Historical facts, accepted as an indisputable truth, sometimes cause many doubts among those who are used to analyzing the course of events and reading “between the lines”. Frank contradictions, silence and distortion of obvious facts cause healthy indignation, since interest in one's roots is inherent in man by nature. That is why a new direction of teaching has arisen - an alternative history. Reading various articles about the origin of mankind, the development and formation of states, one can understand how far the school history course is from reality. Facts, not supported by elementary logic and argumentation, are planted in young heads as the only true path of historical development. At the same time, many of them do not stand up to elementary analysis even by those who are not luminaries in this area, but are only interested in world history and know how to think sensibly.
The essence of alternative history
This direction is considered to be unscientific, since it is not regulated at the official level. However, reading articles, books and treatises on alternative history, it becomes clear that they are more logical, consistent and justified than " official version» events. So why are historians silent, why do they distort the facts? There can be many reasons for this:
- It is much more pleasant to present your origin in a more advantageous light. Moreover, it is enough just to provide the bulk of the population with an attractive theory, even if it does not fit in with the context of real history - they will definitely accept it “as their own”, amusing their self-esteem on the subconscious.
- The role of the victim is advantageous only in the event of a successful ending, because, as you know, all the "laurels" go to the winner. If it didn’t work out to defend your people, then, a priori, the enemies must be bad and insidious.
- To act on the attacking side, destroying other nationalities is “not comme il faut”, therefore it is at least unreasonable to flaunt such facts in the annals of historical events.
The list of reasons for lies and cover-ups in history is endless, but they all originate in one single statement: if it is written that way, then it is beneficial. Moreover, in this context, the benefit implies not so much economic as moral, political and psychological comfort. And it doesn’t matter at all that any lie looks stupid, it’s enough just to analyze the indisputable facts of that time.
Over time, the alternative history becomes more complete and meaningful. Thanks to the work of people who are not indifferent to their origin in the annals of our country, and the world as a whole, there are less and less “dark spots”, and the chronology of events takes on a logical and consistent form. That is why reading about an alternative history is not only informative, but also pleasant - clearly verified facts make the narrative logical and reasonable, and accepting one's roots allows you to better understand the deep essence of historical events.
An alternative history of mankind: a look through the prism of logic
Darwin's theory of human origins is ideally suited to be told to children as a cautionary tale about the benefits of work, with one acceptable context - it's just a fairy tale. Each artifact obtained during the excavations, each ancient find causes healthy skepticism regarding the official version of history, since they clearly contradict the voiced version. And if you consider that most of them are simply kept under the heading "Secret", the origin of mankind looks vague and doubtful at all. A consensus on this issue has not yet been formed, but one thing is known for certain: a person appeared much earlier than history ascribes to him.
- traces of a man of the era of dinosaurs discovered in Nevada, which are more than 50 million years old;
- a fossilized finger, which, according to research, has been stored for about 130 million years;
- hand-drawn metal vase, about half a billion years old.
The proof of the correctness of alternative versions of history is not limited to these facts - the number of traces of human presence in the ancient world is steadily growing, however, far from everyone is known to a wide range of people. Moreover, many theories regarding the course of historical events have already been voiced in the context of mythology, but scientists have dismissed them, since there was no evidence for this. Now, when the revealed facts convince of the opposite, they simply do not want to “lose face”, rewriting the history of mankind.
If in the course of evolution and technological progress people became more and more developed, then how were the famous Egyptian pyramids built? After all, even now, having a huge arsenal of equipment and building materials, such a structure causes delight and awe, because it seems almost unreal. But such pyramids were built not only on the African continent, but also in today's America, China, Russia and Bosnia. How could such inept and technically illiterate ancestors, according to the version of academic history, be able to build this?
Turning to the ancient Indian treatises, one can find references to flying chariots - the prototypes of modern aircraft. They are also mentioned in the writings of Maharshi Bharadwaja, a sage of the 4th century BC. His book was found back in the 19th century, but never had a resonance thanks to the efforts of those who adhere to the official version of history. These works were recognized as nothing more than entertaining writings based on a rich imagination, while the descriptions of the machines themselves, suspiciously reminiscent of modern ones, were considered mere conjectures.
Not only the ancient Indian works confirm the dubiousness of the academic theory of the development of mankind - the Slavic chronicles store no less number of confirmations. Based on the described technical structures, our distant ancestors could not only move through the air, but also make intergalactic flights. So why is the alternate history suggestion of Earth populating the planet from space considered practically insane? It is a completely logical and reasonable version that has the right to exist.
The question of the origin of man is considered one of the most controversial, since rare facts make one only speculate and speculate. The academic version assumes that mankind came out of Africa, but this version hardly withstands the elementary “strength test” of modern facts and discoveries. The novelties of alternative history seem more convincing, since even the latest articles in 2017 consider several options at once as a possible course of events. One of the confirmations of the plurality of theories are the works of Anatoly Klyosov.
Alternative history in the context of DNA genealogy
The founder of DNA genealogy, which reveals the essence of the migration processes of the ancient population through the prism of chromosomal similarities, is Anatoly Klyosov. His works cause a lot of indignant criticism in his address, since the theories set forth by the scientist openly contradict the official version of events about the African origin of the entire human race. The critical questions raised by Klyosov in his books and publications reveal the essence of the erroneous claims of popgeneticists that "anatomically modern man”(precisely in the context of the current genetic basis) went from the African people through constant migration to neighboring continents. The main evidence of the academic version is the genetic diversity of Africans, but this fact cannot be considered confirming, but only makes it possible to put forward a theory that is not supported by any justification.
The main features of the idea promoted by Klyosov are as follows:
- the genetic genealogy founded by him (DNA genealogy) is a symbiosis of history, biochemistry, anthropology and linguistics, and not a subsection of academic genetics, as is commonly believed in scientific circles, accusing the author of quackery;
- This approach allows us to formulate a new calendar of ancient migrations of mankind, which is more accurate and scientifically justified than the official one.
According to the data obtained in the course of a long and rigorous analysis of historical, anthropological and chromosomal studies, the development "from the African source" is not complete, since the alternative history of the Slavs at that time was taking a parallel course. The Proto-Slavic origin of the Aryan race is confirmed by the fact that the chromosomal halogroup R1a1 came from the Dnieper territory and the Ural River and went to India, and not vice versa, as the official version of events claims.
His ideas are actively promoted not only in Russia, but throughout the world: the Russian Academy of DNA Genealogy founded by him is an international online organization. In addition to publishing online, Klyosov has published many books and periodicals. His collection of articles on alternative history, based on a DNA genealogical database, is constantly updated with new works, which each time lift the veil of secrecy over the most ancient civilization.
Tatar-Mongol yoke: an alternative history
In academic history Tatar-Mongol yoke there are still many “dark spots” that allow us to make assumptions and guesses not only for historians of our time, but also for ordinary people who are interested in their origins. Many details indicate that the Tatar-Mongol people did not exist at all. That is why the alternative history looks very reliable: the details are so logical and justified that, willy-nilly, doubts arise, but are the textbooks lying?
Indeed, there are no mentions of the Tatar-Mongols in any Russian chronicle, and the term itself causes healthy skepticism: well, where could such a nationality come from? From Mongolia? But, according to historical documents, the ancient Mongols were called "Oirats". There is no such nationality and there was not, until in 1823 it was introduced artificially!
The alternative history of Russia in those days is clearly reflected in the work of Alexei Kungurov. His book “There was no Kievan Rus, or what historians are hiding” caused thousands of controversies in scientific circles, but the arguments seem quite convincing even to those who are familiar with history, not to mention ordinary readers: “If we demand to present at least some material evidence of the long existence of the Mongol empire, then archaeologists, scratching their heads and grunting, will show a pair of half-rotted sabers and several women's earrings. But do not try to find out why the remains of sabers are "Mongol-Tatar" and not Cossack, for example. No one will explain this to you for sure. At best, you will hear a story that the saber was dug up at the place where, according to the version of the ancient and very reliable chronicle, there was a battle with the Mongols. Where is that chronicle? God knows it, it has not reached our days ”(c).
Although the theme is thoroughly revealed in the works of Gumilyov, Kalyuzhny and Fomenko, who are undoubtedly experts in their field, the alternative history reveals the Tatar-Mongol yoke in such a reasoned, detailed and thorough manner precisely at the suggestion of Kungurov. Undoubtedly, the author is thoroughly familiar with the timing of Kievan Rus and studied many sources before putting forward his theory regarding that time. That is why there is no doubt that his version of what is happening is the only possible chronology of events. Indeed, it is difficult to argue with a logically competent justification:
- Not a single "material evidence" of the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars remained. Even from the dinosaurs, at least some traces remained, and from the whole yoke - zero. No written sources (of course, you should not take into account later fabricated papers), no architectural structures, no coin trace.
- Analyzing modern linguistics, it will not be possible to find a single borrowing from the Mongol-Tatar heritage: the Mongolian and Russian languages do not intersect, and there are no cultural borrowings from the Transbaikal nomads.
- Even if Kievan Rus wanted to eradicate the difficult times of the dominance of the Mongol-Tatars from memory, at least some trace would remain in the folklore of the nomads. But even there - nothing!
- What was the purpose of the capture? They reached the territory of Russia, captured ... and that's it? Was the conquest of the world limited to this? And the economic consequences for present-day Mongolia were never discovered: no Russian gold, no icons, no coins, in a word, nothing again.
- For more than 3 centuries of imaginary dominance, not a single mixing of blood has occurred. One way or another, domestic population genetics did not find a single thread leading to the Mongol-Tatar roots.
These facts testify in favor of an alternative history of ancient Russia, in which there is not the slightest mention of the Tatar-Mongols as such. But why, over the course of several centuries, people were instilled with the opinion of the cruel attack of Batu? After all, something happened during these years that historians are trying to cover up with external interference. In addition, before the pseudo-liberation from the Mongol-Tatars, the territory of Russia was really in a huge decline, and the number of the local population decreased tenfold. So what happened during these years?
The alternative history of Russia offers many versions, but the most convincing seems to be forced baptism. According to ancient maps, the main part of the Northern Hemisphere was the Great State - Tartary. Its inhabitants were educated and literate, they lived in harmony with themselves and with natural forces. Adhering to the Vedic worldview, they understood what was good, saw the consequences of planting a religious principle and tried to maintain their inner harmony. However, Kievan Rus - one of the provinces of the Great Tartaria - decided to take a different path.
Prince Vladimir, who became ideological inspirer and a performer of forced Christianization, he understood that people’s deep convictions cannot be broken just like that, so he ordered to kill most of the adult population, and put a religious principle into innocent children’s heads. And when the troops of Tartaria came to their senses and decided to stop the cruel bloodshed in Kievan Rus, it was already too late - the province at that time was a miserable sight. Of course, there was still a battle on the Kalka River, but the opponents were not a fictional Mongol corps, but their own army.
Looking at the alternative story about the war, it becomes clear why it was so "sluggish": the Russian troops, who forcibly converted to Christianity, perceived the Vedic army of Tartaria not as an attack, but rather as a liberation from the imposed religion. Many of them even went over to the side of the "enemy", while the rest did not see the point in the battle. But will such facts be printed in textbooks? After all, this discredits the modern idea of \u200b\u200bthe "great and wisest" power. There are many dark spots in the history of Russia, as, indeed, in any state, but hiding them will not help to rewrite it.
An alternative history of Russia from ancient times: where did Tartaria go?
By the end of the 18th century, Great Tartaria was wiped out not only from the face of the Earth, but also from the political map of the world. This was done so carefully that there is no mention of it in any history textbook, in any chronicle and official paper. Why is it necessary to hide such an obvious fact of our history, which was revealed relatively recently, only thanks to the works of Academician Fomenko, who was engaged in New Chronology? But Guthrie William described Tartaria, its provinces and history in detail back in the 18th century, but this work remained unnoticed by official science. Everything is simple to the point of banal: the alternative history of Russia does not look as sacrificial and imposing as the academic one.
The conquest of Great Tartaria began in the 15th century, when Muscovy was the first to attack the surrounding territories. The army of Tartaria, which did not expect an attack, which at that time concentrated all its forces on protecting the external borders, did not have time to orient itself, and therefore yielded to the enemy. This served as an example for others, and gradually everyone sought to “bite off” at least a small piece of economically and politically profitable lands from Tartaria. So for 2 and a half centuries, only a weak shadow remained from the Great State, the final blow to which was World War, referred to in the course of history as the "Pugachev Uprising" in 1773-1775. After that, the name of the once great power began to gradually change to the Russian Empire, however, some regions - Independent and Chinese Tartaria - still managed to preserve their history for some more time.
Thus, the long war, which ultimately exterminated all the native Tartarians, began precisely with the filing of the Muscovites, who subsequently took an active part in it. This means that the territory of modern Russia was brutally recaptured at the cost of tens of thousands of lives, and our ancestors are precisely the attacking side. Will such textbooks be written? After all, if history is built on cruelty and bloodshed, then it is not as “wonderful” as they are trying to portray.
As a result, historians who adhere to the academic version simply took certain facts out of context, swapped the characters and presented everything “under the sauce” of the sad saga of devastation after the Tatar-Mongol yoke. In this perspective, there could be no talk of any attack on Tartaria. And what an alternative history of Tartaria, there was nothing. The maps are corrected, the facts are distorted, which means that you can forget about the rivers of blood. Such an approach made it possible to inspire many inhabitants, who were not accustomed to think and analyze, with exceptional integrity, sacrifice and, most importantly, the antiquity of their people. But in fact, all this was created by the hands of the Tartarians, who were subsequently destroyed.
An alternative history of St. Petersburg, or What is hidden in the chronicle of the Northern capital?
Petersburg is almost the main platform for the country's historical events, and the architecture of the city makes you breathless with delight and awe. But is everything as transparent and consistent as the official history shows?
The alternative history of St. Petersburg is based on the theory that the city at the mouth of the Neva was built in the 9th century BC, only it was called Nevograd. When Radabor built a port here, the settlement was renamed Vodin. A heavy fate fell on the locals: the city was often flooded, and enemies tried to seize the port area, causing devastation and bloodshed. In 862, after the death of Prince Vadim, the Novgorod prince who came to power destroyed the city almost to the ground, destroying the entire indigenous population. Having recovered from this blow, after almost three centuries, the Vodinians met another attack - the Swedish one. True, after 30 years the Russian army was able to regain their native lands, but this time was enough to weaken Vodin.
After the suppression of the uprising in 1258, the city was renamed again - in order to pacify the recalcitrant Vodinians, Alexander Nevsky decided to eradicate his native name and began to call the city on the Neva Gorodnya. And after another 2 years, the Swedes again attacked the territory and named it in their own way - Landskron. Swedish dominance did not last long - in 1301 the city returned to Russia again, began to gradually flourish and recover.
Such an idyll lasted a little more than two and a half centuries - in 1570 Moskhi captured Gorodnya, calling it Kongrad. However, the Swedes did not give up their desire to get the port territory of the Neva, so in 1611 they were able to recapture the city, which has now become Kanets. After that, it was renamed one more time, calling Nyenschanz, until Peter I won it back from the Swedes during the Great Northern War. And only after that the official version of history begins the annals of St. Petersburg.
According to academic history, it was Peter the Great who built the city from scratch, created St. Petersburg the way it is today. However, the alternative history of Peter I does not look so impressive, because, in fact, he received a ready-made city with a long history into submission. It is enough to look at the numerous monuments allegedly erected in honor of the ruler in order to doubt their origins, because on each of them Peter I is depicted in completely different ways, and not always appropriate.
For example, the statue in the Mikhailovsky Castle depicts Peter the Great, dressed for some reason in a Roman tunic and sandals. A rather strange outfit for the realities of St. Petersburg at that time ... And the marshal's baton in an awkwardly twisted hand suspiciously resembles a spear, which for some reason (obviously why) was cut off, giving it the appropriate shape. And looking at the "Bronze Horseman", it becomes clear that the face is made in a completely different way. Age changes? Hardly. Just a falsification of the historical heritage of St. Petersburg, which was adjusted to suit academic history.
Alternative history review - answers to burning questions
Thoughtfully reading a school history textbook, it is impossible not to “stumble” over contradictions and imposed clichés. In addition, the revealed facts make us either constantly adjust the approved chronology for them, or hide historical events from people. But A. Sklyarov was right, stating: "If the facts contradict the theory, it is necessary to throw out the theory, not the facts." So why do historians act differently?
What to believe, which version to stick to, everyone decides for himself. Of course, it is much easier and more pleasant to close one's eyes to the obvious, proudly calling oneself a luminary in the field of historical sciences. Moreover, the novelties of alternative history are met with great distrust, calling them quackery and creative fiction. But each of these alleged fictions has much more logic and facts under it than academic science. But to admit this means to abandon an extremely convenient and advantageous position that has been promoted for decades. But if the official version continues to pass off fiction as reality, maybe it's time to stop being deceived ourselves? All you need to do this is to think for yourself.
In the future, 2012 will mark one round date - the 1150th anniversary of the birth of Russian statehood. The President of Russia issued a corresponding decree and stated that he considers it expedient to celebrate the anniversary together with Ukraine and Belarus and declare next year the Year of Russian History. According to Medvedev, the invitation was due to the fact that all three countries have "common historical and spiritual roots."
The decision of Minsk will most likely be positive - to celebrate. But Kyiv will certainly refuse to participate. Still - to accept such a proposal means to cancel all the efforts of historiography, ideology, philology and pedagogy spent over the past 20 years to create a new ethnic group - "wide and holy" (real and conscious) Ukrainians.
And Ukraine's response to the "Muscovites" was not long in coming. Recently, the deputy of the Verkhovna Rada Lilia Grigorovich took the initiative in 2012 to celebrate the 1160th anniversary of the statehood of Ukraine. That is, to legally approve that the Ukrainian state is 10 years older than the Russian one. Where did this date come from? In The Tale of Bygone Years, the chronicler recorded that since 852 the territory of the settlement of the Eastern Slavs began to be called the "Russian Land". According to Grigorovich, this "Russian land" was "Rus-Ukraine".
