Counterintelligence activities - activities carried out by bodies federal service security and (or) their subdivisions (hereinafter in this article - counterintelligence bodies), as well as officials of these bodies and subdivisions through counterintelligence measures in order to identify, prevent, suppress intelligence and other activities of special services and organizations of foreign states, as well as individual persons aimed at causing damage to the security of the Russian Federation.

The grounds for carrying out counterintelligence activities by counterintelligence agencies are:

a) availability of data on signs of intelligence and other activities of special services and organizations of foreign states, as well as individuals, aimed at causing damage to the security of the Russian Federation;

b) the need to obtain information about events or actions that pose a threat to the security of the Russian Federation;

d) the need to study (verify) persons who provide or have provided assistance to federal security service organs on a confidential basis;

e) the need to ensure their own security;

E) requests from special services, law enforcement agencies and other organizations of foreign states, international organizations in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation.

The list of grounds for conducting counterintelligence measures is exhaustive and can only be changed or supplemented by federal law.

In the process of counterintelligence activities, overt and covert measures are taken, the special nature of which is determined by the conditions of this activity. The procedure for carrying out counterintelligence measures is established by regulatory legal acts of the federal executive body in the field of security.

The carrying out of counterintelligence measures that restrict the rights of citizens to the secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraphic and other messages transmitted over electric and postal networks is allowed only on the basis of a judge's decision and in the manner prescribed by the legislation of the Russian Federation.

The carrying out of counterintelligence measures that restrict the right of citizens to the inviolability of their homes is allowed only in cases established by federal law, or on the basis of a judge's decision.

If it is necessary to carry out counterintelligence measures that restrict the constitutional rights of citizens specified in this article, the head of the counterintelligence agency or his deputy shall file an appropriate petition with the court. The resolution on initiating a petition sets out the motives and grounds due to which it became necessary to carry out the relevant measures, as well as data confirming the validity of the petition (with the exception of the information specified in part two of Article 24 of this Federal Law). The list of categories of heads of counterintelligence agencies and their deputies authorized to file a petition for counterintelligence measures that restrict the indicated constitutional rights of citizens is established by regulatory legal acts of the federal executive body in the field of security.

Consideration of a petition for conducting counterintelligence measures that restrict the constitutional rights of citizens specified in this article must be carried out by a single judge and immediately at the place where such measures are carried out or at the location of the body applying for their conduct.

After considering the petition, the judge shall issue one of the following rulings:

a) on the permissibility of carrying out counterintelligence measures that restrict the constitutional rights of citizens;

b) on the refusal to carry out counterintelligence measures that restrict the constitutional rights of citizens.

The period of validity of a ruling issued by a judge is calculated in days from the date of its issuance and cannot exceed 180 days, unless the judge makes a different decision. In this case, the period is not interrupted. If it is necessary to extend the term of the decision, the judge makes a decision on the basis of the newly submitted materials.

The refusal of a judge to carry out counterintelligence measures that restrict the constitutional rights of citizens specified in this article, the counterintelligence body petitioning for their implementation, has the right to appeal to a higher court.

In urgent cases, when delay may lead to the commission of a grave or especially grave crime, or when there is evidence of a threat to the state, military, economic or environmental security of the Russian Federation, on the basis of a reasoned decision of the head of the counterintelligence agency or his deputy, when carrying out counterintelligence measures, it is allowed to limit the measures indicated in of this article of the constitutional rights of citizens without a preliminary judicial decision with the obligatory notification of the judge within 24 hours from the moment of restriction of the constitutional rights of citizens. The counterintelligence body, within 48 hours from the moment of restriction of the constitutional rights of citizens, is obliged to receive a judge's decision on such restriction or cancel the specified restriction.

The decision of the judge on the admissibility of carrying out counterintelligence measures that restrict the constitutional rights of citizens specified in this article, and the materials that served as the basis for its adoption, are stored in counterintelligence agencies.

The petition of the head of the counterintelligence agency or his deputy for carrying out counterintelligence measures that restrict the constitutional rights of citizens specified in this article, the decision of the judge and the materials that served as the basis for its adoption, shall be submitted to the prosecutor's office in the event of supervisory checks on the materials and information received by the prosecutor's office , appeals of citizens testifying to the violation by the counterintelligence agencies of the legislation of the Russian Federation.

The results of counterintelligence measures may be used in criminal proceedings in accordance with the procedure established by the criminal procedural legislation for the use of the results of operational-search activities.

The introduction of agents of the secret services of foreign states goes through two main channels:

• 1) their inclusion in various observer missions;
• 2) activities of intelligence agents under the guise of humanitarian organizations and business structures.

The main areas of work of foreign intelligence services and diplomatic missions:

• 1) collection and analysis of information about the situation in society, the state of power and opposition, protest moods, etc.;
• 2) establishing contacts with local NGOs, representatives of the elite, the media, leaders of opposition forces (in the absence of obvious authoritative and charismatic leaders, identifying possible candidates, as was the case with the figure of V. Kostunica in Yugoslavia), business communities, authoritative representatives of the local community (including in other countries);
• 3) the formation of a mass protest movement, overseeing events to "promotion" of the opposition;
• 4) organization of training seminars and trainings for opposition activists;
• 5) transportation and distribution of cash flows for the opposition:
• 6) tracking the actions of the authorities in the situation of the beginning of the confrontation with the opposition;
• 7) blackmailing government officials, real and potential supporters of government, representatives of law enforcement agencies and the army in the process of preparing a color revolution;
• 8) control over the actions of the oppositionists themselves, preventing the possibility of collusion with the authorities, the introduction of agents of local special services into the opposition environment, and the leakage of information.

The basis for agreements, blackmail and recruitment are:

• 1) the vulnerability of the business of these persons both domestically and abroad. The merging of the business community and the bureaucracy, which is typical for developing countries, the presence of public servants of their own business structures and assets makes them vulnerable to external blackmail if they have a business outside the state or depend on external sources;
• 2) the threat of criminal prosecution and arrest in the territory of other states on charges of corruption, war crimes, etc. The deprivation of the possibility of movement outside the state is, among other things, a continuation of the tactics of economic blackmail;
• 3) the presence of serious compromising evidence, the possibility of its effective publication and "promotion" both before the start of the coup and after it ends, if the person does not express readiness for cooperation and finally ends up in the camp of the losers. The effectiveness of compromising information is largely determined by the possibility of its publication in a specific socio-political situation of confrontation between various political cliques. The opposing faction can grab onto it and “spin it” for their own purposes. Or this person can be transferred to the status of a "scapegoat" for his own, forced (or willing) to "merge" him. Also, the basis for blackmail and recruitment can be the possibility of fabrication and promotion (both in domestic and international media) of compromising evidence, even in the absence of it;
• 4) "positive compromising evidence". Knowing the interests, needs and goals of the individual allows him to "buy", without resorting to intimidation with negative sanctions. After all, the “revolution” can well reward its supporter in a situation of dividing portfolios and property concentrated in the hands of the “anti-people regime”;
• 5) direct or indirect bribery. Latent bribery can be expressed in the provision of opportunities and preferences to the business of this person and/or his relatives.

Ted Garr has the following interesting statement: "One of the most powerful effects of "revolutionary appeals" is to convince people that political violence can provide for itself the acquisition of values ​​\u200b\u200bthat correspond to the price of risk and guilt, or even exceed them."

In 2003, the German director Suzanne Brandstetter filmed a documentary investigating the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime - "Checkmate - Revolution Strategy or Analysis case study American politics." Dominique Fontvielle, a former officer of the French special services, tells about the methods of "organizing the revolution" in the film.

• 1. First, it is necessary to identify in a given country those forces that oppose the regime in order to destabilize it, to identify people who are opposed to the existing regime, who have influence and enjoy the confidence of the population.
• 2. An effective propaganda campaign should be launched from the outside, which tries to prove that this regime is hated by everyone, that it is isolated from other countries, that it no longer has the right to be called a free state. And it should be shown that the opposition movements that will appear are legitimate.
• 3. Preparation of the future head of state. It will be necessary to replace the head of the old regime. He has to be prepared, he has to take office naturally. This means that he must be one of the leaders of the opposition movement or he must be recognized by all opposition movements. It also should not be someone who will be satisfied with twenty years in exile and then arriving in the country in a foreign convoy or in an airplane along with special forces, which must carry out the first stages of destabilization. He must be persuasive, otherwise he cannot emerge or even create a credible government.

In line with the concepts of "cultural hegemony" by A. Gramsci, the American concept of "soft power" is largely built. If the intelligentsia in this or that society has a lot of weight and is the real ruler of thoughts, it immediately acts as an interesting and necessary object for recruitment. Lack of understanding of the power of ideas and ideas that spread among the intelligentsia over the formation of the contours of the "image of the future" destroyed the inflexible political regimes of the countries of the socialist camp and the USSR. The former Hungarian dissident Enike Bollobash, who in 1989 was the deputy ambassador of Hungary in Washington, tells about her close ties with the “diplomats” from the CIA during the preparations for the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime in the Socialist Republic of Romania: “They wanted to unite all those who were against Ceausescu and pro-democratic. They managed to recruit important Romanian intellectuals, writers, thinkers, philosophers and scientists. It was a time when meetings with these diplomats took place at night under the bridge, and various legends had to be invented. This small network in Romania managed to prepare public opinion, which then created the right environment for the overthrow of Ceausescu.

MOSCOW, December 20 - RIA Novosti, Vadim Saranov. Dozens of professional intelligence officers and hundreds of agents recruited by them annually come to the attention of state security agencies. All in all, thousands of agents and spies from different countries are constantly "working" against Russia. The FSB of Russia is celebrating the 100th anniversary of its foundation. Traditionally, one of the key tasks of the department is to counter espionage. About what challenges Russian counterintelligence officers face today - in the material of RIA Novosti.

Four thousand foreign agents

According to the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court, 13 Russians were convicted of treason in 2016, and three foreigners were sentenced for espionage. The figures are modest, however, according to experts, they are not a marker of the activity of foreign intelligence services.

“The number of foreign intelligence agents in Russia has been constant over the past 25 years, the number of established intelligence agents is about four thousand people,” retired FSB Major General Alexander Mikhailov told RIA Novosti. the network begins to act more actively, more global tasks are set for it."

According to Mikhailov, only a few of the exposed foreign agents end up on the bunk. As a rule, the case is limited to their deportation to their historical homeland, and, interestingly, information about spy scandals does not always leak into the media. Some exposed agents are not even aware that they are under the hood and are used by the special services as a channel for disinformation. In total, according to official data, in the first half of 2017 alone, the activities of 30 career employees of foreign intelligence services and more than 200 persons suspected of collaborating with foreign special services were suppressed in Russia.

Games with the CIA

According to experts, one of the main opponents of Russia on the intelligence front continues to be the United States. The most high-ranking American spy recently exposed by our counterintelligence officers was the third secretary of the US Embassy, ​​and part-time CIA staffer Ryan Fogle. The intelligence officer was arrested in May 2013 while trying to recruit an officer of the Russian special services. Everything looked in the best traditions of the spy genre - Fogle came to the meeting in a wig and glasses, taking with him a compass and an atlas of Moscow.

