that at the same time, the leaders of two special groups "Alpha" and "Vympel" declared their readiness to go over to the side of the parliament.
The support of the paratroopers and the two above-mentioned special forces groups made it possible to restore legitimate power in the capital as early as the afternoon of the 22nd. However, the White House shied away from using this opportunity.
According to V. A. Achalov, when he announced that he was going to the headquarters of the Airborne Forces, the leadership of the White House and all the military who were in it opposed this.
Alexander Rutskoi refused the assistance offered to the Supreme Council by the command of the Airborne Forces
He also forbade the new Minister of Defense Achalov to go to the headquarters of the Airborne Forces and coordinate actions to protect the Supreme Council
Having refused the support of the paratroopers, A. V. Rutskoi on the afternoon of the 22nd addressed in writing to the commanders of the military branches with an appeal to support the parliament. It would be understandable if Alexander Vladimirovich dressed his appeal in the form of an order from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Meanwhile, it was a letter on behalf of the acting president and began with the words: “ I am addressing you as an officer."
The call is strange to say the least. And it is not surprising that he remained unanswered.
On the same day, R.I. Khasbulatov ordered several military units to be sent to the White House.
On the 23rd, R. I. Khasbulatov turned to
“to the military - members of the collegium, deputy ministers of defense, individual commanders, heads of military schools” “with a request to fulfill the requirements of the Constitution and the Law on Defense: to defend their own oath - on loyalty to the Constitution ».
There was no answer, but the Ministry of Defense turned off the city phones just in case.
To attract military units to the side of the parliament, some generals and officers who were in the House of Soviets were sent to them: for example, B. V. Tarasov and M. G. Titov.
Was it worth it to issue such orders and appeals to commanders whose position was not known, if it was possible to rely on the support of the paratroopers?
This indicates that the leadership of the White House from the very first day of the coup began to play some kind of strange game
We can judge how a new day began in the White House from the “working diary” of R. I. Khasbulatov: “ 8.00.- Deputies, chairmen of regional and regional councils, entrepreneurs, scientists, cultural figures, a huge number of telegrams in support of the Supreme Council ».
The first actions of R. I. Khasbulatov look quite logical.
He ordered to start “work with public organizations” and entrepreneurs, offered to help “the military organize resistance in the regions”, held a conference call with local councils at the Ministry of Communications, at 16.30 opened a meeting of chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the republics, regional and regional councils, at which an agreement on joint actions and A. Tuleev was entrusted with the duty of coordinator.
Ruslan Imranovich spent the whole evening until 24.00 in other similar conferences and meetings, trying to unite the most diverse social forces around the parliament.
I. Ivanov claims that on the same day, “ on the first day, the Chairman of the Supreme Council spoke four times by satellite phone with Washington and representatives of the State Department.
The speaker's actions could be understood as an attempt to find a way out of the current crisis at the highest political level. But, if such negotiations really took place, why did Ruslan Imranovich prefer to keep them secret from everyone?
On the night of September 23-24, the Speaker of the Supreme Court R. Khasbulatov had 4 conversations with US government authorities,
What Khasbulatov talked about with the Americans is a mystery to this day
In the morning, people began to flock to the White House. The Moscow police department informed that by 10 o'clock about 900 people had gathered here, in the evening no more than 5 thousand.
According to other sources, on the evening of the 22nd, there were about 20 thousand people near the walls of the White House.
R. I. Khasbulatov claims that when around 19.00 he spoke at the rally from the balcony at the 14th entrance, there were about 40 thousand people on the square.
Since, with the receipt of official positions in the Ministry of Defense, A. M. Makashov and S. N. Terekhov resigned from their duties as heads of the centers of the Federal Tax Service created the day before, both centers were merged into one “headquarters”, and the leader of the PKK, a member of the Political Council of the Federal Tax Service Anatoly Viktorovich, was appointed its head Kryuchkov.
In the first half of that day (between 11.00 and 14.00), a group of supporters of the parliament, consisting of 10-15 people, among whom were deputy I. A. Shashviashvili and S. N. Terekhov, went to Ostankino on the Ikarus to demand air for the parliament, but received a refusal.
When S. N. Terekhov was still in Ostankino, a "lieutenant colonel" was brought to A. M. Makashov, who "named himself a civil defense officer." He stated that
“at one of the reserve command posts of the Civil] about [defense] in Kuntsevo”, where I.V. Stalin’s dacha was once located, you can get a “working connection” with military units .»
Having discussed this proposal and received the consent of V. A. Achalov, A. M. Makashov began to prepare for the trip.
A group of 8 people was assembled, which included the leaders of the Union of Officers Gennady Fedorovich Kiryushin, Vladimir Mikhailovich Usov, Vladimir Viktorovich Fedoseenkov.
On two "Volga" they got to Kuntsevo. The Colonel-General and those accompanying him were allowed into the territory without delay. However, the Communications Center located here was inactive. The press notes that the connection "was turned off for a scheduled inspection",
V.V. Fedoseenkov believes that it was turned off when they appeared on the territory of the unit.
The trip there and back took about three hours, so A. M. Makashov returned back no earlier than 18.00
By this time, the Analytical Center of the Supreme Council summed up the first results. They were disappointing. Parliamentary analysts stated that the collegiums of power ministries are on the side of the Kremlin. And consequently, state security, the army and the police are on the side of the Kremlin.