In general, the current Ukrainian history is built for the most part on myths designed to intensify the differences between parts of the single Russian people as much as possible.
Chief among them are the myth of the Soviet occupation and the myth of the deep antiquity of Ukrainian history. This, so to speak, is the general background against which the current Ukrainian historiography is developing. But for some "researchers" the temperature is noticeably higher than the average for the hospital. Here, for example, the Ukrainian political scientist Oleg Soskin from time to time gives out such pearls that it is time to fall off the chair.
“We are Slavs, Aryans, Scythians, we are Russia, and your territory, excuse me, is a Finno-Ugric Turkic territory with a completely different ethnicity and a different language, which has nothing to do with our Slavic, Russian,” Pan Soskin said this about Russia. Or here's another: “In reality, Russia is an undeveloped and unsuccessful state that lives only at the expense of rent - oil or gas. This country is not competitive in terms of the scientific and technological development system.”
Ancient ukry on stamps of Ukraine
“The name of our state “Rus” was stolen by Peter. Bandit natural. Up to the nostrils in the blood, he killed everyone in a row. Then they made him a great emperor, and he was a simple Moscow semi-criminal authority, ”so Soskin speaks of Peter I.
Yes, Oleg Soskin is known as an odious figure in Ukrainian political circles. However, until relatively recently, he was an adviser to two successive presidents of the country and had official status.
Since 1994, he has headed the Institute for the Transformation of Society, organized by him. In 1992–1993 at the same time he was a senior adviser to the President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk on entrepreneurship and foreign economic activity, and an adviser to the Prime Minister on macroeconomic issues. And in 1998-2000. was an adviser to President Leonid Kuchma on economic issues.
Since April 1996, Soskin has been the head of the Ukrainian National Conservative Party. In 2008, he called Russia "an undeveloped and unsuccessful state" and demanded the introduction of a visa regime with it. In 2009, he shocked the Ukrainian public with a forecast about the possibility of a “war between Ukraine and Russia in the coming months.” The forecast, thank God, did not come true.
Or here is another character - the director of the Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Academician Petro Kononenko. Also "lit up" as a historian-discoverer. For example, in the time of Yushchenko, at his lecture at the scientific student conference “Youth and the State Language”, he told the audience that Prince Vladimir of Kyiv in the 9th century. did not want to accept Orthodoxy in Constantinople, deciding to do it "on his own land - in Sevastopol."
Kononenko also mentioned the history of ancient India: he said that in the Mahabharata "one of the clans was Ukrainian and came from Pripyat."
The academician did not forget to remember Russia: according to him, Tatars founded Moscow, and only then Yuri Dolgoruky married a Tatar. Kononenko emphasized that the son of Dolgoruky, Andrei Bogolyubsky, was the first descendant of the Kiev princes, who went to war against Kyiv and ruined it.
References to the Mahabharata are, of course, an excess. But in general, Ukrainian historians are very diligently developing a myth about the ancient history of Ukraine. Its essence is that the distant ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived on the territory of the present state of Ukraine since the Neolithic.
The main goal of this politicized theory is to find fundamental differences between Ukrainians and Russians already at the stage of the primitive communal system. The main method is to “shove” the Indo-European tribes into the territory, where the Old Russian statehood was then formed, which is accordingly attributed to the “Ukrainians”. In fact, there is nothing surprising in these efforts - there is a political order, and nationalism is also characterized by the desire to prove the "feature" and "superiority" of its people, to make its history as "older" as possible.
In order to further alienate the inhabitants of Ukraine and Russia from each other, modern Ukrainian historical thought attributed the Russians to the Finno-Ugric world, the Muscovites are a small admixture of Slavic blood to the base - Finno-Ugric. But the Ukrainians are the direct descendants of the inhabitants of the ancient Trypillia culture - this Eneolithic archaeological culture was widespread in the 6th-3rd millennium BC. e. in the Danube-Dnieper interfluve. Further, stepping from one archaeological culture to another, innovative historians come to Kievan Rus. And this is, from their point of view, a 100% state of the “ancient Ukrainians”.
A page from a textbook designed to form a conscious Ukrainian out of a child
When such theories are born in the minds of scientists, this is not so bad. After all, they can be proven or disproved through discussions and exchanges within the scientific community. It is very bad when such ideas migrate to school textbooks.
Here are examples. According to the four times reprinted in 1999 - 2005. "History of Ukraine" by R. Lyakh and N. Temirova (a textbook for secondary school, approved and recommended by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine), the Ukrainian people are more than 140 thousand years old. That is, the history of the Ukrainian people includes the period before the appearance of a modern type of man.
Or here are the titles of paragraphs from a ninth grade textbook: “Ukraine under the rule of the Russian and Austrian empires”, “The colonial policy of tsarist tsarism in Ukraine”, “Ukraine in the conquest plans of Napoleon I”, “Great opposition to Russian tsarism in Ukraine”, “Crimean war and Ukraine”, “Ukrainians in the defense of Sevastopol”…
On the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, it is said that “the economic life of the Crimea was paralyzed”, the RSFSR could not manage to restore these territories after the war. “In such an environment, the inclusion of the Crimean peninsula into the Ukrainian SSR, which took place to mark the 300th anniversary of the “reunification of Ukraine with Russia,” was initially inevitable.”
By the way, the authors of another mass textbook - "Introduction to the History of Ukraine" - give a very original explanation of Ukraine's acquisition of Crimea: force it to undertake the restoration of economic and cultural life on the peninsula.
Imagine a Ukrainian schoolchild coming to a history lesson for the first time in his life. Over the next years, this version of Ukrainian history is put into his head: until 1991, Ukraine was languishing under the Muscovite yoke. The foreigners did everything to break the Ukrainians: they starved them, persecuted the best sons of the people like Hetman Mazepa and Bandera. But now we have thrown off the age-old yoke and will never let invaders into our land again.
It has long been noted that young nations, at birth and formation, necessarily create history precisely in their own imagination. For the countries of the post-Soviet space, overcoming the “complex of Russia, Moscow” becomes the most relevant on the way to the formation of national identity. And here any means are good - from glorification to falsification. For some, these processes are hidden, latent, for others - in an acute form. Ukraine is among the latter.
As a result, Kyiv's attempts to become an alternative center of gravity to Moscow in the post-Soviet space and ignoring, and even counteracting Russian initiatives in the political, cultural and spiritual spheres.
So we can almost say for sure - next year Ukraine will not be celebrating the 1150th anniversary of the birth of Russian statehood together with Russia and, possibly, Belarus. Her statehood, as it turns out, is already ten years older. So, Muscovites-we ourselves with a mustache.
Vladimir Pinegov
"Remember Russia"
The emergence of the independent state of Ukraine occurred as a result of the collapse of the USSR, which contributed to the awareness of the population of Ukraine as a separate Ukrainian people, but only the armed coup in February 2014 and the civil war unleashed by the new authorities in the Lugansk and Donetsk regions became a factor in completing the formation of the political nation of Ukrainians. And here the turning point should be considered the rejection of the concept of the triune Russian people in the self-consciousness of the MOST Ukrainians. For from this moment History of Ukraine defined otherwise than history of the nation of Ukrainians.
1.2. The reader must understand that history of Ukrainians radically different from the history of Belarusians, who are also close to refusing to recognize themselves as part of the Russian people. Therefore, I consider the purpose of this section - showing those consequences for Russia which will bring the appearance among the neighbors not only of an unfriendly state, but also of the nation of Ukrainians, hostile to the entire Russian world, simply by virtue of the initial anti-Russian attitude of the entire Austrian project UKRAINE.
If earlier History of Ukraine was considered in Ukraine itself as a part, then with the advent of the phenomenon - Ukrainian history of Ukraine, Russian historiography faced the task of defending Moscow-centric view of the history of Ukraine, as the history of the reunification of these southwestern lands of the Old Russian state with the new Russia, the core of which was the Moscow principality. Here the reader must make a conceptual choice- whether he remains in line with Moscow-centrism or accepts the point of view of Svidomo Ukrainian historians, who rewriting the history of Ukraine.
Moskvotsentrizim is the ideological position of the Russian people, which comes from the victory of Moscow in the struggle against the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Commonwealth for the collection of the lands of Kievan Rus. It must be said that, compared with North-Eastern Russia, which fell under the Tatar yoke, the Principality of Lithuania and Poland had more chances to unite the lands of the Eastern Slavs, but only the Moscow princes were able to carry out THIS GREAT WORK. Here it should be noted the successes in the national policy of the Russian Empire, which was still the same Moscow kingdom, where, thanks to the inclusion of the Little Russians and Belarusians as a state-forming nation, the differences between the three branches of the Russian people that had arisen over the centuries of dismemberment were smoothed out. But the Bolsheviks, with their policy of indigenization, destroyed both the fruits and the very concept of the triune Russian people, suffered by generations of Rusyns who lived outside the Russian world for centuries.
The task of Russian historiography today is to defend the Great Russian view of the history of Ukraine, where it has a clear advantage, since only in it History of Ukraine looks as holistically as possible, which cannot be said about modern Ukrainian historiography, which has yet to understand - what is history of Ukraine. After all, just look at the diagram territory of Ukraine by years to see - from how many parts the territory of that which we call - modern Ukraine.
In addition, Ukrainianism, as an anti-Russian ideology, forces historians to rule out entire eras that testify to the common origin of Ukrainians and Russians. That's why everything Ukrainian historians are forced to renounce Kievan Rus, which makes the Ukrainian history of Ukraine a fantasy that only Svidomo Ukrainians. After all, if you skip the era of the Old Russian state, then you can only hold on to dill, but the patchwork nature of the territory of Ukraine cannot be explained without an external subject, which in relation to Ukraine was Russia. Therefore, I believe that it is reliable ancient history of Ukraine cannot be written, but this does not relieve Russian historians from the task of explaining the real Ukrainian crisis.
Without globalization, Russia under capitalism has no chance - therefore, any chance can be imagined only in another world system, but people do not even know what it is.
Relations between Russia and the USA
At the same time, it is considered that history of certain regions of Ukraine well described, but, as a rule, this is only a list of historical events, while understanding - why one event was a consequence of previous ones can only be done using . It only allows us to understand the social experiment that the authorities of Austria-Hungary began to carry out over the Galicians - by analogy with the successful division of one people into Serbs and Croats, who today hate each other. It was the authorities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire who used the word in a racial sense, and the Bolsheviks, who hated Russia, since for the class struggle they needed to declare it a "prison of peoples", continued. So civil war in Ukraine goes over the heads of Ukrainians and Russians, has been going on for many years, which made me create this SECTION for laying out articles on the topic History of Ukraine.
Actually no trouble from the experience in creating an artificial language for Ukrainians was not, since it had only a geographical meaning of living on this outskirts. There are several attempts to bring local Little Russian dialects and Surzhiks to a single norm, but the trouble is that after the revolution, the Bolsheviks took exactly the Austrian version of the language, developed by the Taras Shevchenko Society, which was led by Professor Grushevsky in Lvov, Austria. Therefore, the forced Ukrainization of the Little Russian population was a continuation pre-revolutionary Ukrainization of the Ruthenian population of Western Ukraine according to Austrian standards. The fact is that the Bolshevik commissars did not even understand the essence of the problem of language, especially the danger of Ukrainianism as an anti-Russian ideology.
Ulyanov Ukrainian separatism
Even today, the main scientific works on Ukrainians remain the work of the American scientist Nikolai Ulyanov, who was a post-war emigrant.
- essay Ulyanov N.I.
- Ulyanov N.I.
Actually, Ukrainian propaganda looks somehow illogical, continuing the line from the Russian Empire to the Bolsheviks, attributing to them the same type. Moreover, it was the Bolsheviks who made the most significant contribution to the spread of nationalism in Ukraine, while under the tsar only an insignificant handful of the Little Russian intelligentsia, oriented towards Poland, was fond of Ukrainianism.
Ulyanov Nikolay Ivanovich
Origins of Ukrainian separatism
Quotes: « Feature of Ukrainian independence in that it does not fit any of the existing teachings on national movements and cannot be explained by any "iron" laws. It does not even have national oppression as the first and most necessary justification for its emergence ... For all 300 years of being part of the Russian State, Little Russia-Ukraine was neither a colony nor an "enslaved nation".
Now Ukrainian independence gives an example of the greatest hatred for all the most honored and most ancient traditions and cultural values Little Russian people: it persecuted the Church Slavonic language, which had established itself in Russia since the adoption of Christianity, and even more cruel persecution was erected on the common Russian literary language, which for a thousand years was the basis of the writing of all parts of the Kievan State, during and after its existence.
If for Georgians, Armenians, Uzbeks this problem does not exist, due to their pronounced national appearance, then for Ukrainian independentists, the main concern is still to prove difference between Ukrainian and Russian. Separatist thought is still working on the creation of anthropological, ethnographic and linguistic theories that should deprive Russians and Ukrainians of any degree of kinship between them.
However, the history of Ukrainian separatism begins in the 13th century in the southwestern lands of Kievan Rus, defeated by the Mongol-Tatars, and captured by neighboring empires - Austria-Hungary, the Principality of Lithuania and Poland. In Ukraine, the Commonwealth, first for the sake of self-defense - then for robbery, an ethnically motley settlement of people who called themselves Zaporizhzhya Cossacks is formed.
After the Cossacks captured the entire outskirts of Lesser Poland, they, as a new elite, began to pursue a policy of separatism in order to evade taxes.
The second source of the traditional separatism of Ukraine should be considered the historical separatism of the Galicia-Volyn principality, on the basis of which the Galician Rusyns were persuaded to recognize the new self-name "Ukrainian", which meant their rejection of self-identification as Russians. The Austrians urgently engaged in the creation of Ukrainians in Galicia (similar to the creation of enmity between the brothers Serbs and Croats), since Russia put forward the doctrine of gathering all the lands of Kievan Rus. The goal of Ukrainians was to separate the Galician Rusyns from the Russian people, for which it was necessary to convince the Galicians to consider themselves an ethnos ukraincy. The separatism of the Ukrainians went first through the heads of the Galicians, then the newly appeared nation was opposed to the Russian people and Russia.
Actually, the words "Ukraine" and "Ukrainian", incorporated by the Austrians into the genome of Ukrainianism, today have shown their significance as enemies of Russia. The meaning of Ukrainianness, not recognized by the Bolsheviks, who extended Ukrainianism to the entire population of Little Russia and even the population of the Russian regions annexed to Kiev, manifested itself today, when the elite of Ukraine decided to drag their people from another territorial empire - the European Union.
Confrontation between Ukraine and Russia- this is the result of the hasty actions of the Ukrainian elite, who wished to divert their property - the people of Ukraine - to another empire. Will it annexation of Ukraine to Russia or not (in the sense of friendly relations) - but the real crisis is not the desire of some individual to drag the Ukrainians back into the empire. Accession of Ukraine to Russia or the accession of Ukraine to the EU - in any case, an objective process that takes us back to the moment of Galicia's choice of its future destiny- or a return to Russian foundations - maybe not so "progressive" (and they are only different and incomparable with European ones) - or to the path of Galicia through the now all-Ukrainian Uniatism and the final break with the common history of Russians and Belarusians.
Each person, considering such pictures, should understand that he should not identify himself with the elite. Unfortunately, the majority is influenced by elites who impose their assessment on ordinary citizens. As a result, there is an opinion about the existence confrontation between Ukraine and Russia that reminds confrontation between Russia and Poland, since the Polish elite is resenting Russia for the failed Polish empire. However, this is not so much the fault of a strong neighbor, sometimes really oppressive, but one's own inability to have a full-fledged statehood. Precisely for the sake of clarifying the essence of Ukrainianism, which led Ukraine to the current collapse- I post articles in this section.
National literature is what the country and its people want to know about themselves, what pleases them (not necessarily flattering).
An article about the internal crisis of Russia and the IMPOSSIBILITY OF JOINING UKRAINE. Russia, as a territorial empire, cannot yet allow Ukraine to join another empire - the European Union, but the state of its economy is no longer able to support this sovereign spirit.
Today, many, as a stamp, use the thesis of the unviability of the Ukrainian state. Trying to find irrefutable evidence for this, I came across an opinion that was striking in its sobriety. former president Czechoslovakia Vaclav Klaus.
The article examines the nature of the Ukrainian crisis, analyzes the goals of the organizers of the February coup and its possible consequences for Russia. A.I. Fursov - Director of the Center for Russian Studies of the Moscow University for the Humanities; director of the Institute for System-Strategic Analysis.
Ukrainian nationalism is not nationalism by definition - and its exact characterization is Ukrainian separatism from Russia as their historical homeland. Creators of Ukrainian nationalism- the Austrians - used this false term when they created this anti-Russian separatist movement, using the pretext of ethnic Russians living far "at the edge" of Russia in the territories that were then part of Austria-Hungary. The goal of Ukrainian separatism was to oppose the inhabitants of the territory of Little Russia with their ethnic true nationality - Russians - for which it was invented " nationality Ukrainian". It is as if the inhabitants of the territory of Siberia proclaimed themselves "Siberians" by nationality. Then, in the 19th century, the Austrians came up with a new name for this territory they occupied - “ Ukraine”, whereas before this part of Russia was called for hundreds of years Little Russia and the inhabitants called themselves Little Russians».
Separatism was still inherent in the Galician principality, which grew due to the seizure of the Transcarpathian lands, but sought to isolate itself from the Grand Principality of Kiev. However, when the Mongol-Tatars cut off the Galicia-Volyn principality from North-Eastern Russia, Prince Daniil Galitsky did not support his brothers Rurik, which forced him to move closer to Hungary, for which he made a will on the transfer of the Galicia-Volyn principality to the Hungarian kings. The adoption of the Catholic title King of Russia and the first attempt to introduce Uniatism did not end with the annexation of Western Russia to the Catholic empire of Europe, but became the basis for the seizure of these Russian lands by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The subsequent multiple divisions and redistribution of territories split the Rusyn people into several nationalities, among which there was one who, by recognizing Austria as his fatherland, would become important for the history of the rest of Ukraine.