“The United States not only has a wide intelligence network in our country, but actually manages all European intelligence services,” Alexander Mikhailov is convinced. In fact, we are confronted by a very serious intelligence bloc, to which all new members adjoin, mainly the former Soviet republics.

© FSB of Russia

© FSB of Russia

After the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the Donbass, Ukraine began to show vigorous intelligence activity on the territory of Russia. Agents of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Intelligence Service of our neighbor regularly come to the attention of the Russian special services. The most popular direction for Ukrainian intelligence officers is the Crimea, and their tasks are not limited to collecting information. Members of at least three Ukrainian intelligence groups exposed in Crimea were preparing acts of sabotage at infrastructure facilities. Ukrainian fighters of the invisible front also “emerge” in mainland Russia: in October 2017, a shipyard worker was detained in Togliatti, who, on instructions from the special services, was collecting information about the work of the enterprise. The failed agent was eventually deported to Ukraine.

Social networks - springboard for espionage

The increased activity of foreign intelligence services is connected not only with the aggravation of relations between Russia and the West. According to experts, foreign intelligence services are very closely interested in the state armaments program, under which the army receives the latest models of military equipment. So, on December 12, a 24-year-old resident of the capital Alexei Zhitnyuk was arrested in Moscow. According to investigators, the Muscovite was collecting information about the Russian Navy and passing it through an agent to the US Central Intelligence Agency.

Moreover, foreign intelligence agencies are actively adopting new technologies - in Russia, cases of recruitment via the Internet are increasingly being recorded. Back in 2011, a Special Collection Service (SCS) was created in the United States, which monitors social networks and selects candidates for recruitment.

“Today, preparation for recruiting a person does not require any special approaches,” Alexander Mikhailov believes. “A person puts on the Web not only his biography, but also where he goes, with whom he is friends and even what he eats. Therefore, modern networks represent a colossal springboard for conducting intelligence activities.As for directly electronic espionage or hacker attacks, the events of recent years show that our special services, with the exception of isolated cases of betrayal, do not allow serious leaks of classified information.At the same time, leaks in the United States, roughly speaking, from all the cracks. This is both Snowden and WikiLeaks, but these leaks did not become a big revelation for us - we have known everything for a long time. "

Special services of the White movement. Counterintelligence. 1918-1922 Kirmel Nikolai Sergeevich

2. Suppression of reconnaissance and subversive actions of special services and organizations of Soviet Russia and foreign states

After the October Revolution of 1917, the territory of the split Russian Empire became the scene of a struggle for power, spheres of influence, natural resources, and markets for both internal and external forces seeking to dismember the country. Therefore, not only Soviet Russia and Germany, but also limitrophe countries and even allies - England, the USA, France and Japan - showed increased attention to the White Guard state formations that fought "for the one and the indivisible". Virtually all the powers involved in one form or another in the Russian Civil War engaged in espionage against the White Guard regimes.

When creating their own security agencies, the command of the Volunteer Army was guided by the "Temporary Regulations on the Counterintelligence Service" of 1917. The first paragraph of this document defined the task of counterintelligence, which consisted "... exclusively in the detection and examination of enemy spies ...". Spies were called persons who "secretly or under false pretenses collected or tried to collect information of a military nature with the intention of communicating it to the enemy", and espionage was understood as "collecting all kinds of information."

In November 1918, the head of the special department, based on the experience of the first months civil war, in a report to the chief of the General Staff, he explained that “under the concept of“ spy ”and“ enemy ”one cannot understand a subject or agent of a foreign power with which we are at war. Anyone who seeks to harm the unity and power of the state by his activity should be considered an adversary. Colonel V.V. Kreiter rightly believed that in order to "successfully fight enemy reconnaissance, it is necessary to monitor his work, go in parallel with him and prevent his attacks."

However, in the initial period of their existence, Denikin's counterintelligence organs, which were not yet strong, were forced to devote their forces and means, first of all, to the fight against the Bolshevik underground organizations. “The scope of duties of counterintelligence, determined by the “Regulations on the Counterintelligence Service”, does not at all meet the requirements of the time, since the fight against enemy military espionage is now a secondary task,” says the report of the Chief Quartermaster of the headquarters of the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Territory. “The civil war, being a political struggle, cannot leave counterintelligence aside from politics.” One can agree with this argument only partially. Documents testify that the Bolshevik underground directed its efforts not only to organizing armed uprisings and propaganda activities, but also infiltrated army headquarters to obtain intelligence data. At the same time, the work of foreign intelligence agents was not limited to “pure” intelligence, but was also aimed at weakening the potential of the Denikin regime: support for opposition forces, propaganda, decomposition of military units, sabotage, etc.

Speaking about the priorities in the activities of Denikin's counterintelligence at the initial stage of the Civil War, it should be borne in mind that the special services of the main enemy - Soviet Russia - were in the process of formation. Only on November 5, 1918, the central body of military intelligence was created - the Registration Directorate of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (RVSR). Experiencing a lack of financial resources and qualified personnel, the Register was not immediately able to create agent networks in the White Guard rear and organize the collection of the information needed by the command.

The bodies of the Cheka in 1918 did not have specialized intelligence structures, their main efforts were concentrated on "fighting the counter-revolution" within the country and suppressing the centers of anti-Soviet speeches. The main task of the Special Department of the Cheka, created on December 19, 1918, was to combat espionage and counter-revolution in institutions and units of the Red Army. Only at the end of 1919 did the local special departments take up foreign counterintelligence.

During their formation, the red special services did not actively work in the rear of the White Guard. This circumstance caused some complacency among the officials of Denikin's counterintelligence, which concentrated all its efforts on the fight against the Bolshevik underground organizations. So, the head of the special department of the department of the General Staff of the Military Directorate, Colonel P.G. Arkhangelsky in 1919 wrote about the elimination of counterintelligence "from fulfilling its immediate duty - monitoring the intelligence officers and agents of the enemy."

The peak of the confrontation between Soviet intelligence and the White Guard counterintelligence in the South of Russia fell on 1919, during the period of intensive hostilities.

An analysis of the documents allows us to judge that the Red intelligence services acted in two ways: on the one hand, they sent lone intelligence officers to the White Guard headquarters to collect information of a military nature, and on the other hand, they carried out a massive deployment of agents to carry out reconnaissance and subversive activities behind enemy lines, often in cooperation with underground organizations. Just the latter, for the most part, became the objects of development of Denikin's counterintelligence.

The White Guard security agencies established that in the North Caucasus three Soviet military organizations were conducting reconnaissance against the All-Union Socialist Revolutionary Federation: the Revolutionary Military Council, the headquarters and a special department of the 11th Army. The Soviet command, intending to cut off the oil region from the White Army, launched an attack on Kizlyar. To conduct operational intelligence, commit terrorist acts and agitate among the mountain population and workers, the Bolsheviks sent about 600 inexperienced agents to the North Caucasus. The main mass of intelligence officers, according to the White Guard counterintelligence, went to Kizlyar, Petrovsk, Baku, Grozny, the rest - to Stavropol, Rostov-on-Don, Velikoknyazheskaya, Tsaritsyn, Orenburg, Guryev. The Whites managed to capture some of the agents and find out the plans of the Red Command.

On October 12, 1919, the head of the KRO at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief and commander of the troops of the Terek-Dagestan Territory, captain Novitsky, reported on the disclosure of the entire organization of Soviet intelligence in the rear of the VSYUR.

On October 18, 1919, the captain reported that after the defeat of the Kizlyar and Grozny organizations, the Bolsheviks held a meeting in Baku, at which they decided to form a new intelligence network, sending agents to Tiflis, Batumi, and from there to Sochi, Tuapse, Maikop, Novorossiysk and further to North Caucasus.

Denikin's special services established the goals, objectives, areas of action of some leaders of the Caucasian Communist Committee (KKK), which was engaged in reconnaissance and subversive activities in the rear of the VSYUR. His connection with the British Labor Party in Moscow and the Transcaucasian Peasants' and Workers' Congress in Tiflis was documented. The security agencies of the Armed Forces of Russia managed to find out about the plan for sinking the ships of the Caspian flotilla, which was developed by the KKK together with the command of the Red Army. In October 1919, counterintelligence arrested the main executor of the upcoming act of sabotage and instead introduced its agent into the organization, thanks to which it had reliable information about the impending explosions. Soon the members of the underground were arrested and handed over to the naval court.

In November 1919, the counterintelligence headquarters of the commander of the troops North Caucasus noted that the Bolsheviks spend huge amounts of money on intelligence and agitation. Moreover, in order to lower the exchange rate of the ruble and the living wage, Soviet emissaries flooded foreign markets with all-Russian banknotes, which caused dissatisfaction among the population with the White Guard authorities. The aforementioned Caucasian Communist Committee did not spare money to attract the ranks of the Volunteer Army to tacit cooperation, organize insurrectionary movements in the rear of the All-Union Socialist Revolutionary Federation, and bribe smugglers and administration. The leaders of Denikin's special services suggested that the authorities withdraw from circulation those banknotes that were distributed in unlimited quantities by Soviet Russia and Germany.

Since the appearance of English transports with equipment and weapons in the Novorossiysk seaport, counterintelligence officers have recorded an increase in the activity of Soviet agents, accompanied by the destruction of military supplies, systematic inhibition of the supply of artillery shells to the front, theft of uniforms, etc.

Port workers, exposed to Bolshevik agitation, according to secret sources, intended to sabotage the work of supplying the army by holding strikes.

The author is far from thinking that the above facts characterize the activities of all red intelligence officers and agents exposed by Denikin's counterintelligence. It seems that there were a few more of them, but gaps in the source base do not allow us to name specific numbers, surnames, nicknames of agents, the reasons and circumstances for their exposure, etc. Much, probably, could be told to researchers by documents that appeared as a result of the quartermaster-general’s approved of the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the All-Union Socialist Republic in August 1919 "Instructions for conducting undercover office work by counterintelligence agencies." The document was intended to ensure secrecy, systematization, regulation and accounting of search work, and also established the procedure for undercover office work, which is mandatory for all KROs.

All correspondence about the suspects was conducted by the assistant head of the department for the search department or the head of the point, with the involvement of the most trusted officials for assignments. Paragraph 6 of the instructions read: “All secret employees working on assignments from counterintelligence agencies can only be recorded in the personal notebook of the head of the counterintelligence agency, which he must always have with him and destroy it at the slightest danger. The entire entry must consist of three words: the name, patronymic and surname of the employee, without mentioning any words relating to the agency, its place of residence and occupation. The record of employees must be encrypted with a cipher personally invented by the head of the counterintelligence agency. The alphabet book of secret agents was kept only with an indication of their nicknames and marks of those violations of service and cases of negative behavior of agents that are unacceptable and led to the refusal to register an agent and his exclusion. They had to be stored together with ciphers and were available only to the heads of counterintelligence agencies and persons in charge of agents.