From this, it was concluded that the parliament can turn the tide in its favor only with the support of the population. Meanwhile, the main instrument of ideological influence - television - was also in the hands of the conspirators.
The think-tank proposed to deprive the Kremlin of this tool, not stopping at the most extreme means, up to the disruption of the power supply to Ostankino.
On the same evening, on the 22nd, according to S. N. Terekhov, A. V. Rutskoi held a meeting. It was about the need to occupy the buildings of the Ministry of Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, in other words, about taking power into their own hands.
Apparently, it is this meeting that is mentioned in the memoirs of A. M. Makashov. He writes that “in the first days of the siege” A. V. Rutskoi gathered “those who wear epaulettes” and burst into an emotional speech. Moreover, the retired general admits,
“I never heard such a swear word as from Rutskoy then, except in an army smoking room.” “Rutskoi didn’t even swear, but poured these words mixed with orders: “take”, “block”, “disperse”.
What was offered to the military? Unfortunately, Albert Mikhailovich does not give a complete answer to this question. But from his memoirs we learn that he was personally ordered to "take the post office, telegraph, railway stations." In addition, an order was issued to “occupy” the “MVD”, “General Staff”, “Ostankino”.
How this meeting ended, we do not know. It can only be noted that not a single order of the acting president was carried out.
In order not to return to this issue, it should be noted that since A. V. Rutskoi was acting president, his orders were completely legal. It was about the subordination of state bodies that went beyond the law. It was not the orders of the acting president that were criminal in nature, but the unwillingness of these institutions to obey him.
But unlike the legitimate authorities, the conspirators had real power. Under such conditions, the orders of A.V. Rutskoi were, if not provocative, then adventurous.
Before returning power to legitimate hands, it was necessary to provide it with appropriate force.
The think tank was absolutely right: the fate of the parliament depended entirely on whether the people would support it or not.
But to support the people, powerful agitation was needed. Was she? No, it was not.
The central newspapers Pravda and Sovetskaya Rossiya took a consistent anti-Kremlin stance, but you will not find any concrete proposals on their pages.
You will not find even in the order of information the appeals under consideration by A.V. Rutskoi.
This gives reason to think that the CEC of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation did not take any specific decisions related to the organization of a general Moscow rally and a general strike.
The same was the position of the leadership of the White House in relation to the army.
As witnesses who were directly at the scene recalled, they spoke of it this way:
“After September 22, the officers who were on duty at Rutskoi received calls from military units, they offered help, military equipment, which they wanted to put around the White House,” but “to this Rutskoi answered:
"Not necessary".
“They also talked about how envoys from military units came to the leaders of the parliament and A. V. Rutskoi with decisions of officer meetings in support of the constitution”
According to the St. Petersburg journalist Yu. A. Nersesov, in the early days, officers and generals went to the White House with offers of their services in "jambs", but their services were refused.
N. S. Afanasiev witnessed one of these scenes. In his presence, a major general unknown to him proposed to allocate a company in armored vehicles to guard the White House, but A. V. Rutskoi declared :
"Not yet."
The military repeatedly appealed and offered the Supreme Council protection from the army
But A. Rutskoy repeatedly refused offers of help
Thus, the Supreme Council remained without army protection.
General Achalov recalled it this way:
“People supported us. Calls from military units followed. There were hotheads who were ready to act immediately, to arrive in Moscow with weapons.
I advised them not to take any action. There should not have been unrest in the country. At the moment when dual power begins, any excess can lead to tragic consequences.
V. Domnina, who was in the council house, said:
“General Achalov, who on the fifth day of the blockade managed to contact the troops by radio, persuaded them not to go to the aid of the parliament”
“Rutskoi ordered me to take all measures so as not to provoke a split in the army ... Our people dispersed to military units, the commanders of which were ready to take the troops out into the street and warned them not to do this.
I am a military man and I understand that dividing the army into “ours” and “not ours” will inevitably plunge the country into a civil war.”
A. Dunaev said:
« To me, - many heads of the regional police departments personally called and asked if troops were needed. I asked them not to send troops, but to restore order on the ground.
The tranquility of the province is, I think, the main thing that the executed Supreme Soviet and I personally have achieved.
Then it turns out that those appeals to the army that V. A. Achalov, A. V. Rutskoi and R. I. Khasbulatov made on September 22 and 23 were purely declarative.
But the matter was not limited to this. One of the bibliographers of those days writes:
“Neither the leadership of the Supreme Council, nor about. of the President, nor the newly appointed heads of the Ministries, made no effort to organize a targeted resistance to the regime”, moreover, they did not even try to somehow organize their supporters who came to the White House ».
……………………………….
So the conflict flared up, which was too reminiscent of the “confrontation” played out in advance. To be continued.
There is no need to introduce Alexander Rutskoy to our readers. To this day, his name is widely known. And until now, it causes an ambiguous reaction - primarily in connection with the events of the autumn of 1993. Then, 10 years ago, his name was a kind of banner. Many sincerely believed in this banner, but many of them deftly hid in its shadow. That is why today, on the tenth anniversary of those tragic events, we cannot do without Rutskoi.
"- Alexander Vladimirovich, how did your disagreements with Boris Yeltsin begin?