At the same time, even a piece of Russia could not become part of another country, the mood of the Rusyns to reunite with the main body of the Russian people was ineradicable, but it was precisely this that was used by the Austrians to turn the Galicians into Ukrainians in the racial sense. The Austrian authorities managed to replace the goal of the liberation of the people with a new invented goal of "liberation nation Ukrainians”, and not Rusyns in Austria. Now those who consciously recognize themselves as Ukrainians are forced to deny their Rusyn nature as a descendant of the Russians of the Old Russian state.
It should be noted that the Austrians, through the hands of the last elite of Ukraine, achieved their goal - to deny their own essence as Russians, since the Ukrainian is ready to go to any stupidity, just not to act like the Russian who sits inside him. The secret here is simple: - A Ukrainian evaluates events with the eyes of an inner Russian, but since he accepted the attitude of the Austrian Ukrainians, which denies him as a Russian, he is not able to show himself as a Russian. As a result, we see a lot of crazy actions of Ukrainians that contradict elementary logic. This inadequacy among Ukrainians was noted back in the USSR, considering it a national trait, but when Ukraine became an independent state, an epidemic of the transition of the consciousness of Ukrainian citizens into the state of Galician Ukrainians occurred.
However, many understand the essence of Ukrainianism, in which the image of Franz Joseph overshadows the image of Christ, for the reason that the Austrian emperor was the father of the founder of Ukrainianism.
We do not know how the conglomeration of Russian principalities would have developed without the Mongol invasion, but it was the IGO that brought the Moscow principality forward, which not only reformatted North-Eastern Russia for itself, but also captured the Republic of Novgorod. The centralized state of the Russian tsars became the pivot around which the Russian lands were gathered anew, largely due to the goal of gathering together the lands of the former Kievan Rus, which was proclaimed by the Moscow princes. Moscow was weaker than its rivals, but the structure of the state, created for the purpose of restoring the Russian empire, became a factor not only in collecting the lands of the Old Russian state, but also made it possible to annex most of the Mongol Empire of Genghis Khan.
Considering the importance of Ukraine for Russia- do not forget about the existence of Belarus as another wing of the Russian world. The rejection of this part of the Russian ethnos occurred due to the confrontation between Russia and the Catholic papal throne, the executor of which again was Poland, as a rival territorial empire. The Pope of Rome, with the help of German orders, carried out an aggressive Catholicization of the Baltic states, the colonization of which can be compared with enslavement. Emperor Otto of the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation considered the eastern direction for expansion so important that, in order to maintain friendship with the king of Poland, he gave him a silver eagle for his coat of arms (he left the gold one for himself, and the bronze one was presented to Armenia, as the ruler of the Caucasus). Europe has supported Poland for many centuries in its struggle with Russia, one of the episodes of which was the emergence of their own statehood among the Belarusians. The separatism of Lithuania from the Russian world led to the formation of a new state - the Commonwealth, which included Poland and the Russian Baltic lands, which had the name Lithuanian Rus (the Baltic states have long spoken Russian, and all the Polish nobility in the same way, and many even originated from Rurikovich ).
However, the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania may be a lesson from the impossible entry of Russia into the European empire, since the union with Catholic Poland of the Russian Grand Duchy, which was larger than North-Eastern Russia, ended in complete collapse.
After all, History has no pity for small peoples. And here one cannot compare the history of Western Europe, in which unique exceptions appeared - small "national" states - and the history of Eastern Europe. as two equal forces - allowed even small public entities in Europe to exist for a long time, but in the buffer - between the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation and Russia, as a centralized empire of the eastern model - there were no such conditions. Moreover, one must understand that joining one particular empire meant little for the common people in their financial situation (and for Ukrainian nationalists this is the main factor) - after all these are games of the national elite with the imperial one, but independence often cost much more- precisely because of the mobilization that the national elite arranged. It's just that the infrastructure of the power of a huge empire imposes less burdens on the population than in a small state the maintenance of a native national elite.
To analyze the situation in Ukraine, I try to use methods that consider the history of the state as the actions of the political elite in opposition to the elites of other countries and their own part(usually part of the elite, dissatisfied with their position). The state is a form of retaining the privileged position of the elite, which allows it, like a stationary bandit, to manage the resources of the population (society) - and for its own purposes formulates the so-called “public opinion” for the bulk of the inhabitants (the people), in which it raises “general state issues” .
It must be understood that the elite never takes into account the interests of its own people, but only considers it as a resource - a source of power, which it directs with the help of propaganda in the direction it needs. This was especially evident in Ukraine, where today the elite decided, by transferring 45 million of its citizens from the zone of Russia to the zone of Western Europe, to receive protection of their own capital, and even better - to fit into the ranks of the world capitalist elite. The elite is non-national - Ukrainian, in general, did not take into account the interests of half of its own citizens and their national self-identification.
The Russian elite took its decisions - for example, the annexation of Crimea - taking into account its own considerations, but also taking into account the public opinion that the Russian people have on this issue. If the Russian elite would like to play by the rules invented by the American elite, then, most likely, all these years there would have been propaganda about the independence and independence of Ukraine with the impossibility of tearing away or dividing its territory. The decision to annex Crimea was made by the real supreme elite of Russia, which forms its political system, and in defiance of the interests of the comprador part of the Russian elite, which is guided by the American elite. This dissatisfaction of the comprador part of the Russian elite is expressed by the "white tape" and the swamp current, into which the liberal intelligentsia has rushed. The emergence of an alternative “public opinion” that Putin is an enemy of democracy is precisely the allegorical Aesopian expression of the fears of the comprador liberal elite that Putin’s actions, as Russia’s political elite, will worsen interaction with the Western elites who are its patrons.
Actually, I don’t think that the reader doubts the common roots of Russians and Rusyns, as descendants of the inhabitants of Kievan Rus, who began to be called Little Russians and Ukrainians, but for the sake of broadening one’s horizons, one can read dictionary entries -, and so on from the section:
In that - there is nothing strange. Another thing is that the time has come to rewrite the whole history, since it appeared, which allows you to explain historical events thanks to new factors, but it opened the fact that our world could develop differently. That's why, only in history you can find a clue - where humanity should move on to find.
The page was created to explain the position of articles in the headings and and has a permalink: http://website/page/istorija-ukrainy
On August 24, Ukraine celebrated 26 years of independence. And November 21 will mark the fourth anniversary of the start of the Euromaidan.
The last date divided the history of Ukraine into "before" and "after".
Ukraine before November 2013 and after - these are two completely different countries. Fundamentally different. And, one might say, even hostile to each other. By its concept, ideology, views on the past and on the future.
Therefore, the birthday of today's Ukraine is not August 24, but November 21. Just like the Soviet Union led its ancestry from November 7, 1917.
On November 7, 1917, the previous course of the history of Russia was refracted, and on November 21, 2013, the previous course of the history of Ukraine was refracted. Although, naturally, in both cases, long before the revolutionary events, their objective prerequisites matured in society, which made the turning point, if not predetermined, then quite probable.
In order to understand how this happened and what lies ahead for our country, we decided to analyze in detail all 25 years of Ukraine's independence.
Let's look to the past to see the future.
Year one. Independence as a Fruit of the Great Compromise
As early as the beginning of August 1991, there were few signs of the imminent proclamation of Ukraine's independence. Six months before that - on March 17, 1991 - a referendum was held, in which 70.2% of the inhabitants of the Ukrainian SSR voted for the preservation of the Soviet Union. The national movement was popular in Western Ukraine and in Kyiv, but even in the central regions it was treated, to put it mildly, with caution.
The Verkhovna Rada had a communist majority led by Oleksandr Moroz. The speaker was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk.
Everything changed within three days.
The putsch of the GKChP on August 19 and its subsequent failure led to a sharp rethinking by the party nomenklatura of the Ukrainian SSR of its attitude to the preservation of the Union. It was obvious that power in Moscow was gradually passing from Gorbachev to Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the USSR, together with the socialist system, was living its last days in its former form.
And therefore - is it not worth following the example of the Baltic states and declaring independence while there is such an opportunity? So as not to share power and state assets with the union center on the eve of their privatization?
This logic guided both the red directors of the southeast and the Kiev party apparatchiks. That is why, having united with the national forces, they voted for independence on August 24th. The compromise of these three groups, having gone through various transformations, became the foundation on which Ukraine lived until 2014.
It was this Compromise that became the progenitor of Ukrainian statehood. Which, thanks to him, was born without war and blood.
On December 1, more than 90% of the inhabitants of the republic voted for independence in a referendum. At the same time, Leonid Kravchuk was elected the first president.
Thus, the citizens of the new country, as it were, consecrated the Compromise, showing that they did not want drastic changes: in fact, they voted for the same Ukrainian SSR, but without the all-Union mess of the Gorbachev and perestroika era.
Year two. Compromise's strength test
The very first year of independence became the greatest test for Ukraine. The main blow was dealt to the economy. Since January 2, prices have gone into free float. The former socialist economic system began to rapidly collapse, but a normal market economy had not yet emerged. Chaos began, which was aggravated by the rupture of intra-union economic ties. The people quickly became poor.
In fairness, it should be recognized that Ukraine in this case was rather led. The main trend was set by the policy of shock therapy pursued by the Russian leadership. But for millions of Ukrainians, the onset of economic collapse began to be clearly associated with the country's independence.
In addition, since the autumn of 1992, a gap in the standard of living of Ukraine and Russia has become noticeable. In the latter, at the expense of funds from the export of oil and gas, it was possible to somewhat soften the blow of the reforms. In Ukraine, there were no such props.
Introduced in 1992, the coupon-karbovanets quickly depreciated.
This is what coupon-karbovanets looked like
The people murmured. Particularly noticeable fermentation was in the Crimea, where a sharp conflict began between Ukraine and Russia over the division of the Black Sea Fleet, which coincided with the growth of pro-Russian sentiment.
The peninsula gradually became a potential hotspot.
In parallel, Kyiv began an active Ukrainization of the humanitarian sphere. An attempt was made to separate the Ukrainian parishes from the Russian Orthodox Church, which was only partially successful and led to a split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy and a series of acute conflicts.
Against this background, Kravchuk tried to restore the shattered Compromise by nominating Leonid Kuchma, one of the leaders of the red directorate of the southeast, to the post of prime minister. He is remembered for his appeal to Parliament with a call to say what he should build. As well as words about the need to restore order and search for a common language with Russia.
But that didn't help much.
Year three. Crisis and Return to Compromise
Economically, 1993 became even worse than the previous one. It was then that hyperinflation was recorded in Ukraine - prices rose by 10,000%. In June, a strike of miners in Donbass began, which grew into mass protests in the region. The formal reason was another jump in prices.
The conflict for power between the Dnepropetrovsk clan (led by Kuchma) and the Donetsk clan (led by the mayor of Donetsk Yefim Zvyagilsky) was then called informal. Then, in fact, the country spoke about these clans for the first time.
Miners' strike in Donetsk
But in reality, the significance of those events was much broader. The demands of the strikers were not only anti-government, but also, by today's standards, separatist. Even then, in the Donbass, they called for economic independence and autonomy, to restore ties with Russia.
Together with the growing pro-Russian movement in Crimea, as well as the growing socio-economic problems, this has become a critical challenge for Ukrainian independence. At that time, there were many calls in the Kiev media to strangle the "Donetsk rebellion" (in the language of our time - to start the ATO back in 1993).
But Kravchuk and his entourage then judged otherwise. They went to Compromise. Efim Zvyagilsky was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister (and soon acting Prime Minister - Kuchma did not want to work with him and resigned). The protests have subsided.
In the same year, a temporary agreement was concluded with Russia on the basing of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea, which reduced the intensity of passions on the peninsula.
In domestic politics, a rule was gradually established: the Russian-speaking southeast (primarily the Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk clans competing with each other) is in charge of the economy and business, while the humanitarian sphere was left to the nationalists.
Severe merchants and red directors of the southeast felt like the real masters of the country and looked down on strange people in embroidered shirts who were engaged in the Ukrainization of education, rewriting history textbooks and other matters of little importance from the point of view of strong business executives.
It is curious that the first coming of the Donetsk people to power was marked by the first temporary stabilization of the economy. Zvyagilsky's government gradually reduced inflation, agreed with Russia on energy supplies, and began to put things in order in the sphere of public administration. Although the socio-economic situation of the country remained the most difficult. The people vegetated in poverty, corruption and banditry were rampant.
Returning to the events of the summer of 1993, it should be recognized that if the central government then decided on a military option against Donbass, then Ukraine would no longer exist within its current borders. The beginning of armed clashes, against the backdrop of the peak of the most acute socio-economic crisis, would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the state and the immersion of its fragments into long years of chaos and anarchy.
But then the country managed to move away from the brink.
Year four. Registration of the state
In 1994, Ukraine signed one of the most important agreements in its history - the Budapest Memorandum on the renunciation of nuclear weapons. This decision at that time removed the tension around our country. Although, as subsequent events showed, the states that signed the memorandum did not in reality become guarantors of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. But more on that later.
In domestic politics, 1994 was an election year. Early elections of the Supreme Soviet were held in March. For many in Kyiv, their results were a shock - representatives of the revived Communist Party and the socialists of Alexander Moroz won in many districts (after the elections, he became the speaker of parliament).
The "Reds" went to the polls under the simple slogan "And under the communists, it was possible to drink and eat." Plus they promised to be friends with Russia. Against the backdrop of the economic and humanitarian catastrophe that had occurred by that time in Ukraine, these "messages" were in great demand.
The trend was caught by Leonid Kuchma, who was in disgrace. He went to the subsequent presidential elections under the slogans of the fight against corruption and with a poster "Ukraine and Russia: less rivers, more bridges." He was actively supported by Russian television.
Kuchma defeated Kravchuk in the second round.
True, it immediately became clear that he would not be a pro-Russian president.
In the summer-autumn of 1994, Kuchma, through intrigues, first split and multiplied by zero the Russian-oriented leadership of Crimea, headed by Meshkov and Tsekov. Meshkov lost his post of president of Crimea in March 1995, but already before that he had turned into an undecided figure.
From then until February 2014, pro-Russian forces on the peninsula were completely marginalized.
At the same time, Kuchma tried not to make any sharp attacks against Moscow, establishing a strong male friendship with Yeltsin and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. In parallel, establishing contacts with the West and the IMF.
Later, this policy was called "multi-vector policy". A kind of geopolitical Compromise, which allowed Ukraine to exist relatively conflict-free in a not very simple environment.
Year five. Final course selection
Having stabilized the foreign policy situation around Ukraine and put out the hot spots inside the country, Kuchma also decided on the internal course, which marked the vector of the state's development for many years to come.
The key issue was ownership. Although privatization began back in 1993, it was neither shaky nor bumpy.
Therefore, in 1995 there was a choice of strategy. There were three options. The first is to turn back and follow the path of state capitalism, along which Alexander Lukashenko led Belarus. The second is to embark on the Eastern European path by letting large Western corporations into the country. The third is to prefer the Russian path, placing a bet on the cultivation of their own financial and industrial groups.
Kuchma chose the third option. Moreover, it was the most logical from the point of view of the business-industrial environment that actually ruled Ukraine.
This decision had far-reaching consequences. On the one hand, it allowed the creation of large national capital, which, having passed the turbulent stage of its birth, gradually began to restore the industrial potential of the state to life, invest in the development of the economy, create jobs (thanks to which, until 2014, Ukraine was able to avoid the total deindustrialization that occurred many Eastern European countries).
On the other hand, in an effort to protect themselves from competition with more powerful Russian and Western financial-industrial groups, the oligarchs erected powerful corruption barriers, establishing a close link with the authorities, using it to minimize taxes and maximize profits.
Therefore, when Western partners are now complaining about corruption and how much more Ukraine needs to do to become a "normal European country", they mean precisely the presence of a problem in the face of large national capital, which does not want to let competitors into its hunting field and lives by the principle "Texas should be robbed by Texans."
Also, the presence of national capital created an economic basis for a multi-vector policy (the oligarchs were interested in normal relations with both the West and Russia). And, after this policy died in 2014, the political and economic system created under Kuchma found itself in a deep crisis.
But back to 1995.
If the so-called loans-for-shares auctions played a key role in the creation of the largest Russian financial-industrial groups, the Ukrainian oligarchy had a more exotic way of being born.
It was born from complex gas-credit schemes. When a private gas trading company was given the right to supply gas to a particular enterprise. Then it was entangled with debts, on account of which the trader took the products. And, over time, completely established control over its financial and economic activities. A little later, this control was formalized through uncompetitive privatization.
Year six. Constitution and Lazarenko
Already in 1996, this scheme almost led to the emergence of a mega-corporation that brought key sectors of the Ukrainian economy under its control. We are talking about the Dnepropetrovsk company "United Energy Systems of Ukraine" (UESU).
It was headed by Yulia Tymoshenko, and was patronized by the former governor of the Dnepropetrovsk region, Pavel Lazarenko, who was appointed prime minister in 1996.
Pavel Lazarenko
True, the UESU did not establish this control immediately. Its biggest competitors were representatives of the Donetsk business, who established the Industrial Union of Donbass (ISD) corporation specifically to work on the gas market.
But soon the "Donetsk" were eliminated from the road.
First, back in 1995, an authoritative person and the president of FC Shakhtar Akhat Bragin (also known as Alik Grek) was killed by an explosion at the Shakhtar stadium in Donetsk. In the spring, one of the founders of the ISD, Alexander Momot, was shot. Soon the governor of the region, Vladimir Shcherban, was dismissed from his post, and in the fall of that year, his namesake and informal leader of the "Donetsk clan" Yevgeny Shcherban was killed right at the airport.
After all these events, the UESU became the main player in the gas market, and Lazarenko began to be seen as the main competitor to Kuchma in the struggle for power in the state.