Denikin's security agencies lacked material and financial means, experienced staff members and agents to consolidate and develop their success in the fight against reconnaissance and subversive activities of the Reds. A serious obstacle was the daily turnover and bureaucratic routine, the lack of interaction between the counterintelligence agencies of various departmental subordination - the headquarters of the All-Russian Union of Youth and the department of the General Staff of the Military Directorate.

If the white secret services achieved certain results in exposing Soviet intelligence organizations, then identifying lone agents who hunted for secrets in headquarters turned out to be a difficult task for counterintelligence. Bolshevik agents who infiltrated institutions often remained undiscovered.

The fight against espionage at that time was carried out according to the following simple scheme: obtaining primary information, observing individuals, exposing them, arresting and bringing them to trial. These tasks were solved through internal (secret agents) and external (filers) surveillance. Receiving information from various sources, counterintelligence officials systematized all the data, developed the material received, kept records and registered persons suspected of espionage. For all its seeming simplicity, identifying intelligence agents or enemy agents was a difficult task. “The greatest difficulty is obtaining information about persons suspected of military espionage, due to the fact that the spy works alone, not together, as was the case in underground political organizations, where you can always find dissatisfied Azevs,” he writes in his book “Secret Military Intelligence and fight against it "general N.S. Batyushin. - Therefore, to discover a spy, who usually does not stand out from the environment, is not an easy task and is possible only with the broad assistance of not only government bodies knowledgeable in this matter, but mainly of all sections of the population, reasonably educated in order to preserve the military secrets of the state, that is, in the final analysis. as a result of their own interests, with the collapse of the state, the private interests of subjects usually suffer as well.

In our opinion, the fight against the agents of the Soviet special services was partly hampered by the fact that the war was fought with their fellow tribesmen, speakers of the same language, culture and mentality. The resulting split in society spread different sections of the population on different sides of the barricades: the intelligentsia, officers, nobility, employees who were secret employees of the Soviet special services and underground Bolshevik organizations. The system for protecting military secrets at the headquarters did not work, moreover, the counterintelligence officers did not have the necessary qualifications to identify lone intelligence officers.

Presumably for this reason, the Whites for a long time failed to uncover the red intelligence officer and underground worker P.V. Makarov, who acted under the cover of the adjutant of the commander of the Volunteer Army, General V.Z. May-Maevsky. Checking the newly arrived officers for loyalty was then simple: they were sent to the front line and only after real active participation in hostilities were they allowed to work in headquarters. Since P.V. Makarov knew the encryption business well, he managed to quickly make a career and gain access to classified information. Taking advantage of his official position, the officer arranged for his brother, the head of an underground organization, to be a telegraph operator at the headquarters of the Volunteer Army, which gave additional opportunities to obtain useful information. It was the connection with the underground that led to the failure of the red intelligence officer. Naval counterintelligence arrested members of the organization that was preparing an uprising in Sevastopol, including V.V. Makarov, and then - and "adjutant of his excellency."

As world and domestic experience shows, the most frequent failures of intelligence officers were associated with the leakage of information to the enemy as a result of betrayal or penetration of his agents into the intelligence agency. In other words, in order to expose lone red scouts in the white headquarters, Denikin's counterintelligence had to introduce its agents, for example, into the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Southern Front or the intelligence departments of army headquarters. But, apparently, there were none in 1919, at least the author does not know about them. But something is known about the work of Soviet agents in the White Guard headquarters.

Thus, counterintelligence was unable to hide from enemy intelligence the concentration of Denikin's armies in the area of ​​the Donets Basin in February 1919, which allowed the command of the Southern Front to transfer the main forces to the Donbas direction.

In July 1919, the intelligence agencies of the Southern Front learned about Denikin's impending attack on Kursk-Orel-Tula.

During the siege of Kharkov by the Volunteer Army, the Bolshevik headquarters had absolutely accurate information about the number and location of the White Guard units. During the investigation, it turned out that the agents under the guise of nurses, representatives of the Red Cross or defectors conducted reconnaissance among officers and soldiers, eliciting the necessary information.

It was not a secret for the commander of the South-Eastern Front V.I. Shorin's plan of the White Guard command to break through to Balashov in November 1919. The Whites were then able to break into the defenses on the right flank of the 9th Army, capture Novokhopersk and Art. Povorino. But then they could not consolidate their success - during the battles, the Reds launched a general counteroffensive.

Some Red scouts managed to work for quite a long time (up to six months) in the White Guard rear and remain unexposed, performing an important task. In particular, B.I. Pavlikovsky and A.I. Kholodov established the number of ships and submarines in Sevastopol, the strength of the teams and their mood.

When the Caucasian Front stood on the Manych River, preparing to strike at the troops of A.I. Denikin, red intelligence learned about the disagreements between the Kuban Cossacks and the White Guards, which greatly contributed to the success of the Soviet troops.

Undisclosed was a group of scouts of the Kiev underground revolutionary committee headed by D.A. Teacher (Kramov), who penetrated the headquarters of Lieutenant General N.E. Bredov and supplied the most important information about the plans of the White Guards to the command of the Red Army and the partisan-insurgent detachments.

In Sevastopol, in the Naval Directorate, the reconnaissance department of the 13th Army of the Southern Front of the Red Army also successfully operated, which transmitted qualified intelligence data on the composition and movement of the White Fleet, artillery, fuel reserves on ships, and the composition of teams. According to the Crimean researcher V.V. Krestyannikov, white "counterintelligence failed to reveal this residency, which worked successfully before the arrival of the Red Army in Sevastopol."

But the intelligence officer-Chekist G.G. Lafar, better known in historical and fiction under the name of Georges de Lafar, was not destined to return from Odessa to Moscow after completing the assignment. At the end of 1918, on the instructions of the Cheka, he was sent to Odessa, occupied by the British and French, with the task of infiltrating the headquarters of the French troops and obtaining information about the plans of the allies, as well as their numbers. Having settled down as a translator at the headquarters of the French expeditionary force under the operational pseudonym "Charles", G.G. Lafar managed to send four written intelligence reports to the Lubyanka (only two of them reached the addressee). Denikin's counterintelligence attacked his trail. Hunt for G.G. Lafar began after the interception by Azbuka of his second report to Moscow on February 12–14. In a message from the Odessa residency of "Azbuka" to the head of the political office under the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia, Colonel D.L. On March 4, 1919, Tchaikovsky was told: “This elusive “Charles” from Odessa again sent a (third) letter to Moscow yesterday by a well-known channel, we believe (in) its node on the Lubyanka. When his first letter followed, "Izhe-P" (representative) of the Moscow residency visited the address indicated on the envelope; such Leger Henrietta, who lives at the indicated address, has not been established. Kiselny Lane is located in the immediate vicinity of the Lubyanka ... ". Red scout G.G. Lafar was arrested by the White Guard counterintelligence at the end of March 1919.

The identification of red walker agents was sometimes random. So, on December 4, 1919, the head of the KRO department of the Quartermaster General of the Caucasian Army, Colonel Churpalev, reported to the head of the KRC that a certain N. Chistyakov was detained while crossing to the right bank of the Volga, during a search he was found to have a Bolshevik intelligence officer identity card.

By the end of the war, the intensity of the work of the front-line military intelligence units of the Red Army was growing, as evidenced by intelligence reports regularly received by the Red Command.

In May 1920, the White Guard agents working in the Soviet headquarters drew the attention of the leaders of counterintelligence to the knowledge of the Reds about the operational plans of the command of the Russian army. In particular, the agents reported that the Bolsheviks had become aware of the planned transfer of the corps of General Ya.A. Slashchev to the Kerch Peninsula. But identifying Red agents in their own headquarters for counterintelligence turned out to be difficult. Only after the departure of the assistant of the 2nd Quartermaster General Colonel Siminsky to Georgia, the disappearance of the cipher and a number of secret documents was discovered. The investigation carried out on this fact showed that the colonel was an agent of the Bolsheviks.

In the fall of 1920, counterintelligence officers identified and arrested two red intelligence agents - Colonel Skvortsov and Captain Demonsky, who were in touch with the military representative of Soviet Russia in Georgia and transmitted information about the Russian army and the plans of its command to him. After this incident, staff officers justifiably attributed the failure of the Kuban landing operation mainly to the activities of these individuals.

Wrangel's counterintelligence was more successful in neutralizing walker agents. “Throwing all their free forces to the south, the red command simultaneously took measures to strengthen its work in our rear,” wrote General P.N. Wrangell. - Recently, work on military espionage has again intensified, led by the registration department (“Register”) of the Caucasian Front ... This “Register” through its registration points Nos. 5 and 13 located in Temryuk (Kuban Region) and through special points ( "Ortchk") sent a number of scouts to the coast of the Taman Peninsula, sending them to Temryuk-Taman, and then through the narrow Kerch Strait to the coast of the Kerch Peninsula and further to the Crimea, and taking them back in the same way. Within a month, six Soviet spies were arrested in the city of Kerch and in the area adjacent to it, and the “communication service” organized by the Bolsheviks on our territory with the Taman coast, which had secret stations equipped with signal rockets, was discovered in Kerch and in the village of Yurgaki (on the Sea of ​​Azov). , spherical mirrors for optical signaling and materials for chemical writing ladies. Among other documents, one of these spies also found an order to “contact Mokrousov” and “appearance”, that is, an indication of how to find this latter. Guided by the experienced hand of General Klimovich, the work of our counterintelligence nipped in the bud the enemy's attempts. Enemy agents invariably fell into our hands, were handed over to the court-martial and were resolutely punished.

Let us note that P.N. Wrangel somewhat exaggerated the role of the special department of his headquarters in ensuring the security of the army and its rear. Soviet sources refute the words of the commander-in-chief. In particular, in September 1920, Red intelligence accurately reported the number of White Guard ground forces in Northern Tavria and naval forces interacting with British, American, French and Italian warships.

At the final stage of the war, counterintelligence personnel and their agents from among local residents were tasked with infiltrating Soviet authorities. Military revolutionary committees, commissariats, headquarters of the Red Army, tribunals and the Cheka were a special target for penetration into the Bolshevik structures. The development of such work and its plan in detail were reported by the chief of staff of the commander in chief, Lieutenant General P.S. Makhrov to General P.N. Wrangel and were approved by him.

Thus, in addition to solving the tasks of providing assistance to their military units directly in the front line, counterintelligence agencies began to solve strategic tasks of creating a base for a long-term struggle designed for many years.

So, during the Civil War, the struggle between Soviet intelligence and the White Guard counterintelligence in the South of Russia was carried out with varying success and was episodic, since both special services, by and large, were still at the initial stage of their development. But at the same time, the following trend is still visible: with the strengthening of the power of the state, its special services are strengthened, and vice versa. The victories won by the Red Army expanded the potential of Soviet intelligence, and the defeats of the Russian Army, the reduction of territories, human and material resources narrowed the possibilities of Wrangel's counterintelligence. For this reason, the struggle of the White émigré organizations against Soviet Russia was doomed to failure. Further developments convincingly confirm this conclusion.