Our relationship generally developed along a sinusoid, and shortly after the election, when I became vice president, this sinusoid somehow went down sharply.
What did it depend on?
From whisperers. Burbulis constantly sang to him that I was sawing a chair under the president. And the main whisperer was Korzhakov.
Did you have a strained relationship with him?
Outwardly - normal. But, apparently, such is the psychology of this person: be sure to throw mud at someone. You read his book about Yeltsin, everything will be clear.
A little later, Korzhakov and I interesting story happened. Of course, I have no direct evidence, but there is no one else. Somehow they invited me to the ZIL, the workers rebelled there. Salary - somewhere around 340 rubles a month, then with this money you could buy a couple of kilos of meat and a kilo of butter. In short, you can't feed your family. Well, I went. Calm down. Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov was also present there. I got inflamed and told the workers: when Boris Nikolayevich returns from vacation, I will ask him to allow me to put my guards on Nechaev (then Minister of Economics), and let's see how this scoundrel will live on 340 rubles.
Yeltsin returned, calling me to the dacha - to celebrate his birthday. I went. He has Burbulis, Barannikov, Korzhakov, and someone else there. We didn’t have time to say hello, Yeltsin said to me: “Well, give me 340 rubles.” And includes a record. Everyone is listening. And there, so it is. My words were “edited”, Nechaev was removed, and it turned out: they say, when Boris Nikolayevich returns, I will put my guards on him, give him 340 rubles and see how this scoundrel will live on them.
I see Korzhakov smiling so nastily.
And then Barannikov intervened. He asks: “Boris Nikolaevich, who gave you this record?” And he, Barannikov, had a habit: to write down what happened at such rallies. He took out his cassette, inserted it into the recorder and turned it on. Yeltsin listened, grabbed the recorder and slammed it against the wall. And then he says to me: “Okay, let's work. I entrust agriculture to you.”
This is after his decree on the disbandment of collective farms and the creation on their basis - in one year! - 200 thousand farms?
Well, yes. The purest water scam. We had a lot of skirmishes about this. In the end, he appointed me chairman of the interdepartmental commission to combat corruption. After a while, I bring him a very sharp report. He leafed through the report and said with a grin: "Well, well." And that's all. And then I found out that Yeltsin retold everything to those about whom I wrote in the report. It was then that I decided to speak at the Supreme Council.
After this memorable meeting, were you removed?
Yeltsin and I then parted ways. The next day I come to work, and the guard says to me: “Sorry, but the president forbade you to enter the territory of the Kremlin.”
Were you like-minded with Khasbulatov?
Never. We are completely different people. But then, in August 1993, we united. We decided to hold a congress and sent telegrams to the deputies. Telegrams with all sorts of promises also rained down from the Kremlin - only that no one would come.
And how did the communists behave?
Yes, they are communists! They are shifters. They are like a flag in a bathhouse: in which direction the wind blows, the flag goes there. Remember 1993: where did their leader go after the meeting of the Supreme Council? He said that he was going to raise the masses. And on September 23 - disappeared. And no one saw him again. Later, however, we saw Mr. Zyuganov on TV. He urged the people "not to support the rebels", "not to participate in the confrontation."
And then, at the end of that year, the same “communists” came to the Duma, they were in the majority there. And all these laws on privatization - in other words, a signal for the total plunder of the country - were adopted with their active participation.
But was there still a quorum?
Even in excess. So everything was perfectly legal. We also invited Boris Nikolayevich. In response to our invitation, we were surrounded by barbed wire, dogs, communications, electricity, water, sewage were cut off ... What happened next, you know.
Much is known indeed, but some questions still remain. What was the impetus for the fact that the confrontation grew into an armed conflict?
Terekhov's provocation. Well, the one who leads some sort of “union of officers”. With several of his people, he tried to capture the headquarters of the CIS troops, although no one instructed him to do so. In addition - and this is very important - his people had weapons with cut down numbers. The guards of the Supreme Council had their own weapons park. There was a machine gun, machine guns, and sniper rifles. Then, when the investigation began, it established that all the weapons of the Supreme Council remained in grease, they were not fired from. The cartridges remained in galvanized boxes.
Where did Terekhov's people get weapons from, and even with cut off numbers?
As they say, good question. But I don't have an answer to it. But I know that before appearing in our White House, Terekhov met with the head of the FGC department for Moscow and the region, Yevgeny Savostyanov. Draw your own conclusions.
I have interesting questions myself. How did Terekhov and his men manage to get through the three or four chains of cordons that surrounded the White House? Yes, even with weapons? And how did the Barkashovites get to us, and also - with their weapons?
You want to say that the arrival of Terekhov with his people and the Barkashovites was a provocation of the special services?
I am 100% sure of this. Their slogans, which they hung out, are “Beat the Jews, save Russia!” - part of the same provocation. I repeatedly sent guards to rip off these slogans. And several times there were fights between the guards and the Barkashovites.
Why didn't you put them out of there?
And try to put them in this mess. By the way, they left the White House by underground passages, which no one except the secret services could know about.
Let us suppose. But there is an episode for which you are personally responsible. I mean your call to fellow pilots: to take the planes into the air and bomb the Kremlin. Would you subscribe to it today?