However, Kuchma also achieved some success in the same year - he managed to push the Constitution through the Verkhovna Rada, which increased his powers and turned Ukraine into a presidential-parliamentary republic with a dominant role of the head of state.
The emergence of such a powerful institution of the presidency has led to the fact that every election has become a real battle of destruction.
Moreover, a battle without rules, which played a negative role in the subsequent history of the country.
Year seven. The fall of Lazarenko, the political start of Tymoshenko and Yanukovych
1997 was marked by several significant events. First, the expansion of Lazarenko and the UESU united a variety of forces against them, including Kuchma himself.
In the summer, the all-powerful prime minister was dismissed and literally immediately went into opposition.
Fortunately, the election campaign to parliament began and Lazarenko headed the Gromada party. Yulia Timoshenko became his closest associate. It was in 1997 that the whole country learned about it.
Pavel Lazarenko and Yulia Timoshenko
Ukraine recognized that year and one more person - Viktor Yanukovych. He was appointed governor of the Donetsk region by Kuchma. The appointment was not accidental.
Preparing for the war with Lazarenko, the president decided to reinforce the "Donetsk" ones again. The murdered Bragin and Shcherban were replaced by a new generation of reputable businessmen, among whom the key role was played by Rinat Akhmetov (who inherited the post of president of FC Shakhtar from Akhat Bragin) and Vitaliy Gayduk (the former deputy governor of Shcherban, one of the ideologists of the creation of the ISD). Yanukovych was a figure close to both.
After the resignation of Lazarenko, the UESU business empire was crushed within a matter of months.
The Dnipropetrovsk corporation was deprived of the right to supply gas to enterprises. This sinecure was distributed among other companies, which then became the backbone of the formation of the largest business groups in Ukraine.
Secondly, the Great Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Ukraine and Russia was concluded. He recorded the absence of territorial claims of the two states to each other, removed the issue of the status of Crimea and Sevastopol. By a separate agreement, Ukraine leased the base of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia for 20 years.
This agreement, as it were, emphasized the final post-Soviet normalization and stabilization of relations between the two countries. Ukraine did not join the Union with Russia, like Belarus, but was ready to be friends in all directions.
Thirdly, under the patronage of the Americans, an association of CIS countries was created under the code name GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova). These states were not averse to playing their own, different from Russia, geopolitical role in the post-Soviet space. In particular, in terms of transporting Caspian energy resources to Europe, bypassing the Russian Federation.
This was the first sign that Ukraine was included in the big world game, in which it could not be on the same side with Russia.
However, the unsteadiness of the unification itself and the upheavals of the following years then diverted attention from this issue.
In general, 1997 was remembered for a long time as the calmest year in the "dashing 90s". Introduced in 1996, the hryvnia was stable at 1.8 per dollar. Inflation dropped to single digits.
The first Ukrainian since the collapse of the Union - Leonid Kadenyuk - flew into space.
And on the surface of the Earth at that time, Dynamo Kiev, led by the returned Valery Lobanovsky, smashed Barcelona and Eindhoven. Europe recognized the name of Andriy Shevchenko.
Year eight. Elections and default
In the spring, the first party elections were held in Ukraine. Half of the parliament is elected according to party lists, but even this is enough for television screens to be flooded with videos of little-known but wealthy political forces - the SDPU (o), the Green Party, the pro-government NDP, the PSPU of Natalia Vitrenko and Pavel Lazarenko's Hromada.
All of them go to parliament, taking 4-5%. However, the old parties remain the favorites: the SPU (in alliance with the Peasant Party), the People's Movement and the undisputed leader - the Communist Party, which won a quarter of all votes.
With her support, the leader of the Peasant Party, Alexander Tkachenko, becomes the speaker.
The apparent stability of 1997 and the first half of 1998 ended with a crisis that remained in Ukrainian history as a default.
In fact, we did not have a default - it was in Russia, where the ruble exchange rate collapsed from 6 to 30 per dollar. We have experienced "only" a two-fold fall - from 2 to 4 hryvnia per dollar.
Pavel Lazarenko, having entered parliament, starts a war against the president, who reciprocates: in the fall, the Vseukrainskie Vedomosti newspaper, which is close to the oligarch, was closed, and in December, Gromada split into groups of Lazarenko and Tymoshenko - it decided to make peace with Kuchma separately.
In parallel, the process of formation of domestic business continues. The latter, through credit schemes and privatization, becomes the owner of the largest enterprises.
Western companies that were aiming to participate in the sale of shares of energy companies are flying by.
In the West, they are increasingly writing about total corruption, the establishment of the authoritarian regime of Kuchma, and they complain that Ukraine has taken a completely different path than the countries of Eastern Europe.
Year nine. Kuchma-2
Leonid Kuchma ran for a second term in 1999 in very poor conditions. A crisis raged in the country, the people became impoverished and sat without salaries.
The oligarchs solved the issue of the initial accumulation of capital through the theft of budgetary funds and the ruin of still state-owned enterprises. Naturally, nobody paid taxes.
The project is hindered by two - the leader of the socialists Alexander Moroz and the head of the "Narodny Rukh" Vyacheslav Chernovol. Rukh by that time had already split into two parts, but Chernovol remained popular in the West of the country. And, in the case of his campaign for the elections, he could confuse the cards for Kuchma's team.
But in March, Chernovol suddenly dies in a car accident.
In the meantime, a dirty struggle is being waged around Moroz: he gathers the "Kanev Four" (Moroz, Tkachenko, Marchuk and the current emigrant Vladimir Oleinik), which should nominate a single candidate, but the four fall apart, and everyone plays for himself (and Kuchma turns out to be the winner) .
In October, in Kryvyi Rih, an attempt was made on Natalya Vitrenko, in which Moroz is accused. The accusation is not confirmed by anything, but it plays its role: Kuchma and Simonenko go to the second round.
Kuchma wins. Then there was a lot of talk about the total falsification of the elections, but the communist leader did not dispute the victory.
Almost all leading FIGs have bet on the victory of the incumbent president. They were just completing the process of consolidating assets, creating their own media.
And, in exchange for Kuchma's support, they were promised a green light in all directions. The process of creating national capital was entering its final stage.
Year ten. Death of Gongadze
On January 1, 2000, a significant part of Ukrainians is in a hurry to celebrate the beginning of a new century, although it will begin only in a year.
But the new economic age for Ukraine really began in 2000: for the first time after almost 10 years of recession, the economy began to grow.
For the most part, this was facilitated by the devaluation of the hryvnia, which by that time had fallen to 5.5 per dollar, as well as the economic growth that had begun in neighboring Russia and other CIS countries.
But for many, all these successes were associated with the new prime minister - Viktor Yushchenko, who was appointed to this position at the end of 1999.
In the 1990s, he served as head of the National Bank and established close contacts with Western structures.
Viktor Yushchenko
By that time, Ukraine faced the acute issue of restructuring its external debt.
Relations with the West, after the controversial election of Kuchma, were bad, and the latter, in order to restore dialogue, decided to appoint Yushchenko as prime minister. According to legend, this was strongly recommended to him from Washington.
At first, Yushchenko was not taken seriously. But he, as it were, began to accumulate the expectations of many Ukrainians on his own.
Especially since Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko developed a stormy activity. She declared war on barter-offset schemes in the energy sector and positioned herself as an ardent opponent of the oligarchs.
All this, unexpectedly for many, turned Yushchenko into an alternative figure to Kuchma. The West also provided serious support to Viktor Andreevich.
Since the middle of 2000, there have been rumors that the US sees the prime minister as Kuchma's successor as president.
However, Kuchma had his own plans in this regard. Back in April 2000, he held a referendum where the people voted to amend the Constitution to expand the powers of the head of state.
He then demanded that Parliament implement its results by amending the Basic Law. If this happened, Kuchma would have established complete control over the Verkhovna Rada, which would have opened the way for him to a third term, which began to be actively discussed that same year.
Another important point: since the summer of 2000, very close contact has been established between Kuchma and the new Russian president, Vladimir Putin.
In autumn, for the first time, a proposal was made to create an international consortium to manage the Ukrainian gas transmission system. Rumors were spreading throughout the country that closer integration processes were possible.
It was also said that the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko government, which has already broken pots with many influential people in the country and enjoys too obvious support from the West, is about to be dismissed.
Even the name of the new prime minister, the head of the State Tax Administration Mykola Azarov, was mentioned. He had to change course. But that did not happen.
There was a cassette scandal.
Back in September, Georgiy Gongadze, editor-in-chief of the Ukrayinska Pravda website, became aware of the disappearance.
And already in November, Alexander Moroz published the legendary "Melnichenko's tapes", which indirectly allow accusing Kuchma of Gongadze's murder.
There are many versions of who is behind the cassette scandal. Who actually helped Major Melnichenko record Kuchma, who and why provoked the president against Gongadze.
This is a topic for a separate study. We can still state the obvious consequences.
Kuchma is beginning to turn into a pariah for the international community. His plan for the third term was buried. Viktor Yushchenko is being promoted to the forefront of Ukrainian politics with the support of the West. Ukraine is turning into a field for a big geopolitical battle. The country entered a period of great upheaval.
It was then that many subsequent events were predetermined. First of all, the countdown to the Maidan began.
Year eleven. The stakes are rising
The cassette scandal fell on prepared ground. Kuchma during his reign managed to make numerous enemies, who now all together raised their heads. The main thing was that now there was something to fight for: for Kuchma to leave as soon as possible and give way to Yushchenko.
In particular, George Soros urged him to do this in plain text.
Protests began on the streets of Kyiv - "Ukraine without Kuchma." There was a tent city of protesters. But the president was not going to give up.
Action "Ukraine without Kuchma"
In February, the tent city was dispersed. On March 9, violent (at that time) clashes between the participants of the action "Ukraine without Kuchma" and the police took place.
The protesters were dispersed and mass arrests began.
All this time, Yushchenko showed no support for the protesters. On the contrary, together with Kuchma and speaker Plyushch, he condemned them, calling them fascists. Viktor Andreevich was then convinced that the president would nominate him as his successor anyway. The main thing is not to climb on the rampage.
However, such "collaborationism" does not save the prime minister: in April, parliament passes a vote of no confidence in him.
What is characteristic - the day before he came into conflict with Ukrainian business groups, trying to remove them from participation in the privatization of oblenergos. But "national capital" decided to show Yushchenko who is the boss in the country.
However, the resignation of the prime minister and the end of the protests did not mean that political life returned to a calm course. The Ukrainian politicians began to actively prepare for the elections to the Rada in the spring of 2002.
A significant part of the elite is defecting to Yushchenko, forming the Our Ukraine bloc with him. The ideology of the future president is being created - the European choice, the fight against corruption.
Kuchma hastily gathers his bloc "For a United Ukraine". A separate column is the SDPU (o) party headed by Viktor Medvedchuk.
Meeting between Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma in 2001
The West is increasingly attacking Kuchma. The accusations come one after another. In the eyes of the world community, he becomes a politician like Milosevic. In response, the president turns to Russia. Contact with Putin is getting stronger.
With all this, the economy continues to show steady growth - more than 10%. Inflation is falling and people's incomes are rising.
Year twelve. The scenario is predetermined
The 2002 elections ended unsuccessfully for Kuchma. According to party lists, "Our Ukraine" took the first place. With a small margin from it were the Communists. The "For a United Ukraine" bloc, headed by the head of the presidential administration, Volodymyr Lytvyn, was only third, gaining almost two times less than the Yushchenko bloc (and that only due to the fact that it was actively supported by the "Donetsk people", ensuring a good result in your region).
The opposition Socialist Party and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc also entered the Rada.
After the elections, it became finally clear that Kuchma's third term was an unrealizable dream and the guarantor had to make a choice.
Either really crown Yushchenko as his heir, to which the West and part of the elite were pushing him, or nominate another successor, or, as some political strategists suggested, amend the Constitution, transforming Ukraine into a parliamentary republic, devaluing the significance of the presidency.
Kuchma rejected the first option. He did not trust Yushchenko, moreover, he was considered a protege of the West, which was unacceptable for the "multi-vector" Ukrainian business.
However, Kuchma did not trust not only Yushchenko, but no one at all. Therefore, he also did not want to go to the second option. In the end, it was decided to go for the "third way".
The signal for its implementation, as well as for the impossibility of a compromise with Yushchenko, was the appointment of an enemy of Our Ukraine leader Viktor Medvedchuk as head of the Presidential Administration. The latter became the main ideologist and technologist for amending the Constitution.
In order to prevent a possible alliance between the "Donetsk" and Yushchenko (which was possible on the basis of their common dislike for Medvedchuk), Viktor Yanukovych was appointed to the post of prime minister.
But then, for the reasons described above, no one perceived him as Kuchma's successor. Moreover, the story of his two convictions became known to the whole country.
Having come to the conclusion that a soft option with a "Yushchenko-successor" does not work, the West stepped up pressure on Kuchma.
Back in the spring, a scandal began with the supply of the Ukrainian air defense system "Kolchuga" to Iraq, about which there was allegedly evidence on Melnichenko's tapes. This caused a strong reaction from the United States, although the Ukrainian authorities argued that there were no supplies (which, as it turned out later, turned out to be true).
But Bankova was not inactive either. Ever since the elections to the Rada, a massive campaign to discredit Viktor Yushchenko has begun.
He was portrayed as a Ukrainian nationalist, Bandera, who hates Russian speakers and wants to sell Ukraine to the West. The Russian media also actively participated in this campaign, and Russian political technologists, headed by Marat Gelman, became one of the main strategists in the Presidential Administration.
The scenario for the future battle in 2002 was actually predetermined: a war between Viktor Yushchenko and the then Ukrainian government, with the active use of the topic of splitting the country and with large-scale support from the West and Russia from both sides, respectively.
True, there was a chance, if not to avoid, then at least to soften the intensity of this battle - to actually carry out a political reform, reducing the president's powers. Under the sign of these attempts, the whole next year passed.
Year thirteen. Constitution and Tuzla
2003 was a successful year for the economy. GDP growth amounted to almost 10%. The rise in activity was recorded in all sectors of the Ukrainian economy.
Entrepreneurs demonstrated optimism and believed in a brighter future. Optimism (at least in terms of consumer sentiment) gradually returned to ordinary Ukrainians. People start talking about Ukraine as a new "economic tiger".
The sources of growth were the same: the increase in world prices for the main export commodities, the rise of the Russian market (the main one for Ukrainian exports), the presence of underutilized industrial capacities, the increase in household incomes, and low gas prices (thanks to a long-term contract with Russia).
Relations with the Russian Federation generally developed quite rapidly this year. Kuchma and Putin agreed to set up a tripartite consortium to manage the gas transmission system (the third party was to be Germany, where Putin's friend Schroeder was Chancellor at the time). It was also announced the creation of a Common Economic Space, which could include Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.
True, both projects remained on paper. And not only because of the opposition of the Americans, but also because of the unwillingness of Kuchma and the Ukrainian elite to share their influence in the country with the Russians. Good relations with the Kremlin were important to them in order to fend off Yushchenko and the West, but nothing more.
Multi-vector - first of all.
Therefore, as soon as Kiev had the opportunity to improve relations with the Americans by sending its contingent to Iraq, Kuchma immediately did it.
Tuzla Spit
That same year, for the first time since the early 1990s, the issue of Crimea came up. There was a famous conflict around the island of Kos Tuzla, to which Russia began to build a dam. As the Kremlin later explained, the reason for such actions was allegedly Ukraine's plans to give permission to warships of third countries (read - NATO countries) to enter the waters of the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov.
The conflict was then quickly hushed up, and the decision on the ships was never made. But the "Tuzla crisis" showed that against the backdrop of growing contradictions between the United States and Russia, the Kremlin is ready to respond extremely harshly to any issues related to relations between Ukraine and NATO. Although then at this moment, like many others, few people in Kyiv paid attention.
In domestic politics, the pro-government camp plunged into endless intrigues and internecine wars, which prevented the implementation of the strategic task - pushing changes to the Constitution through parliament. This process has seriously stalled.
It was covertly sabotaged by "Donetsk", hoping to push Yanukovych to the presidency, and openly - "Our Ukraine" and Yushchenko (for obvious reasons).
True, Moroz was among the supporters of the political reform. Only at the end of the year, with a big scandal, the changes managed to be voted in the first reading.
Year fourteen. The first Maidan and the third Great Compromise
The story of the political reform ended in failure already in April 2004, when only seven votes were not enough for its adoption in the final reading.
It was a shock for the president's team, which ended up with nothing - they didn't have a ready successor. Therefore, we had to quickly rely on the only one who was at hand with the highest rating of all the candidates from the government - Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.
It was a fatal decision. Yanukovych was the most convenient opponent for Yushchenko, since the opposition could easily mobilize its electorate against a pro-government candidate with two convictions. In addition, many representatives of the Ukrainian elite treated the ex-governor of the Donetsk region semi-contemptuously, and it was difficult to build a united front in his support.
But, on the other hand, Kuchma had no choice - there was very little time left before the start of the election campaign, and attempts to replace Yanukovych as prime minister and, accordingly, a candidate from the authorities in the elections, could cause a riot of "Donetsk" and their transition to the camp of supporters Yushchenko.
From the very beginning, everything went according to the worst-case scenario.
Yanukovych was quickly given the image of a convict and a candidate who is even worse than Kuchma. Yushchenko launched a vigorous campaign. Many representatives of the Ukrainian elite began to secretly bet on him, not believing in Yanukovych's victory.
But the hopes of Yushchenko's political technologists for an easy walk through the electoral field did not come true.
They underestimated the impact of the anti-nationalist campaign against the leader of Our Ukraine. Instead of trying to refute it, they indulged it in many ways, trying to mobilize the Western Ukrainian electorate with the theme of the "national idea."
The flip side of this was the mobilization of the southeastern voter.
The largest mass media, reluctantly, but joined this campaign, showing videos "about three varieties of Ukrainians", into which Yushchenko allegedly wants to divide the country.