After the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty Germany occupied Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States. It was important for the Germans to control the Bolshevik government so that the Eastern Front would not rebound against them, to support the separatist-minded national outskirts in order to prevent the unification of Russia and pump out material resources. The head of the German Foreign Ministry, R. von Kühlmann, instructed the ambassador in Moscow: “Please use large sums, since we are extremely interested in the survival of the Bolsheviks ... We are not interested in supporting the monarchist idea that will reunite Russia. On the contrary, we should try to prevent the consolidation of Russia as far as possible, and from this point of view, we should support the far left parties.”

Germany staked on separatism even before the First World War. The notorious Count F. Schullenburg, who arrived in Tiflis in 1911 as a vice-consul, having studied the Transcaucasus well and having established extensive contacts in high society Georgian-Armenian circles, concentrated his efforts on working among Georgian nationalists in order to proclaim the independence of Georgia under the protectorate of Germany.

The war for some time interrupted the active intelligence activities of F. Schullenburg in the territory of Transcaucasia. Two months before it began, he unexpectedly went on vacation to his homeland and soon took an active part in the formation of the Georgian national legion, which later fought on the side of Germany on the Turkish front.

At the end of 1918, F. Schullenburg reappeared in Transcaucasia as the head of a diplomatic mission under the commander of the German occupation forces, General K. von Kress, and carried out a number of political combinations to conclude agreements between the highlanders and Musavatists in order to unite Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus into a single state system. Again under the protectorate of Germany.

This period also includes the organization by F. Schullenburg of a new residency under the legal name of the "German-Georgian Verein" headed by the German military doctor Merzweller. There is also an attempt to organize a "German-Armenian Verein", but it ended in failure.

According to the German researcher X. Revere, in the First world war Germany made considerable efforts to develop separatism in Ukraine with the aim of tearing it away from Russia. Conspiratorial activities were carried out by diplomatic missions in Bucharest and Constantinople. However, the efforts of the German agents for several years of the war did not bring the desired results. Ukrainian separatism began to manifest itself noticeably only after February 1917.

Even after the revolution of November 1918, having withdrawn its troops from Ukraine and the Crimea, Germany continued to solve its political tasks in a secret way, maintaining operational communications and an agent network.

The head of German military intelligence, V. Nicolai, believed that the cessation of hostilities in Europe did not lead to the end of the secret war. He preserved the archives of the Kaiser's intelligence, thereby contributing to the creation of a new secret service hidden from the victorious states. So, in September 1919, a body of military intelligence and counterintelligence (Abwehr) was created as part of the Military Directorate. As an official field of activity, he was entrusted with the tasks of counterintelligence support of the armed forces. However, in practice, the Abwehr conducted reconnaissance against European countries.

The most far-sighted leaders of the White Guard secret services expressed a reasonable assumption that Germany would not be able to come to terms with the loss of its former economic power, therefore, it needed a weak Russia for its revival and development. On February 13, 1919, the quartermaster of the headquarters of the troops of the Southwestern Territory reported to the head of the special department of the department of the General Staff: “German capital and banks, led by Jewish agents, remained in Russia and, in particular, concentrated in Odessa, there is reason to believe that the direction towards the destruction of the Russian state continues. Therefore, the fight against banks dependent on German capital, the penetration into their secrets - is one of the types of struggle.

The task of dismembering Russia and strengthening influence on the outskirts was carried out through German banks and a Jewish organization of large local financiers headed by A.R. Hari, Getter and Babushkin. As was established by secret surveillance, they set out to support Ukraine through various political directions, sought to impede the implementation of the ideas of the Volunteer Army to recreate a united Russia.

At the same time, Germany tried, through diplomatic combinations, to appoint its proteges to leading positions, which were a guarantee of the safety and inviolability of German agents. In particular, attorney at law Furman, who had worked for German intelligence before the war, was appointed to the post of Bulgarian consul in Kyiv. The post of Danish consul in Odessa was held by A.R. Hari, director of the local branch of the Russian-Asiatic Bank, through him were money transfers and directives to German spy organizations. Hari, along with other people during the stay of the French in Odessa, bought French currency, which contributed to the depreciation of the ruble. Local counterintelligence knew about this, but did not take any measures. But when the population began to resent, she arrested the entire group. However, the attackers were soon released under the guarantee of a certain Botkin, an adventurer who played a prominent role in the Odessa counterintelligence.

In the South of Russia, the Germans were guided by political forces that did not share allied relations with the Entente countries and stood for an alliance with Germany. In hidden opposition to the command of the Volunteer Army and the All-Union Socialist Revolutionary Federation, there was a monarchist party, which was a significant, although in no way really manifested itself, force. In addition to the aristocracy, it included a significant number of officers and even soldiers. With the help of the monarchists, the Germans hoped to organize a conspiracy to remove the senior command staff of the All-Union Socialist Revolutionary Federation and replace it with persons of German orientation, in order to then conclude an alliance with Russia.

In addition, German intelligence pinned its hopes on Russian officers returning from Germany to their homeland, supplied them with appearances to their agents in Russia and Constantinople to provide money and conduct briefings.

Despite the unsystematic nature of counteracting German espionage, the White Guard counterintelligence revealed German intelligence centers in Constantinople, Novorossiysk, Rostov, Kharkov, Nikolaev, Simferopol and Sevastopol, as well as their agents. According to verified data, there were about 100 German officers in Rostov, Taganrog and Novocherkassk, left by intelligence after the occupation as residents. However, due to the lack of loans for the maintenance of agents and payment for the services of random informants, the counterintelligence unit lost any opportunity to pay attention to the German spy organization. Further observation in this direction was episodic.

Some German-oriented organizations were nevertheless liquidated by the Whites. But for the above reasons, counterintelligence failed to bring the matter to its logical conclusion - to bring the perpetrators to justice. Head of the KRC special department of the department of the General Staff Captain L.S. Dmitriev wrote in August 1919 that, having observed the counterintelligence of the All-Union Socialist Revolutionary Federation for six months, he had not heard of a single spy liquidation, not a single completed process, except for lynching.

Nevertheless, German intelligence was never able to realize the political goals of its government - to bring pro-German politicians to power in Russia and conclude an agreement beneficial for Germany with them. However, this can hardly be credited to the White Guard special services. Germany's further policy was influenced by its defeat in the First World War, which ended with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, as a result of which the country was deprived of the right to have a General Staff and intelligence, received an economic crisis and internal political turmoil.

The intention of the leaders of the White movement to preserve the integrity of Russia was considered by the ruling circles of the states formed on the territory of the former empire as great-power Russian chauvinism. Therefore, already in 1918, the newly formed special services of the "independent" Ukrainian People's Republic(UNR)- intelligence and foreign (supervised the work of the military attache) departments of the 1st quartermaster general of the General Staff - began active reconnaissance and subversive activities against the White movement in the South of Russia. The Hetman's special services collected intelligence information about the military potential of the Volunteer Army and the "aggressive" plans of its command regarding the UNR, as well as about political organizations that carried out subversive work in Ukraine in the interests of the White Guards. The work of Ukrainian intelligence was not limited to obtaining important secret information. She began to carry out special operations, in particular, to secretly support the Regional Government of the Kuban in its struggle for independence and maintain the status of a close ally of Ukraine, worked to deepen the antagonism between local politicians and the command of the Volunteer Army, since Hetman P. Skoropadsky planned to annex the Kuban to Ukraine as a separate administrative unit.

In order to “attach” the Kuban, a landing operation was being prepared on Taman by the forces of the Separate Zaporozhye Division, stationed on the southeastern borders of Ukraine. With the close participation of intelligence, heavy and small arms (21 thousand rifles, 8 guns and machine guns), as well as ammunition, were secretly transported from Kyiv to the Kuban.

“The political situation in the Kuban,” noted the first secretary of the UNR embassy in Yekaterinodar, K. Polivan, “requires the Ukrainian embassy to immediately begin the widest and most energetic work possible in spreading the political influence of the Ukrainian state.”

Taking advantage of the favorable counterintelligence regime, the intelligence officers of the UNR, acting under the guise of diplomatic institutions, in the second half of 1918 did a great job of bringing Ukraine closer to the Kuban with a view to the subsequent possible entry of the region into its composition "on the terms of the federation." In December 1918, the intelligence officers presented proposals regarding the expansion of the presence of Ukrainian special services and the preparation of an armed uprising against the Volunteer Army in the Kuban, but the leaders did not always listen to their arguments, and after the fall of the hetmanate, the case was “lost”.

Ukrainian historian D.V. Vedeneev found documents on the activities of the hetman's intelligence service in the Kuban in the central state historical archive in Lvov. K. Polivan, already mentioned above, acted under the guise of the position of the first secretary of the UNR embassy in Yekaterinodar. According to the report submitted in December 1918, the residency he led collected material on the situation in the region, the alignment of political forces. Good knowledge of the situation allowed her to carry out political and propaganda actions aimed at deepening the contradictions between the Volunteer Army and the Kuban Cossacks. Denikin's counterintelligence uncovered and arrested K. Polivan. However, according to the report, he managed to return home. Less fortunate was Ambassador Colonel F. Borzhinsky, who was arrested by the Whites and then shot "for treason against Russia."

In Odessa, counterintelligence discovered a center in which officers who kept in touch with the Petliurists and carried out their reconnaissance missions were grouped. The White Guard secret services had information about the whereabouts and activities of other intelligence posts of the Directory.

Despite the failures, Ukraine continued to maintain covert contacts with the ruling circles of the Kuban Cossacks through its emissaries. So, on the instructions of the supreme authority of the UNR, Yu. Skugar-Skvarsky repeatedly crossed the front line with false documents, collected information about the forces and action plans of the Volunteer Army, and also tried to persuade the authorities of the Kuban to an open armed uprising against A.I. Denikin. In Yekaterinodar, a Ukrainian intelligence officer received information from I. Makarenko, a member of the Special Meeting, about the redeployment of White military units. On September 15, 1919, he took part in a secret meeting of the Kuban Council, where he called for a common struggle for independence against the forces of Russian reaction. At the end of the month, the emissary provided S.V. Petliura detailed report on his journey. However, this case did not receive further development. Let us note that the illegal contacts of the top of the Kuban Cossacks with Ukraine were not a secret for the command of the All-Union Socialist League.

The author has no other information about the vigorous activity of the UNR intelligence in the territory of the White South. Perhaps she was not. Otherwise, historians of the special services of the current "independent" Ukraine, who consider the White Guards to be Russian chauvinists, would have tried to fill this gap.

Very actively acted against the AFSR Makhnovist counterintelligence, combining the functions of counterintelligence and military intelligence. The management of the military department of counterintelligence behind enemy lines was carried out by the operational department of the headquarters of the insurgent army.