Now, ten years later, no. But try to imagine that situation. two week blockade complete absence the opportunity to express their position through the media, the brutal beatings of people on the outskirts of the White House, the shooting of a demonstration near the mayor's office, the massacre in Ostankino, the shooting of tanks at the building. They hit the meeting room with direct fire, moreover, with shells that pierce the wall and explode inside the room. There were rivers of blood, guts on the walls, severed heads. I saw it all. Perhaps I was wrong in making such an appeal. But it was almost unconscious. I don't know what another person would do in this situation. Only later, in Lefortovo, I told the investigator the same thing: the fault is mine, I am responsible for everything.
And how did the other defendants behave?
I happened to read some protocols of interrogations. It was a shame for Khasbulatov. From the testimony of the “leader of the communists” Anpilov, there was such a feeling as if he was lying in shit. It was embarrassing to read the protocols of interrogations of Yanaev and Makashov... Come on, God bless them all...
Snipers in October. How many were there? Who are they? Where?
This is one of the most mysterious pages of the October events ten years ago. And to this day it remains a mystery. Of course, not the only one. For example, there are many answers to the question about the number of dead and wounded. And this means that most likely none of them is reliable. However, there are no answers to some questions at all, and it is almost impossible to approach them. First of all, I have in mind the snipers, whose role in those October days was discussed so much later in almost all the media. Who are these snipers? How many were there? Where did they come from? And where did they go after it was all over? And why weren't any of them caught?
In the book Notes of the President, Boris Yeltsin writes that on October 4, the Alpha and Vympel special forces refused to obey the order and storm the White House. Mikhail Barsukov, Lieutenant General, head of the Main Directorate of Presidential Security, had to persuade them:
“Barsukov hardly managed to convince them to even just go to the White House,” Yeltsin recalls. - The fact that they are somewhere nearby will psychologically put pressure on those who have settled in the building, they will surrender earlier ... Barsukov had a simple tactic: try to pull them as close as possible to the building, to the fighting. Feeling the gunpowder, burning, plunging into the whirlpool of shots, automatic bursts, they will go further forward.
However, even approaching the White House, the commandos were in no hurry to storm. Here it is - just in time! - Junior Lieutenant Sergeev was killed by a sniper's shot.
“After the Alpha fighters learned that their comrade had died,” Yeltsin continues, “many did not have to be persuaded. Almost the entire team went to the release of the "white house". Barsukov and the head of the presidential guard Alexander Korzhakov were at the head of Alpha.
What kind of sniper it was, Yeltsin did not specify. From the context it was necessary to understand that we are talking about a sniper who fired from the White House.
A year after these events, in 1994, I had a rare stroke of luck. A person agreed to answer my questions, whose last name and even first name I promised not to name under any circumstances. I was allowed to tell about him only that he is a high-ranking intelligence officer, and that part of the information (as far as I understood, very insignificant), which he shared with me, was received by him from his subordinates and colleagues - professionals like him myself. Under the terms of our agreement, even his voice on the tape was changed by me - an interview with him was broadcast in October 1994 on the waves of Radio Liberty, where I worked at that time.
Much of what you are about to read may seem incredible even after 10 years. I can neither confirm nor deny this information. And my interlocutor did not need to confirm anything. He just told me what he thought was possible. By the way, even today he continues to work in the same special service - professionals of his level are always needed.
* * *
According to official and unofficial estimates, 100-110 professional snipers operated in Moscow in those days. There is a version that these are militants who arrived from Abkhazia and Transnistria. Indeed, there are professionals there, but they are few. According to the data I have, there were 8-10 of them in Moscow.
Not more?
Not more. Them, professionals, and in general it is not enough. In addition, even on a train it is very difficult to carry a sniper rifle. This is not a shortened amphibious assault rifle, this is not an AKS.
Maybe they were snipers from the former "Afghans" who were brought to the White House by Kotenev? (Reserve Lieutenant Colonel A. Kotenev, Chairman of the Union of Afghan Veterans. His “Afghans” then took the side of Boris Yeltsin. - M.D.)
In my opinion, no. I myself am a good shooter and I know that in order to prepare and train a sniper, you need to practice at least once a week. Former “Afghans” did not have such an opportunity. Also, when they arrived at the White House, they were armed with pump-action shotguns and AKCs. They didn't have sniper rifles.
True, there was another group that theoretically could have been able to introduce snipers into the combat area ...
There were also snipers from the White House, weren't there?
I just want to talk about them. It was there that the snipers from Abkhazia and Transnistria were located. But in the White House, according to the documents known to me, there were no more than 10 SVD rifles. If we keep in mind the other, opposing side, then the Kremlin guards have a platoon of “attic highway workers”. These people cover the President's route or equip their sectors during his public speeches. They were involved in the October events: even in the media there were reports that, when detaining a sniper, he showed a certificate from the special services, in particular from the Ministry of Security. Employees of the Main Security Directorate have similar certificates - as cover documents. However, there are also very few such people with professional sniper skills. According to my information, some other forces were involved here.
What do you have in mind? According to a simple calculation, there were 20-25 “October snipers” in total, well 30. But not 100-110! Where did the rest come from?