In response, the supporters of the latter began to create an image of the enemy from the “Donetsk”, painting the inhabitants of this region entirely as bandits.
The economy worked into the hands of Yanukovych, as well as some effective steps taken by his government. So, since the beginning of the year, following the example of Russia, Ukraine introduced a single income tax rate - 13%, instead of the progressive one with a minimum of 20% and a maximum of 40%.
GDP growth rates hit a record - 13%. Never before or since has the Ukrainian economy grown at such a pace.
Since autumn, pensions and other social payments have been sharply raised.
All this led to the fact that already in September the ratings of Yanukovych and Yushchenko became equal. It became clear that the elections would not go smoothly. Russia openly played on the side of the prime minister, and the West played on the side of the leader of the opposition.
Both sides created the image of an enemy out of a political competitor, playing off their supporters.
The first round of elections ended in a draw. During the second round, the opposition announced massive falsifications with the help of absentee ballots (they really took place) and did not recognize the victory of Yanukovych announced by the CEC.
Maidan gathered in Kyiv. Moreover, unlike previous protest actions, it became truly massive.
At once, at least 100 thousand people came out, a tent city was set up.
Orange Maidan
The regional councils and city councils of the center and west of the country (including the Kyiv City Council) did not recognize Yanukovych's victory. The capital was in the hands of Yushchenko's protesters. Kuchma did not want to use force to disperse them.
In parallel, the Supreme Court accepted for consideration a claim to declare the elections invalid. And after several days of hearings, the verdict was announced: to appoint a re-vote of the second round of elections (in fact, the third round of elections).
Seeing the worsening situation in Kyiv, Yanukovych's supporters gathered for the famous congress in Severodonetsk, where they threatened to secede the southeast from Ukraine. Russia supported these actions in every possible way.
The country was on the brink of civil war.
Saved from her again by the Great Compromise. In the form of the same political reform. A deal was made.
Supporters of Kuchma and Yanukovych agree to "merge" the third round of elections in favor of Yushchenko (for which the CEC was reorganized). In response, Our Ukraine agreed to vote for changes to the Constitution, which, from January 1, 2006, reduced the powers of the future president.
This proved to be a strategic decision that prevented war. Unfortunately, not forever. And just 10 years...
Year fifteen. Trying to destroy the Great Compromise
At the beginning of 2005, after the inauguration of Viktor Yushchenko, no one in his entourage believed that he had made any concessions or compromises.
Everyone quickly forgot about the fact that the political reform would come into force on January 1, 2006, as there was confidence that in a year everyone would have time to win.
And there really were reasons for this.
Enormous international support (the whole world learned about Ukraine during the Orange Revolution, and our country was at the peak of popularity), a high level of trust (or rather, expectations) of the population, the readiness of even former enemies (Yanukovych's support groups) to swear allegiance to the new president - all it was optimistic.
But Yushchenko made two key mistakes. First, he immediately began to destroy the Great Compromise, on which Ukraine has been based since 1991-1993. He immediately abandoned the multi-vector policy, declaring a course towards integration into the EU and NATO.
Inside the country, Yushchenko emphasized "national revival" (in his understanding, of course), which resulted in the planting of Sharovarshchina, attempts to speed up the Ukrainization of the humanitarian sphere.
The increased glorification of the OUN-UPA began, the state apparatus was actively working to create a single local church and support the Kiev Patriarchate. Against this background, relations with Russia began to deteriorate rapidly.
With the Donbass, the new president behaved emphatically arrogantly. During his first visit to Donetsk, where the local elite was already ready to faithfully serve Yushchenko and establish communication with him, he was rude to people right during a meeting in the regional administration.
His phrase "before you is the president, and not a shepherd of geese is standing."
In other words, Yushchenko did everything to confirm the main theses of Viktor Yanukovych's election propaganda.
That is why Viktor Fedorovich, who had already been written off in early 2005, did not lose his electorate, and since the fall, when the crisis in the "orange camp" began, he began to rapidly increase his popularity.
Yushchenko's second major mistake was the appointment of Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister.
Although this was spelled out in a special agreement, according to which Tymoshenko supported Yushchenko in the elections, the president had to calculate the risks of appointing the ambitious and uncontrollable Lady Yu to the second most important post in the country.
But he did not calculate, for which he soon paid dearly.
Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko
Tymoshenko did not become Yushchenko's assistant in governing the state, but immediately became his main competitor. The new prime minister drew attention to herself, created the impression that it was she who was carrying out reforms, and the president’s entourage (in which she appointed NSDC Secretary Petro Poroshenko as the main enemy) was sabotaging them for corruption reasons.
By the summer, this led to an open conflict between Tymoshenko and the president and his people (the so-called "love friends").
This conflict paralyzed the state system. The declared reforms were not carried out, all the energy was spent on mutual disassembly.
All this could not last long, and the explosion occurred in September.
It all started with a press conference of the head of the Presidential Secretariat Alexander Zinchenko, who accused Petro Poroshenko and other "any friends" of corruption, and ended with Tymoshenko's resignation from the post of prime minister. Lady Yu went into open and ruthless opposition to Yushchenko, the big "orange coalition" was destroyed.
A special memorandum was signed between the president and the "opposition leader" (that's how he was called in the document) Viktor Yanukovych, which marked the collapse of Yushchenko's and the new "orange power" attempts to destroy the Great Compromise.
In subsequent years, there were still some encroachments in this direction, but they could no longer have any success.
Strategically, the end was set precisely in the fall of 2005. At the same time, a "triune" landscape of Ukrainian politics was formed, which remained unchanged until the 2010 presidential elections.
There is President Yushchenko, who has lost a lot of influence and popularity. And there are two main contenders for the role of his successor - Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovych.
Year sixteen. Yanukovych is prime minister again, the first conflicts with Russia, the beginning of the story with NATO
Already in the fall of 2005, after the crisis with the resignation of Tymoshenko and the signing of a memorandum with Yanukovych, it became clear that Yushchenko did not have the strength to stop the entry into force of the political reform from January 1, 2006.
What happened.
Changes to the Constitution sharply reduced the powers of the president. The government was no longer formed by the head of state, but by parliament. But in reality, these changes should have taken effect after the elections to the Verkhovna Rada, which were scheduled for March 2006.
These elections were the first to be held according to a purely proportional system (party lists), and in them the "orange" political forces reaped the fruits of their split.
The first place was taken by the Party of Regions of Viktor Yanukovych - more than 32%. BYuT lagged far behind - just over 22%. "Our Ukraine" Viktor Yushchenko was only third - about 15%. The Socialist Party of Oleksandr Moroz and the Communist Party also passed.
A lengthy bidding for a coalition began. It was whispered on the sidelines that Yushchenko and the Party of Regions would try to create a so-called "broad coalition" in order to overcome the split of the country (as an official pretext).
But these plans were actively torpedoed by Yulia Tymoshenko, who insisted on restoring a purely "orange" coalition consisting of the BYuT, Our Ukraine, and the Socialist Party. At the same time, she naturally saw herself in the prime minister's chair.
Yushchenko's protracted hesitation was put an end to by the Americans, who in June recommended that he still agree to an "orange" coalition (more on the motives for this below).
Reluctantly, the president was forced to take this step, but due to the mutual distrust of the negotiators, the process stalled again, which was immediately taken advantage of by the regionals.
They managed to convince the Socialist Party to form a coalition with the Party of Regions and the Communists. Frost got the post of speaker. Detractors said that the socialists were paid a large sum money, but it should be recognized that objectively everything went towards the creation of a coalition in which the Regions would participate as the largest faction of the Rada. It was a social trend. And if Our Ukraine was not included in it, then one should not be surprised that the socialists were included.
Yushchenko tried to jump into the departing train. Formally preventing the Our Ukraine team from joining the coalition, he agreed with the Party of Regions to keep several positions in the government for his people.
The Universal of National Unity was signed, where the idea was carried out in confused terms about the need to overcome the split of the country. Yushchenko introduced Yanukovych's candidacy for the post of prime minister. And the Parliament approved it in July.
For about two months, there was a semblance of interaction between the president and the prime minister, although the Regions very quickly put the entire government apparatus under their control. And the remaining presidential people in the Cabinet (including, for example, Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko) felt extremely uncomfortable there.
The situation exploded in September.
The main, and, in fact, the only reason for this was the refusal of Viktor Yanukovych to sign Ukraine's application for joining the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), which opened the way for the country to join the Alliance.
A small digression is needed here. When Yushchenko and Yanukovych signed a memorandum in the fall of 2005, it concerned the restoration of the Great Compromise only in domestic politics.
At the same time, Yushchenko believed that he had no obligation to return to a compromise in foreign policy (that is, to a multi-vector approach).
On the contrary, since the beginning of 2006, the president has stepped up the Euro-Atlantic and anti-Russian vector. Yes, in New Year the first gas war between Ukraine and Russia began. Gas transit to Europe was temporarily suspended.
The war ended with the defeat of Ukraine - the former, beneficial for the country, long-term gas supply agreement was terminated, according to which the price of blue fuel was fixed until 2010 at $50 per thousand cubic meters. And under the new contract, the price immediately almost doubled (and then continued to grow every year).
In early 2006, Yushchenko tried to interrupt Yulia Tymoshenko's campaign on the topic "Yushchenko and his beloved friends betrayed the Maidan", pedaling the theme of confrontation with Russia. The situation around the objects of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Crimea escalated, the blockade of Transnistria began.
But that was not the point. There was an agreement with the Americans that in 2006 Ukraine would apply for the MAP.
That is why Washington did not want Yushchenko to form a coalition with the Regions, because he did not believe that they would agree to open the way for the country to join NATO (the anti-NATO theme was one of the main ones in the PR rhetoric).
But after long negotiations with Yanukovych, Yushchenko apparently decided that he had convinced him to support the course towards Euro-Atlantic integration, and therefore agreed to his premiership.
However, they probably did not understand each other. And when the time came to sign the MAP application, Yanukovych refused to do so.
The crisis erupted almost immediately. Yushchenko condemned the refusal. Then people from the presidential quota were gradually removed from the government. The new head of the Presidential Secretariat, Viktor Baloga, began to prepare forces for an attack on the Yanukovych government. At the same time, for the first time, they started talking about the dissolution of parliament.
In turn, the regionals began to lure some of the deputies from the BYuT and Our Ukraine, trying to bring the coalition to 300 people, so that it would be possible to overcome the president's veto.
It should be noted that, despite the permanent political crisis, the economy, after the fall of 2005, again increased its growth rates, household incomes also grew rapidly, and the Ukrainian football team led by Oleg Blokhin first got to the World Cup and immediately reached the quarterfinals.
Many looked to the future with optimism. Popular was the idea that Ukraine was becoming a normal country, in which politics by itself, and the economy by itself.
Year seventeen. Dissolution of parliament, new crisis and new compromise
The crisis in relations between Yanukovych and Yushchenko grew throughout the first months of 2007 and ended with the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada.
Alexander Moroz later said that the main reason for this was the unwillingness of him and Yanukovych to support the course of integration into NATO (which the Americans demanded).
Perhaps it was.
But Yulia Tymoshenko, who skillfully played on the contradictions between the prime minister and the president, acted as the main internal engine of the process. The political reform of 2004 gave rise to these contradictions, giving power to the prime minister, but allowing the president to block the decisions of the government and parliament indefinitely.
Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych
After that, Tymoshenko began to besiege Yushchenko, demanding that he dissolve parliament. The grounds were extremely dubious (transition of deputies to other factions, which, according to the Constitution, is not a basis for early elections), and this embarrassed the president.
However, the BYuT leader was stubborn, and the Regions, for their part, only added fuel to the fire by re-recruiting all the new parties of people's deputies. And on April 2, Yushchenko signed the decree.
A new confrontation began: the government and parliament did not recognize the decree and appealed to the Constitutional Court demanding it be canceled.
The COP dragged on for a long time, and the confrontation heated up.
Dual power arose in the country, which at any moment could develop into an open conflict. Ukraine found itself one step away from him after Yushchenko tried to remove Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun and put his acting president in his place. The government and the Rada did not recognize this decision, and the forces of the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs controlled by the government actually seized the building of the GPU. Yushchenko's appointee was simply not allowed there.
The President in response ordered the Internal Troops to march on Kyiv. And the Ministry of Internal Affairs reassigned them to itself and forbade them to carry out Yushchenko's orders.
The situation could well develop into armed clashes, fraught with civil war.
But at the last moment, the opposing sides again came to a compromise. Yushchenko, Yanukovych and Moroz were negotiating all night on Trinity Street on Bankova Street. They left the building on the morning of May 27 and announced an agreement - there would be early parliamentary elections, but in the fall. And until then, the government of Yanukovych operates.
According to unofficial information, a behind-the-scenes agreement was also concluded between the Party of Regions and Yushenko (which was allegedly consecrated by Viktor Baloga) that after the new elections, the Party of Regions and Our Ukraine would create a new coalition. It was under this promise that Yanukovych agreed to early elections.
But "it didn't happen like that, I guessed."
Yulia Tymoshenko ran an extremely effective campaign, scattering pre-election promises like from a cornucopia. And managed to take 30% of the vote. Our Ukraine came third with 15%. The formal winner of the elections was the Party of Regions, which gained more than 34%. But the problem for the regionals is that the BYuT and Our Ukraine had enough votes for two to create a majority, albeit a fragile one (by a margin of only two votes), but a majority in parliament.
And it was difficult for Yushchenko's voters to explain why, in such a situation, Our Ukraine was creating a coalition with Yanukovych, and not with Tymoshenko. Moreover, Yuriy Lutsenko, who headed the pre-election list of the presidential bloc, became an active lobbyist for an alliance with her.
Baloga and Yushchenko tried for a long time to come up with an excuse to avoid a coalition with Tymoshenko, but to no avail.
Most of the Our Ukraine faction, led by Lutsenko, advocated an alliance with the BYuT. Eventually this coalition was formed. And at the end of 2007, Tymoshenko returned to the chair of the prime minister. Few people then understood that this was a prologue to her future political defeat in the presidential election.
And Yanukovych, on the contrary, miraculously escaped from the prospect of creating a “shirk” with Our Ukraine, which would be fatal for his rating.
The results of 2007 showed that, becoming a hostage to the geopolitical game of external forces, Ukraine can quickly find itself on the verge of an internal conflict and even civil war. But this lesson was not learned then or later.
Year eighteen. Abandonment of NATO and the global crisis
In 2008, two events took place that determined the development of Ukraine until the beginning of 2014.
The first is the failure of the plan for Ukraine's accession to NATO. At first, everything went well here. Tymoshenko signed an application to join the NATO Membership Action Plan, which the Alliance had to approve at its summit in Bucharest.
Admittedly, joining NATO was not popular with the population (slightly more than 20 percent were in favor), but it was decided to correct this moment with a massive information campaign.
However, by that time the geopolitical balance in Europe had changed dramatically. Russia has come to an agreement with France and Germany that Ukraine and Georgia should not receive the prospect of NATO membership. And the MAP was failed by the efforts of the Germans and the French in Bucharest.
This had several major implications. First, Yushchenko's big political game is over. Having failed, in fact, to fulfill the main task of his presidency, he finally became a "lame duck", whose role is only to decide who to transfer power to - Yanukovych or Tymoshenko.
Secondly, external players took Ukraine out of the big geopolitical game for a while, in fact agreeing with its neutral status.
This prompted leading Ukrainian politicians (except Yushchenko) to return to a multi-vector policy. And if Yanukovych was always committed to her, then Yulia Tymoshenko's active search for contacts with Russia surprised many, although it was, we repeat, the natural result of the failure of the MAP.
The consequences of this reversal were already felt in August 2008, when, after the war in South Ossetia, Tymoshenko, unlike Yushchenko, did not clearly condemn Russia. This position of the premier exacerbated the already strong contradictions with Bankova and already in September led to the collapse of the coalition of BYuT and Our Ukraine.
At the same time, for the first time, they started talking about creating a coalition between the BYuT and the Party of Regions. After Tymoshenko's transition to a multi-vector approach, there really were no fundamental disagreements between the two political forces.
In addition, by the end of 2008, both in the elite (except for Yushchenko) and among the majority of the population, a scheme of national consensus had developed around which one could unite. This scheme included the neutral status of the country (we are friends with both the West and Russia), the refusal to pedal painful topics that split society (history, church, language), granting the Russian language the status of an official language in Russian-speaking regions and the rejection of forced Ukrainization, as well as the withdrawal from attempts to arrange a redistribution of property.
If a broad coalition around these ideas had emerged in 2008-2010, then the development of the country could have gone completely differently. But the agreements both then and later failed because of the huge distrust between potential partners.
Yes, and there were too conflicting figures on both sides. For the voters of Yulia Tymoshenko, Yanukovych was a "convict" with whom it was impossible to negotiate anything. And for Yanukovych's voters, Tymoshenko was a rogue and a thief who, as legend has it, promised to surround the Donbass with barbed wire.
It also played a significant role that a significant part of the “ideological” Maidan activists considered themselves to be the bearers of the “only true doctrine” about the path of Ukraine’s development and did not accept any alternatives, did not recognize the right to a different opinion among the “blue-white” opponents, regarding as a betrayal any attempts by the "orange" leaders to negotiate with the regionals.
The lack of the ability to keep a given word and make mutual concessions became the hallmark of Ukrainian politicians, which played a fatal role in the tragic events five years later.
At the end of 2008, Tymoshenko created a shaky alliance in parliament of BYuT, part of Our Ukraine and the Lytvyn bloc, thanks to which the Rada was saved from dissolution (which Yushchenko had already tried to do).
But at this time, political battles receded into the background. The main event was the global crisis. It began with a mortgage collapse in the US and escalated sharply after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The government initially reacted nonchalantly to the alarming news from across the ocean. But it soon turned out that a wave of economic tsunami was sweeping Ukraine.