The so-called counterintelligence information nodes were located in all cities, towns and large villages of the south and east of Ukraine. The main appearances of counterintelligence were located in Odessa, Kherson, Nikolaev, Poltava, Yuzovka, Taganrog, Rostov-on-Don, Yeysk, Sevastopol, Kharkov, Cherkassy, ​​Kyiv. As a rule, they were placed in hotels, restaurants, canteens, shoemakers or tailors, as well as in factories, factories, mines. From there, information about the state of the rear and the mood of the workers flocked to the headquarters of the Makhnovists. According to some reports, Makhnovist agents worked in all White Guard headquarters and military units.

In all likelihood, Denikin's counterintelligence never managed to get to them. At least, the author did not come across documentary evidence of the identification and arrests of the agents of the “father Makhno” by the White Guard special service.

Researcher V. Azarov provides data on the effective work of agents in the rear of the White troops in September 1919. So, before the decisive battle near Peregonovka, the Makhnovist agents reported to the headquarters of the insurgent army that "there were no regular Denikin units as far as Nikopol."

In the field of view of the counterintelligence unit of the special branch of the department of the General Staff came Polish intelligence ("Military Polish Organization" (VPO), created by Yu.K. Pilsudski back in 1916 with the aim of conducting military-political intelligence. According to counterintelligence data, on the territory of Russia, the VPO recruited agents from among newspaper employees, therefore, in their opinion, Polish newspapers on the territory of Russia could be unmistakably considered as intelligence cells. Such in Kyiv was the newspaper "Kyiv Diary". Here was the center of the Polish organization in Ukraine, headed by Benevsky. Between Kiev and Warsaw, communication was maintained by couriers (mostly women), reports were transmitted on photographic film. Information from the VPO was received by the information department of the Polish General Staff.

During the stay of the Bolsheviks in Kyiv, the VPO was in close contact with the Kiev center of the Volunteer Army. Employees of Denikin's special services did not rule out the presence of Polish agents in the All-Union Socialist League, since "the Poles are aware of what is being done with us." However, the KRC of the special department of the General Staff department, apparently, failed to identify Polish agents in the headquarters and institutions, since in the report to the leadership dated November 30, 1919, the head of the counterintelligence unit did not report anything about this.

Worked against the White Guards in the South of Russia and Georgian intelligence service. For example, she managed to obtain secret information from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the All-Union Socialist Republic, signed by the head of the intelligence department, Colonel S.N. Ryasnyansky and Colonel Melnitsky; secret reports of the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the All-Union Socialist Youth League, General Romanovsky, then published in the Tiflis newspaper Borba; a telegram from the head of the Military Directorate, Lieutenant General V.E. Vyazmitinov regarding Georgia. The White Guard command became aware of this only in the summer of 1919. And in September, agents received information about the recruitment by Georgian special services of officers dismissed from the army and sending them as agents to the White Guard rear. Quartermaster General of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of South Russia, Major General Yu.N. Plyushevsky-Plyushchik asked the head of the department of the General Staff of the Military Directorate to order the checkpoints of the Black Sea coast to report the passage of such persons from Georgia to the head of the PKK, indicating their surnames, names, patronymics.

Between allies and the command of the All-Russian Union of Socialist Relations were not easy, since each of the parties in the Civil War pursued its own interests. The leaders of the White movement advocated a "united and indivisible" Russia. The British adhered to the principle of "divide and conquer". Based on world practice, it can be assumed with a high degree of probability that the interventionists carried out reconnaissance and subversive activities on the territory of the All-Union Socialist Republic. Judging by the White Guard funds of the central state archives, it is very difficult to judge the scale of the intelligence work of the Western special services, since there are only a few documents on this problem. In particular, it is known that Denikin's security agencies managed to identify the French counterintelligence center in Constantinople, as well as the British intelligence organization operating under the flag of the Red Cross. On July 1, 1920, the representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army in Switzerland, Efremov, did not rule out the possibility of transferring to the Bolsheviks information of a military nature obtained by this mission for reporting to London. Recall that it was at that time that the British demanded that the white governments capitulate to Lenin's "amnesty".

A naval agent in Turkey learned that a junior officer of the British intelligence branch in Constantinople had submitted a report to the commander of the Mediterranean Fleet, outlining the reasons for the decay of the army of the Odessa region and its rapid abandonment of Odessa. The Naval Agent informed the Marine Department of the incident.

In November 1919, foreign counterintelligence reported that the governments of the Great Powers, not content with the activities of their diplomatic, military and other representatives, were forced to use private organizations, such as the International Red Cross, trading societies, etc., for propaganda and intelligence purposes. Christian Union of Young People. From Polyn and Constantinople, counterintelligence received information that representatives of the KhSML intend to arrive at the location of the All-Union Socialist League. Taking into account their sabotage activities, Colonel S.N. Ryasnyansky considered undesirable the admission of these persons to the territory controlled by the VSYUR. In the event of their appearance, he offered to establish control over their activities.

Assuming the growth of intelligence and subversive activities of foreign states against the White South and knowing the level of professional qualifications of the special services, the chief of the General Staff department decided to prepare a practical guide for the ranks of the counterintelligence service. To this end, in December 1919, he asked the military representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the All-Russian Union of Youth in Paris to send the following materials: the legal regulation of foreign states on the fight against espionage; description of well-known espionage processes, practical methods of combating espionage and organizing the struggle on the territory of foreign states; printed works on intelligence and counterintelligence; instructions and guidelines for conducting espionage, counter-espionage and political investigation; ciphers, systems of secret writing and transportation of secret correspondence abroad; publications on this topic in periodicals. The telegram emphasized that supplying the department of the General Staff with the indicated information was a permanent task of the military representative. Whether this manual was prepared - there is no evidence. Even if it was possible to publish it, it is unlikely that this work could already be useful to the Wrangel counterintelligence officers, who found themselves in exile after the defeat of the Russian army. They themselves could teach their Western "partners" the experience of fighting Bolshevik intelligence and counterintelligence.

White Guard regimes in Siberia The main threat to their security was not without reason seen in Soviet Russia and Germany, so the efforts of their counterintelligence agencies were aimed at countering the intelligence activities of these countries.

A document entitled “The General Concept of Espionage and Related Phenomena” gave the following definition of military espionage or military intelligence: “... collecting all kinds of information about the armed forces and fortified points of the state, as well as collecting geographic, topographical and statistical data of military importance on country. This information may be collected for the purpose of transmitting it to a foreign power.” It also defined other types of espionage - economic, diplomatic, political, maritime. An important clarification is made in the appendix that the work of secret agents is not limited to collecting information, but is sometimes aimed at creating "conditions that weaken the enemy's defensive strength" behind enemy lines.

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• Introduction
• 1. Historical overview of the activities of the Russian special services
• 1.1 Russia's special services before the revolution of 1917
• 1.2 The activities of special services during the existence of the USSR
• 2. Carrying out joint operations by Russian and foreign special services
• 2.1 Interaction of Russian special services with foreign colleagues through Interpol
• 2.2 Joint operations of Russian and foreign intelligence services
• 3. Analysis of the main issues of cooperation between Russian and foreign intelligence services
• 3.1 Cooperation of the world's intelligence agencies in the fight against economic crimes
• 3.2 Cooperation of the world's intelligence agencies in the fight against international corruption
• 3.3 Interaction of the world's intelligence services in the fight against terrorism
• 3.4 Interaction of the world's intelligence agencies in the fight against drug trafficking
• 3.5 Cooperation between the special services of Russia and foreign countries on extradition issues
• Conclusion
• Bibliography

Introduction

The special services are usually understood as state bodies created to protect national interests and security both within the country and in the international arena. The relevance of the topic lies in the fact that throughout the history of Russia, the problem of state security has constantly been in the center of attention of the authorities. To implement such security, various methods were used, which were reflected both in legislation and in the creation of special bodies, the purpose of which was to timely identify and prevent any actions against the ruling system.

The purpose of the course work is to analyze the materials testifying to the cooperation of Russian and foreign intelligence services.

Tasks:

1. Consider the historical development of the special services of Russia and find out the existence of cooperation and confrontation between the special services of Russia and the world;

2. Consider cases of conducting joint operations by Russian and foreign special services;

3. Conduct an analysis of the interaction between Russian and foreign intelligence services on various issues of security, law and order, etc.

The following methods of scientific research were used in the work:

Functionasal method, which is used to highlight the constituent structural parts in the systems in terms of their social purpose, role, functions, connection between them.

statistical method, based on quantitative methods of obtaining data that objectively reflect the state, dynamics and trends in the development of phenomena.

1. Historical overview of the activities of the Russian special services

1.1 Russia's special services before the revolution of 1917

Initially, special bodies of political investigation were not created. However, during the period of centralization of the Muscovite state (XV-XVI centuries), political investigation became one of the most important elements of royal power. The persecution of political criminals was carried out widely and purposefully. At this time, the protection of royal power as the basis of the social system was carried out by almost the entire state apparatus. Both central and local authorities had different rights and powers in this area.

The legislative basis for the prosecution of political criminals before the Council Code of 1649 was also the tsarist judicial code, supplemented by tsarist letters that touched on issues of procedural and criminal law.

An important role in the legislative design of the prosecution of political crimes was the Cathedral Code of 1649.

In 1650, the Order of Secret Affairs was created, to which, among other things, the analysis of political cases was given. In the development of political investigation in Russia, the secret order became an institution that played an important role in the development of state security agencies.

Control over the activities of orders for political investigation by the supreme power was carried out by the tsar himself and the Boyar Duma, whose competence included "secret matters to be in charge."

Church authorities were also involved in political investigations in a number of cases. Such investigations included cases of politically colored heresies, for example, the condemnation of the political regime, the denial of church rites, and the call to disobey the authorities.

In the second half of the 17th century, when the shortcomings of the order system became more acutely felt, the practice of creating temporary commissions of inquiry became widespread. Commissions were endowed with broad powers and acted more quickly than orders. The commission of inquiry was usually headed by a boyar, a roundabout or stolnik, to whom assistants from the same ranks and clerks were appointed, the powers of the commissions allowed them not only to carry out an investigation and repair the court, but also to carry out sentences without waiting for sanction from above.

So, by the beginning of the 18th century, Russia did not yet have specialized bodies of political police. But, involving in this area all the links of the state apparatus, as well as using the law on mandatory denunciation, the state controlled almost the entire population of the country, systematically identifying, punishing and isolating dangerous, in its view, persons.

At the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 16th century, further centralization and bureaucratization of the state apparatus took place. This trend was especially pronounced in the establishment in 1689 of the Preobrazhensky Prikaz, an organ of the political police that was in charge of the most important cases of state crimes.

In 1729, the Preobrazhensky Order was abolished. In addition to the Preobrazhensky order, another special state body, the Secret Chancellery, also operates during this period. Created in 1718, initially to investigate the case of the flight of the son of Peter I, Tsarevich Alexei, abroad, it turned into a permanent body. The Secret Chancellery, as well as the Preobrazhensky Prikaz, carried out an investigation and trial for political crimes, sorting out mainly cases that arose in St. Petersburg and in the district. The largest case considered in the Secret Chancellery is the case of Tsarevich Alexei and his accomplices, who actively opposed the reforms of Peter I.