Let me start by saying they were true professionals. The lieutenant of group “A”, which journalists dubbed “Alpha”, Sergeev, was killed by a bullet that hit between the upper border of the bulletproof vest and the lower border of the sphere. For civilians, I will explain: the sphere is a special protective helmet for special forces. According to information from the investigators, the shot was fired from the technical premises of the Kapranov factory, which is located next to the White House. This room was used for a long time by the KGB of the USSR to monitor the American embassy. The room in this room was equipped on 27 September.
What is equipped?
Everything you need for shift duty snipers.
What is the boundary between the top of the body armor and the sphere? Is it available to an ordinary shooter?
According to the data that I received, Sergeyev's gap was about two centimeters. Only a professional of the highest class can get into it.
Do you rule out an accidental shot?
I do not exclude. But its probability is so insignificant that it can be neglected.
Another fact. The 119th Naro-Fominsk Regiment, withdrawn from the Baltic before the October events (few people know about this - this regiment was also called “Achalovsky”, because before that it was commanded by Achalov, who was later appointed Rutsky Minister of Defense of the White House. The regiment went to the aid of Rutsky It was this that gave Achalov reason to report to the deputies in the White House and Rutskoi that "loyal" troops were rushing towards them), - and so, when this regiment approached the White House, Senior Lieutenant Krasnikov, Private Korovushkin and Corporal were killed by sniper shots ... (the name of the corporal on the tape turned out to be illegible; later I found out that it was corporal Khikhin. - M.D.) Who shot at them?
After that, as I understand it, the mood in the 119th regiment changed dramatically?
Right.
In technical room factory named after Kapranov - what else was found there? Apart from what you have already mentioned?
You never said where all those snipers came from.
As an answer, I will offer you a few disparate facts.
In August, one of the people close to Korzhakov, General Prosvirin (Major General Boris Prosvirin, Deputy Head of the Security Guard of the President of the Russian Federation. - M.D.), through the Swiss residency, established informal contacts with the special services of several European states. On September 17, several groups of tourists flew from Cyprus to Sheremetyevo, among whom were only men. For some reason, documents about the arrival of these groups have not been preserved.
How do you know that - not preserved?
That's how my people informed me. As well as the fact that the documents for the arrival of a certain rugby team were not preserved, which, if I am not mistaken, Korzhakov himself met on September 27 at Sheremetyevo airport. There were no rugby competitions during that period either through the sports committee or through any sports clubs. Prior to the meeting of this group, first Korzhakov, and then Prosvirin, received SVD sniper rifles at the weapons depot of the special police in Reutov.
In what quantity?
According to the information I received - 50 and 52 rifles, respectively.
Here is another fact. In the Mir Hotel, from where - already after the murder of Sergeyev - there was shooting at the Alpha group, subsequently four corpses were found in one of the rooms. One of them is in the uniform of a police lieutenant colonel. According to my informants, this man was an employee of the Main Directorate of Security. Three others are in civilian clothes, without documents.
With weapon?
Not far from them, two SVD sniper rifles were found. It is impossible to say to whom they belonged, since, as far as I know, no investigations into the deaths of these people were carried out.
I remember the Romanian events well. There, snipers, also not caught and not seen by anyone, shot both opposing sides - in this way to untie the hands of the stronger side. Among ourselves, we conditionally call this technique “piccadilla”. During a bullfight, there are people who deliberately anger the bull with small darts so that he seems more furious against the bullfighter. It seems to the audience that because of this, the bull becomes scarier, but in fact it is safer.
Another curious fact. Immediately after the October events, groups of men left Moscow, among whom one could recognize those who flew in as rugby players or tourists from Cyprus. They left by train for Warsaw, Berlin and Bucharest. Moreover, they were traveling in those compartments, tickets for which, according to the practice established many years ago, were sold according to the KGB armor ...
Versions in this case are a thankless and even dangerous business. However, let's say - I emphasize: let's say - these people who flew to Moscow on the eve of the October events and left on the armor of the KGB were those snipers unknown to us. Such use of foreign professionals - how widespread is this practice in relations between special services?
I know of cases when the corporatism of the secret services turned out to be much stronger than the political ties of the heads of state. I also know cases when specialists from the Russian special services, with their physical participation, helped in the fight against organized crime in European countries, where our compatriots were involved against the so-called “Russian mafia”.
As for the story with the snipers, I'll tell you this. Unlike many military men, I am not a subscriber to the newspaper The Day (now it is called Tomorrow. - M.D.), which more than once built a delusional version about the arrival of Jewish militants in Moscow, from which combat detachments were formed here ... Let's leave this version to the "patriots". I just told you about some of the scattered facts that I received through my official channels.
Alexander Rutskoi: "I don't hold a grudge against Yeltsin"
"Gazeta", 03.10.2003, Svetlana Smetanina
Ten years ago, Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi announced that he was taking over the powers of the president and barricaded himself in the White House. The two-week confrontation between the Kremlin and parliament ended with the execution of the latter. Since then, Russia has never had vice presidents again. Alexander Rutskoi recalls the events of October 1993.
How has your attitude towards those events changed over the years?
It is bad that the newest history of Russia began with a tragedy. As a result, all these sacrifices turned out to be unjustified: the basic industries have collapsed, the country's natural resources have been seized, and the population is impoverished.
If you had won then, would Russia have taken a different path?