The crisis has destroyed almost all the sources of growth that previously fueled the Ukrainian economy. In particular, prices began to collapse for the main Ukrainian exports, and most importantly, the flow of Western loans to Ukrainian banks, which had previously covered the deficit in the balance of payments, stopped.
Hryvnia exchange rate in 2008
The hryvnia collapsed from 5 to 8 per dollar, the collapse of industry began, the collapse of banks, the panic of the population. From the illusion of "endless prosperity" and the consumer boom that gripped Ukrainians in previous years, there is no trace left.
This had significant consequences. Ukraine has entered a long period of stagnation (turned into a collapse after the events of 2014). Dreams were shattered, disappointment grew.
Politically, the crisis dealt a colossal blow to Tymoshenko's presidential prospects.
And before that, she had difficulty fulfilling most of her election promises (and forgot about some immediately), and after the crisis, this became completely impossible.
Year nineteen. Putin's contract - Tymoshenko and elections
New 2009 Ukraine met without gas. That is, it was still in the vaults, but there was no contract. Control over gas flows meant for Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko control over the financial resources for the presidential campaign, and they raced to send emissaries to Vladimir Putin, trying to offer better terms than a competitor.
As a result, by January 1, no bargaining was done. Gazprom turned off the valve, and it became clear that there would not be enough gas for heating until the end of winter. And then Tymoshenko decided to take an extreme step: without the decision of the government, she went to Moscow and agreed on a contract that determined a lot in the fate of the country for the next five years.
The base gas price was unheard of - $450 per thousand cubic meters. But Tymoshenko received a discount for one year and, moreover, used 11 billion cubic meters of gas owned by RosUkrEnergo. That was enough for her to get through 2009 with an average price of $232. And what will happen then was not thought.
Russia, on the other hand, has received a very strong lever of pressure on Ukraine. Which she later took full advantage of.
Yushchenko harshly condemned the conclusion of the Tymoshenko-Putin contract and finally decided to bet on the "drowning" of Lady Yu and her prospects in the presidential election.
Thus becoming an unspoken ally of Yanukovych.
Fortunately, the rating of Tymoshenko herself was decimated by the economic crisis, the burden of broken promises, as well as constant scandals. Like the upcoming "shirk" between the BYuT and the Party of Regions (which Viktor Yanukovych later publicly abandoned), the murder of a person by the people's deputy Lozinsky, the panic over bird flu and the pedophile scandal in Artek.
Despite this, Tymoshenko led a very competent and energetic election campaign, and at some point it began to seem that she had a chance to defeat Yanukovych. The oligarchs phlegmatically watched this process, laying eggs in two baskets at once.
The main slogan of Tymoshenko's campaign - Won pratsyuє
Year twentieth. Yanukovych - President
Already at the end of 2009, it became clear that Yanukovych's rating was going into the lead and Tymoshenko would hardly be able to overcome it. Therefore, the results of the elections, in which Yanukovych won in the second round, were taken for granted by everyone, and Lady Yu's attempts to challenge their results were unsuccessful.
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Inauguration of Viktor Yanukovych
Although for some time it seemed that the country would have to watch a tense struggle between President Yanukovych and Prime Minister Tymoshenko.
But the Ukrainian elite and its representatives in parliament were so tired of political strife and so exhausted by the crisis that they wanted stabilization as soon as possible.
Therefore, dozens of deputies from the BYuT, Our Ukraine immediately went over to the camp to the regionals. Together with the factions of Lytvyn and the communists, the PR created a coalition, dismissing the Tymoshenko government and appointing Mykola Azarov in its place.
In the autumn of the same year, having strengthened his own vertical of power, Yanukovych, through the Constitutional Court, restored the operation of the former Constitution, regaining the powers of Leonid Kuchma.
The opposition then called it a usurpation of power, but this did not bother Viktor Fedorovich much. He did the main thing for himself - he brought the government out of the control of the parliament (and the representatives of the oligarchs who were sitting there).
This meant that the way was opened to get rid of dependence on those people who helped him come to power.
It was from this moment that the internal crisis began in the Yanukovych team, which contributed to the victory of the Maidan in 2014.
But that was later. In the spring of 2010, urgent problems had to be addressed. The Tymoshenko government spent the entire 2009 borrowing money at huge interest rates, which now it's time to repay. At the same time, the gas price exceeded $300, bringing down the country's balance of payments into a deep minus. A new crisis was brewing.
However, Yanukovych, contrary to the doubts of many, managed to solve these problems.
On April 21, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia signed the Kharkiv Accords, a $100 discount on gas in exchange for extending the Black Sea Fleet's stay in Crimea until 2042. This caused violent protests from the opposition, but they had no effect. The hole in the trade balance was plugged, the hryvnia was saved from falling.
Further, cooperation with the IMF was resumed. Due to the received tranche and the restoration of economic growth, the government was able to pay off most of Tymoshenko's debts and itself began to actively borrow funds on the foreign market (through the placement of Eurobonds).
By the end of the summer, it seemed that the country was returning to the good old days of Kuchma - a multi-vector policy (we are friends with both the West and Russia), economic growth, political stability.
Protests promoted with the support of the opposition like the "Tax Maidan" in November 2010 were a little embarrassing, but they quickly faded away without any special consequences. Also, vague rumors about rampant corruption, about the introduction of an "institute of beholders", about a grandiose construction project in Mezhyhirya have not yet threatened the authorities.
Nothing seemed to threaten stability. But this was a deceptive impression.
Year twenty-one. Condemnation of Tymoshenko, aggravation of relations with Russia and the West
Outwardly, 2011 was one of the most peaceful years in the history of independent Ukraine. The government was intensively preparing for Euro 2012, economic growth accelerated, wages gradually increased with the hryvnia exchange rate unchanged.
However, already this year, the first bells of future problems sounded. First of all, relations with Russia worsened. The fact is that due to the rise in oil prices, the price of gas rose again to 300 or more dollars, leveling the positive effect of the Kharkiv agreements.
Yanukovych appealed to the Russian leadership with a request to revise the generally enslaving formula for calculating the price of gas in order to reduce its cost. But the answer came from Moscow: any new concessions will be possible only after Ukraine joins the Customs Union. This association of three countries - Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus - started working just in 2011 and became the first really functioning integration project in the post-Soviet space.
The Russian Federation wanted to see Ukraine in its composition, and therefore they activated the "gas lever".
However, Yanukovych and his entourage, who lived according to the above-described principle "Texans must rob Texas", did not want to delegate some of their powers to some supranational bodies.
Especially when it came to customs flows, which were one of the main sources of shadow income for the authorities.
Negotiations on gas and other economic concessions to Ukraine from Russia have stalled. The price of gas grew, the pressure on the hryvnia exchange rate intensified. The hole in the balance of payments was once again filled with foreign loans.
At the same time, relations with the West began to deteriorate. There, Yanukovych was never liked, considered a suspicious type, prone to corruption and deals with Russia.
But since at first he pursued a rather careful policy, actively negotiated the signing of an association agreement with the EU that would be beneficial for Europeans (including a free trade zone), the West did not put much pressure on him. Although he continued to assist the opposition in the person of Yulia Tymoshenko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk, as he did not want to create a situation where Yanukovych would remain the uncontested leader.
The authorities did not like this. Moreover, the opposition was quite active, constantly trying to create some kind of confusion.
Therefore, since the end of 2010, a gradual tightening of the screws began. Yury Lutsenko was arrested and several cases were initiated against Yulia Tymoshenko at once.
After some time, one main one was singled out from them - about the abuse of power in connection with the signing of a gas contract with Russia to the detriment of Ukraine. The main role was played by the relevance of this topic, taking into account the growing "gas" problems with the Russian Federation.
Trial of Yulia Tymoshenko
The trial of Tymoshenko started in June 2011. The ex-premier was judged by the famous Rodion Kireev. Tymoshenko did not recognize the accusation and mocked both the prosecutors and Kireev.
From the very beginning, the West did not like this process, but since everyone expected that it would come down to a suspended sentence for Tymoshenko in the worst case, they did not particularly worry about this.
However, in August, things suddenly took a hard turn. After another skirmish with Tymoshenko, Kireev decided to take her into custody. This caused a shock. Never before has a former prime minister been thrown into a Ukrainian prison.
And if the street unrest turned out to be surprisingly sluggish, the reaction of the West was extremely harsh. They demanded that Tymoshenko be released immediately. And the real crisis erupted in October, when Kireev announced the verdict: seven years in prison.
The EU has stopped negotiations on the Association Agreement. The United States threatened sanctions for the first time.
Yanukovych, out of habit, tried to play the Russian card by restoring relations with Moscow, but did not achieve much success. Russia set the previous condition - the Customs Union.
Thus, by the end of 2011, Yanukovych faced the threat of a serious crisis. Moreover, it was largely due to a change in the geopolitical balance in Eastern Europe.
Russia, thanks to rising oil prices, quickly recovered from the effects of the crisis. Its economy grew along with the standard of living of the population. At that time, the EU continued to be in a fever, and the Eastern European members of the European Union, with rare exceptions, plunged into a long stagnation, surviving only through the export of labor.
Against this background, Russia felt the strength to create an association in the post-Soviet space in order to conduct a conversation with the West from a stronger position. And just the neutrality of Ukraine (which Yanukovych was ready to guarantee) did not suit her anymore.
In turn, the attitude of Western countries towards Russia has deteriorated significantly after the announcement of Putin's nomination for the presidency in the 2012 elections. Earlier, the US and the EU hoped that Medvedev, who was more convenient for them, would remain president, but he preferred to give way to GDP.
It has also upped the stakes on Ukraine, which has once again been seen as an important prize in the geopolitical struggle for influence in Eastern Europe.
Therefore, the West increased pressure on Yanukovych, from which he demanded to release Tymoshenko and not agree to join the Customs Union, but, on the contrary, to complete the work on signing the Association Agreement with the EU.
And if Yanukovych agreed to comply with the second point, he did not want to back down on the first. Apparently, believing that, having eliminated Tymoshenko from the political arena, he will be able to breathe easy.
The economy, meanwhile, dictated the need to make the final geopolitical choice. Hopes that long-term economic growth will resume after the crisis by the end of 2011 have faded. The economy grew, but not at the pace that would allow us to talk about a serious increase in living standards.
This was mainly due to the fact that one of the main sources of growth, the flow of cheap Western loans, never recovered after the crisis. And without it, it was difficult to expect a resumption of the consumer boom. Growth was observed only in certain areas - agriculture, metallurgy, the chemical industry, and some branches of engineering.
The people are tired of waiting for the promised "reduction", especially against the backdrop of constant corruption scandals and rumors about the pace at which the Yanukovych family, headed by his son Alexander, is accumulating their wealth. The gap with Russia in the standard of living began to grow rapidly.
In order to give impetus to the development of the country, it was necessary to decide which source of funding to join - Russian or Western. But Yanukovych did not want to make this choice.
He wanted to get everything and to the maximum, but not to give anything in return - neither Europe nor Russia.
Year twenty-two. European Football Championship
The entire first half of the year was marked by Euro 2012. The European Football Championship has become the brightest and brightest event in the history of Ukraine. Despite a lot of problems at the preparation stage, the tournament itself was held almost perfectly.
This allowed the country to forget about the existing problems for a while, surrendering to the festive mood.
The atmosphere in Kyiv on the eve of the Euro 2012 final
But the holiday ended, and immediately after it, the election campaign began. Rada was elected. By that time, for the reasons described above, Yanukovych had lost his rating, and the opposition, albeit without Tymoshenko, began to strengthen its position.
Basically, the claims of the population (and in all regions of the country) against Yanukovych were of a socio-economic nature. People were tired of waiting for their incomes to start growing again, everyone was outraged by the indecent luxury of Yanukovych's life, total and systemic corruption, the widespread suppression of business by the Family and other people close to the president.
In terms of humanitarian policy, Yanukovych, unlike Yushchenko, behaved very cautiously. I tried not to disturb the society with topics that were splitting the country, and even decided to adopt the law on giving the Russian language official status in the Russian-speaking regions (one of the main election promises) only on the eve of the start of the election campaign to the Rada.
Although the law was rather mild and in no way infringed on the rights of the Ukrainian-speaking population, its adoption led to violent protests by the opposition, which decided to raise nationalist slogans to mobilize its electorate in the elections.
Under such conditions, the elections did not end very well for the Party of Regions. The opposition, according to the party lists, won the majority of votes, having entered the Rada in three columns, consisting of Batkivshchyna (in the absence of Tymoshenko it was led by Yatsenyuk), Klitschko's BLOW and Tyahnybok's Svoboda. The appearance of the last party in the parliament was a complete surprise, especially with a result of more than 10%. They said that the Regionals specifically gave her the green light in order to promote the project of entering the second round of the presidential elections against Yanukovych Oleg Tyagnibok.
Opinion polls showed that this was the only candidate Yanukovych could have won. But, nevertheless, the very fact that this force entered the parliament greatly radicalized the atmosphere in the country.
Xenophobia, provocations on ethnic grounds, readiness for violence, intolerance for other people's opinions entered political life. Soon all this will play a role during the events on the Maidan.
The regionals still managed to create a majority thanks to majoritarian deputies. The President changed the Cabinet. The prime minister remained the same - Mykola Azarov. But the composition of the government has fundamentally changed. The old guard of the Party of Regions, associated with the country's largest financial and industrial groups, was pushed into the shadows.
And representatives of the so-called Family took the first roles: Sergei Arbuzov was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister, the Ministry of Revenue and Duties was given to Alexander Klimenko, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy was given to Eduard Stavitsky.
It became clear that Yanukovych intended to seriously limit the political and economic influence of those people who brought him to power, relying on the creation of his own financial and industrial group.
Including by cutting the "hunting field" for other players. The situation became more and more tense.
Year twenty-three. Beginning of the Maidan
The end of 2012 was marked by a strange story with Yanukovych's visit to Moscow canceled at the last moment. According to the version circulated in the media, the President of Ukraine wanted to finally strike hands with Putin and, in exchange for a discount on gas and financial support, agree to move towards the Customs Union.
However, this plan was allegedly interrupted by representatives of the European Commission, who called Yanukovych and promised him full support if he signed the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU.
It is difficult to say how much one can believe this version.
But the fact remains that since the beginning of 2013, the previously almost frozen process of preparing for the signing of the Agreement suddenly intensified.
At the same time, Yanukovych's contacts with the Russian side have declined. Already in the summer it became clear that Ukraine and the EU are close to concluding an Agreement.
Why did the Europeans need it - the answer is obvious. In addition to the economic benefits of a free trade zone (its terms were more loyal to the EU than to Ukraine), the issue of winning the geopolitical rivalry with Russia was also at stake. After the conclusion of the Agreement, the path to the Customs Union for Ukraine would be closed.
It is still less clear why Yanukovych needed this.
According to one version, in the package with the Agreement, the West unofficially promised the president large-scale financial support, with the help of which Yanukovych hoped to overwhelm voters with "golden loaves" and win the election.
According to another version, Yanukovych initially did not intend to conclude the Agreement, but wanted to blackmail Russia with it, knocking out concessions from it.
One way or another, but the reaction of the Russian Federation to the prospect of signing the document turned out to be extremely tough.
Since August, for several days, the Russian Federation introduced a new regime for the passage of Ukrainian goods at customs, which actually paralyzed all Ukrainian exports to Russia. In the comments, Russian officials said that this would be the regime if Ukraine signed the Association Agreement.
Russia also made it clear that it would withdraw from the free trade zone with Ukraine. This caused a shock among Yanukovych's entourage, but they decided not to slow down the launched mechanism for signing the Agreement.
Since autumn, a total propaganda campaign of the authorities in support of the Association has begun. Propaganda portrayed it as almost a panacea for solving all Ukrainian problems, creating clearly inflated expectations among citizens.
But there was another process going on at the same time. When the Ukrainian authorities decided to probe the West about what kind of assistance it was ready to provide to Ukraine to compensate for the losses from the loss of the Russian market and to transfer the Ukrainian economy to European standards, no intelligible answer was received.
It was only said that the IMF could help with loans. True, the latter has already put forward his conditions - to freeze salaries, increase gas and utility tariffs, let the hryvnia float freely.
Meanwhile, economists and industrialists, who have finally read the Agreement itself, are increasingly saying that it is unprofitable for Ukraine.
Against such a sad background, Yanukovych resumed contacts with Putin. Several meetings passed, after which the tone of statements by Ukrainian government officials suddenly began to change dramatically. They suddenly noticed the shortcomings of the Agreement and loudly asked the Europeans if they would give billions of dollars to compensate for the losses.
In mid-November, there were first leaks of information that Putin agreed with Yanukovych that he would give a discount on gas, give a large loan, and at the same time remove the condition for Ukraine's entry into the Customs Union! All this - "only" for the rejection of the Agreement with the EU.
November 21, Mykola Azarov announced the suspension of preparations for the signing of the Agreement with the EU. Almost a month later, in the Kremlin, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement on $268 gas and a $15 billion loan.
Yanukovych could consider himself a brilliant strategist. He achieved everything he wanted. Russia made colossal concessions, and at the same time, the Ukrainian authorities did not give up one iota of sovereignty. The issue of joining the Customs Union has been removed.
Ukraine now has cheap gas, a colossal financial resource that could be used in the pre-election year to increase wages and pensions (without raising the cost of a communal apartment).
Yanukovych could indeed be celebrating a triumphant geopolitical victory. If not for one thing - Maidan ...
The opposition, inspired by the success in the elections, since the beginning of 2013 began to promote rally activity, launching the action "Arise, Ukraino!" The rallies were not numerous, but created a feeling of the constant presence of the opposition in the information field.
Every high-profile case in the country, the opposition tried to work to the maximum (a typical example is Vradiyevka).
Preparations for the decisive battle were in full swing, but many thought that it would begin no earlier than the calendar dates for the elections - in March 2015. Moreover, during the negotiations on association with the EU, the opposition slowed down and practically did not touch the authorities.