After the death of Peter I, the system of political investigation continued to operate with varying degrees of success. The Secret Office lasted until 1762 and was replaced by the Secret Expedition. The leadership of the newly created Secret Expedition was formally entrusted to the Senate, but in reality it was directly subordinate to Catherine II.

During the reign of Alexander I (from the moment the Secret Expedition was liquidated in 1801 until the formation of the Third Branch of the Imperial Chancellery in 1826), there was no official body in charge of crimes against the state.

The functions of the political police were also carried out by the Special Office of the Minister of Police, which in 1819 became part of the Ministry of the Interior. It was this chancery that later became the basis for the creation of the apparatus of the Third Department of the Imperial Chancellery.

The Expedition of the secret police under the St. Petersburg governor-general was also engaged in political investigation.

IN early XIX For centuries there were bodies of secret political investigation in the army - the central office of the higher police, the secret police at the headquarters of the guards corps, the secret police in the 2nd army. Their peculiarity was that they were created in a secret manner and were guided in their activities by instructions and orders given directly by the emperor.

In 1836, the Regulations on the Corps of Gendarmes were adopted. In accordance with it, the territory of the country was blindly divided into seven gendarmerie districts, which included several provinces; along with this, there were also provincial gendarme departments independent of the local administration. Thus, in the form of the Third Branch of the Imperial Chancellery and the corps of gendarmes subordinate to its chief, there was a centralized, paramilitary political police independent of the local administration.

After the reform of the Russian judicial system in the 1860s, there were certain changes in the activities of the state's special services. In 1867, a new Regulation on the Corps of Gendarmes was adopted, limiting some of the powers of representatives of this department. Along with this, they were charged with new duties; monitor the population, paying particular attention to moods public opinion in the most important strata of society (clergy, army, intelligentsia).

Since 1880, a network of departments for the protection of order and public safety has been created to identify and suppress crimes on the ground. The central body of this network was the St. Petersburg Security Department, to the head of which all local law enforcement agencies were subordinate. All materials of a political nature flocked to the St. Petersburg branch, which were analyzed and systematized here.

In the middle of 1905, on the basis of the Special Department and office work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Political Section of the Police Department was created, designed to increase the effectiveness of the fight against the revolutionary movement. In December 1906, local bodies of this department were created - district security departments. In total, 14 such departments were created.

The activation of foreign spies in connection with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war forced the government to resort to the creation of a special counterintelligence body. In 1903, the Intelligence Department of the General Staff was established. The purpose of the new structure was to "protect the military secrets of the state." With the end Russo-Japanese War the functions of combating foreign espionage were transferred to the gendarmes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which did not cope well with the task assigned to them. In this regard, in 1911, Minister of War V.A. Sukhomlinov approved the Regulations on counter-intelligence departments, whose task was to combat foreign espionage.

1.2 The activities of special services during the existence of the USSR

So, by February 1917, a fairly broad system of special services had developed in Russia, which included security departments of the Police Department and the gendarmerie corps, military intelligence and counterintelligence of the General Staff. An extensive network of agents was formed, experience in operational activities was accumulated.

During the revolution of 1917, the Police Department, the gendarme corps and their local units were abolished. The young state needed an effective body to combat counter-revolution and criminality. The Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), created by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in October 1917, became such an organ. The MRC became the main operational body of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars to combat crime and anti-state demonstrations.

On November 22, 1917, revolutionary tribunals and special investigative commissions attached to them were formed by the Decree on the Court. These commissions carried out investigative, judicial and administrative functions. However, the post-revolutionary situation demanded not only to investigate the crimes already committed, but also to identify those that were being prepared. For these purposes, on December 7, 1917, a special body was created to combat counter-revolution and sabotage - the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (VChK) 2 . F.E. Dzsrzhnnsky was appointed chairman of this commission. With the formation of the Cheka, the Military Revolutionary Committee was abolished.

At the first stage of its existence, all the activities of the new special service were aimed at combating political crimes. The complication in 1918 of the political situation in the country strengthened the position of the Cheka.

The leadership of the state set before the Cheka the task of identifying and eliminating the subversive and intelligence activities of foreign special services. To solve this problem, a number of operations were developed and carried out, which made it possible to identify and destroy the main part of the enemy agents.

The need to maintain a powerful repressive apparatus began to weaken only by the autumn of 1921, when political terror was basically eliminated. On February 6, 1922, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee issued a decree according to which the Cheka and its local bodies were abolished, and the main tasks of the special services were assigned to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, for which the State Political Directorate (GPU) was created within it. Supervision of the activities of the GPU was entrusted to the prosecutor's office.

With the creation of the USSR, a new regulation was adopted to regulate the work of state security agencies. An all-union department was formed - the United State Political Administration (OGPU) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The OGPU was charged with investigating and considering cases of counter-revolution. On the ground, special departments of the GPU were created, subordinate to the central body.

The powers of the OGPU were significantly expanded in connection with the creation in 1925 by a number of countries of a military alliance against the USSR. On June 9, 1927, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee granted the OGPU the right to consider extrajudicial cases against White Guards, spies, bandits, up to the application of capital punishment to them. In the same period, counterintelligence agencies were strengthened and measures were taken to strengthen the fight against smuggling and improve border protection.

The next reorganization of the special services was carried out in 1934, when the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) was created by the Decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, which included the OGPU as one of the structural units. In addition to the OGPU, renamed the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB), the NKVD also included units of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, the secret political department, transport, police and a number of other departments, up to construction. As part of the central organs of the USSR, a commissariat appeared, which concentrated in its hands huge administrative and political powers, had border and internal troops, as well as paramilitary staff of central and local organs.

The original idea of ​​the reorganization of the special service was to create a powerful structure, acting in accordance with the law, that would ensure the security of the state. However, these intentions eventually came down to the creation of an all-powerful repressive apparatus of the state, which was legally reinforced by the CEC decree of December 1, 1934 (the reason for the adoption of this decree was the murder of S.M. Kirov). The decree ordered the investigating authorities to conduct all cases of state crimes in an expedited manner. In addition, the NKVD bodies were given the right to immediately carry out sentences of capital punishment, and the judicial authorities were forbidden to consider petitions for clemency. In 1935, “troikas” were additionally created as part of the NKVD, whose competence included the right to make decisions on the imprisonment, exile or deportation of unreliable citizens to camps for up to 5 years. These "troikas" were liquidated in 1938.

The creation of such a powerful structure led to the latter's unlimited powers and, as a result, to massive violations of the law. This was fully manifested in 1937-1938, when thousands of citizens, including party and government officials, were subjected to repressions.

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, in February 1941, another reorganization of law enforcement agencies was carried out. By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 3, the NKVD was divided into two people's commissariats - internal affairs and state security of the USSR. People's commissariats (of the republics) and state security departments were created on the ground. Thus, the secret service regained its independence.

During the war, the state security organs did a great deal of work in the fight against the fascist invaders. Intelligence and counterintelligence organized and actively used operational-combat and reconnaissance-sabotage groups, led the partisan movement in the occupied territories, and caught saboteurs in the rear. The main task of the Soviet special services at the fronts was to protect military structures from the penetration of enemy spies, saboteurs and terrorists, to keep the operational plans and plans of the command secret.

By decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces on July 20, 1941, the NKVD and the NKGB were merged into a single NKVD of the USSR,

To fight against saboteurs in the army, to ensure the impenetrability of the front line by enemy agents in 1943, a new special services unit was created - the Smersh Main Directorate of Counterintelligence, which was transferred from the NKVD to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.

After the victory in the war, the transition to civilian life required changes in the organization of the activities of the special services, as well as the reorganization of the structure of this department.

In March 1946, by decision of the party and the government, the Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR was created, whose tasks included obtaining information about the political plans of the leadership of states conducting intelligence and subversive activities against the USSR, about the work of their special services, as well as about the military and economic potential. In addition, the MGB was entrusted with the conduct of counterintelligence work.

On March 13, 1954, by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR under the Council of Ministers, a new body was created - the State Security Committee (KGB), which included intelligence and counterintelligence, departments for ensuring the security of transport and communications, for protecting the constitutional order, for fighting in organized crime, to ensure the protection of the top leadership of the state and a number of other units. The concentration of all the functions of the special services in one person provided the KGB of the USSR with the operational use of all means and methods of work to ensure the security of the state.

The KGB of the USSR existed until 1991, when, in connection with the collapse of the USSR, this structure underwent another reorganization and the once monolithic department broke up into five independent services: intelligence, counterintelligence, government communications, state security and border service.

At the end of September 1990, a delegation led by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR V.V. Bakatin brought news from Ottawa about the admission of the country to Interpol. The delegation included the future founder of the NCB, Colonel-General V.P. Trushin.

In a letter addressed to the Secretary General of Interpol, R. E. Keydall, it was stated:

“At present, the Soviet Union, like many other countries, expresses serious concern about the growth of crime in the world, especially transnational. The Soviet side repeatedly stressed its desire to actively participate in international cooperation in the fight against crime. We believe that in modern conditions the effectiveness of the fight against international crime, especially its organized forms, including terrorism and drug trafficking, largely depends on the degree of interaction between the national criminal police (militia) of all countries...

In the Soviet Union in 1989, the crime rate per 100,000 population was 862. Transnational crime does not yet have any significant impact on the crime situation in the country, but with the expansion of international contacts, the possibility of strengthening such an influence is not ruled out.

This is another argument in favor of our application to join Interpol.”

September 27, 1990 is considered the day of formation of the Moscow NCB Interpol. As the successor of the former USSR, Russia became a member of the ICPO-Interpol in 1993.

In the first months of the formation of the domestic service of Interpol, a lot of work was done to determine the ideology in the main activities of the new service. The experience of the National Central Bureaus of Interpol in many countries was taken into account. And as early as January 1, 1991, the NCB began working with foreign colleagues to exchange information and fulfill requests from foreign police organizations.

This work began in an unusual setting. It was necessary to ensure the interaction of the internal affairs bodies of the then Soviet Union with the police of many countries, which worked according to other laws, at a completely different level of technical equipment, as well as with an organization whose headquarters had just moved from Paris to Lyon, into an ultra-modern complex equipped with the latest technology.

The first months of the work of the NCB made it possible to accumulate some experience, to evaluate it, and on this basis, by the end of 1991, to create a service in the main form in which it exists to this day.

2. Carrying out joint operations by Russian and foreign special services

2.1 Interaction of Russian special services with foreign colleagues through Interpol

In the period from 1992 to 1994, a system for working with Information was created, an organizational structure was prepared and implemented, people were selected who created the backbone of the personnel. At the same time, a full-fledged regulatory framework regulating the activities of the NCB of Interpol in the system of internal affairs bodies of Russia and the procedure for their interaction.