We fought not for the division of portfolios, not for power. We were against this approach to reforms. From the very beginning it was clear to me what the amateurs' experiments would lead to. In 1993, the Congress of People's Deputies asked Yeltsin to clarify: what are the goals of the reforms, to give a program. But there were only amendments to the Constitution, giving the president unlimited powers.
What did you count on, starting the confrontation with the Kremlin - on the support of the people? Khasbulatov then called for the blocking of railways, oil pipelines, communications ...
The people supported us - remember those thousands of demonstrations. But bare hands cannot resist force. We were surrounded by barbed wire, troops in three rows. How could you get through it? We are accused of having criminals in the ranks of our defenders. And I say - name the names. And when they say that people from the RNE turned up in the White House, one asks, how could they get through these three cordons, who let them through? This was done on purpose, so that later they would point the finger - that's who defended them. In general, there were a lot of provocations. The same Terekhov, for example, who arranged all sorts of provocative combat sorties. Where is this "defender of the people" now? Not seen or heard. All this talk about snipers from the White House is also nonsense. The investigation found out that the bullets with which the victims of snipers were shot were of a caliber that neither the army nor the police had in service. Where would they come from with us? In addition, all the weapons belonging to the Supreme Council, including sniper rifles, were in their places in a special room, where the Prosecutor General later described them.
Have you tried to compromise? Did you call Yeltsin?
It was impossible to contact Yeltsin. We negotiated with his representatives. Our demands were to announce new elections for both the parliament and the president, and to convene a constitutional assembly for the period of anarchy.
Khasbulatov in one of his interviews says that disagreements soon began between you: he told you - "you are the president, well, go take your Kremlin."
If there had been another person in Khasbulatov's place, perhaps everything would have gone differently. He then sat huddled in a corner - neither seen nor heard. He's puffing out his cheeks now. And what did they say later during the investigation ... When I got out of prison, I published all my protocols of interrogation - I had copies. I suggested to Khasbulatov, Makashov, other "great revolutionaries" - Anpilov the same: publish your protocols, ten years have already passed. No, they are afraid.
So you don't talk to any of them now?
No, I don't talk. Zyuganov - he generally privatized these events. But I remember how in May 1993 Zyuganov fled through the Neskuchny Garden - he left a demonstration of workers. And on September 24, they, together with another figure, Tuleev, declared: we went to raise the proletariat, and no one saw them again. When Zyuganov starts blaming journalists that they are discrediting the Communist Party, I think, look at yourself. Privatize what does not belong to you. And people shed blood.
What do you think today - was the campaign against Ostankino justified?
I was standing at the window of the White House, and a demonstration was going on along the Arbat. And I saw how a machine gun began to hit from the city hall building, people began to fall. In a fit of anger, evil, despair, and because we had no outlet in the media, people were sent to Ostankino. Of course it was a mistake. I didn't want blood. But the nerves are in a ball. We are sitting without electricity, without water, there is no connection ...
And who specifically made those or other decisions?
I couldn't take one. Everything was decided collectively - Khasbulatov, Dunaev, Barannikov, Achalov, Rutskoi. We did not want confrontation, we made a compromise - remove the blockades, we will take away all the weapons, seal them in the gun park and start a dialogue.
When the shelling began, was it scary?
The first shell hit the meeting room, the second hit Khasbulatov's office, and the third hit mine. Moreover, they hit with high-explosive shells, and not with blanks, as they say today. From blanks the building will not burn. I was sitting in my office when a shell broke through the window and exploded in the right corner. Luckily, my desk was on the left. Jumped out of there crazy. What saved me, I don't know.
Do you still have a personal grudge against Yeltsin?
Some modern researchers of those events are trying to prove that all these were personal showdowns between Yeltsin, Rutskoi and Khasbulatov. Yes, there were personal moments: a forgery was prepared against me - a trust agreement, accounts in Switzerland. And then, two years later, Prosecutor General Skuratov notified me in writing that the investigation had been completed, my signatures had been forged, and no perpetrators had been found. But I don't hold a grudge against Yeltsin. God will judge us, because the law cannot.
How will you celebrate those events?
What to celebrate? It's a memento. Besides, I can't drink. Well, maybe I'll drink lemonade ... "
Those who in August 1991 reveled in their triumph, celebrating the "victory of democracy over the dark forces of totalitarianism", probably believed that they had provided not only (or maybe not so much) Russia, but a bright future for themselves and forever inscribed their glorious names in the history of the country. However, life has refuted these hopes. At least the fates of the members of the nearest circle Yeltsin, who during the "putsch" together with him defended the White House and "democracy", together with him reaped the fruits of victory in the form of the power and popularity they inherited, did not develop brilliantly. At least in politics. Someone - a little earlier, someone - a little later, but almost all of them (with the exception of Yeltsin, of course) quickly lost power, positions, influence, popularity and gradually faded into political oblivion. And today, if the inhabitants remember them, they mainly remember them with an unkind word - as people who once, together with Yeltsin they destroyed one country - the USSR, and then - another, post-Soviet Russia. In some cases, the fate of the winners of the GKChP in the post-Soviet period was even more dramatic.