But the country's unexpected refusal to sign the Agreement gave the oppositionists an unexpected trump card. A huge number of people, under the influence of the very same pro-government propaganda, were waiting for this Agreement, and then it suddenly turned out that it was being canceled, and without much explanation.
This caused strong discontent, superimposed on all past claims against Yanukovych - corruption, poverty, the extraction of business.
Already in the evening of November 21, people came to the Maidan at the call of journalist Mustafa Nayem, spread through social networks on the Internet. Soon the actions became massive.
On November 29, Yanukovych traveled to Vilnius for an EU summit where the Association Agreement was to be ratified, and publicly refused to do so. The protesters immediately branded the president, saying that he sold out to Moscow and wants to turn the country into a Russian colony.
On the night of November 30, Berkut dispersed the Maidan participants by force, which caused mass indignation. Together with extreme annoyance at the refusal to sign the Agreement, it led to a huge protest on 1 December.
Then behind the scenes (and some openly) many big businessmen and oligarchs went over to the side of the protesters, which immediately became clear from the image loyal to the Maidan, shown by the largest TV channels. By that time, Yanukovych and his family had already "gotten" quite a few influential people, and they decided that the time had come to get even with him.
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Mass action on the Maidan
But already on December 1, the action turned into violence - the radicals stormed the Presidential Administration. The attack was repulsed. Many were detained. Many are beaten. Opposition leaders and Petro Poroshenko personally called the attackers provocateurs.
Although, as the radicals themselves later stated, their attack was coordinated with the leadership of the opposition parties. But when it became clear that it was not possible to take the Presidential Administration by storm, the politicians hastened to disown the action.
All this caused bad forebodings that this time the protest would not end peacefully.
In December, the government, contrary to forecasts, held on. An outbreak of violence on December 1 scared the oligarchs around Yanukovych, while Russia's gas rebate and huge loan gave temporary confidence that the economy would be all right.
Maidan passed into a sluggish stage, and by the New Year, even among its activists, forecasts were spreading that it would soon come to naught.
Year twenty-four. Maidan victory and war
Events reached a new level in January 2014. The day before, the parliament passed and the president signed the so-called "dictatorial" laws designed to bring protesters under the articles of the Criminal Code.
On Epiphany Sunday, January 19, radicals from the still little-known Right Sector attacked the positions of internal troops on Hrushevsky Street. Street fighting ensued. Opposition leaders feared that Yanukovych would use this as a pretext to clean up the Maidan, and therefore again declared the radicals provocateurs.
Clashes on Hrushevsky Street in January 2014
Vitali Klitschko, who persuaded the radicals not to attack the Internal Troops on Hrushevsky, was doused with a fire extinguisher
But time passed, the president did not give the order to clean up. And gradually the opposition leaders switched to supporting radical actions.
On January 22, under strange circumstances, three people were killed at Hrushevsky Street. The protesters immediately blamed the authorities for this.
Demoralized by the loss of life, Yanukovych went to talks with opposition leaders.
The next day, the seizures of regional administrations began in all regional centers of Western and - partially - Central Ukraine. Feeling that the president had given up slack, big business openly began to go over to the side of the opposition, a split began even within the Party of Regions faction.
The confrontation grew in general and in society, which was more and more clearly divided into "us" and "them". Pantheons of enemies and heroes directly opposed to each other were created.
If for Maidan and its supporters the "Berkutites" were a fiend, then for many in the southeast they were heroes fighting against the "Nazis".
Yanukovych tried to find the possibility of a compromise, persuaded Prime Minister Azarov to resign and even offered the post of head of government to Arseniy Yatsenyuk. Western diplomats joined the talks.
And by mid-February, it began to seem that a compromise was about to be found, as it had happened more than once in the past.
But all hopes collapsed on February 18, when the situation escalated to the limit. The self-defense of the Maidan tried to break through to the Verkhovna Rada, but the attack was repulsed by the Berkut, which, together with the titushki, went on the offensive and captured a significant part of the Maidan. To prevent its further advance, the protesters set fire to the tires.
Everyone was waiting for the final sweep, but the order was not followed. Instead, Yanukovych entered into negotiations with the opposition, and on February 20, the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland were supposed to fly to Kyiv.
But on the morning of that day, bloody events began. Shooting was opened at the Berkut and explosives from the positions of the protesters. Killed and wounded appeared among the security forces, after which the government troops hastily retreated. Maidanovites rushed after them, who were met with fire at Institutskaya Street, and several dozen people were killed.
Who shot - is still not clear. Now Berkut fighters are officially accused of this (they can be seen on numerous videos with weapons and yellow armbands). But they deny shooting at the protesters, saying that some provocateurs fired to kill.
The massacres played a fatal role. And before that, the search for a compromise was extremely difficult. Too much hatred has accumulated between the opposing sides, the external players have bitten the bit too much.
After dozens of deaths on the Maidan, the situation escalated sharply.
Although Yanukovych and the opposition leaders signed a certain document on February 21 through the mediation of the heads of the Foreign Ministries of Germany, France and Poland.
Formally, it was the very Great Compromise that could save the country from slipping into war. It provided for a return to the 2004 Constitution (to a parliamentary republic) and a presidential election in autumn 2014. Until then, Yanukovych was to remain the head of state.
It was similar to compromise agreements concluded by Ukrainian politicians in previous years. Apparently, this document was perceived in this way by Western partners as well. Victoria Syumar recalled the words that Polish Foreign Minister Sikorsky said to the opposition on February 21: "If you do not sign this agreement, there will be war."
However, the compromise was only in form, but not in essence. The agreement included a clause on the withdrawal of government troops from the center of Kyiv. After that, Maidan remained the only organized and already armed force in the capital. From the podium, the centurion Parasiuk said that the protesters would not recognize any compromises and Yanukovych should be overthrown.
The President panicked. Realizing that there would be no one to protect him, in which case, he urgently left for Kharkov, where the congress of the southeastern regions was to be held on February 22.
According to some reports, there he planned to announce the transfer of the center of power to Kharkov, including the Cabinet of Ministers and the State Treasury (that is, taxes would be paid from all over the country to Kharkov, and not to Kyiv).
However, he did not find understanding in any of his associates. Kernes and Dobkin, as well as Akhmetov's people, refused to support this idea. Even the regionals close to Yanukovych were tired of his throwing and were already preparing to negotiate with the new government.
The congress on February 22 ended in nothing, Yanukovych did not appear at it. But he recorded a video message in which he accused the Maidanites of not fulfilling their part of the agreement.
At this time, the Verkhovna Rada in Kyiv actually took power into its own hands. A new speaker was appointed - Oleksandr Turchinov. The new head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is Arsen Avakov.
But the key decision taken by the parliament that day was to deprive Yanukovych of the powers of the president in connection with his self-removal from his duties. There is no such wording in the Constitution. Therefore, this decision was a direct violation of the agreements of 21 February.
However, the West did not pay any attention to this, recognizing in fact the changes that had taken place.
Yanukovych did not resist. Faced with the unwillingness to fight for him on the part of his comrades-in-arms, he simply fled to the Crimea with the help of the Russian military. And from there he was sent to the Russian Federation.
On February 23, Alexander Efremov made a statement on behalf of the Party of Regions, in which he accused Yanukovych of betrayal. Regionals and oligarchs have already fled to negotiate with the new government.
For the first time in the history of Ukraine, a situation has developed when the change of power took place not through a preliminary compromise, but through the defeat of one part of the country by another. In another part, after the flight of Yanukovych and the capitulation of the Party of Regions, there was no organized force left that would represent the interests of millions of people dissatisfied with the Maidan and its victory.
And this circumstance had a fatal effect on the entire course of subsequent events.
Who knows, if the Regionals had not been so cowardly, if they had turned the Kharkiv congress into a new headquarters for the organization of forces opposing the Maidan already without Yanukovych, then perhaps there would have been no annexation of Crimea, no separatism, no war.
The West, having seen the presence of resistance, would not recognize Turchinov as acting. president, would force the Maidanites to compromise, preventing the subsequent catastrophe with the loss of Crimea and the massacre in the Donbass. But history, as you know, does not know the subjunctive mood.
The Party of Regions has removed itself from the political scene.
In its place came a new government - those people who stood on the Maidan. Their backbone was a contingent of flesh from the flesh of the former system. Poroshenko, Yatsenyuk, Martynenko, Avakov and most of the other leaders of the Maidan did not differ much in their moral and political characteristics from Yanukovych and his entourage. They also came to power, mainly to solve their business issues, to saddle corruption flows.
But there was one significant difference. Having come to power on the blood of people who died on the Maidan, and having received a shattered vertical of power, with the state losing its monopoly on violence, they became dependent on the "collective political consciousness" of the Maidan, which was broadcast through hundreds and thousands of activists with influence on tens and hundreds of thousands of people.
And this "collective consciousness" has long developed a common vision of the situation in the country.
He perceived the compromises of the past not as saving steps that saved the state, but as acts of cowardice and betrayal that hindered the country's movement into a brighter future.
A bright future was seen as joining the EU and NATO, moving away from Russia at any cost. People who did not support the Maidan were perceived not as compatriots with a different point of view on political issues, but as "non-Ukrainians", whose opinion does not need to be taken into account.
Those who resisted the Maidan actively were considered an enemy of the people, against whom it was not a sin to apply measures of influence of any degree of rigidity.
Ukrainians must become a unified nation with one language and one idea of the past and future. There were discrepancies in the methods - how and how quickly this should be achieved, but no one questioned the strategic goal.
It was considered correct to impose on the whole country their vision of the path of development of Ukraine and to force them to follow it at any cost.
In the first days after Yanukovych's flight, it seemed that the roll-up of the Maidan would meet no resistance. But this impression turned out to be deceptive.
The place of the disappeared Party of Regions as a guide for Ukrainians dissatisfied with the change of power was taken by Russia and the structures controlled by it. The removal of Yanukovych, contrary to the agreements signed on February 21, was perceived by Russia as extremely painful.
Moscow considered this an impudent treachery on the part of the West, which undermined the authority of the Kremlin - they say, it turns out that right under the nose of the Russian Federation its allies are being overthrown, and it cannot do anything about it.
Such, from the point of view of the Russian Federation, deceit required an answer. And he followed immediately.
As early as February 23, mass protests began in Sevastopol. On their wave, a group of pro-Russian activists, led by a well-known businessman and philanthropist Alexei Chaly, seized power in the city. The police, "Berkut" and most of the local officials went over to their side.
This was the signal for Russia to act.
Pro-Russian forces were activated in Simferopol with the aim of raising the local Supreme Soviet to revolt against Kyiv. However, on their own they could not achieve their goal - the deputies were afraid to speak openly against the central government. In addition, they faced organized resistance from the Crimean Tatars.
Therefore, on February 27, Russia had to intervene openly - its special forces (according to other sources - Wagner PMC fighters) captured the Supreme Council. Only after that did the deputies find the courage to get together, elect the leader of Russian Unity, Sergei Aksyonov, as prime minister, and announce a referendum on expanding the rights of autonomy. Aksyonov and Speaker of the Parliament Konstantinov announced that they would recognize Viktor Yanukovych as the legitimate president.
The next day, Russian troops, unmarked and wearing balaclavas, took control of everything key objects on the peninsula and blocked the Ukrainian military units. A week later, the new Crimean authorities announced a referendum on joining Russia.
"Green men" in Crimea
On March 1, the Federation Council gave Putin permission to send troops to Ukraine, and pro-Russian speeches swept through all the major cities in the southeast.
As the Regionals withdrew from active politics, a key role in the organization was taken by various marginal pro-Russian organizations, which were helped financially from Moscow.
That is why, despite the widespread anti-Maidan sentiment in the southeast, the protests there were chaotic and of little meaning. In addition, against the backdrop of the events in Crimea, they immediately took on a separatist character (“we also want to go to Russia!”), thereby removing themselves from the legal field of Ukraine.
Russian curators tried to give them the form of a "fight for federalization", but it turned out badly, because people came out to rallies "to be like in Crimea", "for joining Russia." This seemed to the pro-Russian residents of the southeast a simple and understandable way to solve all problems at once.
Probably, there was an idea in Moscow that it was necessary to create a new movement, instead of the Party of Regions, which would set conditions for the central government and force it to compromise, but this did not work out.
First, the aforementioned factor of Crimea had a powerful influence. And not only in the sense that one way or another he set a separatist vector in protest actions, but also in the fact that from now on any protest speeches of the anti-Maidan persuasion were interpreted by the Ukrainian authorities unambiguously as separatist and treasonous. And what kind of dialogue can you have with them?
Secondly, the Russian curators simply lacked the ability and managerial skills to build some kind of unified line with a single leader who could become the personification of the protest movement and who, theoretically, could impose a dialogue on Kiev and the West. The bet was made on absolutely insignificant personalities, with whom no one wanted to deal with even at the level of their regions.
This was also superimposed on the beginning disagreements on the Ukrainian issue in the Kremlin. There, according to media reports, there was an influential group of people who urged Putin to limit himself to Crimea and leave the rest of Ukraine alone.
At the same time, a group of "Orthodox oligarch" Malofeev, with the support of Aksenov and some representatives of the Russian special services, insisted on spreading the "Russian Spring" to the entire southeast.
Taken together, this led to the fact that by the beginning of May, pro-Russian speeches in all regions of Ukraine, except for the Donbass, came to naught.
The Ukrainian authorities easily defeated them. True, they had to make several concessions. Thus, the law on languages was not repealed (although the Rada voted for it one of the very first days after the Maidan), non-aggression agreements were concluded with local elites in the regions of the southeast.
Dobkin and Kernes remained in Kharkov, Akhmetov established the closest communication with Yatsenyuk and installed Taruta, who was close to him, as governor of the Donetsk region. No one organized a purge of the "family overseer" of the Odessa region, Avramenko. Finally, the Dnipropetrovsk region was headed by Igor Kolomoisky, who, with his team (Gennady Korban and others), turned Dnepropetrovsk into a center of resistance to the Russian Spring.
However, if the authorities made concessions, they were only superficial.
In strategic terms - cooperation with the IMF and a course towards the West (EU and NATO), suppression of any attempts to challenge the legitimacy of the Maidan and hint at federalization or the need for dialogue with Russia - nothing has changed. Fortunately, the annexation of Crimea gave justification for such a policy.
Back in early April, Kyiv announced the collapse of the "Russian spring". And it seemed that everything was going to this. But then Donbass exploded...
There were three factors that distinguished the situation in this region from other areas of the southeast.
First, anti-government sentiment was particularly strong here. Moreover, initially they were not so much pro-Russian as anti-Maidan and regional-autonomist (“No one forced the Donbass to its knees”).
Secondly, if in other regions almost all influential people swore allegiance to the new government, then in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions the situation was different. Part of the elite, headed by Akhmetov, agreed to cooperate with Kiev. But the other part - associated with the fugitive President Yanukovych and his associates - decided to resist. And there were quite a few of their proteges in the authorities and in law enforcement agencies at all levels.
Thirdly, the Donbass became the only region where a significant part of the law enforcement agencies refused to comply with Kyiv's order to clean up the pro-Russian forces, and as soon as the clashes began, they openly went over to their side.
We are talking about the commander of the Donetsk "Alpha" Khodakovsky and the former "Berkut".
Akhmetov, who, along with his associates after the flight of Yanukovych, took control of the Party of Regions, was the first to sound the alarm, anticipating the threat of losing control over the Donbass.
At the end of March, his people (Boris Kolesnikov, Nikolai Levchenko) raised the issue of the need to expand the rights of the regions, to transfer part of the powers from the center to the localities. Lugansk elites made similar statements. Thus, the regionals expected to intercept the autonomist and, in part, the anti-Maidan agenda from the pro-Russian forces.
As of the end of March and the beginning of April, this plan could still work and due to relatively small concessions ("small compromise") from the central government, bring down the separatist wave in the Donbass.
But these proposals met with profound misunderstanding in Kyiv. They believed that the "Russian spring" had begun to decline, and therefore there was no need to make any concessions. Anyone who offered them was immediately labeled a traitor and separatist.
Further events were not long in coming. On April 7, the Donetsk and Kharkiv " people's republics"KhNR" lasted less than one day - the building of the regional administration seized by them was cleared out by special forces.
In Donetsk, everything was more complicated. Local "Alpha" refused to carry out the order to clean up and at a meeting of the security forces with the participation of Deputy Prime Minister Yarema, she made it clear that if someone tries to take the Donetsk Regional State Administration by force, then the local security forces will defend it.
Rinat Akhmetov also spoke out against the assault, fearing that the situation would then get out of control altogether. He, along with Nikolai Levchenko, came to the square in front of the Donetsk Regional State Administration and tried to convince the protesters to transfer the action to a legal course, to withdraw the demands for the separation of Donbass from Ukraine, promising to prevent tough actions by the security forces.
The assault was postponed, Yarema left for Kyiv.
And on April 12, a detachment of participants in the "Crimean self-defense" led by the former head of the security service Malofeev, Igor Strelkov-Girkin, captured Slavyansk.
Girkin in Slavyansk
Akhmetov and the Regionals once again turned to Kiev with a proposal to urgently expand the rights of Donbass in order to stop the conflict in the bud. But the answer was the decision to start the Antiterrorist Operation.
For many in Kyiv, Strelkov's raid was a real gift. They have long been waiting for a reason to rehabilitate themselves for the shameful surrender of Crimea and they wanted to "give a fight to Russia" at least somewhere, and at the same time to clean up the "anti-Maidan" harshly.
The capture of Slavyansk (officially interpreted by Ukraine as an invasion of the Donbass by Russian troops) provided an excellent excuse for this. The country began to slide towards war.
Subsequently, judging by unofficial media leaks, the Kremlin said that, they say, Strelkov's march was Malofeev's amateur performance, not coordinated with anyone and dragging Russia into the conflict in Donbas against her will. Although this is hard to believe. Especially, given the powerful informational support provided to the “strelkovites” by state-owned Russian television channels.