Already in 1993-1994, interaction was carried out with the law enforcement agencies of 115 states. This was reflected in the increase in incoming and outgoing information. During the year, the NCB processed 27.5 thousand requests, instructions and other messages, NCB employees assisted the law enforcement agencies of Russia and foreign countries in disclosing and investigating more than 2600 crimes, including 109 against the person, 277 related to counterfeiting, forgery of securities and documents, 511 - in the field of economy, 1257 - for theft of vehicles. It became clear that the volume of operational information received by the NCB of Interpol exceeds all possible levels of load. And then the foundations of an automated system for its processing were laid, which brought our NCB to one of the first places in the world in terms of the level of technical equipment.

The main user, who has cordoned off the possibilities of the computer information processing system, has become the International Investigation Department, which has launched a full-scale work in the main areas of information support for the fight against international crime.

In the same period, the duty service of the NCB of Interpol was created. With a very modest number, this service managed to ensure practically uninterrupted receipt, processing, sending, registration and maintenance of NCB data banks in the working languages ​​of Interpol. Already in January 1992, the communication center of the NCB of Interpol in Russia switched to a round-the-clock mode of operation.

In 1995, Interpol Secretary General Raymond Kepdall made his first visit to Moscow. He had a working meeting with the Deputy Director of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation on combating counterfeiting and money laundering.

By the end of 1995 - the beginning of 1996, the use of Interpol's capabilities by Russian law enforcement agencies was reaching a qualitative level. new level. Under these conditions, it became clear that the status of the NCB of Interpol should be determined not only as a division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but also as a body operating at the interdepartmental level.

In 1996, Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1113 "On the participation of the Russian Federation in the activities of the International Criminal Police Organization - Interpol" and Government Decree No. 1190 "On Approval of the Regulations on the National Central Bureau of Interpol" were signed. These documents raised the status of the NCB and determined the possibility of creating territorial subdivisions in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

In accordance with the Decree of the National Central Bank of Interpol, the criminal police unit, which is part of the central apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, has the statute of the main department and is a body for cooperation between law enforcement and other government agencies Russian Federation with law enforcement agencies of foreign states - members of the International Criminal Police Organization - Interpol and the General Secretariat of Interpol.

To date, branches of the NCB of Interpol have been established and are operating in 72 constituent entities of the Federation. At the same time, systematic training of employees of NCB branches was launched, where they master the intricacies of interaction with foreign colleagues in Interpol.

And during 1998, at the initiative of Russian law enforcement agencies, about 500 fugitives were put on the international and interstate wanted list. As a result, among others, extradited or detained:

A. B. Kozlenok, director of the Golden Ada company, who was accused of committing fraudulent actions that caused damage to Gokhrap of the Russian Federation in the amount of more than 178 million dollars;

Dryamov V.Yu., former director of the Tibet concern, wanted for fraud on an especially large scale and deception of millions of depositors;

Miroshnik G. M., accused of embezzlement of state property in the amount of more than 9 million marks and 270 million rubles;

Pakhmanovich L.A., accused of embezzling funds in the amount of 3.8 billion rubles using false advice notes;

Sharakip A.V., accused of fraudulent embezzlement of state property in the amount of more than 313 billion rubles.

There are also many members of organized criminal groups on this list.

An analysis of the incoming requests showed that the structure of investigated transnational economic crimes is steadily dominated by the following:

- Fraud and malfeasance;

- theft of funds and securities;

-- laundering of money;

-- tax avoidance;

- Violation of currency legislation.

Germany, the USA, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, the Czech Republic, and Great Britain interact most actively with the Russian NCB in the area of ​​economic crimes. The NCB continues to provide informational support in a number of criminal cases of an economic nature.

Currently, the NCB of Interpol in Russia processes a much larger volume of operational information on a daily basis than the Interpol bureaus of European countries. In 2000, more than 100,000 requests, instructions, responses and other messages were executed and prepared. According to this indicator, only the NCB of Interpol in the USA can be compared with Russian counterparts.

2.2 Joint operations of Russian and foreign intelligence services

cooperation special service confrontation

At the beginning of the 21st century, Russian special services are increasingly conducting joint operations with their counterparts from the CIS countries and far abroad.

More than 200 heads of special services and law enforcement agencies from the countries - members of the CIS, the G8, NATO, the European Union and others gathered for a meeting in Novosibirsk in April 2005. An action that seemed impossible in the very recent past is not even perceived as unprecedented now.

As for the meeting place for the heads of special services, the capital of the Siberian Federal District, according to the regional FSB, was not chosen by chance. In recent months, Novosibirsk counterintelligence officers have managed to find a common language with the intelligence service of another country - Kazakhstan. Several joint operations have already been carried out to block international channels through which to Siberia from Central Asia drugs came in. Apparently, the experience of "friends" of the special services can be useful to colleagues.

The contacts of the leading intelligence services are established at a good level.

According to the director of the FSB of Russia, Nikolai Patrushev, without the exchange of information and joint measures, it is impossible to effectively counter the terrorists, who are becoming more and more cruel and sophisticated. This is a serious adversary that requires an adequate attitude of the world community, - Nikolai Patrushev emphasized. The danger from international terrorists increases many times over due to the possibility of their use of weapons of mass destruction. This threat makes it necessary to unite the efforts of all countries, and first of all their special bodies.

At the same time, the director of the FSB of Russia, Nikolai Patrushev, reassured the journalists, explaining that there was no talk of information exchange between special services in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence. The fight against terrorism is another matter, for the sake of which one can forget about political differences and professional secrets.

True, the words about the calmness of the journalists did not calm, but, on the contrary, excited, because the head of the FSB actually admitted that the threat of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction is not so ephemeral.

Fuel to the fire was added by the head of the anti-terrorist center of the US FBI, John Lewis. Like a bolt from the blue, he said that the US FBI has operational information about Al-Qaeda's plans to carry out terrorist attacks using biological and chemical agents. He did not specify which regions he was talking about.

But this issue was concretized by the French. The effect of Lewis's statements was multiplied by the recent revelations of the French secret services that the terrorists in France were planning to use poisonous substances produced in the terrorist camps of Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. It is difficult to suspect the heads of Western intelligence services of being biased towards Chechen terrorists, so their words are not perceived as propaganda and sound more than weighty.

By the way, the FBI representative highly appreciated the level of cooperation with the FSB of Russia. "The fact that active FSB officers are involved and participate in operations and investigations conducted by the FBI in the United States is an indicator of the highest level of practical interaction between the special services," he told reporters in Novosibirsk. For the first time, representatives of the UN Security Council, which is entrusted with the role of coordinator of international efforts aimed at combating terrorism, took part in the meeting along with the FSB, FBI, CIA and Mossad.

A joint operation of the special services of Russia and Ukraine, code-named "Border" carried out in 2003. dealt a serious blow to international crime. The large-scale operation was carried out by units of the police, the FSB and the border service of the Rostov and Luhansk regions. Over the six days of operational-search activities, more than 1,200 crimes committed both in Russia and Ukraine were uncovered, about 100 firearms, several kilograms of explosives were seized, 25 stolen cars were found and returned to the owners.

In 2004 Russia has eliminated a major transit channel for illegal transportation of citizens of Moldova, Ukraine, Transcaucasia and Southeast Asia to the USA, France and Spain. This operation was carried out by the FSB of Russia together with the special services of these countries.

During the four years of its operation, about 1,000 people managed to use this channel, among which were terrorists. Lists of people sent from Chechnya and the Transcaucasian republics to Europe have already been discovered. Those who wanted to go abroad in circumvention of the law and pay for it were brought to Russia, settled in Moscow and the Moscow region. For the transfer of one illegal migrant, the criminals took only about $ 1,000.
But according to the FSB, in order to fully pay for the service of ferryers, illegal immigrants were forced to "commit various crimes." However, the representative of the special service did not specify what kind of crimes and did not give examples.

The organizers of this large underground network, Karen Gevorkyan and Dmitry Kedrov, have been detained. During searches on April 5 at the place of residence and work of Gevorkyan and Kedrov, a large number of forged Russian foreign passports and exit visas were found, intended for sale and use by illegal migrants. We also found fake seals and stamps of Russian public institutions, passport and visa services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia and border control authorities and chemical reagents intended for making changes to original documents.

From 1999 to 2001, Gevorkyan was serving a sentence in Germany for similar illegal activities. Upon his return to Russia, he, together with Kedrov, created a group, which included employees of a number of Moscow international airports and administrative services, designed to combat this kind of crime.

Judging by the statement of the FSB, they came to this transfer channel after the testimony of a previously detained native of Chechnya - a militant from the group of the murdered Ruslan Gelayev.

In just a year, about 10 such channels for transporting illegal immigrants were liquidated in Russia: by rail, air, water and vehicles. True, according to the FSB, "there are cases of walking."
At present, on the facts of the organization of the channel and the forgery of documents, the investigative unit of the Main Department of Internal Affairs of Moscow initiated and transferred a criminal case for investigation to the capital's prosecutor's office.

On February 9, 1998, Eduard Shevardnadze's motorcade was fired from grenade launchers. As a result of the shelling, the Georgian President's armored Mercedes was destroyed. Shevardnadze himself was not seriously injured and left the scene in a police car. In total, 16 people were detained on suspicion of organizing an assassination attempt on the Georgian president. According to some reports, some of the detainees were trained in the terrorist camps of Khattab.

Soso Toriya and Vepkhia Durglishvili, who were put on the international wanted list, accused of attempting to kill Eduard Shevardnadze in 1998, were detained in Chechnya in 2002. during a joint operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the FSB of Russia with the support of the special services of Georgia. Toriya and Durglishvili were active supporters former president Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Durglishvili served in the presidential guard battalion, and after the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia was in Chechnya. In 1997, Durglishvili arrived in Zugdidi and became part of an armed group that prepared an assassination attempt on the head of Georgia. Hekmat Lakhani, a Briton of Indian origin, was arrested in the United States, suspected of smuggling the Russian Igla man-portable anti-aircraft system, he was going to import 50 such devices into American territory.

At a press conference held after the first hearing on the arms smuggling case, it was stated that one of his alleged accomplices - Moinuddin Ahmed Hamid - was summoned by Lahani to the United States from Malaysia in order to launder 500 thousand dollars - an advance for a shipment of 50 MANPADS "Needle". An FBI agent who posed as an Islamic extremist and bought one set from Hamid for $86,000 demanded the sale of such a quantity of weapons. Especially for the transfer of Lakhani, a special Igla MANPADS was made in a single copy, which, according to sources in Russian law enforcement agencies, outwardly did not differ from the combat one, but was just a dummy.

Lakhani was detained as a result of a joint operation of the FBI, FSB and British intelligence services. It began in St. Petersburg, where a missile system, previously disabled, was handed over to the suspect. Lakhani was detained near the Newark airport while trying to sell the Needle to an FBI agent. At the same time, his alleged accomplices were detained in New York.