Konstantin Kobets (vk.sibsutis.ru)
As, for example, in the case of Konstantin Kobets. Professional military man, since 1987 - Chief of the Communications Troops of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, Professor, Doctor of Military Sciences Konstantin Ivanovich Kobets from the first days of the "putsch" stood on the side Yeltsin, was directly responsible for the defense of the White House and on August 20, 1991 was appointed Minister of Defense of the RSFSR (the position, however, was abolished in September of that year). And after the coup, on August 24, he was awarded the military rank of army general.
After the collapse of the USSR Kobets served as Chief Military Inspector of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. In October 1993 Kobets helped again Yeltsin in a critical situation - suppressed "riots in Moscow." The general's career seemed to be at its peak. Everything collapsed overnight. In May 1997 General of the Army Kobets was removed from his post, dismissed from the Armed Forces and arrested on charges of taking bribes and illegal possession of weapons. Before his arrest, the general was often called one of the most likely candidates for the post of Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, his name was constantly at the center of various corruption scandals. In 1998, Kobets pleaded guilty and was released from custody on bail. In 2000, his case was terminated under an amnesty, after which Kobets declared the invalidity of his earlier confession of guilt.
Or take another general - Alexander Rutskoy. His biography before joining big politics is almost standard: a combat pilot, a real hero without any reservations, a hero not only by title - Hero of the Soviet Union, but in fact, a veteran of the Afghan war: almost 500 sorties, was shot down twice, miraculously survived, was captured by the Mujahideen.
Alexander Rutskoi (dic.academic.ru)
June 12, 1991 Rutskoi was elected vice-president of Russia together with the president of the RFSR Yeltsin. During the "putsch" he was one of the organizers of the defense of the White House, together with Silaev delivered the "liberated" man from Foros to Moscow by plane Gorbachev. After the "putsch" by decree Gorbachev to Rutskoi was promoted to the rank of Major General. And soon after that, the conflict begins. Rutsky And Yeltsin. In December 1991 Aleksandr Vladimirovich during his trip to Barnaul publicly criticized the "shock therapy" program for Gaidar, whose government he called "the boys in pink pants". Rutskoi was equally critical of the Belovezhskaya agreements, comparing them with the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918.
In October 1992 Rutskoi Headed the Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on Combating Crime and Corruption. On February 19, 1993, his detailed program to combat crime and corruption was published under the title "It's dangerous to live like this." On April 16, 1993, Rutskoi summed up his work: in a few months he collected "11 suitcases" of compromising evidence; on the list of the perpetrators were Gaidar, Burbulis, Poltoranin, Shumeiko, Shokhin, Chubais, Kozyrev. 9 cases were handed over to the prosecutor's office. On April 29, a special commission of the Supreme Council was approved to investigate the corruption of senior officials. On the same day Rutskoi was removed from the leadership of the Interdepartmental Commission, and on September 3 Rutsky temporarily removed from the duties of vice president. On the night of September 21-22, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted a resolution later confirmed by the Congress on the termination of Yeltsin's presidential powers and the temporary transfer of powers, in accordance with the Constitution and the decision of the Constitutional Court, to the acting vice president Alexander Rutsky. Rutskoi took the oath of the President of the Russian Federation. Then there were the well-known events of October 1993, Rutskoy’s calls to storm the Moscow mayor’s office and the television center in Ostankino, the shooting of the White House, the arrest of Alexander Vladimirovich, the liquidation of the post of vice president, the conclusion in Matrosskaya Tishina, from where Rutskoi was released in February 1994 under an amnesty (although his trial never took place).
Gennady Burbulis, Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar - 1992 (svpressa.ru)
In the 1996 presidential election, he supported the candidacy of Zyuganov, whom he had previously harshly criticized. Zyuganov lost the election, but the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in the election of the governor of the Kursk region in October of the same 1996 actively supported the candidacy Rutsky and he became governor. Governorship Rutsky in 1996-2000 was marked by corruption scandals and conflicts between the governor and the regional prosecutor's office. In October 2000, Rutskoi again put forward his candidacy for the election of the head of the administration of the Kursk region, but a few hours before the vote he was suspended from participating in the elections for indicating false information about property. In 2001, the major general intended to take part in the election of a State Duma deputy in a single-mandate district, but then abandoned this idea "for health reasons." In the future against Rutsky A criminal case was initiated under Article 286 (“Abuse of power”). In 2003, Alexander Vladimirovich again tried to become a State Duma deputy, but was not admitted to the elections: his registration as a candidate was canceled by the Supreme Court in connection with the provision of incorrect information about the place of work to the election commission.
The political fate and ally looks no more enviable Rutsky during the events of October 1993, and before that - an ally Yeltsin Ruslana Khasbulatova. In August 1991, he acted as chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, and in October of the same year he got rid of the prefix “and. about.". After the putsch, the activities of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR were paralyzed, and Khasbulatov actually turned the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia into a real government. In mid-January 1992, in an official statement, Khasbulatov proposed Yeltsin dismiss a practically incapacitated government Burbulis- Gaidar. Since then, in the eyes of the "reformers" Khasbulatov became one of their worst enemies. The result of the growing contradictions was the aforementioned tragic events of September-October 1993, after which Ruslan Khasbulatov was arrested on charges of organizing mass riots. Like Rutskoi, in February 1994, Khasbulatov was released under an amnesty.