Rather, it can be assumed that Russia, perhaps not striving for a large-scale war in the Donbass, nevertheless decided to radicalize the situation in order to still force Kyiv and the West to make concessions and force them to compromise. In particular, to agree on a neutral status for Ukraine and on autonomy for a number of Ukrainian regions, putting the question of Crimea out of the brackets.
Indeed, five days after the capture of Slovyansk, an international group consisting of representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the United States, the EU and the OSCE met for the first time in Geneva, at which the first "peace plan" was written to resolve the situation in Ukraine. It carried the traces of that same Great Compromise - it spelled out, in particular, the expansion of the rights of the regions.
However, everything as a whole was formulated very indistinctly, and in sharp contrast with the mood in Kyiv. There, on the contrary, the escalation in the Donbass was used as proof of Russia's perfidy and the impossibility of making any compromises ("With whom? With terrorists seizing cities and killing Ukrainians?").
The West, after the Crimea, saw no reason to put pressure on Ukraine in order to force it to make any concessions to Moscow.
The conflict continued to develop according to its own laws. Since the 20th of April, fighting has become regular in the Donbass. A significant part of the region was already controlled by the separatists.
On May 11, the so-called "referendum" on the independence of the "DPR" and "LPR" was held. After him, the "government of the DPR" was formed, headed by a political strategist and citizen of the Russian Federation Borodai (a person close to Malofeev), which gave even more reason for Ukraine to talk about Russian aggression.
The Ukrainian authorities brought large military units to the Donbass, battles began, which went on with varying success for both sides. Losses grew, bitterness grew. Volunteers from all over Ukraine and from Russia went to Donbass. The flywheel of war spun more and more.
Ukrainian military in the ATO zone
In such conditions, on May 25, presidential elections were held, in which Petro Poroshenko won in the first round. Many were surprised that Russia did not ignore this fact, but, on the contrary, recognized it. Ambassador Zurabov (an old acquaintance of Poroshenko) returned to Kyiv and there were persistent rumors that the Great Compromise was about to be concluded, which would end the war in Donbass.
Allegedly, even before his election, Poroshenko promised the Kremlin that he would put the issue of Crimea out of the brackets, and give the Donbass some special status. And in response, Russia will recall Strelkov and Co. from there.
Immediately after the inauguration of Poroshenko, these rumors seem to have begun to be justified. The president announced a truce and then met with Putin, Merkel and Hollande in Normandy (hence the expression "Norman Four").
Poroshenko even appointed a special representative for the settlement of the Donbass - Leonid Kuchma. Soon he, together with Viktor Medvedchuk, Nestor Shufrich, Russian Ambassador Zurabov and OSCE representatives, went to Donetsk, where he met with Borodai and other representatives of the "DPR".
Leaks of information from the negotiating group indicated that the issue of some kind of autonomy for Donbass and a ceasefire was being discussed. Then the chances for this were, of course, lower than in March, but still they were.
At least in all the cities of Donbass occupied by the separatists, dual power was maintained. In fact, the former management structures were operating, the police were subordinate to Ukraine. But in parallel, indignation at these negotiations grew in Kyiv. There were rallies of volunteer battalions, at which Poroshenko was demanded a war to a victorious end.
The President hesitated for a long time, but, in the end, he decided to go to war. On the night of July 1, he gave the order to end the truce and start the offensive. At the headquarters of the ATO, as Strana has already written, they proceeded from the fact that the separatists are poorly trained gangs, and Russia will not dare to intervene.
What follows is well known.
After the successes of July (the north of the Donetsk region and the west of the Luhansk region were liberated), a series of defeats began. With the active participation of Russian troops, the separatists defeated the Ukrainian units on the border with Russia. Then the battalion-tactical groups of the Russian army entered the Donbass and hit the rear of the ATO group advancing on Ilovaisk. Ukrainian troops fell into the pocket, suffered heavy losses, a significant part of the equipment was destroyed, the entire southern flank of the Ukrainian troops fell apart.
Stunned by this turn of events, Poroshenko agreed to a truce.
On September 5, an agreement was signed in Minsk on a ceasefire, as well as on a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Donbass. It spelled out the same special status, local elections and amnesty. The situation seemed to have returned to the state of July 1, 2014.
At first it seemed that there was a chance for the implementation of the agreements.
At least the Ukrainian leadership began to do their part in a disciplined manner. So, the president and the then speaker Turchynov pushed through the parliament a law on a special status for the Donbass with the argument "otherwise there will be a war, and there will be no one to fight after Ilovaisk."
Judging by friendly dialogue Governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region Kolomoisky with a Russian prankster who introduced himself as Pavel Gubarev, the Ukrainian elite was really in the mood for a compromise in September 2014.
The moral and military-political consequences of Ilovaisk were still strong. And the West, frightened by the prospect of a military defeat of its Ukrainian allies, demanded the implementation of the Minsk road map.
But since October the situation began to change. The threat of another military defeat receded. The holes in the front were patched up with new units. Oil was falling in price, and obviously Russia was no longer up to the war with Ukraine. Fights for the Donetsk airport began. The image of cyborgs defending it has become a moral compensation for Ilovaisk for the Ukrainian society, the mood "we need peace at any cost" began to weaken.
But the main thing is that in the parliamentary elections of 2014, the Popular Front unexpectedly took a lot of votes, which positioned itself as a "party of war." The Rada also included many representatives of volunteer battalions and people with radical views. The general mood of the deputies became quite unambiguous: "no compromises with Russia and separatist terrorists."
In such an environment, Poroshenko, even if he was initially determined to implement the political part of Minsk, could not follow this path, as he risked running into accusations of betrayal.
Note that Russia did not contribute to the mood for compromise. In November, she held "elections" for the heads of the "DPR/LPR", which were not provided for by the Minsk agreements, which gave Kiev a reason to accuse Moscow of completely ignoring them.
By December 2014, the Minsk Compromise had died without being implemented.
Since the new year, fighting in the Donbass has resumed. The separatists were the initiators this time. Russia did not like the fact that Ukraine was ignoring the agreements, and therefore it wanted to force Kyiv to sit down at the negotiating table again.
The battles, unlike in 2014, were local in nature - the Donetsk airport and Debaltseve. But shelling went along the entire front line, leading to numerous casualties among the civilian population (well-known examples are Volnovakha and Mariupol).
In military terms, events unfolded unsuccessfully for the Ukrainian side. Control over the Donetsk airport was lost. In February, with the support of the Russians, the city of Debaltseve was taken into the cauldron, from which, with heavy losses and abandoning military equipment, troops had to be withdrawn.
Against this background, new negotiations started in Minsk with the participation of Merkel, Hollande, Putin and Poroshenko. But there was an important difference from the situation on the eve of the first Minsk talks. At that time, the Ukrainian army faced the prospect of defeat, and therefore Kyiv had a motive to speed up peace negotiations in order to avoid this defeat.
In February 2015, despite heavy losses, there was no prospect of defeat. It was clear that, except for Debaltseve, the separatists would hardly have been able to win new victories. Unless, if large-scale support for Russian troops is provided, which Kyiv no longer believed in.
Therefore, Poroshenko was seated at the negotiating table in Minsk by the leaders of the West, who by that time were determined to put up with Moscow.
Negotiations in Minsk in February 2015. Photo sputniknews.com
It was for their sake (or rather, for the sake of receiving financial assistance from the IMF, which was critically important for a country where the hryvnia exchange rate exceeded 30 at that moment) that the president signed the second Minsk agreements. They worsened the negotiating position for the Ukrainian authorities. There, the logistics of the reconciliation process were described more specifically.
In particular, it was written that the transfer of control over the border to Ukraine will begin after the local elections and will end only after the amendments to the Constitution come into force. That is, the political process was put in the first place before the transfer of control over the border to Ukraine.
That is why, literally from the very first days, the Ukrainian authorities began to sabotage the implementation of the political part.
First of all, because they did not see any sense in it. Poroshenko and his allies from the Popular Front were quite tired of maintaining the status quo. When active hostilities (which could lead to new defeats and heavy losses) are not conducted, but local battles continue (and you can constantly talk about them in the media, mobilizing the people against the aggressor country and recording all your political opponents as agents of the Kremlin ).
Around the line of demarcation, its own corrupt infrastructure for smuggling and control over commodity flows has developed, from which the entire power vertical was fed.
The billions of dollars allocated for the war were also used by structures close to power.
In general, there was no reason for the ruling elite to stop this celebration of life of their own free will.
However, there were two factors that for some time forced the authorities to move towards a political settlement.
First, it is the pressure of the West. Ukraine assumed international obligations under the Minsk agreements, under which a large complex of relations between the EU and the US and Russia was tied up, and therefore Western partners believed that Kyiv should still follow the path of implementing Minsk-2. Mainly - to prevent the threat of a new war.
Secondly, a significant part of Ukrainian big business was in favor of an early pacification in the east and the normalization of relations with Russia. And not only associated with the Opposition Bloc, but also focused on Poroshenko. While the war is going on and the issue of borders and relations with the largest neighbor has not been fully resolved, naturally, one should not count on an influx of investments and an increase in the capitalization of one's own assets.
The lack of credit resources bled Ukrainian business and made the country more and more dependent on the support of the West. The national capital was determined to return to a multi-vector approach. Cautious thoughts on this subject were expressed at the end of 2016, but were in the air much earlier.
Throughout 2015 and 2016, consultations continued between the Russian, Ukrainian and Western sides, during which a preliminary scheme was even developed. After the local elections, the former elite (Akhmetov and representatives of the Opposition Bloc) returned to power in the Donbass, the region received a special status, the border was transferred under the control of Ukraine. Russia is leaving.
However, this plan aroused strong opposition from the "party of war" in Kyiv. In addition, he was dissatisfied with the separatists and their curators in Moscow. They did not want to lose power in their "republics".
Therefore, by joint efforts, they did everything to ensure that this plan remained only on paper.
On August 31, 2015, when the parliament adopted in the first reading amendments to the Constitution on a special status, clashes took place near the Verkhovna Rada. Opponents of the changes threw a grenade at the National Guardsmen. Several people died.
Representatives of the authorities began to express fears that pedaling the topic of "special status for Donbass" could lead to mass riots (especially since the radicals constantly threatened this).
At the beginning of 2016, when the time came to adopt amendments to the Constitution in the second reading, the Popular Front strongly opposed this, without which there would hardly have been votes.
The question was shelved.
Throughout 2016, there were sluggish negotiations on how to implement Minsk-2. The West demanded that Ukraine fulfill the political part of the agreements, but at the same time, the position of the Ukrainian authorities became tougher - it insisted: first control over the border and only then elections.
And for starters - a complete ceasefire (which was impossible to achieve).
After Trump's election victory, many believed that now, finally, there would be a breakthrough in relations. But this turned out to be an illusion. American establishment tied up american president hands and feet in relations with Russia, and therefore no global changes are taking place.
In the Donbas itself, meanwhile, the base for the Great Compromise was gradually being destroyed by the efforts of both sides.
This process accelerated sharply after the blockade of uncontrolled territories. The blockade was initiated by Ukrainian radicals, but at the same time the separatists clearly played along with them, squeezing out enterprises of Ukrainian owners under this pretext.
The basis for compromise was also destroyed by the humanitarian policy of the Ukrainian authorities. After a tactical retreat in the spring of 2014, massive Ukrainization began in 2016. The process of decommunization was launched, cities are renamed without the consent of their inhabitants.
People with a different point of view are actively hinted that it is better for them to leave Ukraine or accept a new concept.
In general, everything is being done to show that there will be no compromise. The question is closed. Ukraine will be a mono-country, with common ideas about the past and the future.
So, at least, the ideologists of the current government think. And how will it really be?
Three scenarios for Ukraine
The current situation is obviously transitional. Its meaning is that the former class that has ruled Ukraine since Kuchma's time - the class of national capital and the politicians and officials associated with it - wants to continue to live according to the principle "Texas must be robbed by Texans." That is, not to let competitors from either the East or the West reach the commanding heights.
It should be noted that it is much more difficult to carry out such a policy now than in the days of the multi-vector policy of Kuchma and Yanukovych.
The Eastern vector has been broken, relations with Russia, if not completely terminated, have become semi-legal and can no longer be relied upon to prevent the West from increasing its influence.
Dependence on the latter has dramatically increased. And financial, and military-political, and personal. With one call from Washington, Panama can arrest Poroshenko's offshore companies, turning him from a billionaire into a beggar. Moreover, a beggar who, unlike Yanukovych, has nowhere to run.
The same can be said about most of the other representatives of the current elite. The zeroing of the Russian vector has made them totally dependent on relations with the West.
True, the current Ukrainian elite, headed by Poroshenko, showed considerable ingenuity and resourcefulness in order to continue to follow the “Texas” principle, even with a mere minuscule in their hands.
Two factors contribute to this.
The first is the rather low commercial interest of transnational corporations in Ukraine. Yes, they are interested in our country as a sales market. We have assets that can be taken under control (land, energy and transport infrastructure, mining). But all this does not promise such a big profit that someone in the West would decide to make real efforts to clean up the political space in Ukraine for the entry of their capital.
If we suddenly discovered huge and easily recoverable oil and gas reserves, then the conversation would be completely different.
The second factor is war. It performs a dual function. On the one hand, the unresolved conflict in the east deters Western competitors who would like to compete for a place under the Ukrainian sun.
On the other hand, the war allows the Ukrainian elite to "sell" to the West their necessity and irreplaceability. Kyiv opposes Russia, which is beneficial to the West, and therefore why destabilize the situation in Ukraine, starting to scrap an already established system, risking playing into the hands of the Russians. Like, let the Texans continue to plunder Texas, because they are protecting the Mexican border at the same time.
So far, this story works. Despite the constant criticism of the Ukrainian authorities from the West, neither the EU nor the US are taking any tough measures against Poroshenko and Co.
But Ukraine does not exist on a separate planet. And so the changes are coming and will go.
The main factor is that due to political and military instability, as well as incomprehensible rules of the game, there is no access to large investments and cheap money in Ukraine.
Including the development of national business.
Some of its representatives can compensate for this through corrupt rent (development of budgetary funds or making super profits through tariff regulation), but this path is far from accessible to everyone. And because of the need to coordinate fiscal policy with the IMF and the West, it will become more and more difficult to do this every year.
Therefore, one way or another, but the national business will weaken, and its ability to withstand pressure from outside will decrease. Especially after the introduction of the land market, which will deal a blow to the largest agricultural holdings.
Gradually, with the help of anti-corruption structures created with the participation of the West, key representatives of the Ukrainian political and business elite will be purged, who will resist the course of events.
And if everything goes as it goes, then in ten or fifteen years Ukraine will turn into an ordinary Eastern European country, from which millions of people will leave to work - some to Russia, some to Europe, and the rest will have a standard of living slightly lower than now in Bulgaria.
At the same time, the remnants of industry, as well as the agricultural business, will be controlled by Western European, Chinese and Middle Eastern companies. A significant part of the current oligarchs will either be forced to leave the country or go to jail. Those who survive will lose influence and recede into secondary roles in politics and business.
At the same time, the geopolitical future of such Ukraine is rather uncertain. Whether the country will join the EU and NATO, what kind of relations it will have with Russia is unclear. Just as it is not clear what NATO, the EU and Russia will be like in 10-15 years.
But this is, shall we say, an inertial scenario.
The Ukrainian elite can break it in two ways.
The first is the radicalization of the nationalist vector, the final rejection of most democratic freedoms, the cleansing of the political space from any competition, the dispossession of part of the oligarchy and the redistribution of its assets among the remaining players. Possibly a declaration of martial law.
This will allow for some time to extend the existence of the current clan-corruption model of power.
True, such a scheme carries obvious risks. The most important is the risk of running into obstruction from the West, and hence the entire international community. This will be a strong blow to power.
Moreover, at the same time, both separatist and pro-Russian sentiments in the southeast and radical nationalist movements can intensify. The latter will try to take advantage of the turmoil to seize power, just as the Bolsheviks did in October 1917.
As a result, the country will be on the verge of collapse, and the current Ukrainian elite will be under the threat of complete annihilation.
The second way is just the opposite. Return to multi-vector. That is, the restoration of relations with Russia at one level or another, the reintegration of Donbass with a special status, amnesty, the rejection of nationalist excesses and the pedaling of socially divisive topics in domestic politics, the refusal to join NATO, the declaration of the neutral status of Ukraine.
Given the West's fatigue from the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the United States and the EU can theoretically agree with this option (at least for the first time).
This path has economic advantages - the end of the war and reconciliation with the largest neighbor will open the way for investments, Ukraine can count on donor assistance from both the West and Russia to eliminate the consequences of the war. This will ensure a rapid recovery of the economy and an increase in the standard of living of the population. National business will receive the necessary impetus for development.
At the same time, this scenario currently looks difficult to implement.
It will certainly try to torpedo the nationalist forces. They are already talking about a "night of long knives" if "pro-Russian" forces win the elections. It is very likely that they will try to carry out their threats.
Therefore, in order for the country to take the "third way", much more needs to be done. Starting from the consolidation of forces advocating the implementation of this scenario, and ending with a radical change in the information policy of the largest media owned by national capital.
In general, any variant of the country's future development is a difficult path, fraught with a complete breakdown of the existing system in the country, demolition of all its current players from the chessboard.
The realization of this should, in theory, encourage the Ukrainian elite to be extremely cautious and avoid abrupt and ill-considered steps. Moreover, relations with Russia are teetering "on the brink", and war is smoldering in the east. The "DPR" and "LPR" are listed with the sword of Damocles. Millions of citizens of Ukraine do not accept the current government.
In the event of a major upheaval, all this can again begin to move.
The conversation about the future of Ukraine, which began on the first Maidan and came to blood on the second, has not yet been completed. Moreover, more and more firewood is thrown into the fire of contradictions from all sides.
Will the Ukrainian elite and people have the courage and intelligence to end this curse and follow the path of national reconciliation, refusing to be a tool in the hands of external forces, is the main question on which the future of our country depends.