3. Analysis of the main issues of cooperation between Russian and foreign intelligence services

3.1 Cooperation of the world's intelligence agencies in the fight against economic crimes

At the end of 1994, several high-level forums and conferences were held in the United States, dedicated to the Russian mafia in the United States and a number of problems in interstate relations. The most important of them are the conferences "Russian Organized Crime" and "Global Organized Crime". Both of these conferences were attended by representatives of the law enforcement structures of Russia and some other post-Soviet states. The American side proceeded from a number of obvious facts - for example, that up to a billion dollars are secretly imported into Russia from the United States every week, in fact for their laundering and legalization. As a rule, this money belongs to various American "families", large mafia groups and syndicates. They return from Russia as completely legal, "clean" deposits in banks in the USA, Switzerland and other countries. Along with Russian money itself, exported through numerous channels of theft in Russia itself, this constitutes a powerful financial flow that in all aspects not only supports, but also burdens both the American and Russian, and the world economy.

The magnitude of this danger, as well as the specific conditions of Russia, where organized crime has really merged with state structures and traditional methods of controlling the movement of finances have become ineffective,

Naturally, the FBI is most concerned about the emergence of new and very dangerous, due to their legally uncontrolled ways of laundering "dirty" money through Russia, primarily from drug trafficking and gambling. And the situation in the country, even after the change of leadership, remains very difficult. The level of corruption can also be judged by direct external manifestations - prosecutors general, ministers, and heads of major departments were among the accused. In other CIS countries, among those accused of corruption and embezzlement, there are prime ministers, deputy prime ministers, and many ministers. One can also judge indirectly: not only in the regions, but also in the State Duma, there are assassination attempts and assassinations of legislators; in some cities the lists of deputies have turned into a martyrology in a few years. The conditions for financial abuse, in particular money laundering and drug trafficking, remain very extensive in Russia, and this is fully exploited by the American mafia and the global drug mafia.

But there are other reasons as well. The main sources of the export of big money from Russia and the CIS countries are representatives of the executive branch and businessmen who are (or were) with them in corrupt ties. The placement and use of their money in the United States also accompanied and stimulated the development of their own corruption. In addition, the corruption defeat of the executive power seriously changed the structure of Russian society, in particular, slowed down, if not reversed, the creation of a democratic model. This option could lead to a phenomenon even more dangerous than the once ideocratic system: to the creation of a real bandocracy in the nuclear giant. Baidocracy is immoral, unpredictable, uncontrollable, and in the presence of such a powerful nuclear potential, it is mortally dangerous for the world as a whole. Even in such a simple aspect as the sale of nuclear weapons to potential or apparent terrorist regimes in other countries of the world, or even to individual terrorist groups.

Back in the turn of the 1990s, a strategy was worked out in the United States, which has already been adopted by three administrations - a strategy to promote the creation of a democratic regime in Russia with the primacy of legislative power over the executive, i.e., to eventually turn this great power into a partner from which there is no more direct threat to the US than, say, from a nuclear-armed UK or France. Perhaps this strategy is not viable, like most of the "recipes" put forward from outside for Russia (which cannot be said about the "recipes" and means against Russia or the USSR). But the practical manifestation of this strategy in the part that concerns the opposition to corruption in Russia, it seems to be quite appropriate. And here it should be noted that under the patronage of Al Gore, who was practically undividedly in charge of the "Russian question" in the Clinton administration, a regime was created, if not indulgence, then passivity in relation to top Russian officials and the so-called oligarchs, who were taken to the United States, Switzerland, offshore zones of hundreds of billions of dollars - according to Professor Candy Raie, this is more than the entire official external debt of Russia.

3.2 Cooperation of the world's intelligence agencies in the fight against international corruption

In February 1999, the Russian Federation signed the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Commercial Transactions (hereinafter referred to as the Convention). By signing this document, Russia has taken a significant step towards bringing Russian legislation closer to the OECD regulations.

The gradual liberalization and integration of the national economies of the OECD member states, the removal of controls on international investment, and the loosening of foreign exchange controls have contributed to the internationalization of their financial markets and an increase in the number of international commercial transactions. On the other hand, the negative outcome of this process has been the widespread practice of foreign bribery in international commercial transactions, including trade and investment, which raises serious moral and political concerns and distorts the conditions for international competition.

The call for effective measures to prevent the bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions and, in particular, for changes to national tax laws applies primarily to those states that allow the possibility of tax reductions on amounts earmarked for bribery of foreign public officials. .

Indeed, in some countries there is a loyal attitude towards such bribery, for example, in Austria, Switzerland, New Zealand. A bribe is considered there as one of possible types expenses and is not included in the tax base. But if on demand tax authorities the taxpayer refuses to name the recipient of the money, then the possibility of deduction for the taxpayer is canceled. In Sweden and Denmark, it is possible to deduct from taxable income amounts paid to foreign officials as bribes, but the taxpayer must prove that giving the bribe is necessary and due to normal practice in the country of residence of the foreign official. True, at present, appropriate amendments have already been made or are planned to be introduced into the legislation of the above and some other countries.

Russia's accession to the Convention will contribute to both expanding cooperation with other countries and strengthening the rule of law in our state.

3.3 Interaction of the world's intelligence services in the fight against terrorism

Faced with a real threat of terrorism on their territory, the governments of many countries, previously skeptical about various special legal norms aimed at strengthening the prevention of terrorism and suppressing its manifestations by criminal law, were forced to revise national legislation, often even to the detriment of one or another recognized democratic principles.

A significant number of states faced with the problem of combating terrorism, long before Russia, went through the path of reassessing their own legal framework, often very contradictory - with returns to previously rejected measures and, conversely, with the rejection of hastily adopted norms. In order to assess the current Russian legislation in terms of its completeness, effectiveness and compliance with international standards in the field of human rights protection and directly in the field of countering terrorism, it is extremely important to analyze the approach of other countries to similar issues. In addition, it is useful to study both the positive and negative experiences of the "pioneers" in order to improve domestic laws based on this knowledge.

Majority Western countries was not ready for a sharp surge of cruelty and violence, not only morally, but also institutionally, and above all legislatively. Only acts of terrorism that really shocked the public with their inhumanity forced a number of very liberal governments, who after the Second World War were afraid even to mention any non-democratic measures, to take already overdue cardinal decisions.

Within the framework of the CIS, on December 1, 2000, the Regulations on the Anti-Terrorist Center of the CIS Member States were adopted, which defines legal status, main tasks, functions, composition and organizational bases of the activities of the Anti-Terrorist Center of the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter referred to as the Center).

According to part 1 of this Regulation, the Center is a permanent specialized body of the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter referred to as the CIS) and is designed to ensure coordination of interaction between the competent authorities of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the field of combating international terrorism and other manifestations of extremism.

Decisions on fundamental issues of the Center's activities are made by the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The general management of the work of the Center is carried out by the Council of Heads of Security Agencies and Special Services of the CIS Member States.

In its work, the Center interacts with the Council of Ministers of Internal Affairs of the CIS Member States, the Council of Ministers of Defense of the CIS Member States, the Coordinating Council of Prosecutors General of the CIS Member States, the Council of Commanders of the Border Troops, their working bodies, as well as the Bureau for Coordinating the Fight against Organized Crime and other dangerous types of crimes on the territory of the CIS member states.

Here are some of the main tasks and functions of the Center that are assigned to the special services of the CIS states:

- Ensuring coordination of interaction between the competent authorities of the CIS member states in the fight against international terrorism and other manifestations of extremism.

- Analysis of incoming information on the state, dynamics and trends in the spread of international terrorism and other manifestations of extremism in the CIS member states and other states.

- Formation on the basis of the Joint data bank of security agencies and special services, data banks of other competent authorities of the CIS member states of a specialized data bank:

about international terrorist and other extremist organizations, their leaders, as well as persons involved in them;

on the state, dynamics and trends in the spread of international terrorism and other manifestations of extremism in the CIS member states and other states;

about non-governmental structures and persons providing support to international terrorists.

Provision of information on a regular basis and upon request to the competent authorities of the CIS member states participating in the formation of a specialized data bank.

- Participation in the preparation and conduct of anti-terrorist command-staff and operational-tactical exercises organized by decision of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

- Assistance to interested CIS member states in the preparation and conduct of operational-search activities and complex operations to combat international terrorism and other manifestations of extremism.

- Assistance in organizing the training of specialists and instructors of units involved in the fight against terrorism.

- Establishment and maintenance of working contacts, on behalf of the Council of Heads of Security Agencies and Special Services of the CIS Member States, with international centers and organizations involved in the fight against international terrorism, as well as relevant specialized structures of other states.

Thus, in the conditions of the fight against terrorism, it is necessary to recognize that in order to maintain a balance between the interests of society and the individual, the emphasis in the counter-terrorism strategy should be placed on preventive methods - on the development of the intelligence base itself, including those obtained as a result of infiltration into terrorist structures, and through the exchange of intelligence information with other states.

3.4 Interaction of the world's intelligence agencies in the fight against drug trafficking

CIS states in 2000 in Minsk signed an agreement on cooperation between the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the fight against illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and precursors

The parties agreed to cooperate in the fight against illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors in the following forms:

exchange of operational, statistical, scientific, methodological and other information on the state of crime; new samples of seized drugs and precursors in illicit circulation; information to replenish a single data bank on transnational criminal groups and their leaders involved in illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors;

exchange of normative acts, publications, teaching aids;

mutual assistance in carrying out operational-search and other activities;

mutual consultations on issues of practical cooperation, harmonization of common approaches and principles in the development of international treaties and other normative acts aimed at combating illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors;

working meetings, exchange of delegations for mutual study of work experience, familiarization with the activities of institutions and organizations dealing with drug addiction problems;

creation on an equal footing of working groups of specialists to study law enforcement practice, prepare and hold events, including scientific and practical conferences and seminars, develop joint programs to combat drug trafficking and precursors, international treaties, develop proposals for the formation of a legal framework for cooperation in this region;

implementation of joint scientific research on the problems of illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors;

provision of legal assistance in accordance with international treaties;

development and implementation of technical means for detecting narcotic substances;

training and retraining of personnel involved in the fight against illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors.

The parties also cooperate in the development and implementation of new methods of treatment, prevention of drug addiction, social and medical rehabilitation of drug addicts.

The Parties shall promote and encourage the exchange of information in this area, and also carry out the exchange of delegations of specialists.

Cooperation is carried out through direct contacts between the competent authorities of the Parties.

The competent authorities of the Parties are:

ministries of foreign affairs;

general prosecutor's offices (prosecutors' offices);

ministries of the interior;

national security agencies and special services;

border agencies;

customs departments;

ministries of justice;

ministries of health;

ministries of education

and other departments whose functions include issues of combating, preventing and preventing illicit trafficking in drugs and precursors.

According to the partnership agreement between the Russian Federation and Federal Republic Brazil decided to cooperate in the fight against organized crime, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, acts of international terrorism, including those directed against the security of civil aviation and maritime navigation, counterfeiting, smuggling, including the illegal movement of cultural property across borders, as well as animal species and endangered plants, in accordance with current international instruments.

3.5 Cooperation between the special services of Russia and foreign countries on extradition issues

The legal cooperation of states should contribute to the interests of justice and the return of persons serving sentences to a normal life in society. The rehabilitation process will be more effective and achieve results faster if the convict is serving his sentence in the country of his citizenship or permanent residence.

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