After the GKChP, Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov quickly turned from a friend and ally of Yeltsin into his worst enemy (peoples.ru)
Thereafter Khasbulatov intervened in the events around the growing conflict in the North Caucasus and even organized the so-called. "Professor Khasbulatov's peacekeeping mission", which tried to arrange negotiations between Dudayev and Russian authorities. However, on the whole, the mission turned out to be unsuccessful, including because in Moscow the attitude of Khasbulatov's mission was cool. In 1995, when a full-scale war was already underway in Chechnya, Khasbulatov, according to media reports, again offered to act as an intermediary, but the Russian authorities again refused his services. In 2003, Khasbulatov intended to run for president Chechen Republic and declared that he could win in the first round, but in the end he did not take part in the elections, and then completely withdrew from political life.
The townsfolk practically forgot the name of another faithful comrade-in-arms Yeltsin during the "putsch" - Ivan Silaeva, at that time - Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. Then Silaev together with Rutskoi brought Gorbachev from Foros to Moscow, in addition, he took the initiative to restore the St. George Crosses and award them to the "defenders of the White House." After the putsch, on August 24, Ivan Stepanovich headed the Committee for the Operational Management of the National Economy of the USSR, created instead of the liquidated Council of Ministers of the USSR, while remaining the head of the Russian government. But soon Silaev, unexpectedly for everyone (first of all, for his like-minded people), spoke out for the preservation of the Soviet Union.
Relations between Boris Yeltsin and Ivan Silaev cooled off after the latter spoke out against the collapse of the USSR
On December 18, 1991, after the liquidation of allied structures began, Silaev was appointed Russia's permanent representative to the European Communities (the organization was annulled on December 1, 2009 after the signing of the Lisbon Treaty. - Ed.) in Brussels in the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. On February 7, 1994, he was relieved of this position "in connection with his resignation at his own request." At the end of 1994 Silaev created and headed the International Union of Mechanical Engineers (IMM), which included more than 100 civil and defense enterprises and associations, mostly Russian. Since September 2002, Ivan Stepanovich has been the chairman of the Russian Union of Mechanical Engineers.
In 2007 Silaev ran for the State Duma on the list of the Agrarian Russia party, but was not elected, because Agrarian Russia did not overcome the seven percent barrier.
Gennady was considered one of the brightest political stars among the "defenders" of the White House. Burbulis, then - Secretary of State of the RSFSR. He retained this position until May 1992, in addition, from November 6, 1991 to April 14, 1992, he served as First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Burbulis was one of the main actors in the preparation of the Belovezhskaya Accords, which formalized the collapse of the USSR. As stated Gorbachev, for solution Yeltsin on the liquidation of the USSR was strongly influenced by an analytical note Burbulis, in which he justified the impossibility of real reforms as long as there are allied power structures. It was Burbulis who achieved Yeltsin appointments to key economic positions of young economists from the “team Gaidar". In 1990-1992, according to the general opinion, under Yeltsin Burbulis played the role of the "grey eminence", determining the adoption of many important decisions.
Then, however, its influence on Yeltsin weakened: according to some information, Yeltsin admitted in private conversations that Burbulis he just got bored.
In 1993 and 1995 Burbulis was elected a deputy State Duma, then worked on the Supervisory Board of Novotrubny Zavod JSC (Pervouralsk).
In July 2000, the then governor of the Novgorod region prusak appointed Burbulis vice-governor for interaction with the chambers of the Federal Assembly. More than a year later Burbulis was appointed a member of the Federation Council - a representative of the Novgorod region in the upper house of the Russian parliament. He was released from senatorial powers in 2007 at the suggestion of the new governor of the region. Although with the Federation Council Burbulis never parted: since November 2007, he has been an adviser to the chairman of the Federation Council, head of the team of authors and scientific editor of the annual reports of the Federation Council “On the state of legislation in the Russian Federation”. Apparently, due to the versatility of his personality political activity Burbulis freely combines with sports: he is the president of the Russian Short Track Federation. In the same way that the former head of Yeltsin's security service, Alexander Korzhakov, combines political activity with art -.
Among the "defenders" of the White House in August 1991 there were also completely unexpected persons from the modern positions. People like Michael Khodorkovsky, at that moment - the chairman of the board of the interbank association "MENATEP". Another thing is noteworthy. He and his business colleague Leonid Nevzlin in 1990 became advisers to the then Prime Minister of Russia Ivan Silaev, who, being supporters of Boris Yeltsin, in turn, during the days of the "putsch" played a significant role. Not surprisingly, Khodorkovsky himself eventually became a fierce opponent of the State Emergency Committee.
Or, for example, Shamil Basayev, who participated in the defense of the White House on August 19-21, 1991. In an interview with the Moskovskaya Pravda newspaper on January 27, 1996 Basayev said: "I knew that if the GKChP won, it would be possible to put an end to the independence of Chechnya ...". The GKChP lost and a real war broke out very soon for the independence of Chechnya. However, it makes no sense to talk about his "exploits" - Russia will not forget this name for a long time.
If we talk about more significant “democratic” figures at the time of August 1991, including those mentioned above, it is difficult to say today why practically none of them subsequently developed a political career. Probably, these figures wanted to get too much in return for their "friendship" with Yeltsin. Or maybe because Yeltsin from the very beginning perceived them as pawns, executors of his plans. And then corny "threw". And he remained, in fact, the only one who won big - in every sense - "defender of the White House."
